AN    INTRODUCTION   TO    PHILOSOPHY 


I 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK    •    BOSTON   •    CHICAGO   •    DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •    SAN   FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


AN  INTRODUCTION  TO 
PHILOSOPHY 


BY 


ORLIN    OTTMAN    FLETCHER 

PROFESSOR    OF    PHILOSOPHY    IN    FURMAN     ? 
UNIVERSITY 


THE   MACMILLAN    COMPANY 
1913 

uill  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1913, 
By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  June,  1913. 


Norfajooli  i^resa 

J.  S.  Gushing  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 

Norwood,  Mass.,  U.B.A. 


PREFACE 

This  Introduction  is  a  product  of  the  classroom.  It 
originated  in  a  desire  to  outline  an  undergraduate  year  in 
Philosophy  that  would  be  both  critical  and  constructive. 

The  History  of  Philosophy  affords  a  natural  introduc- 
tion to  the  problems  with  which  this  discipline  deals. 
It  acquaints  the  student  with  the  questions  considered 
by  those  who  have  determined  the  course  of  reflective 
thought,  and  it  reveals  their  attitudes  and  modes  of  ap- 
proach. It  also  furnishes  him  with  developed  statements 
of  philosophical  problems,  and  discovers  to  him  the  ad- 
vance made  in  their  solution.  In  thus  tracing  the  devel- 
opment of  the  Science  of  Sciences,  the  student  grasps  the 
significance  of  philosophical  activity.  This  course  is  also 
preeminently  fitted  to  develop  the  critical  interest  and 
aptness  which  are  essential  to  the  framing  of  worthy 
philosophical  conceptions.  But  the  results  have  led 
many  to  doubt  the  wisdom  of  limiting  the  undergraduate 
to  the  History  of  Philosophy.  Most  students  whose  only 
acquaintance  with  Philosophy  has  been  made  through  a 
historical  study  of  it,  are  merely  critical.  Many  become 
philosophic  sceptics ;  and  most  of  those  who  retain  some 
philosophic  faith  are  sadly  confused. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  history  of  reflective  thought 
be  ignored  and  the  student  be  immediately  introduced  to 
a  completed  statement  and  solution  of  these  problems,  he 
fails  to  get  what  the  history  alone  furnishes.  This  alter- 
native course  tends  to  a  blind  acceptance  of  the  views 
held  by  the  teacher;  and  the  resultant  dogmatism  pre- 


VI  PREFACE 

vents  the  development  of  the  philosophic  spirit  and  the 
attainment  of  a  philosophic  vision. 

I  sought  a  course  which  would  be  critically  construc- 
tive, one  in  which  the  student  would  become  acquainted 
with  the  great  thinkers  of  the  past  and  their  thought,  in 
which  he  would  also  be  led  to  a  solution  of  the  main 
problems.  A  certain  end  influenced  my  choice  of  ap- 
proach and  presentation.  It  is  agreed  that  the  teacher 
of  Philosophy  is  not  to  aim  to  give  his  students  informa- 
tion concerning  Philosophy  and  philosophers ;  he  should 
induce  them  to  philosophize.  He  and  they  are  not  to 
read  and  think  and  talk  about  Philosophy ;  the  students 
are  to  be  incited  to  think  critically  and  constructively  of 
themselves  and  the  world  of  persons  and  things  and  his- 
tory. Up  to  the  measure  of  his  ability  the  student  is  to 
become  a  philosopher;  and,  in  endeavoring  to  secure 
this,  we  are  to  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  a  true  Philoso- 
phy is  not  a  mere  theory  of  the  universe,  it  is  a  personal 
relating  of  the  Self  to  all  that  is. 

These  considerations  led  me  several  years  since  to  out- 
line the  course  herein  presented.  Lectures,  classroom 
discussions,  and  the  criticisms  of  friends  have  determined 
the  filling  in  of  the  outline.  At  the  urgency  of  persons 
who  were  acquainted  with  the  results,  it  was  offered  for 
publication. 

Frankly,  I  have  a  philosophical  doctrine,  and  that  doc- 
trine determines  the  treatment  given  the  questions  and 
opinions  which  are  considered.  My  point  of  view  is  that 
of  Objective  Idealism.  Reality,  in  its  epistemological 
relation,  is  conceived  as  being  with  meaning;  in  its  onto- 
logical  relation,  as  active  being;  "active"  being  here  used 
with  the  meaning  assigned  it  on  page  187.  In  a  word. 
Reality  is  regarded  as  cognizable  and  immanently  active. 
I  also   distinguish   between   a   "totality"  and  "a    true 


PREFACE  vii 

whole.''  A  totality,  being  an  aggregation,  lacks  the  one- 
ness which  is  essential  to  a  unitary  whole.  In  dealing 
with  the  categories,  I  have  followed  a  pedagogical  order; 
but  weighty  reasons  may  be  advanced  in  favor  of  pre- 
senting them  in  the  logical  order  of  their  development. 

I  owe  a  great  debt  of  gratitude  to  Dr.  J.  E.  Creighton, 
of  Cornell  University.  He  gave  time  to  the  reading  of 
my  manuscript,  and  his  suggestions  and  criticisms  have 
been  invaluable.  I  would  also  acknowledge  aid  rendered 
by  Dr.  A.  H.  Jones,  of  Brown  University.  But  I  alone 
am  responsible  for  what  is  justly  open  to  adverse  criti- 
cism. The  list  of  references  which  follows  the  text  gives 
the  names  of  a  few  among  the  many  authors  to  whom  I 
am  under  obligation.  I  owe  much  to  authors  from  whose 
philosophic  doctrines  I  feel  compelled  to  dissent;  natu- 
rally few  of  these  appear  in  that  list.  But  for  my  wife's 
encouragement,  the  publication  of  this  work  would  not 
have  been  undertaken;  but  for  her  constant  assistance, 
this  Introduction  could  not  have  been  brought  to  comple- 
tion. She  has  looked  up  references,  criticised  statements, 
read  proofs,  and  prepared  the  Index. 

O.  O.  F. 

Greenville,  South  Carolina, 
June,  1913. 


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TABLE   OF    CONTENTS 

PART   I.     GENERAL   INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER  I.     INTRODUCTORY 

PAGE 

§  I.  Ourselves  and  the  World I 

§  2.  Experience  and  Philosophy 2 

§  3.  Subject  and  Object           .         .         .         .         .        .         .         .  4 

§  4.  Subjective  and  Objective          .......  5 

§  5.  The  Problem  in  Philosophy 6 

§  6.  Philosophic  Material 8 

PART   II.     HISTORICAL   INTRODUCTION 

CHAPTER  II.     PREFATORY 

§  7.    Purpose  of  this  Sketch II 

§  8.   General  Divisions  of  Philosophy 12 

DIVISION  A.    ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER   III.     GENERAL  VIEW;     PRE-SOCRATIC 
PHILOSOPHY 

§  9.   General  View^  of  Ancient  Philosophy 14 

f§  10-12.    Pre-Socratic  Philosophy   .         .        .        .         .        .         .15 

§11.   Particular  Doctrines 16 

§  12.    Summary 21 

CHAPTER  IV.    THE   SOCRATIC   PHILOSOPHY 

§13.   Socrates 22 

§  14.   Plato 25 

§  15.   Aristotle 30 

§16.   Teleology  in  this  Philosophy 37 

ix 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  V.    GR^CO-ROMAN  AND  NEO-PLATONIC 
PHILOSOPHIES 

PAGE 

J§  17,  18.  The  Grseco-Roman  Philosophy 39 

^§  19,  20.  The  Neo-Platonic  Philosophy 43»  44 

§  21.   Point  of  View  and  Doctrines  at  the  Close  of  the  Ancient  Phi- 
losophy      45 

DIVISION   B.     MEDIAEVAL  PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER  VI.     GENERAL  VIEW;    PATRISTIC  AND 
SCHOLASTIC   PHILOSOPHIES 

§  22.   General  View  of  Mediaeval  Philosophy 47 

j§  23-25.   The  Patristic  Philosophy 48 

§  24.    Period  of  Growth 49 

§  25.    Period  of  Decline  .         . 51 

5§  26-28.   The  Scholastic  Philosophy 51 

§§26,27.   General  View  of  this  Philosophy       .         .         .         5i>  53 

§  28.   The  Platonic  Period 54 

CHAPTER  VII.     SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  {ConHnued); 

TIME  OF  TRANSITION 

I 

J§  29-32.   The  Scholastic  Philosophy  (Ccjw/m^^a')  ....       56 

§§  29,  30.   The  Aristotelian  Period 56 

§§  31,  32.  The  Period  of  Separation 59,  60 

J§  '^2)i  34'   The  Transition 61 

§  35.   Summary  of  Mediaeval  Philosophy         .        .        .        .        .62 

DIVISION  C.     MODERN   PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER  VIII.     GENERAL  VIEW  OF  MODERN 
PHILOSOPHY 

§  36.   Introductory 65 

§  37.   Schools  in  Modern  Philosophy 69 

CHAPTER  IX.    SUBSTANTIALISTS  AND  EARLY 
EMPIRICISTS 

§§  38,  39-   The  Substantialists 70 

§§  40, 41.   The  Early  Empiricists       .        ,        .        .        .        .         76,  77 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xi 

CHAPTER  X.     IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS 

PAGE 

§  42.    Idealism  Defined 8j_ 

§  43.   Historical .82 

§  44.   Kant 83 

CHAPTER  XI.     IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  {Continued) 

§45.   Fichte 95 

§  46.    Schelling 98 

§  47.   Hegel loo 

CHAPTER  XII.     REALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  AND  LATER 
EMPIRICISTS 

§  48.  Realism  Defined 109 

§  49.  Realistic  Rationalism :   History  and  Doctrines  .         .         .110 

§50.  General  View  of  Empiricism 113 

§51,  Doctrines  of  Later  Empiricists         ......     115 

CHAPTER  XIII.     PHILOSOPHY  TO-DAY 
§52.   Questions  settled;  Points  of  Difference 118 

CHAPTER  XIV.    THE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

§  53.  Historical 122 

§  54.  The  Plain  Man  and  the  Scientist 123 

§  55.  Science  and  Philosophy 1 24 

§  56.  Descriptive  and  Normative  Sciences 126 

PART   III.     ELEMENTS   OF  GENERAL 
PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER  XV.     EXPERIENCE 

§  57.   Standpoints  of  Psychology  and  Philosophy  Distinguished        .     128 

§  58.    Dual  Aspect  of  Experience 132 

§  59.    Characteristics  of  Consciousness  and  Experience     .        .        .     134 


xii  TABLE   OF  CONTENTS 

DIVISION  A.    COGNITION  AND  REALITY;  EPISTEMOLOGY 
CHAPTER  XVI.     SCEPTICISM 

PAGE 

§  60.    Historical .         .         .  140 

§61.    Purpose  of  this  Study 141 

§  62.   Grounds  of  Doubt 141 

§  63.   Scepticism  Examined 144 

§  64.   Conclusion .  149 

CHAPTER  XVII.     SOLIPSISM 

§  65.   The  Doctrine  Stated 150 

§66.    Purpose  of  this  Study 151 

§  67.    Exposition  of  Solipsism 152 

§68.   Examination  of  Solipsism 153 

§  69.   Conclusions 155 

CHAPTER  XVIII.     APPEARANCE  AND   REALITY; 
PHENOMENALISM 

§  70.  The  Question  Stated 157 

§  71.    Doctrine  Criticised:  Appearance  is  a  Seeming,  back  of  which 
there  is  a  Reality;  we  know  Appearance,  Reality  remains 

unknown 159 

§  72.   Doctrine  Criticised  :  Appearances  are  Illusory;  we  know  Ap- 
pearances, Reality  cannot  be  known  ....  l6l 

§  73.   Shall  we  discard  the  Concept  Reality  ? 166 

§  74.   Conclusions 169 

CHAPTER  XIX.    APPEARANCE  AND   REALITY; 
PHENOMENALISM  {Continued) 

§  75.   Appearance  is  Reality  Expressed 171 

§  76.   The  Apparent  and  the  Real 173 

§77.   Sources  of  Error  in  Perception;  Conclusion    .        .        .        'ITS 

CHAPTER  XX.     REALITY 

§78.   Kinds  of  Reality 179 

§  79.   Degrees  of  Reality 180 

§  80.   Reality  as  the  Universal  in  Experience 181 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS  xiii 


§  8i.   The  Nature  of  Reality i86 

§  82.    Reality  expressed  only  in  the  Subject-Object  Relation      .         .188 

CHAPTER  XXI.     IS  THE  COGNITIVE  EXPERIENCE 
RESOLUBLE  ? 

§  83.  What  the  Resolution  of  Cognitive  Experience  Signifies  .        .190 

§  84.  Why  Cognition  is  thus  Analyzed 191 

§85.  Attempt  to  resolve  Cognitive  Experience  Criticised .         .         .     192 

§  86.  Is  a  State  of  Consciousness  the  Primary  Object  in  Cognition  ?     197 

§  87.  The  Kantian  Limitation  of  Knowledge 203 

§  88.  Summary 205 

CHAPTER  XXII.    TRI-PHASAL  CHARACTER  OF 
COGNITIVE  ACTIVITY 

§  89.  Historical '      .         .         .         .     207 

§  90.  Consciousness  is  Unitary  .         .        .         .        .         .         .     209 

§91.  Feeling  and  Will  involved  in  Cognition 21 1 

§  92.  Cognition  characteristically  a  Thought  Process         .         .         .213 

CHAPTER  XXIII.    A  CONSTRUCTIVE  STUDY  OF 
COGNITION 


§  93.  A  Review 

§  94.  The  Universal  in  Experience  and  Cognition    . 

§  95.  Concepts,  Objective  Reality,  and  Cognition 

§  96.  "  Identity  in  Difference  "  and  Cognition 

§  97.  The  Particulars  of  Experience  organically  Related 

§  98.  Conclusions;   Questions  answered    . 


215 
216 
218 
222 

225 
228 


DIVISION  B.    THE  CATEGORIES  AND   REALITY; 
ONTOLOGY 

CHAPTER  XXIV.    GENERAL  VIEW  OF  THE  CATEGORIES 

99.   Introductory 234 

100.   Historical 235 

loi.  The  Categories  and  Reality 238 

102.  Characteristics  of  the  Categories 241 

103.  Conclusions ....  242 


xiv        TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XXV.  RELATIONS  IN  GENERAL 

FAGB 

§  104.   Characteristics  of  Relation 243 

§  105.  Thought  is  mediated  by  Relation 244 

§  106.    Relation  and  Reality ^245 

§  107.   As  to  Externality  or  Internality  of  Relations  ....  246 

§  108.   Objects  modified  by  Relation          ......  249 

§  109.   The  Ground  of  Relation 252 

§  no.  Conclusions 252 

CHAPTER  XXVI.     PERMANENCE  AND   CHANGE 

§111.    Introductory 254 

§  112.    Historical 254 

§113.    Is  Permanence  Actual  ? 255 

§  114.   Change,  Permanence,  and  Reality 256 

§  115.   Conclusions 257 

CHAPTER  XXVII.    INDIVIDUALITY 

§116.   An  Individual  Object 259 

§  1 1 7.   Individuality  as  determined  by  the  Subject    ....  260 

§118.   Individuality  as  determined  by  the  Object      ....  261 

§  119.   Conclusions 262 

CHAPTER  XXVIII.    SUBSTANTIALITY 

§  1 20.   Origin  of  this  Category 263 

§  121.    Historical 265 

§  122.   Substance  and  Substrate 271 

§  123.   Substance  and  the  Primary  Qualities 273 

§  1 24.   Substance  and  the  Totality  of  Qualities 274 

§125.    Substantiality  and  Reality 275 

§  126.   Conclusions 277 


CHAPTER  XXIX.    QUALITY 

§  127.   Quality  and  Object 278 

§  128.   Chararacteristics  of  Quality 279 

§  129.   Quality  and  Reality 281 

§  130.   Conclusions 282 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS  xv 
CHAPTER  XXX.    QUANTITY 

PAGE 

§  131.   Introductory 283 

§  132.   Characteristics  of  Number 284 

§  133.   Characteristics  of  Measure 285 

§  134.    Real  and  Ideational  Number 286 

§  135.   Quantity  and  Reality 288 

§  136.   Conclusions 289 

CHAPTER  XXXI.     SPACE 

§137.   Characteristics  of  Perceptual  Space  Experience      .         .         .  291 

§  138.   What  Perceptual  Space  Is 292 

§  139.   Direction 294 

§  140.   Conceptual  Space 294 

§  141.    Is  Space  infinitely  Divisible  and  infinitely  Extended  ?    .         .  296 

§  142.    Space  and  Reality 297 

§  143.   Non-spatial,  or  Trans-spatial,  Reality 298 

§  144.   Conclusions 299 

CHAPTER  XXXII.    TIME 

§  145.   Characteristics  of  Perceptual  Time 301 

§  146.   Conceptual  Time 303 

§  147.   Is  Time  infinitely  Divisible  and  Extended  ?    .         .         .         ,  305 

§  148.   Time  and  Reality .  306 

§  149.   The  Non-temporal  or  Trans-temporal 307 

§  150.   Conclusions    .....,,...  309 

CHAPTER  XXXIII.    ACTIVITY,  REST,  AND  MOTION 

§  151.   Activity 311 

§  152.   Transeunt  Activity 312 

§  153.    Rest       ....                  313 

§  154.    Motion 314 

§  155.   Conclusions 316 

CHAPTER  XXXIV.    CAUSALITY 

§156.   Origin  of  the  Idea  of  Cause 318 

§  157.   Conceptions  of  Cause 321 

§  158.   Phenomenal  Cause *        .        .  322 


xvi  TABLE   OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

§  159. •  Is  Phenomenal  Cause  Adequate? 326 

§  160.  The  Natve  Metaphysical  Conception  of  Cause         .         .         .  330 

§  161.   Is  the  Natve  Metaphysical  Conception  Adequate  ?         .         .  332 

§  162.  The  Complete  Ground 333 

§  163.   Conclusions 335 

CHAPTER   XXXV.     FINALITY 

§  164.    Finality  in  Individual  Experience 338 

§  165.   Finality  in  Historical  Sources 339 

§  166.   Finality  in  the  Development  of  Science  ....  340 

§  167.   Finality  in  Ethical  and  -^sthetical  Relations  .        .         .  340 

§  168.   Directivity 341 

§  169.   Finality  and  Non-living  Individua 343 

§170.   Self-determination  the  Highest  Form  of  Activity   .         .         .  345 

§  171.   Finality  and  Reality 346 

§  172.   Conclusions 348 

CHAPTER  XXXVI.    INDIVIDUALITY  AND  PERSONALITY 

§  173.   Individuality  and  Personality 350 

CHAPTER  XXXVII.     SOCIALITY;    SUMMARY  OF 
CONCLUSIONS 

§174.   The  Solitary  Self  and  the  Social  Self 355 

§  175.  The  Social  Self  is  the  Real  Self 356__ 

§  176.    Social  Reciprocity  and  the  Development  of  the  Individual    .  359 

§  177.    Conclusions  from  our  Study  of  Sociality          ....  360 

§  178.   Conclusions  from  our  Study  of  the  Categories        ,         .         ,  361 

PART   IV.     HUMAN   FREEDOM  AND  THE 
EXISTENCE   OF   GOD 

CHAPTER  XXXVIII.     HUMAN   FREEDOM 

§  179.   The  Problem 363 

§  180.    Kinds  of  Freedom 364 

§  181.  Theories  Stated 367 

§  182.   Historical 369 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS  xvii 

PAGE 

§183.   Phases  of  Consciousness  immediately  related  to  Volition         .  370- 

§  184.   Conditions  of  Psychical  Freedom 373 

§  185.   Character 375 

CHAPTER  XXXIX.  HUMAN  FREEDOM  (^Continued) 

§  186.    Indeterminism  Criticised 379 

§  187,    In  Favor  of  Determinism 380 

§  188.  Determinism  Criticised 384 

§  189.    Self-determinism 387 

§  190.   Perfect  Freedom 391 

CHAPTER  XL.    THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD 

§  191.   Introductory 393 

§  192.   The  Religious  Consciousness 394 

§  193.  The  Religious  Consciousness  Evaluated          ....  399 

§  194.   Conclusion 404 

References 406 

DEX       . 413 


INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

PART  I 

GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 

CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTORY 

§  I.  Ourselves  and  the  World.  — We  find  ourselves  In 
a  world  where  there  are  things  and  other  persons,  and 
where  events  occur.  We  have  dealings  with  these  per- 
sons and  things,  and  we  have  part  in  some  events  and 
take  interest  in  others.  Life  is  very  real.  We  are  real, 
and  the  outer  world  and  all  that  is  in  it  are  real.  This 
fact  of  the  reality  of  ourselves  and  all  that  is  about  us  has 
been  impressed  upon  us  by  the  experiences  we  have  had 
in  our  intercourse  with  persons  and  our  handling  of  things. 
We  have  found  that,  if  we  would  succeed  in  our  under- 
takings, we  must  recognize  the  reality  of  that  with  which 
we  have  to  do,  and  we  must  adapt  ourselves  to  its  way  of 
behaving;  and  we  are  certain  that,  if  we  should  ignore 
the  reality  of  the  world  and  its  happenings  and  the  way 
things  and  persons  behave,  we  would  invite  trouble,  if  not 
disaster. 

Through  the  experiences  which  have  impressed  us  with 
the  reality  of  ourselves  and  the  world,  we  have  come  to 
personal  and  practical  acquaintance  with  ourselves  and 
with  what  is  other  than  self.  We  have  learned  something 
of  the  meaning  for  us  of  events  and  things  and  persons, 

B  I 


2  iNTROOLGTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

something  of  their  meaning  for  life.  Our  knowledge  is 
not  complete,  neither  is  it  always  exact.  Experience  dis- 
covers to  us  the  incompleteness  and  inexactness  of  our 
knowledge  and  enables  us  to  enlarge  and  correct  it.  We 
recognize  that  the  man  of  careful  thought  and  extended 
practical  acquaintance  with  the  world  and  its  affairs  is 
the  man  whose  opinion  is  of  most  value ;  it  is  most  likely 
to  be  correct.  This  is  illustrated  in  the  value  which  we 
assign  to  the  judgment  of  the  lawyer  or  the  physician  of 
wide  reading  and  large  practice,  assuming  that  he  is  also 
a  man  who  judges  his  experiences  critically.  In  a  word, 
reflection  upon  what  has  come  to  us  in  our  commerce 
with  the  world  of  nature  and  persons  and  happenings,  i.e. 
a  thoughtful  reasoned  consideration  of  our  experiences, 
tends  to  accurate  knowledge.  In  this  day  of  general  edu- 
cation, the  knowledge  of  most  persons  is  to  no  small 
degree  systematized.  It  is  because  their  knowledge  of 
numbers  is  to  some  extent  systematized,  that  the  mer- 
chant and  the  farmer  are  able  to  calculate  the  value  of 
goods  and  produce.  The  knowledge  of  the  scientist,  like 
that  of  all  others,  comes  through  his  experiences ;  but  it 
differs  in  some  particulars  from  the  knowledge  of  those 
who  have  not  pursued  critical  studies.  It  comes  more 
largely  from  reflection  upon  experiences;  and  it  is  more 
extended,  more  exact,  and  better  systematized. 

Summary:  Our  intercourse  with  persons  and  things 
gives  us  experience.  Experience  impresses  us  with  the 
reality  of  the  world  and  ourselves  and  life,  and  furnishes 
us  with  the  content  of  our  consciousness  —  our  feelings 
and  our  knowledge.  Through  it  we  develop  skill  in  think- 
ing and  doing;  and  our  more  exact  knowledge  comes  of 
the  reasoned  consideration  of  our  experiences. 

§  2.  Experience  and  Philosophy.  —  We  have  seen  that 
we  come  to  assurance  of  the  reality  of  the  world  and  to 


INTRODUCTORY  3 

knowledge  of  It,  through  experience.  The  question  we 
have  now  to  consider  Is,  What  does  Philosophy,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  other  forms  of  thought,  find  In  experience  ? 
To  this  we  can  only  give  a  general  answer  at  this  point. 
This  book,  as  a  whole,  is  little  more  than  the  beginning 
of  an  answer  to  this  question.  An  illustration  will  help 
us  to  recognize  what  is  peculiar  to  Philosophy  in  its  view 
of  experience.  You  hear  a  confused  noise,  you  look  in  the 
direction  of  the  sound  and  see  a  runaway  horse  bearing 
down  upon  you,  you  are  filled  with  fear  and  flee  to  shelter. 
Let  us  see  what  Psychology,  a  science  closely  allied  to 
Philosophy,  will  do  with  this.  Speaking  in  very  general 
terms,  we  may  say  that  the  Psychologist  will  note  the 
auditory  sensation  and  the  localization  of  the  source  of 
the  sound,  then  the  visual  sensation  and  the  localization 
of  the  object,  then  the  instinctive  fear  and  the  motor 
reaction  in  running  to  shelter.  He  would  distinguish 
much  more,  but  this  will  answer  our  purpose.  For  him, 
this  experience  Is  a  process,  or  rather  a  series  of  processes. 
Philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  notes  three  character- 
istics of  this  experience  which  are  of  special  moment  for 
reflective  thought.  First,  you  are  certain  of  the  reality 
of  what  you  heard  and  saw  and  fled  from,  and  of  yourself 
as  seeing,  fearing,  and  fleeing.  Philosophy  deals  with 
this  fact  of  reality ;  and  what  it  has  to  say  concerning  it 
will  appear  in  our  further  study.  The  second  character- 
istic of  this  experience  is  that  you  interpreted  what  you 
heard  and  saw,  that  you  discovered  meaning  in  it  for  your- 
self. What  you  were  conscious  of  was  not  merely  some 
sounds  and  an  extended  patch  of  color  moving  toward 
you ;  but  that  a  runaway  horse  was  bearing  down  upon 
you.  The  perception  of  meaning  was  an  element  of  the 
seeing  and  hearing.  Philosophy  deals  with  this  fact  of 
knowing.     What  it  has  to  say  about  it  will  appear  farther 


4  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

on.  Just  here  we  wish  to  emphasize  another  characteristic 
of  this  experience.  This  characteristic  is  that  the  ex- 
perience as  a  whole,  and  in  every  stage  of  it,  has  two  con- 
trasted aspects.  You  hear  the  sound  and  refer  it  to 
something  apart  from  you ;  you  see  something  and  refer 
what  you  see,  and  your  fear,  to  what  is  not  you ;  and 
you  run  to  some  place  which  is  shelter  for  you.  In  these 
experiences,  the  hearing,  the  seeing,  the  fearing,  and  the 
idea  of  shelter  have  each  of  them  two  references ;  one  of 
them  to  you,  the  other  to  something  which  is  not  you. 
These  two  references  are  two  aspects  of  one  experience. 
Every  experience  has  these  contrasted  references,  or 
aspects.  Later  we  shall  have  more  to  say  about  this. 
What  we  wish  to  do  here  is  to  call  attention  to  this  char- 
acteristic of  experience  as  a  cardinal  fact  for  Philosophy. 
Philosophy  has  not  always  taken  account  of  this  fact, 
nevertheless  it  has  affected  all  philosophic  thought,  except 
possibly  the  earliest. 

Summary :  An  experience  is  a  selected  whole  of  con- 
sciousness ;  it  may  be  regarded  as  a  process  in  conscious- 
ness, or  as  content  of  consciousness.  An  experience  has 
two  aspects ;  it  is  a  unitary  consciousness  with  duality 
of  reference,  a  reference  to  the  self  and  a  reference  to  some- 
thing to  which  the  self  is  giving  attention.  Philosophy 
is  the  reasoned  consideration  of  experience,  as  experience. 

§3.  Subject  and  Object. — An  experience  reduced 
to  its  simplest  form  may  be  stated  in  one  of  three  ways : 
"  I  know  something,  I  do  something,  or  I  feel  somehow." 
It  is  evident  that  in  each  of  these  there  is  a  self  who  ex- 
periences and  something  in  respect  of  which  he  has  the 
experience.  This  agrees  with  what  was  said  about  the 
two  aspects  of  experience.  The  self  who  experiences  is 
the  Subject;  that  in  relation  with  which  the  subject  has 
the  experience  is  the  Object.     Our  experiences  come  of 


INTRODUCTORY  5 

our  giving  attention  to  objects.  In  the  first  two  forms,  — 
*'  I  know  something,"  and  "  I  do  something,"  —  the  object 
appears  as  something  which  is  other  than  the  subject; 
it  is  trans-subjective  —  i.e.  beyond  the  subject.  In 
the  other  form,  "  I  feel  somehow,"  the  subject  directs 
his  thought  toward  himself  as  feeling;  that  is,  he  makes 
himself  the  object.  We  do  this  whenever  we  give  atten- 
tion to  ourselves,  as  when  we  say,  "  I  know  myself,"  or 
"  I  feel  disturbed."  There  are  other  experiences  which 
appear  to  be  like  these  last  named,  though  they  really 
differ  from  them.  Examples  are  at  hand  in  experiences 
that  may  be  stated  thus :  "  I  know  what  he  thinks  of  it," 
and  "  I  can  picture  the  river-bank."  In  the  first  of  these 
just  given,  the  subject  has  an  idea,  or  a  thought,  for  his 
object ;  in  the  second,  his  object  is  a  mental  image. 

One  may  also  have  experiences  that  would  be  expressed 
in  these  words :  "  I  am  glad,"  and  "  I  saw  a  beautiful 
house."  The  "  gladness  "  has  its  existence  in  you  ;  you 
are  the  subject  of  the  "  gladness."  The  "  beauty  "  is  of 
the  "  house  "  ;  the  "  house  "  is  the  subject  of  the  "  beauty." 
The  subject  is  that  to  which  the  state  or  quality  pertains. 

Summary :  The  subject  is  the  self  who  experiences ;  or 
that  to  which  a  state  or  quality  pertains.  The  object  is 
that  in  relation  with  which  the  subject  has  an  experience, 
or  that  toward  which  the  subject  directs  his  thought. 
The  subject  may  make  himself,  an  idea,  or  a  mental  image, 
his  object. 

§  4.  Subjective  and  Objective.  —  Our  personal  ex- 
periences belong  peculiarly  to  ourselves.  You  cannot  have 
my  headache.  You  determine  to  write  a  letter ;  that  ex- 
perience, as  a  purpose,  is  yours.  Another  may  have  a 
similar  experience,  but  he  cannot  have  yours.  These 
experiences  are  in  a  sense  "  private  property."  Looked 
at  thus,  experiences  are  Subjective ;  they  are  in  the  subject 


6  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

and  of  the  subject.  In  contrast  with  this  "  private  prop- 
erty "  in  experience,  we  have  "  public  property  "  for  ex- 
perience. The  world  of  nature,  the  events  of  history, 
literary  remains,  and  current  happenings,  are  objects 
for  all  of  us  just  as  they  are  for  each  of  us.  Some  of  us 
may  get  more  from  them  than  others,  but  they  are  there 
for  all  of  us.  What  is  "  public  property  "  for  experience 
is  said  to  be  Objective.  You  picture  the  face  of  an  absent 
friend  by  visual  memory ;  or  you  recall  a  symphony  which 
you  have  heard,  by  auditory  memory.  These  mental  im- 
ages are  subjective  in  so  far  as  they  are  in  you  and  of  you ; 
but,  inasmuch  as  you  direct  your  thought  to  them,  they 
are  at  the  same  time  objective.  What  is  in  experience  is 
subjective ;   what  is  for  experience,  is  objective. 

§  5.  The  Problem  in  Philosophy.  —  The  purpose  of  any 
particular  line  of  study  determines  the  point  of  view,  the 
choice  of  material,  and  the  method.  The  geographer  and 
the  geologist  both  study  the  earth ;  but  they  have  different 
ends  in  view  and,  as  a  consequence,  they  differ  in  their 
selection  of  material.  We  have  seen  that  Psychology  and 
Philosophy  differ  in  their  study  of  consciousness ;  this 
difference  arises  from  the  difference  in  the  tasks  they  set 
for  themselves.  The  important  question  for  us  at  this 
point  in  our  study  is,  What  is  the  task  which  is  under- 
taken by  Philosophy  ^  All  exact  knowledge  is  attained  by 
critical  and  systematic  study  of  what  comes  to  us  in  our 
experiences ;  and  we  have  concluded  that  Philosophy  studies 
experience,  as  experience.  Our  present  question,  then,  is, 
What  does  Philosophy  seek  in  its  study  of  experience  ? 

We  say  that  the  world  as  a  whole  is  real  and  that  the 
persons  and  things  which  are  in  it  are  real ;  but  what  is  it 
to  be  real }  Shall  we  say  that  what  we  can  measure  ^nd 
weigh  and  what  we  can  see  and  touch  is  real,  and  that 
what  we  cannot  see  and   touch  is  not  real  t      Is   reality 


INTRODUCTORY  7 

always  "  lumpish,"  or  is  there  reality  which  does  not 
occupy  space  ?  If  ideas  are  as  real  as  houses  and  trees, 
have  we  two  kinds  of  reality,  one  that  fills  space  and  another 
that  does  not  ?  If  so,  what  is  the  relative  value  for  us  of 
that  which  fills  space  and  that  which  does  not  ?  Which 
is  most  important  for  us,  that  we  accumulate  the  things 
which  can  be  measured  and  weighed  or  that  we  develop 
our  minds  and  have  right  purposes  ?  Or  we  may  ask.  Is 
the  world  which  we  know  the  real  world,  or  is  it  only  a 
shadow  or  sign  of  the  real  world  ?  These  questions  are 
not  prompted  by  idle  curiosity;  they  are  asked  because 
we  wish  to  know  just  what  we  are  and  what  those  actu- 
alities are  with  which  we  are  dealing  day  by  day.  It  is 
important  also  that  we  attain  to  positive  and  correct 
answers  to  these  inquiries.  In  fact,  we  have,  each  of  us, 
already  answered  them,  in  part  at  least.  We  have  certain 
notions  respecting  things  and  man,  certain  ideas  as  to 
their  make-up  and  what  they  are  for.  Are  these  notions 
valid  ?  Do  they  accord  with  reality  ?  This  is  not  a  mere 
debate  about  words.  Our  belief  as  to  what  we  are  and 
as  to  what  the  world  of  things  and  other  persons  is,  afi'ects 
our  thoughts  and  feelings  and  purposes.  It  determines 
the  value  we  give  to  things.  If  to  be  real  is  to  fill  space, 
and  if  what  does  not  fill  space  is  not  real,  we  will  naturally 
put  highest  value  on  what  is  material;  and  our  ability 
to  think  will  be  valued  only  because  it  is  a  means  for  ac- 
quiring things.  Our  conception  of  what  man  is  and  of 
what  he  is  for  will  certainly  influence  our  thinking  and  our 
doing ;  it  will  determine  our  attitude  toward  the  questions 
of  the  day.  We  have  questionings  and  fears,  longings  and 
hopes.  These  doubts,  aspirations,  and  assurances  have 
their  origin  and  their  support  in  our  notions  of  the  world 
and  ourselves,  in  our  conception  of  what  is  essential 
to  the  reality  of  man  and  things.     We  repeat  that  most, 


8  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

if  not  all,  of  us  have  arrived  at  some  kind  of  an  answer 
to  these  questions ;  but  our  conclusions  are  of  doubtful 
worth,  because  they  are  not  the  result  of  critical  and  sys- 
tematic study.  Philosophy  seeks  a  positive  and  valid 
answer  to  these  inquiries.  Philosophers  wish  to  know  the 
nature  of  the  reality  in  us  and  in  things  and  the  true 
significance  of  life  for  us.  In  short,  Philosophy  seeks  to 
give  an  exact  and  systematic  account  of  the  essential 
nature  of  all  that  is. 

§  6.  Philosophic  Material.  —  We  have  concluded  that 
Philosophy  is  the  reasoned  consideration  of  experience. 
From  this  it  naturally  follows  that  all  particulars  of  ex- 
perience are  material  for  Philosophy.  Each  of  us  has 
such  material  in  his  own  consciousness  —  in  his  feelings 
and  instincts,  in  his  thought  of  himself  and  the  universe, 
in  all  that  he  has  felt  and  purposed.  But  we  are  not 
confined  to  our  private  experiences ;  we  may  know  the 
experience  of  others.  Men  are  constantly  giving  expres- 
sion to  their  experience.  We  hear  it  in  conversation,  we 
find  it  in  their  writings,  it  is  embodied  in  their  art.  Litera- 
ture, art,  and  religious  ceremonies  and  beliefs  are  expres- 
sions of  the  conception  of  the  universe  and  man  and  life 
had  by  authors,  artists,  and  worshipers ;  and  they  are 
therewith  expressions  of  what  these  men  themselves  were. 
In  fact,  all  the  activities  of  men  are  expressions  of  experi- 
ence ;  and  the  products  of  these  activities  record  the 
thoughts  and  longings  and  hopes  of  men ;  and  so  far  as 
they  do  this  they  are  material  for  Philosophy.  Some- 
times men  are  subject  to  illusions,  and  many  of  their  con- 
ceptions are  doubtless  incorrect,  and  the  best  are  incom- 
plete ;  but  these  illusions  and  misconceptions  are  ex- 
perience facts  and  are,  therefore,  philosophic  material. 
Erroneous  views  and  gross  superstitions  are  oftentimes 
significant  material  for  the  philosopher.     The  tested  and 


INTRODUCTORY  9 

assured  findings  of  scientific  investigation  are  of  great 
value.  So,  too,  are  the  views  which  have  been  held  by 
men  who  have  studied  the  world  and  man  most  critically 
and  who  have  greatly  afi"ected  the  thought  of  their  time. 
Of  still  greater  value  are  the  reasonings  and  teachings  of 
those  who  have  influenced  thought  long  after  their  own  age. 
All  this  material  comes  of  commerce  with  the  world  of 
persons,  things,  and  events,  and  of  thought  respecting 
the  world  and  reflection  upon  it  and  ourselves.  We  con- 
clude, then,  that  the  universe,  what  it  contains,  and  all 
ideas  respecting  the  universe,  its  events,  and  ourselves 
are  material  for  Philosophy. 

But,  inasmuch  as  Philosophy  would  give  an  exact 
account  of  experience,  the  philosopher  may  not  assign  like 
value  to  all  the  items  in  this  vast  store  of  material.  To 
be  exact,  we  must  be  critical ;  and,  while  all  the  material 
has  some  value,  the  particulars  are  of  unequal  worth. 
The  peach  tree  bearing  fruit  yields  fuller  information  as  to 
what  a  peach  tree  is  than  the  young  tree  just  appearing 
aboveground.  The  thoughts  and  purposes  of  primitive 
man,  as  evidenced  by  the  way  he  lived  and  what  he  did, 
are  of  value  for  the  study  of  man ;  but  the  activities  of 
civilized  man  present  a  completer  and,  therefore,  a  more 
valuable  embodiment  of  human  experience.  What  is 
important  for  the  understanding  of  one  age,  and  therefore 
important  for  a  true  understanding  of  man,  may  be  of 
little  importance  if  we  are  studying  man  in  another  age. 
It  is  also  possible  that  what  at  first  may  seem  to  be  of 
great  value,  will  be  found  to  be  relatively  valueless ;  and 
that  what  is  apparently  trivial  may  prove  to  have  great 
significance.  We  must  be  careful  in  our  evaluation  of 
material. 

Our  account  is  to  be  systematic,  otherwise  it  will  not 
be  exact.     This  will  require  that  the  particulars  of  the 


j^. 


lo  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

material  shall  be  carefully  classified,  and  that  the  items 
shall  be  set  in  an  orderly  relation  to  each  other  and  to  the 
whole.  If  we  would  know  the  significance  of  any  organ 
of  the  body,  we  must  study  it  in  its  relation  to  the  other 
organs  and  to  the  body  as  a  whole.  To  get  a  true  con- 
ception of  the  meaning  of  a  finger,  it  must  be  studied  in 
its  relation  to  the  other  fingers,  to  the  hand,  and  to  the 
arm.  In  fact,  we  need  to  discern  its  part  in  making  the 
hand  an  efficient  instrument  and  in  conserving  life.  It  is 
not  sufficient  that  the  conclusions  of  philosophic  study 
shall  be  organized  into  a  system;  but  it  is  antecedently 
necessary  that  our  material  shall  be  organized,  each  part 
being  set  in  right  relation  to  the  others  and  to  the  whole ; 
for  only  thus  can  we  perceive  what  each  item  signifies. 

Summary :  The  task  of  Philosophy  is  to  discover  the 
essential  nature  of  all  that  is  and  to  give  a  systematic 
statement  of  its  findings.  In  order  to  this,  it  is  required 
to  furnish  a  systematic  and  reasoned  justification  of  its 
findings  and  of  the  course  of  thought  by  which  it  attains 
these  conclusions.  All  human  experience  is  philosophic 
material.  The  critical  use  of  this  material  calls  for  a 
judicious  classification  and  evaluation  of  the  material, 
and  for  the  careful  and  exact  relating  of  the  various  partic- 
ulars to  each  other  and  to  the  whole.  The  real  signifi- 
cance of  an  experiential  fact  can  only  be  discovered  when 
it  is  studied  in  its  relations. 


PART  II 

HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION 

CHAPTER  II 

PREFATORY 

§  7.  Purpose  of  this  Historical  Sketch.  —  Our  purpose 
in  this  sketch  is  to  take  advantage  of  the  work  done  by 
those  who  have  preceded  us.  Much  has  been  accomplished 
by  men  who  have  thought  upon  the  great  questions  dis- 
cussed in  Philosophy  —  the  universe,  whence  it  came, 
and  what  it  is ;  man,  his  origin,  nature,  and  destiny. 
The  records  which  preserve  their  discussions  constitute 
a  great  storehouse  of  philosophic  material ;  but  what  they 
hand  down  to  us  is  of  such  a  character  that  it  can  only 
be  rightly  valued  and  efficiently  used  if  we  shall  trace  its 
development.  In  following  the  course  of  its  development, 
certain  facts  will  become  evident.  We  shall  see  that  upon 
the  whole  there  has  been  steady  advance.  At  times, 
progress  will  appear  to  halt ;  at  some  points,  it  may  even 
look  as  though  the  movement  were  backward.  But  such 
halting  and  such  backward  movement  are  more  apparent 
than  real,  and  are  only  temporary.  We  shall  discover  that 
some  questions  have  been  settled.  We  shall  also  perceive 
that  there  are  three  great  topics  for  thought :  — 

(i)  The  Object,  i.e.  the  world  of  nature  and  history,  of 
persons  and  things  and  events  —  all  that  is  not  the  Self ; 


12  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

(2)  The  Subject  who  is  conscious  of  the  object  and  of 
Self; 

(3)  The  Religious  Consciousness  with  what  it  signifies. 
These  are  not  always,  all  of  them,  distinctly  treated  in  the 
Philosophy  of  every  people  and  period;  but  philosophic 
thought  —  and,  in  fact,  the  thought  of  all  men  —  is  con- 
stantly related,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  these  topics.  We 
shall  likewise  learn  how  Philosophy  has  defined  itself,  its 
problem,  and  its  province ;  and  we  can  note  incidentally 
how  it  has  approached  its  task  and  what  are  some  of  its 
conclusions. 

The  limitations  of  this  Introduction  will  require  that 
we  limit  our  sketch.  We  shall,  therefore,  confine  it  to 
what  will  best  serve  to  introduce  us  to  a  study  of  the  main 
problems  of  Philosophy.  The  observance  of  this  limita- 
tion will  result  in  the  omission  of  much  that  is  of  itself 
interesting  and  valuable.  For  example,  the  questions 
immediately  related  to  the  religious  consciousness  will 
only  be  referred  to  in  passing,  except  in  the  instance  of 
the  Medieval  Philosophy.  The  study  of  the  religious 
consciousness,  though  of  the  highest  importance,  must 
otherwise  be  left  until  later. 

§  8.  General  Divisions.  —  The  most  general  classifica- 
tion of  philosophic  thought  is  into  Oriental  and  Occidental 
(or  Western). 

I.  Oriental  Philosophy.  —  The  Oriental  peoples  —  Bab- 
ylonians, Hebrews,  Egyptians,  Persians,  and  others  — 
gave  the  religious  feelings  dominance  in  reflection.  This 
is  true  also  of  the  Hindu  philosophies,  which  survive  even 
to-day.  The  earlier  Chinese  thought  was  distinctly  re- 
ligious; but  under  the  influence  of  Confucius  it  became 
ethical  rather  than  religious.  Because  of  the  dominance 
of  the  religious  feelings  and  purpose,  some  would  regard 
the  thought  under  consideration  as  not  in  any  true  sense 


PREFATORY  13 

philosophic.  But  its  literature  evidences  a  thoughtful 
consideration  of  the  origin,  nature,  and  destiny  of  the  uni- 
verse and  man ;  and  this  is  philosophizing  thought  even 
though  it  lacks  cogency  and  system.  As  familiar  in- 
stances, we  may  name  the  Brahmanic,  Buddhistic,  Zoro- 
astrian,  and  Hebrew  literature.  The  philosophic  charac- 
ter of  the  thought  of  portions  of  the  Bible  is  evident.  As 
examples  we  may  refer  to  the  Books  of  Job  and  Ecclesiastes, 
and  to  some  of  the  Psalms. 

'  2.  The  Poetic  Period  of  Western  Philosophy.  —  The 
early  Philosophy  which  is  of  special  value  to  us  is  the 
Western.  In  its  earliest,  or  Poetic,  period  it  corresponds 
to  the  Oriental  in  the  prominence  which  it  gives  to  the 
religious  conceptions  and  in  its  not  being  distinctively 
systematic.  In  the  writings  of  Homer,  Hesiod,  and  Phere- 
cydes,  we  find  the  answers  of  the  thought  of  their  day  to 
the  questions  raised  by  reflection  upon  man's  experiences. 
They  furnish  accounts  of  the  origin  of  the  gods,  and  at- 
tempt is  made  to  explain  the  origin  of  the  cosmos  (or 
orderly  universe). 

3.  Western  Philosophy  Proper. — About  600  B.C. 
Western  reflective  thought  became  somewhat  critical 
and  systematic.  It  is  this  more  critical  and  systematic 
reflection  to  which  the  term  "Philosophy"  is  usually  ap- 
plied ;  and  it  is  this  Philosophy  whose  development  we 
purpose  to  sketch.  For  historical  purposes  it  is  conven- 
ient to  consider  it  under  three  divisions  :  Ancient,  or  Greek, 
Philosophy  (from  600  B.C.  to  325  a.d.)  ;  Medieval  (150 
A.D.  to  1625  A.D.) ;  Modern  (1625  a.d.  to  the  present). 
These  dates  are  merely  approximate.  It  will  be  seen  that 
Ancient  and  Medieval  Philosophy  overlap  in  time. 
This  is  because  the  classification  is  not  fundamentally 
chronological,  but  is  determined  by  aifinities  of  thought. 


DIVISION  A:  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 
CHAPTER  III 

GENERAL    VIEW;    PRE-SOCRATIC    PHILOSOPHY 

§  9.  Ancient  Philosophy.  —  i .  General  View.  —  The 
Western  Philosophy  had  its  birth  and  early  fostering  in 
Greece ;  in  consequence  of  this,  it  is  frequently  spoken  of 
as  Greek  Philosophy.  It  differs  from  Oriental  Philosophy 
and  the  higher  thought  of  the  Poetic  Period  in  its  sub- 
ordinating the  religious  element  to  the  intellective.  But 
it  did  not  suppress  the  religious  instinct ;  on  the  contrary, 
the  religious  feeling  had  so  large  a  place  in  the  Greek 
consciousness  that  it  indirectly  prevented  the  limiting 
of  reflective  thought  to  the  consideration  of  the  material 
world  and  present-day  interests.  With  this  exception. 
Philosophy  had  free  range,  subject  only  to  the  demand  of 
the  Western  mind  that  its  procedure  should  be  rational. 

2.  Divisions.  —  Ancient  Philosophy  will  be  considered 
under  the  following  heads :  I.  Pre-Socratic  Philosophy 
(600-400  B.C.) ;  II.  Socratic  Philosophy  (440-300  B.C.) ; 
III.  Graeco-Roman  Philosophy  (380  B.C.-300  a.d.)  ;  IV. 
Neo-Platonic  Philosophy  (40  A.D.-325).  The  dates  given 
are  approximate  and  indicate  the  periods  of  effective 
activity.  Thus,  the  Neo-Platonic  Philosophy  was  taught 
as  late  as  529  a.d.  ;  but  it  ceased  to  be  effectively  active 
about  325  A.D.,  hence  the  latter  date  is  given. 

3.  Schools  in  Philosophy.  —  It  must  not  be  assumed  that 

14 


PRE-SOCRATIC  PHILOSOPHY  15 

all  the  thinkers  of  any  one  of  these  great  divisions  held 
the  same  views  or  were  in  exact  agreement  as  to  what 
are  the  important  questions.  The  philosophers  of  each 
of  these  divisions  fall  into  groups,  or  schools.  These 
schools  are  made  up  of  thinkers  who  consider  the  same 
questions  and  whose  views  have  certain  fundamental 
likenesses.  Hence  when  we  speak  of  a  school  in  Philosophy, 
the  term  "school"  does  not  signify  an  institution  of  learning, 
but  a  group  of  thinkers  who  agree  as  to  what  are  the  im- 
portant questions  and  whose  fundamental  doctrines  are 
somewhat  alike. 

§  10.  The  Pre-Socratic  Philosophy.  —  General  View. — 
The  Pre-Socratic  schools,  given  in  the  order  of  their  de- 
velopment, are  the  Milesian  or  Early  Ionian,  the  Pythag- 
orean, the  Eleatic,  the  Later  Ionian,  the  Atomists,  and 
the  Sophists.  The  earlier  schools  studied  the  external 
world,  —  the  object  of  experiences,  the  first-named  of  the 
three  great  topics  of  thought  (§  7) ;  in  other  words,  this 
Philosophy  was  in  the  main  objective.  The  Sophists 
turned  attention  toward  the  subject  who  has  experience 
of  the  world,  and  Philosophy  became  somewhat  sub- 
jective. The  questions  to  which  these  early  philosophers 
gave  consideration  are  the  germinal  questions  of  reflective 
thought.  Their  ideas  may  seem  to  us  to  be  very  crude ; 
nevertheless  these  thinkers  were  men  of  ability  and  they 
did  effective  pioneer  work.  They  defined,  in  general 
outline,  the  task  of  Philosophy;  and  they  developed 
opposing  attitudes  toward  the  universe  and  life,  attitudes 
which  have  been  represented  in  every  age  since  and  which 
must  be  recognized  if  we  would  understand  the  Philosophy 
of  to-day.  To  note  these  great  questions  and  to  follow 
the  development  of  these  attitudes  will  lend  interest  and 
give  value  to  our  further  study.  Their  first  inquiry  was 
as  to  what  the  world  is  made  of;    and,  in  their  endeavor 


i6  INTRODUCTION   TO   PHILOSOPHY 

to  answer  this  question,  they  give  us  their  theory  of  the 
cosmos,  or  orderly  world,  i.e.  their  Cosmology. 

§  II.  Particular  Doctrines.  —  i.  Change  and  Per- 
manence. —  This  world  seems  to  us  to  be  stable,  yet  change- 
ful ;  and  so  it  appeared  to  these  first  philosophers,  and 
they  thought  of  it  as  made  out  of  a  changeful  single  sub- 
stance. That  the  world  is  of  one  substance  is  a  first 
assumption  of  the  Milesians.  In  selecting  a  substance 
which  would  answer  to  the  requirements,  they  naturally 
sought  a  substance  that  would  change  readily.  Thales, 
the  pioneer,  chose  water ;  and  he  thought  of  air  and  mist 
as  water  rarefied,  and  earth  and  rock  as  water  condensed. 
Anaximenes  selected  air;  and  Anaximander  chose  the 
Unlimited  or  Indeterminate,  for  it  might  become  any- 
thing, j  But  the  Eleatics  insisted  that  what  is  real  cannot 
change Tand,  believing  that  what  they  perceived  was  real, 
they  declared,  "  All  is ;  there  is  no  becoming ;  change  is 
an  illusion."  Heracleitus  —  of  the  Later  lonians  — 
affirmed  in  opposition  to  the  Eleatics,  that  "  all  is  becom- 
ing "  ;  but  inconsistently  with  this  he  believed  that  reason 
—  the  order  of  the  world  —  is  unchangeable.  J  The  Soph- 
ists followed  Heracleitus  in  declaring  that  "  all  Is  becom- 
ing." «JEmp£iocles  and  Anaxagoras  (of  the  Later  lonians) 
and  the  Atomists  heTd  to  the  changeability  of  all  else 
than  the  elements  of  which  the  world  is  composed ;  but 
these  unchangeable  elements  may  change  their  place, 
and  the  world  which  we  know  comes  of  the  changeful 
commingling  of  the  moving  elements. 

2.  Hylozoism.  —  The  Milesians  assumed  that  matter, 
since  it  moves,  is  alive.  In  this  they  were  followed  by 
most,  if  not  all,  the  Pre-Socratics  down  to  the  time  of 
Empedocles.  This  is  known  as  the  doctrine  of  Hylozoism. 
The  important  fact  for  us  is  that  they  were  thinking  about 
the  nature  of  reality. 


PRE-SOCRATIC  PHILOSOPHY  17 

3.  Monism;  Pluralism;  Dualism.  —  We  have  indicated 
that  the  Milesians  assumed  that  there  is  one  world-stuff, 
and  we  have  noted  what  some  of  them  believed  this  world- 
substance  to  be.  Of  the  Eleatics,  Parmenides  insisted 
that  this  substance  is  Being  and  that  this  Being  is  both 
matter  and  thought;  Xenophanes  said  that  the  world- 
God  is  this  substance,  and  in  this  he  identified  God  with 
the  world  ;  Heracleitus  —  a  Later  Ionian  —  declared  fire 
to  be  the  world-stuff.  Here  we  have  the  doctrine  that 
all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  are  derivable  from  a 
single  principle,  or  source ;  this  doctrine  is  known  as 
Monism.  Against  the  view  just  stated,  Empedocles 
asserted  that  the  world-substance  is  many,  not  one.  He 
said  that  there  are  four  elemental  substances  —  earth, 
air,  fire,  water.  Anaxagoras  insisted  that  the  elemental 
substances  are  infinite  in  number;  and  the  Atomists 
taught  that  the  world-substance  is  an  infinite  number  of 
indivisible,  unchangeable,  physical  points,  which  are  called 
atoms  because  of  their  indivisibility.  Here  we  have  the 
doctrine  that  the  universe  comes  of  a  plurality  of  sources, 
that  it  is  composed  of  many  ultimate  reals.  This  doctrine 
is  known  as  Pluralism.  Some  of  the  Pythagoreans  de- 
veloped a  doctrine  of  Dualism,  i.e.  they  would  derive  the 
world  from  two  principles.  This  is  a  special  form  of 
Pluralism.  These  doctrines  —  Monism,  Pluralism,  and 
Dualism  —  have  all  been  held  in  varying  forms  down  to 
the  present.  We  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  this 
philosophy  was  questioning  as  to  the  nature  of  the  reality 
with  which  men  are  in  constant  commerce. 

4.  Reality,  and  the  One  and  the  Many.  —  The  Milesians 
and  the  early  Pythagoreans  accepted  the  reality  of  the 
one  world-substance  and  the  many  objects  in  the  world. 
The  Eleatics  denied  the  reality  of  the  many  and  insisted 
that  reality  is  simple,  it  is  all-alike  oneness.     The  Later 

c 


i8  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY  | 

lonians  (except  Heracleitus)  and  the  Atomists  accepted 
the  reality  of  the  many  and  denied  the  oneness  of  reality. 
This  question  persists  in  Philosophy,  but  with  great  changes 
of  reference  and  import. 

5.  Cause.  —  Down  to  the  time  of  the  development  of 
Pluralism,  those  who  accepted  the  fact  of  change,  accepted 
it  without  asking  how  it  originated ;  their  Hylozoism  led 
them  to  think  of  change  as  in  the  nature  of  the  world- 
substance.  But  it  was  different  with  the  Pluralists. 
Their  elements  were  considered  as  unchangeable;  and, 
as  a  consequence,  they  were  forced  to  ask  how  change  of 
place  could  occur  in  a  world  of  changeless  elements.  Out 
of  this  inquiry  arose  the  problem  of  Cause.  Empedocles 
held  that  the  elements  were  commingled  through  the  action 
of  some  force  external  to  them;  Anaxagoras  taught  that 
reason,  the  most  mobile  of  the  elements,  is  supreme  in 
power  and  determines  the  motions  of  the  elements;  the 
Atomists  insisted  that  the  elements  combine  by  necessity 
quite  apart  from  any  agency. 

6.  Mechanism  and  Teleology.  —  Empedocles  and  the 
Atomists  conceived  the  universe  to  be  constituted  solely 
by  matter  in  motion.  With  Empedocles,  change  is  change 
of  place,  not  change  of  quality ;  and  the  elements  of  the 
Atomists  do  not  differ  in  quality.  In  a  word,  they  held 
that  all  changes  in  the  universe  are  due  to  matter  In 
motion,  and  that  all  differences  in  objects  are  really  dif- 
ferences of  quantity,  not  differences  of  quality.  These  dif- 
ferences in  quantity  arise  through  a  commingling  of  the 
elements,  and  this  commingling  is  determined  by  external 
compulsion  or  the  nature  of  the  elements.  There  is  no 
place  here  for  the  free  purposing  and  directing  of  changes 
by  thought;  all  moves  machine-like.  This  is  known  as 
the  doctrine  of  Mechanism.  Anaxagoras  held  a  doctrine 
which  differs  radically  from  that  just  described ;   his  con- 


PRE-SOCRATIC  PHILOSOPHY  19 

ceptlon  of  it  was,  to  be  sure,  crude.  He  assumed  an  ele- 
ment, the  reason,  which  he  conceived  as  differing  in  quality 
from  the  other  elements.  According  to  him,  this  reason, 
or  Nous,  knows  all  things,  and  is  free  in  action  and  su- 
preme in  power.  He  insisted  that  the  Nous  determines 
the  commingling  of  the  elements,  and  that  the  Nous 
determines  it  toward  a  chosen  end.  Here  we  have  the 
doctrine  that  all  change  has  respect  to  an  end ;  and  this 
is  known  as  the  Teleological  conception  of  the  universe. 
Teleology  and  Mechanism  are  distinctly  opposed  to  each 
other  as  theories  of  the  cosmos  ;  both  views  have  persisted 
through  varying  statements  down  to  the  present.  He  in- 
troduced the  distinction  between  mind  and  matter. 

7.  Knowledge.  —  Doubt  as  to  whether  our  knowledge 
is  valid  appears  to  have  originated  with  the  Eleatics. 
Parmenides,  an  Eleatic,  declared  that  the  senses  deceive 
us,  but  that  truth  may  be  attained  by  thinking.  A  classic 
instance  of  such  deception  is  the  straight  stick  appearing 
to  be  broken  when  it  is  thrust  into  water.  Anaxagoras 
averred  that  "  all  our  ideas  are  derived  solely  from  sensa- 
tions " ;  and,  in  this  statement,  due  emphasis  is  to  be 
given  the  word  "  solely."  This  doctrine  is  known  as 
Sensationalism;  we  shall  have  occasion  to  consider  it 
more  particularly  later  in  our  study.  Sensationalism 
followed  upon  the  distrust  of  knowledge  and  culminated 
in  the  teachings  of  the  Sophists.     They  taught,  — 

(i)  That  knowledge  is  only  sense-perception;  it  con- 
sists of  ideas  aroused  within  us  by  objects  from  without. 
The  subject  perceives  merely  his  idea  of  the  object,  not 
the  object  itself;  hence  perception  gives  no  knowledge  of 
the  object. 

(2)  That  all  is  becoming ;  therefore  objects  only  become 
for  the  person  perceiving  —  i.e.  the  percipient,  and  they 
become  in  the  moment  in  which  they  are  perceived. 


p 

20  INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

(3)  That  sense-impressions  are  unreliable.  This  they 
held  was  shown  in  the  fact  that  diflFerent  percipients  have 
differing  experiences  of  the  same  object. 

(4)  That  particular  sensations  are  the  only  reality; 
hence  we  only  know  our  ideas  of  particular  objects. 

(5)  That  it  follows  from  the  above  that  knowledge  is 
purely  personal  (i.e.  valid  only  for  the  individual  subject), 
and  is  determined  by  education  and  intellectual  habitude 
and  condition.  "  As  each  thing  appears  to  me,  it  is  to  me ; 
as  it  appears  to  you,  it  is  to  you."  Any  statement  and 
its  contradictory  are  both  true,  if  they  each  appear  to 
different  persons  to  be  true.  There  is  no  reality  for  com- 
mon, or  public,  knowledge ;  this  would  follow  from  their 
claim  that  the  object  becomes  only  for  the  one  subject. 
And  there  is  no  knowledge  which  is  valid  for  all  subjects ; 
this  follows  from  the  doctrine  that  all  knowledge  is  purely 
personal,  or  individual. 

Under  Gorgias,  this  teaching  developed  into  absolute 
scepticism.  He  held  as  follows:  (i)  Nothing  exists ;  (2) 
If  anything  could  exist,  it  could  not  be  known;  (3)  If 
we  could  know,  we  could  not  communicate  our  knowledge. 
His  argument  ran  thus :  That  which  is  thought  is  some- 
thing else  than  that  which  is,  or  they  could  not  be  dis- 
tinguished ;  hence  we  do  not  know  the  thing,  we  only 
know  our  thought  of  it.  We  cannot  communicate;  for 
every  one  has  his  own  ideas,  and  there  is  no  guarantee 
of  mutual  understanding. 

We  call  special  attention  to  particulars  of  this  teaching. 
The  first  is,  that  the  immediate  object  of  knowledge  is  not 
the  object  itself,  but  the  subject's  idea  of  the  object.  We 
shall  have  occasion  to  deal  with  this  later;  for  it  was 
scarcely  challenged  until  late  in  the  Modern  age  of  Philos- 
ophy.    The  other  is,  that  there  is  no  common  knowledge. 

Democritus,  the  ablest  of  the  Atomists,  a  man  of  com- 


PRE-SOCRATIC  PHILOSOPHY  21 

prehensive  learning  and  unusual  acumen,  was  a  contem- 
porary of  Protagoras,  the  ablest  of  the  Sophists,  and  of 
Socrates  and  Plato.  He  revolted  from  the  scepticism 
which  was  the  logical  consequence  of  the  Sophist  sensa- 
tionalism ;  and,  in  his  revolt,  he  developed  a  dualistic 
doctrine  of  knowledge.  His  doctrine  will  be  more  fully 
stated  in  our  study  of  Aristotle. 

§  12.  Conclusion.  —  Philosophy  first  studied  the  object 
and  sought  to  know  what  the  world  is  made  of;  in  other 
words,  it  questioned  as  to  the  Being  of  the  world.  The 
pursuit  of  this  inquiry  led  the  later  Pre-Socratics  to  ask 
as  to  how  we  know,  what  we  know,  and  whether  our 
knowledge  is  valid.  The  problem  of  Philosophy  thus 
takes  two  forms  :  it  is  the  question  of  the  Being  of  all-that- 
is  ;  and  the  question  of  Knowing.  Corresponding  to  these 
two  forms  of  the  problem  are  the  two  great  divisions  of 
Philosophy:  The  theory  of  Knowing,  or  Epistemology ; 
and  the  theory  of  Being,  or  Ontology.  These  are  not, 
however,  wholly  separable  questions ;  each  involves  the 
other.  One  cannot  treat  Ontology  apart  from  his  theory 
of  Knowing;  nor  Epistemology  apart  from  his  theory 
of  Being.  The  question  of  Reality  is  raised  by  these 
thinkers.  They  ask.  Is  the  world  that  we  know  the  real 
world  .?  and.  What  is  the  real  world  ?  The  question  of 
Reality  gives  heart  and  life  to  Metaphysics  —  the  theory 
of  the  essential  nature  of  Being.  The  ultimate  questions 
of  both  Epistemology  and  Ontology  fall  to  Metaphysics. 
These  ancient  philosophers  studied  their  experience  in 
order  that  they  might  find  out  what  experience  had  to 
say  respecting  the  world  and  man.  That  is  what  Philos- 
ophy is  doing  to-day. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE    SOCRATIC    PHILOSOPHY 

The  Socratic  Philosophy  is  the  product  of  three  of  the 
world's  greatest  thinkers  —  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle.* 

§  13.  Socrates.  —  i.  His  Purpose.  —  Socrates  did  not 
develop  a  system ;  he  sought  practical  ends,  not  the  con- 
struction of  a  theory.  He  was  not  interested  in  Philos- 
ophy, as  such.  His  sole  interest  was  in  the  discovery  of 
the  principles  of  right  conduct;  in  other  words,  his  in- 
terests were  exclusively  ethical.  But  he  believed  that 
true  knowledge  is  the  sole  basis  of  upright  conduct.  He 
held  that  only  he  who  has  true  knowledge  will  live  a  life 
of  moral  goodness ;  and  that  he  who  has  valid  knowledge 
will  live  such  a  life,  i.e.  will  be  virtuous.  Therefore,  since 
knowledge  is  virtue,  and  morality  is  not  possible  without 
valid  knowledge,  Socrates  believed  that  valid  knowledge  is 
of  fundamental  importance.  He  also  believed  that  by 
criticism  and  self-examination  valid  knowledge  may  be 
attained.  His  ethical  interest  caused  him  to  be  dissatisfied 
with  the  sceptical  conclusions  of  the  Sophists,  although 
he  was  himself  of  that  school;  and  his  ethical  impulse 
and  his  conception  of  the  ground  of  morality  led  him  to 
seek  ethical  knowledge  which  is  not  merely  relative,  not 
merely  valid  for  the  individual,  but  valid  for  all. 

2.  Socrates  and  the  Sophists  Contrasted.  —  The  Sophists 
had  been  led  to  doubt  the  validity  of  knowledge  by  reason 
of  the  emphasis  which  they  laid  upon  the  differences  in 

22 


THE  SOCRATIC  PHILOSOPHY  23 

the  judgments  of  men  respecting  persons  and  things  and 
events;  Socrates  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  there 
is  a  general  agreement  among  men  touching  ethical 
questions.  The  Sophists  based  their  views  on  the  con- 
tradictions in  the  experiences  of  individuals ;  Socrates 
insisted  that  the  truth  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  opinions 
of  the  inconstant  individual,  but  in  the  experience  of  all 
men  taken  together.  The  Sophist,  Protagoras,  had  said, 
"  Man  is  the  measure  of  all  things  " ;  and  he  meant  by 
this  that  truth  is  merely  relative  to  the  individual,  and 
that  contradictory  opinions  held  by  different  individuals 
are  true  because  each  is  true  for  the  subject  holding  it. 
Socrates  would  also  say,  "  Man  is  the  measure  of  all 
things  "  ;  but  he  would  mean  by  "  man,"  not  the  individual 
man,  but  man  in  general,  universal  man,  humanity.  He 
insisted  that  in  the  opinions  of  all  men  taken  together  we 
find  a  rational  agreement,  an  agreement  which  proves 
that  there  is  ethical  knowledge  which  is  universally  valid. 
3.  His  Method.  —  He  proceeded  by  asking  questions, 
as  if  he  were  himself  seeking  knowledge;  and  he  would 
ask  for  the  exact  definition  of  words.  Thus,  if  the  con- 
versation should  touch  upon  good  citizenship,  he  would 
ask  those  with  whom  he  was  conversing  to  tell  what  they 
meant  by  "  the  good  citizen."  He  might  follow  this  by 
asking  that  they  apply  their  definition  to  particular  cases, 
or  he  might  pass  from  this  to  the  question  of  "  goodness." 
He  would  in  this  way  approach  the  definition  of  the  various 
ethical  terms  —  as  "  piety,"  "  virtue,"  "  patriotism,"  etc. ; 
and  it  would  be  found  that  there  was  substantial  agree- 
ment, such  agreement  as  made  it  evident  that  ethical 
judgment  is  not  merely  relative  to  the  individual,  but 
that  the  ethical  experience  of  all  subjects  has  a  common 
content.  It  is  also  seen  that  there  is  general  agreement 
as  to  attitude  toward  ethical  questions,  i.e.  that  men  have 


24  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

common  ethical  attitudes  and  opinions.  This  is  shown 
in  the  very  fact  that  they  use  common  terms  —  as  "  good," 
"  bad,"  "  right,"  "  wrong"  —  to  express  their  ethical  ex- 
periences. These  common  ethical  opinions  and  terms 
are  concepts ;  and  one  great  service  that  Socrates  ren- 
dered to  reflective  thought  was  his  demonstration  of  the 
value  of  the  concept. 

4.  The  Concept  Illustrated.  —  In  emphasizing  the  dif- 
ference in  the  knowledge  of  individuals,  the  Sophists  had 
sense-perception  in  mind.  Socrates  searches  for  the  com- 
mon objective  element  and  finds  it  in  the  concept.  The  sig- 
nificance of  the  concept  and  its  place  in  cognition,  or  the  act 
of  knowing,  will  be  more  fully  treated  later ;  at  this  point, 
we  will  merely  illustrate  the  concept,  believing  that  such 
illustration  will  make  for  a  readier  understanding  of  the 
course  of  Philosophy  from  this  time  on.  We  will  take 
"  chair  "  for  an  example  of  a  concept.  There  are  objects 
which  differ  in  particulars,  but  which  are  nevertheless 
alike  in  that  they  all  have  their  parts  so  related  that  any 
one  of  them  will  serve  as  a  seat,  and  they  all  have  a  part 
against  which  the  sitter  may  lean  back.  Despite  the 
individual  differences  of  these  objects,  which  may  be  many 
and  marked,  they  are  so  far  similar  that  they  express  a 
common  idea  —  the  idea  of  something  to  sit  on.  They 
have  a  common  content  for  thought.  Thus  we  see  that 
"  sufficient  similarity  "  between  objects  gives  them  a  com- 
mon content  for  thought,  so  that  in  knowing  one  of  the 
particular  objects  we  know  all  that  have  this  common 
content.  We  perceive  qualities  and  relations  which 
are  common  to  a  number  of  objects ;  and,  assigning  a  name 
to  this  common  content,  we  give  our  experience  a  fixed 
form.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  term  "  concept  "  may 
be  used  of  the  idea  which  is  common  to  the  class,  or  group, 
or  of  the  word  by  which  we  express  this  idea  in  speech. 


THE   SOCRATIC  PHILOSOPHY  25 

The  former  may  be  indicated  by  the  term  "  idea-concept," 
the  latter  by  the  term  "  word-concept."  In  contrast 
with  the  percept  in  sense-perception,  the  concept  is  the 
universal  which  includes  what  is  common  to  all  the  per- 
cepts which  embody  this  common  idea.  Thus,  the  con- 
cept "  book "  is  the  universal  which  includes  what  is 
common  to  all  the  particular  objects  that  embody  this  idea. 

Summary :  Socrates  was  unsystematic ;  but  his  great 
ability  and  enthusiasm  and  the  directness  of  his  practicality 
led  him  to  a  choice  of  method  and  an  attainment  of  results 
which  have  been  of  great  worth  to  Philosophy.  It  was 
his  purpose  to  lead  men  to  recognize  the  validity  of  ethical 
judgments.  In  accomplishing  this  he  opposed  the  scepti- 
cism of  the  Sophists,  and  effectively  criticised  their  doctrine 
that  knowledge  is  purely  relative  to  the  individual ;  and 
he  called  attention  to  the  value  of  the  concept  for  thought 
and  to  the  fact  of  our  common  humanity  and  common 
ethical  experience.  He  insisted  that  we  may  have  ab- 
solute knowledge  and  arrive  at  universal  truth. 

§  14.  Plato.  —  I.  General  View.  —  Of  Plato's  long  life 
of  eighty  years,  sixty  years  were  given  to  Philosophy. 
He  agreed  with  Heracleitus  that  the  world  about  us  is 
a  world  of  Becoming,  and  with  the  Eleatics  that  the  world 
of  Reality  is  a  world  of  eternal,  unchangeable  Oneness. 
He  believed  that  we  may  know  Reality;  but  along  with 
this,  he  accepted  the  doctrine  of  the  Sophists,  and  of 
Socrates,  that  sense-perception  only  yields  relative  truth. 
With  the  Pythagoreans,  he  rejected  the  Eleatic  doctrine 
of  the  all-alikeness,  or  homogeneity,  of  the  One  Reality, 
and  Insisted  that  the  eternal  unchangeable  Reality  is 
Many  in  One,  i.e.  that  the  ultimate  Is  complex  unity. 
From  Socrates  he  received  the  notion  of  the  concept.  It 
may  be  justly  asserted  that  this  principle  of  thought,  the 
concept,  ordered  his  Philosophy. 


26         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

2.  General  Estimate.  —  It  must  not  be  assumed  that 
Plato  merely  collected  and  adopted  the  thoughts  of  others. 
He  was  not  an  eclectic ;  he  was  an  independent  thinker 
and  a  man  of  giant  intellect.  Plato  gave  new  meaning 
and  added  value  to  every  view  in  which  he  appears  to  be 
in  agreement  with  others.  Thus,  while  he  remained  true 
to  his  master,  Socrates,  he  did  not  limit  his  interest  to 
ethical  questions ;  he  took  the  broader,  philosophic  view. 
It  was  this  broader  interest  and  outlook  which  led  him  to 
use  the  conceptual  principle  in  the  philosophic  study 
of  the  world  at  large ;  and  in  his  application  of  this  prin- 
ciple he  utilized  it  in  considering  questions  of  Knowledge 
and  Reality.  Our  limited  sketch  cannot  give  an  adequate 
presentation  of  his  system.  Extended  study  is  necessary 
if  one  would  duly  appreciate  its  comprehensiveness,  its 
coherence,  and  its  great  advance  beyond  the  philosophic 
thought  which  preceded  him.  We  select  for  special 
mention  here  one  notable  contribution  of  his  to  Western 
Philosophy,  —  the  conception  of  Reality  as  immaterial. 

3.  His  Doctrine  of  Ideas.  —  Plato's  doctrine  of  reality 
can  scarcely  be  understood  or  duly  appreciated  apart  from 
his  doctrine  of  Ideas.  He  developed  this  doctrine  from 
the  Socratic  notion  of  the  concept.  He  was  many  years 
perfecting  his  view  of  the  Idea  and  at  the  last  the  Platonic 
Idea  differed  greatly  from  the  Socratic  concept.  With 
Socrates  the  concept  is  a  construct  of  thought  and  is  a 
complex  of  the  qualities  which  are  common  to  a  number  of 
objects ;  and  it  is  at  the  same  time  the  thought-content 
which  is  common  to  the  opinions  of  men.  In  other  words, 
with  Socrates  the  concept  is  related  in  thought  to  percepts  ; 
i.e.  it  is  logically  related  to  objects.  With  Plato  the  Idea 
bears  the  same  relation  to  any  particular  of  which  it  is 
the  Idea  that  the  Idea  of  the  sculptor  bears  to  the  com- 
pleted statue.     The  statue  comes  to  be,  in  order  that  the 


THE  SOCRATIC  PHILOSOPHY  27 

sculptor's  Idea  may  have  embodiment.  The  Idea  is 
before  the  statue,  and  it  is  the  cause  of  the  statue  in  this 
sense,  that  the  statue  comes  to  be  because  of  the  Idea. 
The  statue  is  the  means  for  realizing  in  marble  what  was 
first  realized  in  the  mind  of  the  sculptor.  The  sculptor's 
Idea  included  the  purpose  to  create  the  statue;  and  this 
purpose  is  said  to  be  the  teleological  cause  of  the  statue. 
The  purpose  of  any  action  is  known  as  the  teleological 
cause  of  the  action  and  of  the  result  of  the  action.  So 
Plato  conceived  the  particulars  of  the  physical  world  as 
means  for  the  expression  of  the  world-Idea,  as  so  many 
partial  embodiments  of  that  Idea.  The  world-Idea  was 
before  they  began  to  be,  and  they  come  to  be  because  of  it. 
The  world-Idea  is  related  tele ologic ally  to  the  particulars 
of  the  world.  Each  of  these  particulars  is  but  an  incom- 
plete expression  of  the  world-Idea';  and,  because  of  its 
incompleteness,  it  is  not  real.  The  Socratic  concept  is 
related  logically  to  its  particulars ;  the  Platonic  Idea  is 
related  teleologically  to  its  particulars. 

4.  His  Doctrine  of  Reality.  — This  world  and  the  persons 
and  things  in  it  with  which  we  have  intercourse  are  real 
to  us.  We  demand  the  real ;  we  would  not  consent  that 
life  should  be  a  pretence  or  that  that  with  which  we  deal 
should  be  a  mere  seeming.  We  require  that  what  is 
offered  us  for  acceptance  shall  be  a  statement  of  reality 
before  we  accept  it  and  undertake  to  act  upon  it.  Philos- 
ophy raised  the  question  as  to  what  is  real  very  early. 
It  was  involved  in  the  discussions  of  the  Eleatics.  They 
held  that  the  only  reality  is  the  Universal  One,  and  that 
the  many  particulars,  the  individual  persons  and  things, 
are  not  real.  Plato  stated  the  question  in  a  way  then 
quite  new ;  but  this  statement  so  affected  reflective  thought 
that  we  must  understand  Plato  here  if  we  would  under- 
stand the  subsequent  course  of  Philosophy.     He  asked, 


28  INTRODUCTION   TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Is  Reality  In  the  concept  (or  Universal)  or  In  the  sense- 
object  (or  Particular)  ?  Stating  It  In  terms  of  Plato's 
doctrine  of  Ideas,  the  question  would  be,  Is  the  Idea 
or  the  perceived  object  real  ?  For  example,  which  is 
truly  real,  this  desk  at  which  I  sit,  or  the  universal  "  desk," 
the  "  desk  "  as  Idea  ?  Plato  Insisted  that  reality  is  in 
the  "  desk  "  Idea ;  the  desk  at  which  I  sit  Is  only  an  in- 
complete, an  imperfect,  representation  of  the  real  "  desk." 
Because  of  its  Incompleteness  and  Its  being  subject  to 
change,  it  Is  not  real ;  for  with  him  reality  Is  perfect, 
eternal,  and  unchanging,  and  the  particular  is  Imperfect, 
temporary,  and  In  constant  change.  His  doctrine  of 
knowledge  also  led  him  to  deny  the  reality  of  sense- 
objects.  He  believed  that  perception  only  gives  us  rel- 
ative knowledge,  not  absolute  knowledge  or  knowledge 
of  reality.  But  sense-objects  are,  according  to  Plato, 
known  by  perception ;  hence  the  particulars  thus  known 
are  not  reality.  On  the  other  hand,  Plato  held  that  knowl- 
edge by  concepts,  or  knowledge  of  Ideas,  is  absolute 
knowledge.  From  this.  It  would  follow  that  reality  is  In 
the  Universal,  or  Idea. 

5.  Dualism.  —  Plato  agreed  with  the  Eleatlcs  In  holding 
that  the  world  of  Reality  is  a  world  of  unchanging  One- 
ness. Despite  this  manifest  monistic  assumption,  he 
developed  a  distinct  Dualism.  Plato's  Ideas  were  the 
structural  types  of  physical  objects ;  that  is,  his  world  of 
Ideas  was  a  world  of  norms,  the  Ideas  being  the  norms 
of  the  particulars  of  the  physical  world.  The  Ideas  are 
not  mental  constructs,  they  are  independent  of  the  subject ; 
in  other  words,  they  are  evidently  objective,  not  sub- 
jective. In  holding  thus,  Plato's  system  offers  us  two 
objective  worlds  —  one  the  becoming,  changeful  world 
of  physical  objects;  the  other,  the  unchanging  world  of 
Ideas.     These  worlds  are  represented  as  explanatory  of 


THE   SOCRATIC   PHILOSOPHY  29 

each  other;  but  Plato's  system  keeps  them  otherwise 
apart,  they  are  not  organically  united.  In  this  he  is 
dualistic;  and  the  recognition  of  this  Platonic  Dualism 
is  a  pre-requisite  to  the  correct  interpretation  of  Aristotle. 
This  is  Ontological  Dualism,  —  a  dualistic  theory  of  Being. 
His  system  also  presents  a  dualistic  theory  of  Knowledge, 
i.e.  an  Epistemological  Dualism.  He  separates  appre- 
hension through  perception  and  apprehension  through 
reason.  According  to  Plato,  perception  only  gives  us 
relative  knowledge,  or  opinion,  whereas  reason  yields 
absolute  knowledge. 

6.  Was  Plato^s  World  of  Ideas  Pluralistic?  —  His  world 
of  Reality  appears  to  be  constituted  of  many  independent 
Ideas.  But  while  he  conceived  the  Ideas  as  independent 
of  the  subject,  he  did  not  think  of  them  as  wholly  unrelated. 
The  particulars  of  the  physical  world  are  related  teleo- 
logically  to  the  Ideas;  .and  the  Ideas  themselves  are  re- 
lated teleologically  to  the  Idea  of  the  Good.  This  Idea 
of  the  Good  holds  the  primacy  in  his  world  of  Reality ; 
all  the  other  Ideas  are  partial  realizations  of  this  primal 
Idea,  they  are  that  it  may  be  realized.  Hence  Plato's 
world  of  Ideas  is  not  a  pluralistic  world ;  its  Reality  is  a 
unitary  Reality,  the  plural  Ideas  being  unified  in  their 
teleological  relationship  to  the  primal  Idea  of  the  Good. 
His  was  a  thoroughgoing  teleological  conception  of  the 
universe. 

Summary  :  Plato  prepared  Western  thought  to  recognize 
Immaterial  Reality;  previous  to  him  Greek  philosophy 
had  assumed  that  Reality  was  material.  In  this  he  opened 
the  way  for  a  clearer  distinction  of  mind  and  matter, 
although  he  himself  did  not  definitely  distinguish  them. 
His  system  was  for  the  time  a  strong  defence  of  the  valid- 
ity of  knowledge  against  the  assaults  of  philosophical 
doubt.     His  adoption  and  advocacy  of  the  teleological 


30  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

doctrine  —  that  the  world  as  a  whole  and  all  particulars  of 
it  exist  for  some  purpose —  was  of  itself  a  great  contribution 
to  reflective  thought.  Much  of  his  work  was  achieved  in 
his  treatment  of  questions  which  do  not  come  within  the 
province  of  this  introduction.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  our  present  inquiry,  his  great  work  is  found  in  the  stage 
to  which  he  developed  thought,  making  it  ready  for  Aris- 
totle, and  in  the  training  of  Aristotle  for  a  still  greater 
achievement  than  that  effected  by  Plato  himself. 

§  15.  Aristotle.  —  i.  Introductory. — We  preface  our 
study  of  Aristotle  with  a  consideration  of  the  dualism 
which  is  implicate  in  the  epistemology  of  Democritus  and 
Plato.  Theirs  were  the  forms  of  philosophic  thought 
which  were  most  active  when  Aristotle  began  his  stud- 
ies, and  they  naturally  affected  his  procedure  and 
conclusions.  (Democritus  was  a  materialist  and  Plato 
was  an  immaterialist ;  but  they  agreed  in  holding  that 
there  are  two  kinds  of  knowledge  —  knowledge  obtained 
through  sense-experience  and  knowledge  attained  by 
reason^/  Perceptual  knowledge  —  that  had  through  sense- 
experience  —  was  said  to  be  merely  relative ;  rational 
knowledge  was  thought  to  be  absolute.  According  to 
Democritus,  perceptual  knowledge  is  knowledge  of  mere 
appearances,  or  phenomena ;  according  to  Plato,  it  is 
opinion  respecting  what  is  an  incomplete  copy  of  reality. 

Plato's  dualism  was  involved  in  his  separation  of  the 
world  of  Ideas  —  i.e.  the  world  of  reality  —  from  the 
world  of  perceptions.  This  has  been  set  forth  in  our  study 
of  Plato.  Democritus  grounded  his  belief  in  two  kinds^ 
of  knowledge  upon  a  distinction  in  the  properties  of  the 
atoms.  He  divided  these  properties  into  two  classes,  and 
these  became  known  later  as  the  primary  and  secondary 
properties  of  matter.  In  the  first  of  these  classes  he  placed 
form,  size,  inertia,  density,  and  hardness ;    and  he  held 


THE   SOCRATIC   PHILOSOPHY  31 

that  these  are  properties  of  the  atoms  themselves ;  and, 
as  he  believed  that  the  atoms  are  reality,  they  were, 
for  him,  properties  of  reality.  It  would  follow  then  that 
we  know  reality  in  knowing  these  properties.  He  held 
further  that  these  properties  are  known  through  reason, 
not  through  perception.  In  the  second  class  of  properties, 
he  placed  sound,  color,  taste,  and  smell ;  these  are  thought 
to  exist  only  in  the  appearances  and  are  perceived  through 
the  senses.  From  this  we  see  how  it  was  that  Democritus 
and  Plato  were  agreed  in  rejecting  Sensationalism  — 
the  doctrine  that  knowledge  is  constituted  solely  of  sense- 
elements  —  and  in  recognizing  the  activity  of  reason  in 
cognition.  The  doctrine  that  the  subject  is  rationally 
active  in  cognizing  is  known  as  Rationalism.  Both  these 
philosophers  were  rationalists,  but  they  differed  in  their 
emphasis.  Plato  gave  emphasis  to  the  world  of  Ideas ; 
Democritus,  upon  the  whole,  to  the  facts  of  sense-ex- 
perience, or  empirical  facts  as  they  are  commonly  called. 
Neither  Democritus  nor  Plato  could  effect  a  union  of  the 
two  worlds ;  their  philosophy  had  in  it  an  element  of 
Dualism. 

2.  Aristotle's  Attitude  toward  this  Dualism.  —  Aristotle 
was  convinced  that  his  master,  Plato,  erred  in  not  giving 
due  value  to  empirical  facts.  Neither  could  he  agree  to 
the  separation  of  the  world  of  Ideas  from  the  physical 
world.  To  separate  them,  as  Plato  did,  would  be  to  make 
knowledge  of  the  world  of  nature  impossible ;  and  Plato 
himself  taught  that  we  know  the  physical  world.  To  be 
sure  our  knowledge  of  it  is  not  a  knowledge  of  reality; 
but  that  is  because  what  is  known  is  not  reality.  Besides 
this,  how  could  the  world  of  nature  be  related  to  the  world 
of  Ideas  if  they  were  separate  as  Plato  taught?  Yet 
Plato  asserted  that  they  were  related  teleologically. 
Aristotle  could  not  accept  the  materialism  and  the  radical 


32  INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

mechanism    of    Democritus.     Therefore    he    rejected  the 
dualistic  Philosophy  of  his  time. 

3.  Doctrine  of  the  Universal. — Aristotle  accepted  the 
principle  of  the  concept,  or  the  universal ;  but  he  did  not 
accept  the  Platonic  relation  of  the  universal  and  the 
particular.  The  difference  between  him  and  Plato  may 
be  stated  thus :  With  Plato,  the  Idea,  or  the  universal,  is 
before  the  thing;  with  Aristotle,  it  is  in  the  thing.  For 
example,  according  to  Plato,  the  ideas  "  man  "  and  "  dog  " 
are,  and  the  particular  man  and  dog  come  to  be  as  means 
for  the  expression  of  these  Ideas.  But  this  conception 
does  not  include  a  real  linking  of  the  Ideas  and  the  objects ; 
as  to  reality,  they  are  apart  and  cannot  be  joined  by  this 
thought  of  them.  Aristotle,  on  the  other  hand,  holds  that 
the  universal  "  man  "  or  "  dog  "  is  in  the  particular  man 
or  dog  as  the  essence  of  the  particular.  The  universal  is 
reality;  but  it  has  no  being  apart  from  the  particular; 
and  the  particular  has  its  being  through  the  universal 
which  is  in  it,  which  is  there  as  the  essence  of  the  partic- 
ular. Thus,  the  universal  "  man  "  or  "  dog  "  has  no 
reality  apart  from  some  particular  man  or  dog.  Thought 
of  apart  from  any  particular,  it  is  a  mere  abstraction.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  particular  man  or  dog  is  because  of 
that  in  it  which  is  the  essence  of  every  man  and  every 
dog.  For  Aristotle,  the  concrete  particular  thing  is  the 
real. 

4.  Principle  of  Development.  —  The  next  question  to 
be  answered  is.  How  is  this  universal,  or  essence  of  the 
particular,  related  to  the  changing  particular  t  The  an- 
swer is,  The  particular  is  the  unfolding  of  the  universal ; 
that  is,  the  particular  is  the  universal  in  the  developing 
expression  of  itself.  An  oak  tree  is  an  unfolding  expres- 
sion of  its  own  essence,  and  this  essence  is  the  universal 
"  oak."     When  we  apply  this  interpretation  of  the  uni- 


THE   SOCRATIC   PHILOSOPHY  33 

versal  to  the  world  of  nature,  we  get  a  very  different 
conception  of  it  from  that  which  is  presented  in  the 
Platonic  system.  Plato's  Idea  is  unchangeable,  or  static; 
Aristotle's  universal  is  active,  or  dynamic.  As  the  uni- 
versal is  reality,  reality  is  active  being.  We  must  not, 
however,  overlook  the  fact  that  Aristotle's  development 
differs  from  the  modern  conception  of  development; 
his  is  simply  development  within  the  particular,  not  a 
development  of  new  classes,  or  genera. 

5.  His  Doctrine  of  Development  is  Teleological.  —  We 
have  seen  that  Anaxagoras  grasped  the  idea  of  teleology  — 
that  changes  in  the  universe  are  related  to  purpose  and 
move  toward  the  fulfilment  of  purpose ;  but  he  limited 
his  application  of  this  principle  to  the  astronomical  world. 
Plato  needed  it  that  he  might  effect  a  relation  between  his 
Ideas  and  the  physical  world.  It  has  a  place  in  Aris- 
totle's fundamental  conception  of  reality.  According  ^ 
to  him,(there  is  in  every  particular  of  the  world  of  nature  j 
an  essence  which  is  unfolding  into  perceptible  expression ;) 
i.e.  every  particular  is  matter  to  which  form  is  being 
given.  He  thus  distinguishes  two  elements  in  the  partic- 
ular :  Matter  and  Form.  Matter,  apart  from  Form, 
would  be  undetermined,  would  have  no  character.  Form 
is  the  principle  which  gives  character  to  the  Matter  of 
a  particular.  The  Matter  of  an  oak,  conceived  apart 
from  the  Form,  is  a  potential  oak;  the  Form  is  that  by 
means  of  which  the  potential  oak  becomes  actualized. 
The  body  of  each  of  us  is  such  a  real  particular;  and  its 
form  is  determined  from  within  by  its  essence.  In  this 
relation,[he  conceived  of  the  essence  as  active  Form  giving 
its  own  expression  to  Matter.  ]  From  this  it  follows  that 
all  such  activity  is  toward  the  fulfilment  of  a  purpose,  viz. 
the  expression  of  the  essence.  The  ideal  end  and  the 
activity  are  within  the  particular;    that  is,  they  are  im- 

D 


34  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

manent,  not  external.  Aristotle's  concept,  or  Idea,  or 
universal,  is  being  which  is  immanently  and  teleologically 
active. 

6.  A  Dualistic  Remainder.  —  Aristotle  himself  did  not 
succeed  in  avoiding  dualism.  We  note  one  instance  of 
his  dualistic  thought.  What  was  said  above  about  the 
immanent  teleological  unfolding  of  the  universal  into  the 
particular  seems  clear  and  evident  when  we  study  the 
activity  of  nature  and  attend  only  to  the  individual  object. 
But  when  Aristotle  gave  his  attention  to  the  activity  of 
man  in  the  shaping  of  material,  —  e.g.  that  of  a  carpenter 
making  a  box,  —  he  felt  that  he  was  forced  to  seek  the 
end  and  the  activity  outside  that  which  is  forming.  Some 
changes  do  not  appear  to  be  effected  immanently;  and 
when  we  relate  particulars  to  each  other,  their  related 
changes  appear  to  be  effected  externally  and  mechanically. 
He  failed  to  include  these  experiences  in  his  teleology. 
At  this  point  he  accepts  that  change  may  be  brought  about 
by  action  from  without,  and  he  conceives  particulars  to 
be  externally  related  to  one  another.  He  thus  holds  two 
opposed  conceptions  :  Mechanism  and  Teleology. 

7.  Logical  Doctrine.  —  We  desire  that  our  conclusions 
about  things  and  events  shall  be  dependable.  It  is  but 
natural  that  men  should  feel  that  they  must  have  assurance 
that  their  knowledge  of  things  and  events  is  valid.  If 
our  judgments  concerning  the  affairs  and  objects  of  life 
in  which  we  are  interested  and  with  which  we  have  to  do 
are  not  valid,  we  are  in  a  sad  case.  Sometimes  the  ques- 
tion takes  this  form  :  How  may  we  reason  convincingly,  so 
that  the  reasonable  man  will  accept  our  conclusions .? 
The  Sophists  had  laid  down  some  rules  for  convincing 
thought ;  but  Aristotle  was  the  first  to  make  an  extended 
and  thoroughgoing  investigation  of  the  forms  of  valid 
thinking.     His  work  was  so  comprehensive  and  was  so 


THE  SOCRATIC  PHILOSOPHY  35 

well  done  that  little  occasion  has  arisen  for  making  material 
change  in  the  principles  of  Deductive  Logic  as  stated  by 
him.  He  agreed  with  Plato  that  there  is  one  all-inclusive 
cause  for  all  that  is  and  all  that  occurs.  He  was  an  ac- 
complished scientist;  and,  as  a  scientist,  he  was  wont  to 
seek  one  general  cause  for  all  similar  physical  events.  In 
other  words,  he  had  learned  that  particular  events  are 
individual  instances  of  a  general  process.  This  is  a  com- 
mon-place now  in  science,  and  gravitation  is  a  notable 
instance  of  such  a  general  process.  Believing  as  he  did, 
it  was  but  natural  that  Aristotle  should  assume  this  to  be 
true  of  the  process  of  thinking  and  that  he  should  endeavor 
to  discover  the  general  laws  and  forms  of  valid  thought. 
His  search  for  these  laws  and  forms  was  the  origin  of  the 
science  of  Logic. 

For  our  inquiry  it  will  only  be  necessary  that  we  take 
note  of  three  particulars  of  his  logical  doctrine.  First, 
he  laid  hold  of  a  truth  which  has  been  too  often  overlooked  : 
A  complete  thought  is  always  a  conclusion  respecting  the 
object  of  thought.  It  is  not  a  mere  name-idea,  as  the  name 
of  a  thing  or  a  quality;  it  is  a  judgment.  To  state  it 
otherwise,  the  unit  of  thought  is  a  judgment  respecting 
some  object;  in  the  speech  of  the  Plain  Man,  a  complete 
thought  is  an  opinion  about  some  person,  thing,  or  event. 
An  illustration  will  help  us  to  understand  the  second  partic- 
ular to  which  we  call  attention.  Passing  along  a  strange 
road,  you  see  a  building  and  you  say,  "  That  is  a  school- 
house."  You  arrived  at  this  conclusion  in  this  way : 
You  have  a  general  idea  of  the  appearance  of  a  school- 
house  and  its  grounds ;  you  see  this  particular  building 
and  its  grounds ;  you  compare  the  general  idea  and  this 
particular  perception,  or  idea ;  and  you  draw  your  con- 
clusion. Here  we  have  three  Judgments :  one  general 
judgment    (the    general    appearance   of   a   schoolhouse). 


36  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

a  singular  judgment  (the  appearance  of  this  building),  and 
the  conclusion.  Here  is  the  foundation  of  his  doctrine  of 
the  syllogism.  The  third  characteristic  of  his  logical 
doctrine  comes  of  the  fact  that  question  may  be  raised 
as  to  the  truth  of  either  of  the  first  two  judgments,  or 
propositions.  It  is  evident  that  if  we  undertake  to  estab- 
lish the  premises  from  which  our  conclusion  is  drawn,  we 
must  seek  yet  more  general  premises  and  the  truth  of 
these  may  be  questioned.  From  this  it  follows  that, 
if  our  reasoning  shall  be  valid,  there  must  be  back  of  all 
thinking  some  truths  which  are  not  dependent  upon  proof 
for  their  validity,  truths  which  are  self-evident.  Aristotle 
insisted  that  there  are  such  truths ;  e.g.  a  thing  cannot  be 
both  itself  and  not-itself. 

8.  Doctrine  of  Man.  —  Aristotle  taught  that  man  is 
body,  soul,  and  Nous  (or  intelligence).  The  soul  and  the 
Nous  are  immaterial.  According  to  him,  all  organisms 
have  souls ;  plants  have  nutritive  souls,  animals  sensitive 
souls,  and  man  has  a  rational  soul.  It  is  the  Nous,  or 
intelligence,  which  distinguishes  man  from  other  organisms, 
as  to  constitution.  In  the  latest  form  of  his  teaching,  the 
Nous  has  no  bodily  organ ;  it  enters  man  from  without. 
Man  thus  becomes  a  triple  real  —  a  real  as  to  the  body, 
the  soul,  and  the  Nous. 

Summary :  Our  study  of  Aristotle  has  barely  alluded  to 
a  few  particulars  of  the  thought  of  this  wonderful  genius, 
the  father  of  Logic,  one  of  the  greatest  scientists,  and 
probably  the  greatest  of  philosophers.  He  was  a  Monist 
in  purpose,  but  his  system  has  in  it  an  element  of  dualism. 
He  advanced  far  beyond  his  predecessors  in  his  appre- 
hension of  the  significance  of  the  concept  and  in  relating 
the  concept  to  the  individual  object.  At  this  point,  he 
overcomes  the  dualism  of  Democritus  and  Plato.  The 
universal,  or  concept,  is  seen  to  be  the  essence  of  the  partic- 


THE   SOCRATIC  PHILOSOPHY  37 

ular,  or  percept.  There  is  no  particular  apart  from  the 
universal,  and  no  concrete  universal  apart  from  the  partic- 
ular. Reality  is  in  the  particular.  ,  Aristotle  believed 
that  we  know  reality  in  knowing  the  object.  He  perceived 
that  the  unit  of  thought  is  a  judgment,  he  discovered  the 
fundamental  forms  of  valid  thinking,  and  he  averred  that 
some  truths  are  self-evident.  His  conception  of  reality  as 
dynamic,  not  static,  was  of  itself  a  valuable  contribution 
to  Philosophy.  His  conception  of  development  was, 
indeed,  limited  to  development  within  the  individual, 
but  it  was  a  distinct  advance  beyond  the  Platonic  thought. 
He  was  dualistic  in  that  he  believed  that  changes  which 
appear  to  be  mechanical  —  as  the  movement  of  a  ball  when 
it  Is  struck  —  are  wholly  apart  from,  and  fundamentally 
different  from,  developmental  changes  —  such  as  occur 
in  the  growth  of  a  plant. 

§  16.  Teleology  in  the  Socratic  Period. — A  clear 
understanding  of  the  significance  of  teleology  is  so  essential 
that  we  give  a  further  illustration  and  description  of  it. 
Your  friend  goes  into  the  country  to  visit  his  brother. 
Your  friend's  movements  are  undertaken  for  a  purpose, 
—  visiting  his  brother,  —  and  they  are  determined  with 
a  view  to  the  attainment  of  that  purpose.  His  action  is 
teleologlcal,  because  it  is  related  to  a  purpose,  or  end. 
Teleology  is  the  theory  that  the  world  and  its  changes 
are  purposeful ;  this  theory  holds  that  they  —  the  world 
and  its  changes  —  exist  for  a  purpose.  The  purpose  is 
usually  spoken  of  as  the  end.  In  ordinary  speech,  the 
word  "  end  "  signifies  a  termination  ;  but  it  does  not  neces- 
sarily mean  a  terminus  when  used  teleologically.  In  fact, 
in  the  teleologlcal  theory  of  the  universe  as  it  is  generally 
held,  "  end  "  does  not  signify  the  terminus  of  activity. 
An  illustration  will  make  its  meaning  clear.  You  see  men 
and  materials  gathered  at  the  foot  of  the  rapids  and  some 


38  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

work  begun.  Upon  inquiry,  you  learn  that  a  dam  is  to 
be  built.  Now,  the  completed  dam  is  not  the  end,  or 
purpose,  of  these  changes,  although  the  building  of  the  dam 
is  purposed.  The  end  of  this  activity  is  the  continued 
utilization  of  the  water-power.  The  teleological  end  of 
a  series  of  changes  is  that  result  which  is  sought  through 
the  changes,  and  the  end  may  be  something  which  is  not 
thought  of  as  terminating. 

The  Socratic  philosophers  had  a  teleological  conception 
of  the  universe.  Socrates  believed  that  the  world  was 
arranged  with  a  view  to  man's  advancement.  Plato  held 
that  the  changing  world  is  in  order  that  the  Idea  of  Good- 
ness may  have  expression.  It  will  be  necessary  to  revert 
to  Aristotle's  doctrine  of  the  Form  if  we  would  understand 
what  he  conceived  to  be  the  end  of  the  universe  and  its 
changes.  He  conceived  the  reality  which  is  the  essence 
of  any  particular  as  immanently  active,  somewhat  as  the 
Plain  Man  thinks  of  the  life  of  the  plant  as  active  within 
the  plant.  He  likewise  held  that  in  its  activity,  this  essence 
gives  form  and  motion  to  matter;  and  he  also  conceived 
this  activity  as  developmental,  as  giving  gradual  expres- 
sion to  the  nature  of  the  essence.  He  called  this  reality, 
this  essence.  Form.  But  his  conception  of  Form  required 
a  prime  mover  to  initiate  the  world-changes ;  and  this 
prime  mover  must  not  be  dependent  upon  matter,  as  is 
the  form  of  every  particular  of  the  universe ;  it  must  be  a 
perfect  universal.  Aristotle  spoke  of  this  prime  mover, 
the  perfect  reality,  as  pure  Form ;  it  is  his  basal  conception 
of  God.  Aristotle  was  the  first  philosophical  monotheist. 
For  him,  the  end  of  the  universe  is  the  expression  of  the 
pure  Form,  the  perfect  universal  reality  which  gives  reality 
to  all  that  is.  God  is  this  pure  Form,  the  perfect  Being ; 
and  the  end  of  the  Cosmos  is  the  expression  of  God's 
thought  and  blessedness. 


CHAPTER  V 

GILffiCO-ROMAN    PHILOSOPHY;    NEO-PLATONIC   PHILOSOPHY 

§  17.    General  View  of  the    Graeco-Roman  Philosophy. 

—  The  interests  of  this  Philosophy  were  specifically  ethical. 
Distrust  of  the  prevailing  religious  thought  had  developed, 
and  an  effort  was  made  to  substitute  individual  morality 
for  religion.  In  connection  with  the  discussion  incident 
to  this  attempt,  and  through  the  persistence  of  previous 
philosophic  questionings,  inquiry  was  made  as  to  the  tests 
or  criteria  of  truth,  the  activity  and  passivity  of  the  mind 
in  cognition,  the  validity  of  knowledge,  the  idea  of  cause, 
and  the  teleologlcal  conception  of  the  world.  It  was  held 
by  many  that  we  have  ideas  previous  to  experience.  This 
is  the  doctrine  of  Innate  ideas ;  it  comes  into  evidence  from 
this  time  on.  This  was  a  period  of  marked  advance  in  the 
sciences.  Archimedes,  Arlstarchus,  —  who  anticipated 
Copernicus,  —  and  Euclid,  the  geometer  and  physicist, 
had  part  in  this  movement.  The  sciences  were  cultivated 
apart  from  philosophical  system ;  but  there  was  no  sug- 
gestion that  Science  and  Philosophy  differ  in  purpose  and 
in  field  of  thought.  This  Philosophy  is  represented  in 
the  following  schools :  Stoics,  Epicureans,  Sceptics  (or 
Agnostics),  and  Eclectics. 

§  18.  Doctrines  of  the  Graeco-Roman  Schools.  —  i. 
Reality.  —  Plato  first  introduced  the  idea  of  immaterial 
reality  into  European  thought ;  with  Aristotle  this  reality 
became  virtually  spiritual.     But  it  was   a   difficult   con- 

39 


40  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

ceptlon  for  the  West.  The  Stoics  and  Epicureans  insisted 
that  only  the  material  is  real ;  and  the  Stoics  went  so  far 
as  to  declare  that  qualities,  relations,  and  feelings  are 
material.  Despite  the  work  of  the  Socratics,  the  prevailing 
doctrine  of  reality  was  materialistic  down  to  the  rise  of 
Neo-Platonism.  According  to  the  Stoics,  ultimate  reality 
is  one;  the  Epicureans  were  Atomists,  and  as  a  conse- 
quence, Pluralists.  The  Stoics  held  that  the  one  reality 
is  subject  to  changes  of  quality ;  the  atoms  of  the  Epicu- 
reans are  unchangeable. 

2.  Cognition.  —  The  Stoics  taught  that  the  mind  is 
active  in  cognition ;  it  assents  to  certain  representations 
as  true  because  it  is  forced  so  to  do  by  tension  aroused  in 
the  soul  by  the  shock  of  the  sense-impression.  From  these 
perceptions  and  certain  innate  ideas  which  arise  naturally 
in  us  through  experience,  we  form  conceptions.  These 
conceptions  are  thought-shadows  of  reality,  but  are  them- 
selves unreal.  The  Epicureans  taught  that  all  cognition 
consists  of  transformed  sensations ;  but  Epicurus  recog- 
nized the  activity  of  reason  and  the  reality  of  "  pre- 
conceptions." These  "  pre-conceptions  "  are  composite 
images  which  arise  from  repeated  sensations ;  and  the  use 
of  a  term  connected  in  thought  with  the  sensation  calls 
up  this  image.  He  cannot  connect  his  world  of  images 
and  his  world  of  objects. 

3 .  Validity  of  Knowledge.  —  The  Stoics  believed  that 
conceptions,  scientifically  proved,  gave  greater  certainty 
than  perceptions.  Immediate  conviction  was  their  cri- 
terion of  truth.  The  Epicureans  held  that  we  know  images, 
but  do  not  know  objects  ;  there  is  no  valid  science.  With 
them,  vividness  of  feeling  in  connection  with  sensations 

is  the  criterion  of  truth.     The  Sceptics  insisted  that  we  -y 
only  know  appearances  and  that  there  is  no  criterion  of 
truth.     They  argued  that  any  assumed  criterion  would 


GR^CO-ROMAN   PHILOSOPHY  41 

have  the  same  source  as  the  conviction  which  was  to  be 
tested  by  it.  We  only  have  probability,  but  that  may 
approximate  certainty.  The  Eclectics  believed  that  we 
may  trust  what  is  immediately  given  in  consciousness. 
Antiochus,  an  Eclectic,  contended  that  Scepticism  de- 
stroyed itself.  Thus,  the  Sceptics  held  that  we  can  arrive 
at  probable  truth ;  but  if  the  true  cannot  be  known,  how 
can  we  know  that  we  have  the  appearance  of  truth,  that 
what  we  know  is  probably  true .?  Further,  Scepticism 
averred  that  there  is  no  such  difference  between  true  and 
false  interpretations  as  that  we  may  distinguish  them, 
nevertheless  it  undertobk  to  define  and  reason ;  this  is  in- 
consistent. 

4.  Teleology.  —  The  Stoics  held  that  the  being  and 
course  of  the  world  are  determined  according  to  a  rational 
purpose.  They  undertook  to  hold  this  teleological  con- 
ception along  with  the  view  that  the  course  of  the  world 
is  determined  by  a  law  of  necessity.  The  Epicureans  had 
a  mechanical  conception  of  the  universe,  but  they  assumed 
that  some  of  the  atoms  had  the  power  of  self-determination. 

5.  Ethics.  —  While  it  is  not  our  purpose  to  trace  the 
history  of  Ethics,  the  ethical  temperament  of  the  Graeco- 
Roman  Philosophy  calls  for  the  presentation  of  two  widely 
divergent  ethical  theories  which  were  developed  in  this 
period.  The  Stoics  advocated  a  theory  which  may  in 
a  general  way  be  characterized  as  Perfectionism,  i.e.  they 
held  that  the  end  of  conduct  is  the  perfection  of  the  in- 
dividual. They  believed  that  the  ideal  man  is  one  who 
is  in  harmony  with  nature.  "  Nature  "  had  for  them  a 
two-fold  reference.  It  signified  first  the  nature  of  the 
universe.  As  thus  used,  they  insisted  that  men  should 
freely  accept  the  course  of  the  world,  for  the  order  of  the 
world  is  the  true  order  of  experience.  "  Nature  "  also 
signified  for  them  the  nature  of  man,  not  the  individual 


42  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

man,  but  the  universal  man;  that  is,  in  this  reference 
**  nature "  means  essential  human  nature.  The  later 
Stoics  gave  greater  emphasis  to  this  second  meaning.  At 
root,  these  meanings  are  one ;  for  the  Stoics  believed  that 
the  nature  of  man  is  one  with  the  nature  of  the  world. 
To  live  according  to  nature  is  to  oppose  sensuous  inclina- 
tions, to  subdue  passions,  to  lead  a  life  of  reason,  a  life 
of  justice  and  sympathy :  this  is  the  "  duty  "  of  man. 
This  virtuous  life  will  be  accompanied  by  mental  quietude, 
because  it  means  the  mastery  of  all  that  might  disturb. 
But  this  "  happiness  "  is  not  the  end  to  be  sought ;  it 
is  a  state  attendant  upon  the  attainment  of  the  end. 

The  Epicureans  declared  that  "  self-love  is  the  centre 
of  all  virtues  " ;  and  in  this  they  advocated  what  is  com- 
monly called  a  theory  of  Hedonism.  Hedonists  hold 
that  happiness  is  the  highest  good,  and  that  the  end  of 
life  is  the  attainment  of  happiness.  According  to  Epi- 
curus, the  ideal  state  is  one  of  unperturbed  satisfaction ; 
and  the  ideal  man,  while  not  indifferent  to  pleasures,  is 
independent  of  them.  He  would  give  mental  joys, 
aesthetic  enjoyments,  the  first  place.  Epicureanism  was 
necessarily  individualistic;  it  did  not  recognize  social 
obligations  and  could  not  command  heroism.  One  should 
do  justice  and  cultivate  friendship ;  but  only  because,  and 
in  so  far  as,  they  minister  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  self. 
Few,  if  any.  Hedonists  of  the  present  would  agree  in  all 
particulars  with  the  Epicureans ;  and  the  same  may  be 
said  of  Perfectionists  and  the  Stoics. 

Summary:  The  prevalent  conception  of  reality  is 
materialistic.  Effort  is  made  to  describe  and  explain  the 
cognitive  process ;  and  there  is  recognition  of  two  factors 
in  cognition  —  the  subjective  and  the  objective.  The 
Socratic  Philosophy  was  intellectualistic ;  the  knowing 
subject  was  thought  of  as  essentially  intellect.     The  Stoics 


NEO-PLATONIC   PHILOSOPHY  43 

and  the  Eclectics  indirectly  assign  value  to  feeling,  while 
they  directly  conceive  man  as  a  thinking  being.  For 
Epicureanism,  "  man  is  a  feeling  being."  The  inconsist- 
ency of  fundamental  doubt  of  the  validity  of  knowledge 
is  exposed.  This  indicates  that  Philosophy  must  begin 
by  accepting  the  trustworthiness  of  cognition ;  to  do  other- 
wise is  to  invaHdate  all  thinking,  even  our  doubt.  The 
doctrine  of  innate  ideas  which  first  appears  definitely 
in  this  Philosophy  raises  a  question  which  is  much  dis- 
cussed long  after  this  period :  Is  man  at  birth  mentally 
"  a  blank  tablet,"  or  is  he  born  with  a  mental  furnishing } 
and.  If  he  has  a  mental  furnishing  at  birth,  what  can  we 
say  definitely  respecting  it .? 

§  19.  General  View  of  Neo-Platonic  Philosophy.  — 
We  cannot  rest  in  a  Philosophy  which  accounts  the  world 
or  ourselves  unreal ;  neither  can  we  rest  in  a  Philosophy 
which  cuts  us  off  from  real  knowledge  —  i.e.  valid  knowl- 
edge —  of  the  real  world.  Previous  to  the  rise  of  the 
Neo-Platonic  Philosophy  there  had  developed  a  wide- 
spread distrust  of  man's  ability  to  attain  the  truth.  With 
the  belief  that  reason  is  unable  to  respond  adequately  to 
man's  demand  for  actual  and  valid  knowledge  of  the  world 
with  which  he  is  in  constant  and  unavoidable  commerce, 
there  arose  doubt  as  to  whether  reason  has  authority  to 
dictate  our  behefs.  When  men  became  convinced  that 
the  conclusions  of  reason  are  out  of  harmony  with  our 
daily  experience  of  real  knowledge  of  a  real  world,  they 
began  to  ask  whether  there  is  not  some  other  source  of 
knowledge  and  some  other  standard  of  truth  than  reason. 
Judaism  and  Christianity  insisted  that  they  were  in  pos- 
session of  knowledge  which  is  derived  from  a  source  higher 
than  reason;  they  claimed  that  it  was  received  by  im- 
mediate communication  from  God,  the  source  of  truth. 
Philosophic  thought  acted  upon  this  suggestion. 


44  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

In  addition  to  this  philosophic  dissatisfaction,  there  was 
extended  rehgious  unrest  and  hunger;  the  prevalent  ma- 
terialistic Philosophy  could  not  satisfy  the  longing  and 
demands  of  the  religious  consciousness.  At  this  juncture 
some  thinkers  seized  upon  the  suggestion  of  a  "  super- 
ordinary  "  mode  of  cognition ;  and  from  this  there  de- 
veloped the  Pagan,  or  Anti-Christian,  Neo-Platonism. 
Previous  to  this,  however,  an  allied  Jewish  philosophy  had 
been  constructed  and  the  Mediaeval  Philosophy,  which 
we  will  study  later,  accepted  a  super-rational  source  and 
standard  of  truth.  In  all  ages  since,  there  have  been  those 
who  have  insisted  that  there  is  a  super-rational  mode  of 
obtaining  knowledge,  viz.  by  spiritual  illumination.  This 
doctrine  is  known  as  Mysticism.  Neo-Platonism  is  the 
real  source  of  all  later  philosophical  mysticism. 

§  20.  Neo-Platonic  Doctrines. —  i.  Philo  represents 
Jewish  Neo-Platonism.  —  Moved  by  the  eclectic  spirit 
of  his  age,  he  sought  to  harmonize  Greek  Philosophy  and 
the  religious  thought  of  the  Old  Testament.  His  super- 
ordinary  source  of  truth  was  the  Nous,  by  which  we  im- 
mediately lay  hold  of  truth  in  contemplation.  Man 
acquires  the  Nous  in  the  renunciation  of  self  and  conse- 
quent absorption  into  unity  with  God.  The  body,  being 
matter,  drags  the  soul  down;  but  the  soul  may  rise  to 
union  with  Deity  through  the  Nous. 

2.  Plotinus,  the  founder  of  Pagan  Neo-Platonism,  held 
that  it  was  the  task  of  Philosophy  to  bring  us  to  conscious- 
ness of  our  essential  oneness  with  God.  With  this  con- 
sciousness there  comes  the  mystical  ecstasy  in  which  the 
knower  becomes  one  with  what  is  known  and  thus  attains 
knowledge  of  the  true,  for  he  shares  in  the  divine  contem- 
plation. Matter,  an  emanation  from  individual  souls, 
has  neither  quality  nor  being ;  the  world-soul,  an  emana- 
tion from  the  world-reason,  gives  ideas  to  matter;    the 


NEO-PLATONIC  PHILOSOPHY  45 

world-reason  is  an  emanation  from  the  Primal.  Of  the 
Primal,  or  God,  we  cannot  say  any  more  than  that  he  is 
and  that  the  universe  is  an  efflux,  or  overflowing  from  the 
unchanging  God.  Jamblichus  developed  a  polytheistic 
theology  from  the  system  of  Plotinus ;  and  opponents  of 
Christianity  utilized  the  teachings  of  Jamblichus  with  the 
hope  of  reviving  interest  in  the  heathen  religions  and 
worship. 

§  21.  At  the  Close  of  Ancient  Philosophy.  —  i.  Point 
of  View.  —  At  the  close  of  the  Ancient  Philosophy, 
thinkers  are  considering  subject  and  object,  idea  and 
sense-object,  activity  and  passivity  of  tne  mind,  change  and 
permanence,  motion  and  rest,  unity  and  manifoldness, 
mind  and  matter,  freedom  and  necessity,  mechanism  and 
teleology.  Those  who  do  not  accept  some  form  or 
modification  of  Neo-Platonism  regard  the  principles  in 
each  of  these  pairs  as  inherently  exclusive  of  each  other, 
with  possible  exception  of  the  last  pair,  —  mechanism 
and  teleology.  Hence  the  prevailing  conception  of  the 
universe  outside  Neo-Platonism  was  fundamentally  dual- 
istic.  But  despite  this,  when  Justinian  forbade  the  teach- 
ing of  Philosophy  at  Athens,  reflective  thought  was  striv- 
ing after  a  single  primal  reality  which  shall  be  the  ground 
of  the  being  and  order  of  the  cosmos.  That  is.  Philosophy 
was  seeking  a  monistic  ultimate,  and  this  ultimate  was 
generally  conceived  as  spiritual. 

2.  Philosophical  Doctrines. — We  have  seen  that  differing 
philosophical  doctrines  developed  from  Greek  philosophical 
activity.  A  clear  definition  of  these  differences  will  tend 
to  a  better  understanding  of  the  subsequent  course  of 
Philosophy.  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  the 
lines  of  difference  are  not  always  sharply  drawn,  and  that 
the  names  given  these  doctrines,  together  with  their  defi- 
nitions, are  to  be  taken  as  applicable  only  in  a  general 


46  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

way  to  Individual  thinkers.  Monism  is  the  doctrine  that 
there  is  only  one  ultimate  real ;  Pluralism,  that  there  are 
many  ultimate  reals  ;  Dualism,  that  the  universe  is  derived 
from  two  fundamental  principles.  Any  view  is  said  to 
be  dualistic  if  it  regards  the  phenomena  or  realities  of 
the  universe  as  reducible  to  two  orders  which  are  inherently 
exclusive  of  each  other;  e.g.  Plato's  world  of  Ideas  and 
world  of  objects.  Sensationalism  is  the  doctrine  that  ideas 
are  constituted  solely  of  sense-elements ;  Rationalism, 
as  opposed  to  Sensationalism,  is  the  view  that  elements 
of  knowledge  are  contributed  by  the  mind.  The  Sophists 
were  sensationalists;  Democritus  and  Plato  were  ration- 
alists. Idealism  —  known  also  as  Spiritualism  —  holds 
that  the  universe  "  is  the  embodiment  of  reason  " ;  Ma- 
terialism insists  that  matter  furnishes  a  sufficient  explana- 
tion of  the  universe.  The  Socratic  philosophers  were 
idealists  and  rationalists ;  the  Stoics  and  Epicureans  were 
materialists.  We  have  learned  that  the  Stoics  conceived 
man  to  be  a  thinking  being ;  and  the  Epicureans  regarded 
him  as  a  feeling  being.  We  have  also  called  attention  to 
the  fact  that  every  experience  can  be  stated  in  one  of  three 
ways :  as  a  knowing,  feeling,  or  doing  experience.  The 
Socratic  Philosophy  gave  supremacy  to  knowing,  i.e. 
to  Intelligence;  so  did  the  Stoics.  This  attitude  toward 
man  and  related  philosophical  questions  Is  known  as 
Intellectuallsm.  The  Epicureans  and  the  Neo-Platon- 
ists  and  Mystics  give  supremacy  to  feeling,  or  affection 
as  it  is  termed  in  Psychology ;  and  this  attitude  is  called 
Affectlvlsm.  In  our  further  study  we  shall  discover  that 
some  regard  the  self  as  essentially  will,  or  volition ;  for 
these,  man  is  a  willing  being.  This  attitude  is  known  as 
Voluntarism. 


DIVISION  B:   MEDIEVAL  PHILOSOPHY 
CHAPTER  VI 

GENERAL    VIEW;     PATRISTIC    PHILOSOPHY;     SCHOLASTIC 
PHILOSOPHY 

§    22.    General   View    of    Mediaeval    Philosophy.  —  i. 

Relation  to  Ancient  Philosophy.  —  Ancient  Philosophy, 
during  the  greater  part  of  its  history,  developed  in  rel- 
ative independence  of  religious  instincts  and  ideas ;  but 
in  Neo-Platonism  this  apparent  apartness  of  Religion 
and  Philosophy  ceased.  Mediaeval  Philosophy  is  domi- 
nantly  religious.  In  its  beginning  it  was  closely  related 
to  Neo-Platonism;  but  it  was  moved  by  purposes,  and 
took  on  forms,  which  clearly  distinguish  it  from  that 
Philosophy.  Its  life  and  distinguishing  characteristics 
have  their  origin  in  devotion  to  Jesus  and  in  the  acceptance 
of  him  and  the  religious  teachings  of  the  Bible  as  revela- 
tions of  the  highest  truth.  Throughout  the  Mediaeval 
Age,  Philosophy  continued  to  claim  the  whole  field  of 
scholarly  thought,  although  Mathematics  and  the  Natural 
Sciences  were  not  pursued  with  ardor  except  by  a  few. 
Roger  Bacon  is  the  most  notable  representative  of  inde- 
pendent and  efficient  scientific  research  during  this  age. 
2.  Divisions.  —  Mediaeval  Philosophy  will  be  treated 
under  the  following  heads :  I.  The  Patristic  Philosophy 
(150-800  A.D.) ;  II.  The  Scholastic  Philosophy  (800- 
1450  A.D.) ;    III.  The  Transition  (1450-1625  a.d.).     The 

47 


48  INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

Patristic  Philosophy  falls  naturally  into  two  periods :  i. 
Period  of  Growth  (150-430  a.d.)  ;  ii.  Period  of  Decline 
(430-800  A.D.).  The  Scholastic  Philosophy  divides 
readily  into  three  periods:  i.  The  Platonic  Period  (1000- 
1200  A.D.) ;  ii.  The  Aristotelian  Period  (1200-1300  a.d.)  ; 
iii.  Period  of  Separation  (1300^1450  a.d.). 

I.    The  Patristic  Philosophy 

§  23.  Point  of  View.  —  The  Patristic  Philosophy  was 
developed  by  the  eariy  expounders  of  Christian  doctrine. 
These  teachers  are  known  as  the  Church  Fathers,  and  the 
Philosophy  derives  its  distinctive  name  from  this  fact. 
It  regarded  the  Bible  as  a  source  of  knowledge  super- 
rationally  communicated.  In  holding  to  the  possibility 
and  value  of  knowledge  so  obtained,  it  was  in  agreement 
with  Neo-Platonism.  But  it  differed  radically  from  that 
Philosophy  in  some  particulars,  among  others  in  this : 
The  content  of  the  super-rational  knowledge  of  the 
Patristic  Philosophy  was  fixed,  —  it  was  the  content  of  the 
Old  and  New  Testaments ;  whereas  the  knowledge  to 
be  obtained  through  mental  ecstasy  —  the  super-rational 
knowledge  of  Neo-Platonism  —  had  no  fixed  content. 
The  widespread  opposition  to  Christianity  set  the  task 
for  these  first  exponents  of  Christian  Philosophy.  They 
undertook  to  defend  Christian  truth;  and  in  order  to 
defend  it,  they  were  obliged  to  discover  and  specify  the 
particulars  of  Christian  doctrine.  Much  of  the  content 
of  the  Christian  doctrine  was  believed  by  the  Fathers  to 
have  been  obtained  through  a  super-rational  mode  of 
communication.  This  content  was  accepted  as  valid 
because  of  faith  in  its  source  and  the  mode  in  which  It 
was  communicated.  From  this  the  Christian  doctrine 
Itself  came  to  be  known  as  the  Christian  faith,  or  simply 
the  faith.     Hence  in  the  writings  of  the  Fathers  and  those 


PATRISTIC  AND  SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY     49 

who  succeeded  them,  we  find  that  the  term  "  faith " 
signifies  the  mental  process  by  which  the  Christian 
doctrine  is  appropriated,  and  also  the  doctrine  itself. 
Faith  thus  conceived  is  set  over  against  reason.  Reason 
signifies  intellective  activity  and  the  knowledge  obtained 
through  intellective  activity;  and  faith  signifies  a  mode 
of  cognition  distinct  from  intellection,  also  that  content 
of  knowledge  which  is  distinctively  Christian.  From 
these  distinctions  as  to  mode  of  cognition  and  knowledge 
contents,  there  arose  the  question  of  the  relation  of  faith 
and  reason,  and  the  kindred  question  of  the  relation  of 
Revelation  and  Philosophy. 

Man  is  regarded  as  central  to  the  universe,  and  it  is 
believed  that  his  destiny  gives  significance  to  all  historical 
movements.  In  other  words,  this  Philosophy  is  anthro- 
pocentric.  Revelation  is  thought  of  as  progressive  and 
as  determined  with  a  view  to  the  gradual  enlightenment 
of  mankind;  that  is,  revelation  is  teleologic.  In  fact, 
the  Fathers  held  that  all  history  is  teleologic. 

i.  Period  of  Growth 

§  24.  Doctrines.  —  i.  Revelation  and  Philosophy. — 
All  but  a  few  of  the  Fathers  assumed  the  inner  harmony 
of  Philosophy  and  Revelation  and  insisted  that  Chris- 
tianity is  the  highest  Philosophy. 

2.  Mind  and  Matter.  —  Most  of  the  Fathers  held  to  the 
ultimate  distinctness  of  mind  and  matter  and  the  im- 
materiality of  the  soul.  A  few  had  a  materialistic  con- 
ception of  mind. 

3 .  God  and  Reality.  —  The  dominant  Patristic  Philos- 
ophy conceived  God  as  personal  and  spiritual,  the  creator 
of  the  world  and  man.  Origen  insisted  that  reality  is 
spiritual  in  its  nature,  that  God  is  the  true  real,  that 
the  spiritual  ideas  in  man  constitute  the  real  in  him,  that  the 

£ 


so  INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

highest  reality  in  God  is  the  creative  will,  and  that  will  is 
the  essential  expression  of  personality.  He  was  a  Volun- 
tarist. 

4.  Augustine;  His  Doctrine  and  Method.  —  Augustine 
was  the  philosopher  and  the  theologian  of  the  early  Chris- 
tian community;  and  his  philosophy  is  the  philosophy 
of  much  of  the  religious  thought  of  to-day.  He  attained 
conceptions  which  seem  almost  modern.  His  starting 
point  is  experience  of  self ;  in  this  he  advanced  beyond  all 
who  had  preceded  him.  He  argues  thus :  I  know  that 
I  have  sensations ;  this  indubitable  fact  carries  with  it 
the  certainty  that  I  am ;  and  this  certainty  also  attaches 
to  all  phases  of  consciousness,  since  consciousness  is 
unitary.  He  held  that  reason  furnishes  the  standard  for 
—  i.e.  the  norms  of  —  truth  and  right  and  beauty ;  the 
authoritativeness  and  the  sameness  of  these  norms  for 
all  subjects  constitute  the  warrant  of  their  universal 
validity. 

His  Doctrine  of  Reality.  —  We  find  reality  in  our  con- 
sciousness of  self;  and  we  are  conscious  of  ourselves  as 
being  and  knowing  and  willing ;  therefore  being,  knowing, 
and  willing  are  attributes  of  reality.  We  may  not  affirm 
knowing  and  willing  of  a  body,  hence  a  body  is  a  defective 
reality.  Man  does  not  have  fulness  of  being  and  knowl- 
edge, and  he  is  not  perfectly  free  in  willing;  hence 
man  is  also  a  defective  reality.  God  alone  is  the  perfect 
reality. 

His  Doctrine  of  Knowledge.  —  We  attain  knowledge  by 
reflecting  upon  our  sense-impressions  and  our  intellectual 
life.  We  need  Divine  aid  both  in  reception  of  truth  and 
in  reflecting  upon  it;  and  this  aid  is  given  in  the  Bible 
and  the  gracious  illumination  of  the  individual.  Faith  is  a 
condition  of  knowing  and  is  ultimately  resolved  into 
knowledge ;  it  is  not  opposed  to  reason. 


PATRISTIC  AND  SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY    51 

u.    Period  of  Decline 

§  25.  Period  of  Decline.  —  Philosophical  discussion 
degenerated  to  what  was  little  better  than  word-juggling. 
It  aroused  mental  activity,  but  was  out  of  touch  with 
the  world  of  reality.  Apart  from  the  work  of  two  men  — 
Erigena  and  Gerbert  —  there  is  little  in  this  period  that 
would  be  of  value  for  our  study.  Erigena  was  virtually 
a  Neo-Platonist.  He  held  that  God  is  the  substance  of 
the  world,  and  that  God  himself  is  without  mode  of  being, 
but  takes  determinate  form  in  the  world.  The  doctrine 
that  God  is  the  substance  of  the  world  is  Pantheism. 
Gerbert,  who  travelled  extensively,  came  into  contact 
with  Arabians  and  became  interested  in  their  scientific 
researches.  He  urged  that  the  pursuit  of  empty  word- 
subtilities  be  given  up  and  that  thought  be  directed 
to  the  study  of  nature.  But  Christian  thought  at  large 
did  not  turn  to  scientific  methods  and  investigations  until 
much  later. 

II.   The  Scholastic  Philosophy 

§  26.  General  View.  —  i.  The  Task  of  Philosophy. — 
It  was  now  generally  accepted  that  the  Fathers  had  settled 
the  form  and  substance  of  truth.  The  Christian  doctrines 
as  set  forth  in  the  Patristic  Philosophy  were  also  regarded 
as  the  standards,  and  truth  and  untruth  were  determined  by 
conformity  or  non-conformity  to  these  teachings,  or  dogmas. 
In  this  period,  the  religious  consciousness  has  the  chief  place 
in  philosophical  thought.  Primacy  over  reason  is  given  to 
faith,  and  reason  is  made  to  serve  the  Interests  of  faith. 
The  task  of  Philosophy  is  to  explain  and  justify  Christian 
dogma. 

2.  The  Form  which  the  Problem  Assumed.  —  The  ablest 
exponent  of  Patristic   Philosophy  had   established   con- 


52  INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

sciousness  as  the  starting-point  of  philosophical  inquiry. 
Scholastic  Philosophy  does  not  continue  the  development 
of  Augustine's  thought ;  it  reverts  to  a  question  which  was 
discussed  by  Plato  and  Aristotle  —  the  question  as  to 
whether  reality  is  in  the  universal  or  the  particular  (§§  14, 
4;  15,  3).  Out  of  the  controversy  which  was  consequent 
upon  this  statement  of  the  philosophical  problem,  there 
developed  three  philosophic  doctrines ;  these  are  known 
as  Realism,  Nominalism,  and  Conceptualism.  These 
doctrines  did  not  originate  in  this  period  ;  but  the  interests 
of  the  church  at  this  time  gave  them  such  value  as  to 
bring  them  into  prominence.  They  are  involved  in  sub- 
sequent philosophic  thought;  in  fact,  this  question  of 
reality  is  even  now  a  matter  of  controversy,  but  presents 
itself  in  a  somewhat  different  form. 

Realism.  —  The  Realists  held  that  universals  alone  are 
real.  "  Rose,"  the  universal,  is  real ;  a  particular  rose  — 
as  that  rose  in  the  vase  —  is  an  imperfect  copy,  an  in- 
complete and  changeful  expression,  of  the  universal 
"  rose,"  and  it  is  by  that  much  unreal.  This  is  readily 
recognized  to  be  the  same  with  Plato's  doctrine  of  the  Idea 
and  the  sense-object. 

Nominalism.  —  The  Nominalists  insisted  that  the  uni- 
versal is  a  mere  word ;  the  more  extreme  would  say  that 
it  is  a  mere  sound.  Thus,  "  rose,"  the  universal,  is  a  mere 
word ;  and  there  is  no  objective  reality  corresponding  to 
this  word.  Only  the  independent  particular  is  real. 
We  may  have  a  number  of  objects  each  of  which  is  a  rose ; 
but  the  "  rose  "  class  is  merely  a  mental  construct ;  there 
is  no  such  objective  reality.  What  is  true  of  groups  is 
also  true  of  parts  of  an  individual  object ;  they  are  mental 
figments. 

Conceptualism.  —  Conceptualism  is  intermediate  be- 
tween  Realism   and   Nominalism.     According   to   it   the 


PATRISTIC  AND  SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY    53 

universal  "  rose  "  is  a  mental  construct ;  but  it  is  true  for 
individual  flowers,  because  it  has  ground  in  the  characteris- 
tics which  are  common  to  certain  flowers.  The  univer- 
sal has  no  objective  reality,  merely  as  a  universal^  but  it  is 
objectively  real  in  all  individuals  which  have  the  common 
marks.  This  connects  directly  with  Socrates'  doctrine 
of  the  concept. 

These  views  variously  modified  are  present  in  subsequent 
Philosophy.  The  Schoolmen,  the  learned  men,  —  or  Doc- 
tors, —  of  this  period  contrasted  these  doctrines  in  certain 
concise  formulas.  The  doctrine  of  Realism  was  said  to 
be  Universalia  ante  rem  (Universals  are  before  the  thing, 
or  sense-object) ;  the  doctrine  of  Nominalism,  Universalia 
post  rem  (Universals  after  the  thing) ;  the  doctrine  of 
Conceptualism,  Universalia  in  re  (Universals  in  the  thing). 

§  27.  "What  gave  this  Discussion  Importance.  —  To 
the  church,  this  controversy  was  no  mere  dispute  about 
words ;  grave  consequences  were  involved  in  it.  The 
church  declared  in  favor  of  Realism,  because  the  leading 
Doctors  believed  that  it  was  vital  to  the  church  and  its 
dogmas.  According  to  Realism,  only  the  universal  church 
is  real;  hence  authority  is  in  the  universal  church.  Ac- 
cording to  Nominalism,  the  so-called  universal  church  is 
a  mere  term.  It  is  a  convenient  term  for  thought  and  inter- 
course ;  but  the  only  real  church  is  the  particular  church. 
If  Nominalism  be  true,  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  in- 
dividual experience  is  the  only  real  expression  of  religious 
reality ;  and  leaders  in  the  church  believed  that  this  would 
destroy  the  reality  and  authoritativeness  of  general  dogmas. 
Realism  was  also  accordant  with  the  doctrine  of  the  Unity 
in  the  Trinity;  whereas  Nominalism  would  involve  the 
conclusion  that  each  of  the  three  persons  in  the  Trinity 
is  an  independent  reality,  and  that  the  Oneness  of  the 
Trinity  is  a  mere  mental  concept,  i.e.  Nominalism  led  to 


54  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Tri-theism.  It  is  not  strange,  therefore,  that  the  church 
held  with  Realism  and  condemned  Nominalism ;  and  as  the 
Philosophy  of  this  age  is  the  product  of  the  church.  Realism 
was  the  prevailing  philosophic  doctrine.  But  extreme 
Realism  tended  toward  Pantheism,  and  this  led  some  to 
revolt  from  it.  It  must  not  be  concluded  that  this  dis- 
cussion is  simply  an  incident  in  the  historical  past  of  Phi- 
losophy. This  question  is  with  us  to-day  in  the  inquiry 
as  to  what  may  be  said  of  the  reality  of  the  laws  of  nature 
and  the  reality  of  scientific  concepts  —  as  atoms,  electrons, 
sensations,  memory,  etc. 

i.   The  Platonic  Period 

§  28.  Representative  Teachers.  —  In  this  period,  the 
Platonic  Philosophy  stated  the  problem,  and  it  largely 
determined  the  generally  accepted  doctrine  and  its  inter- 
pretation. We  will  give  the  views  of  three  teachers  — 
a  representative  of  each  of  the  three  types  of  doctrine  dis- 
cussed in  the  two  sections  preceding  this. 

1 .  Anselm  was  a  Realist,  —  This  is  shown  in  his  argu- 
ment for  the  existence  of  God.  It  is  sufficient  for  our 
purpose  here  to  state  that  his  argument  is  determined  by 
his  belief  that  reality  is  in  the  universal,  not  in  the 
particular.  He  also  believed  that  faith  precedes  knowl- 
edge, that  faith  and  reason  are  in  agreement,  and  that  the 
church  doctrines  are  rationally  intelligible. 

2.  Roscellin  represents  Extreme  Nominalism.  —  He  in- 
sisted that  only  individuals  are  real,  and  that  a  universal  is 
merely  a  human  device  for  the  inclusion  of  different  reals 
or  qualities.     He  was  a  Sensationalist  and  a  Tri-theist. 

3.  Abelard  was  opposed  to  Realism  because  of  its  ten- 
dency to  develop  into  Pantheism ;  he  contended  that  it 
was  inherently  pantheistic.  Abelard  laid  the  foundations 
of  Conceptualism.     As  stated  by  him,  this  doctrine  would 


PATRISTIC  AND  SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY    55 

run  thus :  The  universal  exists  before  the  particulars  in 
the  mind  of  God,  as  a  type ;  after  the  particulars  in  the 
mind  of  man,  as  the  result  of  conceptual  thought ;  in  the 
particulars,  as  likeness  of  qualities  and  relations,  i.e.  as 
likeness  of  accidents.  The  prevalent  thought  of  this 
period  regarded  the  Christian  dogmas  as  the  standard  of 
truth,  and  as  authority  for  reason  in  otherwise  doubt- 
ful cases;  but  Abelard  insisted  that  in  doubtful  cases 
reason  should  be  recognized  as  judge.  He  was  opposed 
in  this ;  and  the  opposition  to  him  developed  a  Christian 
Mysticism. 


CHAPTER  VII 
SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  (continued) ;   the  transition 

ii.    The  Aristotelian  Period 

§  29.  General  View.  —  Aristotle's  principal  writings 
were  unknown  to  the  Fathers  and  to  the  eariier  Schoolmen. 
They  were  recovered  during  the  latter  part  of  the  Platonic 
period,  and  their  recovery  imparted  a  new  zest  to  philo- 
sophic study.  Aristotle's  dominance  in  reflective  thought 
began,  and  all  subsequent  Science  and  Philosophy  have 
been  greatly  influenced  by  him.  Settled  dogma  had 
become  authority  for  faith;  Aristotle  became  authority 
for  reason. 

1.  Philosophy  and  Theology;  Faith  and  Reason. — 
Two  kinds  of  knowledge  are  recognized :  That  which  is 
attained  through  faith ;  and  that  which  is  acquired  through 
reason.  Philosophy  and  Theology,  reason  and  faith, 
are  regarded  as  harmonious  ;  but  distinct  provinces  are  as- 
signed them.  It  was  held  that  Philosophy  deals  with  truths 
which  may  be  attained  and  comprehended  by  reason; 
and  that  Theology  deals  with  truths  which  are  beyond 
the  reach  of  reason,  but  may  be  acquired  through  faith 
in  the  Christian  revelation.  Philosophy  has  rationality 
for  its  guide ;  Theology  is  guided  by  revelation.  "  Theol- 
ogy views  truth  in  the  light  of  Divine  revelation ;  Philos- 
ophy views  it  in  the  light  of  reason." 

2.  Arabian  Influence.  —  The  Mohammedan  conquests 
brought  Arabian  scholars  into  contact  with  the  results 

56 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  57 

of  the  Graeco-Roman  scientific  activity  and  put  the  works 
of  Aristotle  into  their  hands.  They  achieved  much  in 
Science;  but,  with  the  exception  of  Averroes,  they  ac- 
complished little  in  general  Philosophy.  Jewish  students 
became  acquainted  with  the  work  of  the  Arabians;  and, 
through  their  extended  commercial  relations,  they  fur- 
thered the  distribution  of  the  Arabian  thought  throughout 
the  West.  The  Jews  themselves  made  no  material  con- 
tribution to  Philosophy  ;  Maimonides,  their  ablest  thinker, 
simply  gave  a  Jewish  dress  to  Averroes.  Scholastic 
Philosophy  proper  had  no  special  scientific  interest,  except 
in  the  instance  of  Albert  the  Great  and  Roger  Bacon; 
and  they  seem  to  have  been  aroused  by  the  scientific 
activity  of  the  Arabians. 

3.  Moderate  Realism.  —  Moderate  Realism  was  the 
view  generally  held  of  the  relation  to  reality  of  the  uni- 
versal and  the  particular.  It  may  be  stated  thus :  The 
universal  exists  before  particulars  in  the  mind  of  God,  as 
a  type ;  after  particulars  in  the  mind  of  man  ;  in  particu- 
lars as  the  essence  of  each  particular.  Comparison  of  this 
with  Abelard's  statement  of  Conceptualism  shows  that 
these  doctrines  differ  at  one  point ;  and  the  difference  is 
important.  Conceptualism  finds  the  universal  in  like- 
ness of  accidents  ;  Moderate  Realism  finds  it  in  the  essence, 
not  the  accidents,  of  particulars.  According  to  Abelard, 
the  universal  is  a  mere  thought-construct,  and  is  grounded 
in  phenomenal  likeness ;  according  to  Moderate  Realism, 
the  universal  is  grounded  in  identity  of  essence.  This 
modified  Realism  connects  directly  with  Aristotle;  its 
universal  corresponds  to  Aristotle's  Form. 

§  30.  Other  Doctrines.  —  i.  Philosophy  and  Theology. 
—  Albertus  Magnus  held  that  the  realm  of  faith  lies  be- 
yond the  world  of  reason,  and  that  it  is  the  continuation 
and  completion  of  reason.     In  relating  Philosophy  and 


58  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Theology,  Thomas  Aquinas,  who  studied  under  Albert, 
distinguished  three  orders  of  truths.  The  mysteries 
of  faith  —  as  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  —  are  in  the 
highest  order,  and  he  assigned  these  mysteries  to  Theology. 
Truths  of  the  next  lower  order  —  as  those  relating  to 
man's  destiny  and  the  existence  of  God  —  he  assigned  to 
both  Theology  and  Philosophy.  Truths  of  the  lowest 
order  he  sets  over  to  Philosophy.  Roger  Bacon  taught 
that  Theology  is  based  on  the  authority  of  the  Divine 
will,  all  other  knowledge  on  experience  or  reason. 

2.  Cognition.  —  Albert  insisted  that  the  mind  can  only 
know  what  is  within  itself ;  and  he  inferred  from  this  that 
the  immediate  object  of  knowledge  is  an  idea.  The  Stoics 
and  Epicureans  held  the  same  view  as  to  what  the  im- 
mediately known  object  is.  Until  relatively  late  in  the 
modern  age  of  Philosophy,  it  was  held,  without  serious 
question,  that  what  we  perceive  is  a  state  of  consciousness. 
Thomas  Aquinas  sought  to  explain  the  process  in  cogni- 
tion. He  taught  that  the  soul  and  the  object  interact  and 
this  interaction  produces  a  copy  of  the  object  in  the  mind, 
and  that  what  the  subject  perceives  is  this  mental  copy 
of  the  object,  and  not  the  object  itself.  Thus,  in  seeing 
a  tree,  or  hearing  a  song,  the  mind  and  the  object  interact 
and  produce  a  mental  copy  of  the  tree  or  the  song ;  and 
we  perceive  this  mental  representation  of  what  is  itself 
external  to  the  mind. 

3.  Man.  —  Aquinas  developed  Aristotle's  doctrine  of 
Forms  and  applied  it  to  man.  He  distinguished  two 
classes  of  Forms  —  Inherent  and  Subsistential ;  the  latter 
have  being  within  themselves.  The  former  realize  them- 
selves in  matter;  the  latter  are  active  intelligences  and 
realize  themselves  apart  from  matter.  These  two  orders 
of  Forms  are,  according  to  him,  united  in  man ;  and  man, 
as  subsistential  Form,  may  exist  apart  from  the  body. 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  59 

4.  Intellectualism.  —  The  philosophers  of  this  period 
followed  Aristotle  in  giving  supremacy  to  intellect 
over  will  and  feeling.  .Averroes,  the  noted  Arabian 
philosopher,  went  so  far  as  to  deny  volition  to  the  Supreme. 
He  contended  that  the  subject  wills,  and  only  wills,  be- 
cause he  has  a  sense  of  imperfection ;  and,  as  the  Supreme 
is  perfect,  we  may  not  think  of  him  as  willing.  This  view 
is  also  found  in  Modern  Philosophy. 

5.  Science. — Albert  made  original  scientific  researches 
and  was  himself  an  authority  in  Natural  Science  for  his 
period.  Roger  Bacon's  great  work  in  the  sciences,  his 
intense  ardor,  and  the  persecution  he  had  to  endure  are 
well-known  facts.  Three  centuries  passed  before  Christian 
thought  gave  itself  to  scientific  investigation;  but,  in 
the  meantime,  some  of  the  ablest  minds  took  part  in 
preparing  the  way  for  its  ultimate  recognition  as  a  worthy 
line  of  study. 

iii.  Period  of  Separation 

§  31.  General  View. — The  Patristic  Philosophy  as- 
sumed the  harmony  of  faith  and  reason,  but  the  Philosophy 
of  this  period  held  that  that  which  distinguishes  the  Chris- 
tian faith  is  of  a  realm  distinct  from  reason.  Religion  was 
even  thought  to  be  independent  of  a  reasoned  explanation 
or  foundation  for  the  truth  it  declared ;  it  was  regarded 
rather  as  an  attitude  of  submission  to  authoritative  state- 
ment. In  keeping  with  this,  the  church  Doctors  taught 
that  the  church  doctrines  needed  no  reasoned  justification. 
An  ardent  and  influential  Mysticism  developed;  it  had 
its  source  in  the  teachings  of  Thomas  Aquinas.  Intel- 
lectualism was  prevalent  in  this  period,  so  much  so  that 
although  Mysticism  has  a  natural  affinity  for  Afi'ectivism, 
Eckhart,  a  typical  Mystic,  was  an  intellectualist.  Duns 
Scotus  was  by  way  of  exception  a  voluntarist. 


6o  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

§  32.  Particular  Doctrines.  —  i.  Thomas  Aquinas  had 
assigned  some  Christian  doctrines  —  as  creation  and  im- 
mortality—  to  a  field  common  to  Philosophy  and  Theol- 
ogy; Duns  Scotus  and  William  of  Ockham,  Doctors  of 
this  period,  assigned  all  religious  truths  to  Theology  and 
gave  Philosophy  a  purely  secular  field.  They  contended 
that  the  church,  and  not  reason,  is  the  authority  for  faith ; 
and  that  a  proposition  may  be  both  true  and  false  —  say 
true  according  to  reason  and  false  according  to  faith. 

2.  Cognition.  —  Duns  Scotus  held  with  Thomas  Aqui- 
nas that  what  we  apprehend  in  cognition  is  a  mental 
copy  of  the  external  object.  William  of  Ockham  believed 
with  Scotus  and  Aquinas  that  an  idea  is  interposed  between 
the  subject  and  the  object ;  but  he  differed  from  them  in 
holding  that  this  interposed  idea  is  a  mere  sign  of  the  object, 
not  a  mental  copy  of  it.  Both  views  have  been  held  in 
some  form  down  to  the  present. 

3.  Mysticism.  —  Eckhart  and  Nicholas  of  Cusa  are 
representative  Mystics.  They  were  men  of  unusual 
ability.  Our  limitations  do  not  permit  such  a  statement 
as  would  adequately  indicate  their  influence  upon  sub- 
sequent Philosophy.  Eckhart  gave  German  Philosophy 
its  earliest  form  of  expression.  Both  he  and  Nicholas 
were  learned  in  Science.  Nicholas  insisted  that  the  earth 
revolves  around  the  sun,  anticipating  Copernicus  in  this. 
German  Mysticism  has  its  source  in  Eckhart.  For  him 
the  church  doctrines  are  temporal  symbols  of  eternal 
truth,  and  this  truth  is  purely  spiritual.  He  was  an  in- 
tellectualist ;  but  he  believed  that  eternal  truth,  which  is 
the  spiritual  essence  of  all  that  appears,  may  be  had  by  all 
the  pious,  and  only  by  the  pious.  Both  he  and  Nicholas 
were  extreme  Realists.  Nicholas  taught  that  God,  the 
One,  is  real  j  and  that  the  Many  come  to  reality  in  the 
One, 


THE  TRANSITION  6i 

III.    Time  of  Transition 

§  33.  General  View.  —  The  Natural  Sciences  begin  to 
receive  such  attention  as  had  not  been  given  them  in  the 
Mediaeval  Philosophy,  and  scientific  methods  and  ends  are 
coming  to  definition.  Among  the  thinkers  of  this  period 
we  find  Copernicus,  Tycho  Brahe,  Kepler,  and  Galileo. 
Hitherto  the  Aristotelian  astronomy  had  been  accepted, 
and  the  earth  was  conceived  as  the  centre  of  the  universe. 
The  new  astronomy  and  the  new  conclusions  in  Science 
gave  a  new  view  of  man's  position  in  the  universe  and  a  new 
estimate  of  his  importance.  The  new  Science  would  lead 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  earth  and  man  are  relatively 
unimportant.  As  a  consequence,  thinkers  were  inclined  to 
doubt  the  older  conceptions  and  to  seek  a  new  point  of 
view.  Independent  Philosophy  discarded  Aristotle;  in 
discarding  him  it  rejected  what  was  true  in  his  system 
along  with  what  was  false.  The  Christian  conception 
of  God  and  man  and  the  world  had  been  identified  by  most 
teachers  with  the  Aristotelian  science ;  and  this  led  those 
who  held  to  the  Scholastic  Philosophy  to  attack  the  new 
Science. 

§  34.  Transitional  Schools.  —  i.  The  Italian  School 
was  naturalistic  and  insisted  that  the  universe  and  all  its 
phenomena,  including  mental  and  moral  phenomena,  may 
be  explained  in  terms  of  the  physical  world.  Bruno,  the 
ablest  of  this  school,  held  that  God,  an  eternal  spirit, 
is  the  original  matter  of  this  world  and  the  only  reality. 
But  he  also  held  that  the  universe  is  composed  of  a  num- 
ber of  ultimate  monads ;  and  in  writing  of  these,  he  some- 
times speaks  as  if  he  were  a  Pluralist.  Campanella,  a 
Sensationalist,  contended  that  we  perceive,  not  objects, 
but  states  of  consciousness  which  objects  arouse  in  us; 
and  that  sense-qualities  —  as  color  and  taste  —  which  we 


62  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

assign  to  objects  are  states  of  consciousness  which  are 
for  us  signs  of  the  objects. 

2.  The  German  School  was  distinctly  Mystical.  Jacob 
Boehme,  its  most  notable  representative,  sought  to  unite 
religious  Philosophy  and  Science.  His  favorite  thought 
of  the  world  was  that  it  is  an  organism  developing  outward 
from  within.  According  to  him,  the  highest  knowledge 
comes  of  illumination,  not  reflection.  All  creature  con- 
sciousness is,  in  his  view,  God's  consciousness ;  never- 
theless he  thinks  of  God  as  somehow  other  than  the 
universe. 

§  35.  Summary  of  Characteristics  of  the  Mediaeval 
Philosophy. —  i.  General. — The  Mediaeval  philosophic 
aim  was  definitely  religious.  The  relation  of  Philosophy 
and  Theology,  hence  also  of  reason  and  faith,  was  a 
dominant  question.  It  passed  through  the  following 
stages  :  (i)  They  were  assumed  to  be  identical ;  (2)  They 
were  regarded  as  supplementary,  with  some  province  in 
common ;  (3)  They  were  thought  to  be  supplementary, 
with  different  provinces.  Faith  and  Theology  were  gen- 
erally deemed  to  be  the  higher  in  rank.  Their  relation, 
as  conceived,  may  also  be  stated  thus  :  (i)  In  the  Patristic 
Period  the  task  assigned  Philosophy  was  that  of  deter- 
mining and  defending  Christian  dogma ;  (2)  In  the 
Scholastic  Period,  Philosophy  was  subject  to  the  Chris- 
tian dogmas,  being  required  to  accept  these  dogmas  as 
criteria  of  validity  ;  (3)  By  the  close  of  the  time  of  Transi- 
tion, religion  and  Philosophy  are  set  in  a  relation  somewhat 
like  that  which  obtained  in  the  Greek  Philosophy,  but 
with  a  noteworthy  difference.  The  Greek  Philosophy 
down  to  Neo-Platonism  did  not  have  a  determinative 
religious  aim,  and  it  made  no  endeavor  to  find  a  philo- 
sophic justification  for  religious  faith.  In  contrast  with 
this,   the  Mediaeval  Philosophy  owes   its  being   and   its 


THE   TRANSITION  63 

distinguishing  qualities  to  the  religious  life.  The  early- 
Christians  felt  called  upon  to  give  a  systematic  and 
reasoned  statement  of  their  views  to  the  world  that  mis- 
understood them,  and  to  defend  these  views  against  the 
attacks  of  their  enemies.  In  doing  this,  they  were  forced 
to  relate  their  religious  life  to  Philosophy.  The  effort 
to  relate  Philosophy  and  the  religious  life  discovered  an 
important  fact :  Philosophy  will  not  submit  to  external 
authority;  it  cannot  and  be  true  to  itself.  It  cannot 
accept  aught  the  acceptance  of  which  is  not  justified  by 
reason;  and  it  is  bound  to  accept  whatever  bears  the 
certification  of  reason.  But  while  Philosophy  may  not 
submit  to  external  authority,  even  though  it  speak  in  the 
name  of  religion,  it  may  not  be  indifferent  to  the  religious 
consciousness,  to  its  instincts  and  its  contents ;  for  re- 
ligious experience  gives  content  to  our  general  experience, 
and  questions  respecting  object  and  subject  cannot  have 
full  answer  apart  from  the  recognition  of  the  reality  and 
the  significance  of  the  religious  consciousness. 

2.  Various  Doctrines.  —  Attempts  to  explain  the  cogni- 
tive process  have  led  some  to  conclude  that  what  is 
immediately  known  is  a  mental  image  of  the  external 
object;  others  hold  that  the  known  object  is  a  state  of 
consciousness  which  is  a  sign  of  the  object.  According  to 
either  view,  what  the  subject  immediately  knows  is  a 
subjective  state,  not  the  external  object.  The  doctrine 
of  Reality  remains  a  question  of  difference.  There  are 
Realists,  who  hold  with  Plato,  and  Nominalists,  according 
to  whom  the  universal  is  a  mere  device  for  facilitating 
thought.  Moderate  Realists  and  Conceptualists  are 
found ;  and  they  agree  that,  as  to  the  world  of  nature,  the 
universal  is  real,  but  that  it  has  no  reality  apart  from  the 
particular.  Conceptualism  finds  the  universal  and  its 
reality  in  the  phenomenal  likeness  of  particulars ;   Moder- 


64  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

ate  Realism  finds  the  reality  of  the  universal  in  the  essen- 
tial likeness  of  individuals.  The  tri-phasal  character  of 
consciousness  is  recognized ;  and  some  give  emphasis  and 
authority  to  intellection,  others  to  the  will,  still  others  to 
feeling.  Realism  shows  pantheistic  affinities.  An  im- 
plicit Dualism  pervades  much  of  Philosophy.  This  is 
manifest  in  the  assumed  mutual  exclusiveness  of  mind 
and  matter,  and  of  subject  and  object,  and  in  the  asserted 
apartness  of  fai^h  and  reason  which  we  find  in  the  later 
Mediaeval  thought.  The  way  is  prepared  for  a  more 
general  recognition  of  the  worth  of  scientific  studies,  for 
freedom  to  pursue  them  without  incurring  authoritative 
opposition,  and  for  the  development  of  Science. 


DIVISION  C:    MODERN   PHILOSOPHY 
CHAPTER  VIII 


GENERAL    VIEW 


§  36.  Introductory.  —  i .  Some  Contrasts.  —  The  Pre- 
Socratic  Philosophy  occupied  itself  mostly  with  the  object ; 
Modern  Philosophy  begins  with  the  subject.  Mediaeval 
Philosophy  is  restricted  by  its  partial  aim  —  which  was 
religious  —  and  by  its  submission  to  authority ;  Modern 
Philosophy  acknowledges  no  restrictions  except  those 
involved  in  the  demand  that  reflective  thought  shall  be 
true  to  reason.  Hitherto  the  problem  of  Reality  has  been 
resolved  into  the  question  as  to  whether  reality  is  in  the 
universal  or  the  particular,  and  Realism  has  signified  the 
doctrine  that  the  universal  is  real.  The  Modern  Age 
states  this  problem  differently  and  in  a  way  that  seems  to 
bring  it  nearer  the  common  conception.  Modern  Phi- 
losophy studies  the  reality  of  the  world  of  other  persons 
and  things  and  events ;  it  would  know  what  is  the  nature 
of  the  reality  of  the  objective  world,  what  the  reality  of 
the  universe  is.  We  shall  learn  further  on  that  the  doc- 
trine of  Realism  to-day  is  something  very  different  from  the 
Realism  which  we  have  found  in  our  study  thus  far. 

2.  Cognition.  —  In  the  Summary  at  the  close  of  §  18 
we  note  that  philosophers  were  undertaking  to  describe 
and  explain  the  cognitive  process.  Two  factors  were 
recognized  —  the  object  and  the  subject ;    and  question 

F  65 


66  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

had  been  already  raised  as  to  the  activity  and  passivity 
of  the  mind  in  cognition.  Democritus,  the  Atomist, 
regarded  the  mind  as  active  in  attaining  knowledge;  and 
the  Socratic  philosophers  certainly  held  the  same  view. 
But  there  were  those  who  insisted  that  ideas  are  composed 
solely  of  sense-elements ;  they  would  even  reduce  the 
thought-products  of  reflection  to  sensation.  Out  of  the 
discussion  incident  to  this  study  of  cognition,  there  de- 
veloped two  opposed  attitudes.  These  attitudes  repre- 
sent opposing  views  of  the  relation  of  the  mind  and  the 
object  in  perception.  There  were  those  who  would  begin 
with  the  object  in  explaining  this  process  ;  they  would  em- 
phasize the  impression  which  the  object  makes  upon  the 
subject  through  sensations  which  it  arouses.  They  would, 
for  example,  describe  your  perception  of  a  tree  thus  :  You  are 
looking  over  the  landscape ;  the  tree  intercepts  your  vision ; 
it  acts  upon  you  through  your  visual  sense-organs  and 
arouses  sensations ;  and  these  sensations  are  in  some  way 
so  combined  as  to  give  you  a  perception  of  the  tree. 
Similarly  as  to  the  dinner-bell  which  breaks  in  upon  your 
study.  This  is  a  very  general,  yet  sufficiently  specific, 
illustration  of  what  is  called  the  sensational  theory  of 
cognition.  It  contends  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  in- 
tellect which  has  not  been  in  the  senses.  According  to 
this  theory,  we  have  a  datum,  a  somewhat  given,  to  con- 
sciousness ;  and  this  datum  coming  from  without  is  the 
sole  material  of  knowledge.  As  thus  viewed,  experience 
is  merely  datum  to  consciousness,  conceived  apart  from 
mental  activity,  and  hence  does  not  include  any  content 
of  consciousness  that  comes  of  thought.  Any  theory  of 
cognition  which'  limits  experience  to  sense-data  and  finds 
its  point  of  beginning  and  the  total  material  of  knowledge 
in  experience,  is  known  as  Empiricism.  Our  experience 
comes  of  commerce  with  other  persons  and  things  and  our 


GENERAL  VIEW  67 

interest  in  events.  In  every  moment  of  our  intercourse 
with  the  objective  world,  we  are  mentally  active;  and 
all  actual  experience,  viewed  as  a  process,  has  an  element 
of  mental  activity.  Hence  experience  as  conceived  by 
Empiricism  is  incomplete;  in  fact,  it  is  not  real  experi- 
ence, it  lacks  an  essential  element.  There  is  no  such  ex- 
perience as  this  Empiricism  assumes ;  for  there  is  no  ex- 
perience apart  from  mental  activity. 

The  opposing  theory  begins  with  rational  activity,  or 
reason.  It  contends  that  there  is  no  sensation  apart  from 
mental  activity;  that  there  is  no  experience  which  is  a 
mere  datum  to  consciousness,  or  impression  upon  it,  from 
without ;  and  that  rational  activity  itself  always  contrib- 
utes somewhat  to  perception.  Inasmuch  as  this  theory 
emphasizes  the  rational  factor  and  would  find  the  key  to 
the  problem  in  the  activity  of  reason,  it  is  known  as  Ra- 
tionalism. Rationalism  and  Empiricism  are  thus  seen 
to  be  opposing  theories  of  cognition.  Empiricism  in  its 
crudest  and  extremest  form  makes  knowledge  to  come  to 
man  from  without;  Rationalism  in  its  extremest  form 
would  make  knowledge  purely  subjective,  it  would  come 
wholly  from  within.  It  is  doubtful  if  any  one  at  present 
takes  either  extreme  view.  These  two  theories,  as  thus 
described,  are  opposed  philosophical  methods  or  modes 
of  approach  to  the  problem  of  knowing.  One  approach  is 
by  way  of  the  rational  activity  of  the  subject;  the  other 
by  way  of  the  object  regarded  as  acting  upon  the  sense- 
organs  of  the  subject. 

3.  Immediate  Object  of  Knowledge.  —  Up  to  the  begin- 
ning of  the  modern  age  of  Philosophy  and  down  to  a  rel- 
atively late  period  in  this  age,  it  seems  to  have  been 
assumed  that  the  immediate  object  of  knowledge  is  sub- 
jective,—  in  and  of  the  subject;  and  that  the  subject 
passes  by  some  mental  process  from  this  subjective  object 


68  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

to  mental  grasp  of  the  external  object.  Some  have  held 
that  the  object,  through  its  action  upon  the  sense-organs 
of  the  subject,  produces  in  the  subject  a  mental  image 
of  the  object ;  others,  that  it  produces  a  state  of  conscious- 
ness which  is  a  mere  sign  of  the  object.  Some  conceive 
of  this  image  or  state  of  consciousness  as  the  product  of  the 
interaction  of  subject  and  object.  But  all,  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  modern  age  of  Philosophy  and  for  some  time 
after,  held  that  the  immediate  object  of  knowledge  is  an 
idea  or  a  state  of  consciousness,  and  not  the  external 
object.  Further  on  we  shall  find  that  this  assumption  is 
challenged. 

4.  Rationalism.  —  We  have  found  that  Philosophy  is 
unwilling  to  submit  any  of  its  questions  to  external  au- 
thority for  final  settlement.  It  holds  that  reason  is  the 
sole  authority  for  reason.  In  this  relation,  reason  signifies 
the  mind  as  active,  with  special  emphasis  upon  intel- 
lective activity.  The  Socratic  philosophers  appealed  to 
reason  alone ;  Augustine  found  the  standard  of  truth  in 
reason ;  and  the  endeavor  of  Mediaeval  Philosophy  to 
relate  faith  and  reason  concluded  the  discussion  of  this 
question.  That  conclusion  is  that  reason  must  pass  upon 
all  claims  to  validity ;  and  it  will  accept  no  certificate  of 
validity  except  such  as  reason  itself  issues.  As  Philosophy 
is  the  reasoned  consideration  of  experience,  its  conclusions 
must  be  the  conclusions  of  rationality.  This  philosophical 
attitude  —  that  of  unwillingness  to  submit  the  settlement 
of  philosophical  questions  to  authority  —  is  known  as 
Rationalism ;  and,  in  this  sense,  all  Modern  Philosophy  is 
rationalistic.  Rationalism  as  a  philosophical  attitude 
is  to  be  distinguished  from  Rationalism  as  a  theory.  As 
a  theory,  it  is  opposed  to  Empiricism ;  and  when  we  speak, 
as  we  shall,  of  Idealistic  and  Realistic  Rationalists,  we 
have  in  mind  those  who  are  opposed  to  Empiricism,  those 


GENERAL  VIEW  69 

who  hold  that  the  mind  contributes  content  to  knowl- 
edge. 

§  37.  Schools  in  Modern  Philosophy.  —  The  Modern 
Schools  will  be  treated  in  the  following  order :  Sub- 
stantialists  (1625-1750) ;  Earlier  Empiricists  (1625-1820) ; 
Idealistic  Rationalists  (1750-) ;  Realistic  Rationalists 
(1750-);  Later  Empiricists  (1820-).  Following  this,  we 
will  append  a  concise  statement  of  the  differing  philo- 
sophical attitudes  of  the  present. 


CHAPTER  IX 

SUBSTANTIALISTS  :     EARLY    EMPIRICISTS 

I.    The  Substantialists 

§  38.  General  View.  —  The  philosophers  whose  views 
we  are  about  to  consider,  were  extreme  Rationalists,  at 
least  in  purpose.  They  would  find  the  basis  of  Philosophy 
in  reason  apart  from  experience  of  the  external  world. 
Descartes,  from  whom  Modern  Philosophy  dates,  takes 
this  position  definitely ;  and  those  of  this  school  who  come 
after  him,  do  not  free  themselves  from  the  limitations  of 
this  fundamental  assumption.  In  constructing  their 
Philosophy,  they  make  much  of  substance.  It  is  with 
them  the  ultimate  reality ;  and  the  differences  in  their 
teachings  arise  from  their  differing  conceptions  of  sub- 
stance. All  of  them  conceive  substance  as  that  which 
exists  "  in  such  a  way  as  to  stand  in  need  of  no  other 
thing  in  order  "  that  it  may  exist.  Substance  manifests 
itself  in  some  mode  or  modes,  but  it  is  not  a  mere  mode ; 
it  is  that  which  exists  in  some  mode.  What  we  know 
about  substance,  we  know  through  its  having  marks  or 
qualities  ;  but  these  marks  or  qualities  are  accidents  of  the 
substance,  not  the  substance  itself.  They  agree  so  far; 
but  they  differ  in  their  conception  of  the  nature  of  sub- 
stance. They  agree  also  in  regarding  the  changes  of  the 
universe  as  being  mechanically  effected  ;  they  believe  that 
these  changes  are  effects  produced  by  causes  external  to 
the  objects  in  which  the  changes  take  place. 

70 


SUBSTANTIALISTS  71 

§  39.    Doctrines   of   Representative    Substantialists.  — 

Descartes,  Spinoza,  and  Leibniz  are  representative  Sub- 
stantialists. 

1.  Philosophic  Method.  —  Descartes  believed  that  ex- 
perience —  and  experience  with  him  is  sense-experience  — 
is  deceptive,  and  that  only  that  knowledge  is  valid  whose 
origin  is  in  human  intelligence  and  whose  basal  content  is 
contributed  by  reason.  He  also  believed  that  the  prin- 
ciples of  Intelligence  have  their  expression  in  mathematics  ; 
and  he  concluded  from  this  that  mathematics  would  furnish 
the  true  philosophic  method.  But  mathematics  is  a  de- 
velopment of  ideas  that  are  Immediately  (or  intuitively) 
known,  ideas  whose  truth  is  self-evident;  and  he  held 
that  we  should  similarly  deduce  Philosophy  from  some 
indubitable  principle.  He  found  such  a  principle  In  the  con- 
sciousness that  he  doubted.  He  could  not  doubt  the  fact 
of  his  doubting;  hence  It  was  evident  to  him  that  he 
thought.  This  Is  the  origin  of  his  famous,  Cogito,  ergo 
sum.  He  is  not  to  be  understood  as  arguing  from  the  fact 
of  his  thinking  to  the  fact  of  his  existence.  "  Therefore 
I  am  "  is  implicit  In  "I  think."  What  he  would  assert 
is,  that  he  has  an  immediate  certainty  of  his  own  existence. 
This  was  his  Indubitable  principle ;  but,  in  making  his 
deductions  from  It,  he  regarded  it  as  the  same  with  cer- 
tainty of  his  own  existence  as  a  thinking  substance.  That 
Is,  Descartes  assumed  that  his  Immediate  apprehension  of 
himself  as  doubting  was  the  same  with  knowledge  of  him- 
self as  thinking  substance ;  and  he  believed  that  he  had 
discovered  this  without  appeal  to  sense-experience. 
Spinoza  and  Leibniz  adopted  Descartes'  method,  the 
method  of  deduction  from  rationality;  and  Spinoza  was 
even  more  severely  mathematical  than  Descartes. 

2.  Substance.  —  Descartes  begins  with  self  as  thinking 
substance;    and  from  the  existence  of  self  he  undertakes 


72  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

to  prove  the  existence  of  God.  Consideration  of  his  argu- 
ment for  the  existence  of  God  does  not  fall  in  with  our 
purpose  at  this  point;  what  we  would  note  here  is,  his 
belief  that  the  existence  of  self  involves  the  existence  of 
God.  His  conception  of  substance  is,  that  it  is  that  which 
has  no  need  of  any  other  that  it  may  exist ;  and  he  holds 
consequently  that  God  is  the  sole  primary  substance,  for 
God  alone  has  no  need  of  any  other  that  he  may  exist.  The 
self  as  thinking  —  i.e.  the  mind  —  is  in  his  view  dependent 
upon  God  for  being;  it  is,  therefore,  created  or  relative 
substance.  Following  this  he  grounds  his  belief  in  the 
reality  of  material  substance  upon  two  facts :  that  God 
would  not  give  us  over  to  deception,  and  that  material 
objects  force  themselves  upon  our  attention.  In  this  way, 
Descartes  finds  one  primary  substance,  God,  and  two 
created  substances  —  mind  and  matter. 

Spinoza's  conception  of  substance  differs  from  Descartes' 
in  one  important  particular.  To  Descartes'  definition  of 
substance  as  that  which  exists  by  itself,  he  adds  an  attribute 
—  it  is  that  which  is  conceived  by  itself  alone.  From  this  he 
concludes  that,  since  substance  is  not  dependent  upon  any- 
thing for  its  conception,  there  is  only  one  substance.  For 
him  there  is  only  one  reality,  and  God  is  that  reality. 

According  to  Descartes  and  Spinoza,  substance  is  inde- 
pendent existence ;  according  to  Leibniz,  it  is  independent 
activity.  He  believed  that  there  are  many  independent 
individual  existences ;  and  that  activity  is  the  essential 
characteristic  of  each  of  these.  He  called  them  monads. 
Descartes'  system  was  dualistic.  Spinoza  was  a  Monist, 
and  Leibniz  was  a  Pluralist. 

3.  Leibniz^ s  Monads.  —  Leibniz's  monad  is  in  no  sense 
a  physical  entity ;  it  is  a  force-centre.  The  monads  are 
conceived  by  him  to  be  independent  centres  of  activity, 
each  of  which  is  sufficient  unto  itself.     These  monads 


SUBSTANTIALISTS  73 

combined  into  groups  compose  the  objects  which  make 
up  the  universe.  In  each  organic  group  —  as  a  plant,  an 
animal,  or  a  man  —  there  is  a  central  monad.  This 
central  monad  most  fully  and  definitely  represents  the 
idea  of  the  group ;  and  it  is  also  a  peculiar  representation 
of  the  universe,  for  the  universe  has  a  specific  and 
particular  representation  in  every  monad.  Man  is  a 
self-conscious  group-monad.  Below  man  the  monads 
have  lessening  degrees  of  consciousness  until  in  plants  and 
inorganic  objects  consciousness  is  wholly  wanting.  The 
perfection  of  the  monad  is  its  conscious  representation 
of  the  universe.  Above  man  is  God,  the  highest  monad ; 
the  universe  is  perfectly  represented  in  him.  Every 
monad  is  active  toward  the  expression  of  the  ideal  which 
is  completely  represented  in  God. 

4.  Mind  and  Matter.  —  According  to  Descartes,  mind 
is  thinking  substance  and  matter  is  extended  substance. 
Bodies  are  distinguished  from  one  another  by  difi"erences 
of  form,  size,  place,  and  motion  ;  and  form,  size,  place,  and 
motion  are  modes  of  extension.  Minds  difi"er  as  to  modes  of 
consciousness  —  judgments,  ideas,  and  will.  He  believed 
color,  taste,  and  sound  to  be  modes  of  consciousness,  not 
qualities  of  perceived  objects ;  i.e.  they  are  not  properties 
of  the  object,  but  states  of  consciousness  of  the  subject. 
Democritus  had  propounded  a  similar  doctrine ;  he  taught 
that  color,  odor,  taste,  and  sound  arise  in  sense-perception. 
With  Spinoza,  thought  and  extension  are  not  substances ; 
they  are  attributes  of  the  one  and  only  substance  —  God. 
They  are  two  aspects,  but  not  the  only  aspects,  of  the  one 
substance.     Leibniz's  monads  are  immaterial. 

5.  Knowledge.  —  We  have  stated  Descartes'  view  as  to 
how  valid  knowledge  may  be  attained.  His  criterion  of 
truth  was  clearness  and  distinctness.  By  "clearness'*  he 
meant  what  is  immediately  present  to  the  mind  ;  by  "  dis- 


74  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

tinctness,"  what  is  In  Itself  clear  and  exactly  defined.  We 
have  this  clearness  and  distinctness  in  our  knowledge  of 
self  In  self-consciousness  ;  and  he  held  that  to  be  true  which 
is  thus  clear  and  distinct.  Spinoza  did  not  criticise  his 
own  processes ;  he  naively  assumed  that  what  he  held 
to  be  knowledge  could  be  accepted  without  question.  To 
clearness  and  distinctness  he  added  another  mark  of 
validity  —  adequacy.  He  believed  that  what  is  obtained 
through  sense-experience  is  inadequate ;  that  which  is 
attained  through  reason,  by  deduction,  he  regarded  as 
adequate.  He  also  accepted  the  fact  and  adequacy  of 
intuitive  knowledge.  In  this  mode  of  cognition,  he  be- 
lieved that  we  see  everything  in  the  light  of  God,  the  one 
substance.  Leibniz  describes  the  monads  as  "window- 
less  "  ;  nothing  "  can  enter  them  or  depart  from  them."  We 
might  conclude  then  that  for  him  knowledge  of  the  external 
world  is  impossible ;  for,  according  to  this  conception,  the 
monad  can  only  know  its  own  states.  But  Leibniz  avoided 
this  consequence,  for  he  also  held  that  every  monad  "  is  a 
mirror  of  the  cosmos  "  ;  i.e.  that  the  cosmos  is  represented 
in  the  monad.  It  follows,  then,  according  to  his  view, 
that  the  more  clear  and  definite  the  consciousness,  the 
better  and  fuller  the  knowledge  of  the  universe.  The  idea 
in  the  conscious  self  is  one  with  the  idea  in  the  universe, 
and  knowledge  of  the  self  is  knowledge  of  the  cosmos. 

6.  Mechanism  and  Teleology,  —  According  to  these 
philosophers,  nature  is  perceived  as  subject  to  mechanical 
law.  Every  event  is  the  necessary  consequent  of  some 
preceding  event.  But  Leibniz  gave  the  succession  of 
events  a  teleological  significance;  for  he  conceived  the 
whole  course  of  nature  and  history  as  progress  in  the  ex- 
pression of  the  ideal  which  is  represented  in  God,  the  cen- 
tral monad. 

7.  Parallelism.  —  Spinoza  was  a  Monist,  nevertheless 


SUBSTANTIALISTS  75 

he  sharply  distinguishes  extension  and  thought.  He 
conceives  them  as  two  orders  which  are  parallel;  and 
he  holds  that  for  every  mode  of  thought,  there  is  a  parallel 
mode  of  extension,  and  that  the  changes  in  these  orders 
run  parallel  with  each  other.  The  unity  of  the  two  orders 
in  any  instant  is  in  their  having  the  same  content  of  sub- 
stance; this  identical  content  expresses  itself  in  the  one 
instant  in  a  mode  of  thought  and  a  mode  of  extension. 
Thus,  when  I  will  to  sit  down  and  sit  down,  according  to 
Spinoza,  my  seating  myself  is  not  caused  by  my  will; 
but  the  one  content  of  substance  expresses  itself  in  my 
will  and  in  my  sitting  down.  He  proffers  in  this  a  parallel 
dualism  of  phenomena,  which  is  applicable  in  the  descrip- 
tion of  related  phenomena  of  mind  and  body.  Ideas 
are  causally  related  to  ideas,  and  motions  to  motions ; 
but  they  are  in  separate  orders,  orders  which  do  not 
interact. 

8.  Pre-established  Harmony.  —  Leibniz  conceives  the 
monads  to  be  absolutely  independent  in  action ;  no  one 
of  them  ever  influences  another.  Nevertheless  he  believes 
that  the  changes  of  the  universe  are  orderly.  How  is  the 
orderliness  of  these  independently  active  ultimates  to  be 
explained .?  Leibniz  does  this  by  his  doctrine  of  pre- 
established  harmony.  Every  monad  is  within  its  limi- 
tations the  same  with  the  central  monad ;  the  Creator 
has  so  made  it.  Each  monad  is  active  in  the  direction 
of  expressing  the  idea  of  the  central  monad ;  hence  the 
harmony  of  the  activity.  The  concurrent  action  of  the 
mind  in  willing  to  sit  down  and  of  the  body  in  sitting,  comes 
of  the  pre-established  harmony  of  the  mind  and  the  body. 
This  harmony  is  pre-established,  not  by  the  ordering  of 
each  event,  but  by  giving  to  each  monad  an  ideal  in  keep- 
ing with  the  ultimate  end,  which  is  the  expression  of  the 
Divine  ideal. 


76  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

II.   The  Earlier  Empiricists 

§  40.  General  View.  —  The  Sophists  were  Empiricists, 
and  since  their  time  Empiricism  has  had  continuous  rep- 
resentation in  Philosophy.  It  is  so  consonant  with  the 
"  common-sense  "  view  of  the  questions  involved  that 
it  finds  ready  acceptance,  especially  when  it  is  set  in  con- 
trast with  the  subtilties  of  the  Mediaeval  Philosophy. 
The  fruitless  word-combats  of  the  Schoolmen,  the  apart- 
ness from  life  of  their  discussions,  and  the  opposition  of  the 
Schoolmen  to  the  scientific  method  prepared  the  awaken- 
ing mind  of  the  Renaissance  to  welcome  thought  which 
appeared  to  deal  with  facts  instead  of  abstractions,  and 
fitted  it  to  give  a  sympathetic  hearing  to  a  Philosophy 
which  pursued  a  method  of  observation  and  induction. 
But  Empiricism  possibly  won  most  favor  from  the  fact 
that  it  studied  man ;  for  the  time  in  which  it  came  to 
flower  was  a  time  when  man  and  the  study  of  man  were 
glorified.  The  Earlier  Empiricism  was  thus  the  product 
of  the  enlightenment  which  followed  the  Renaissance. 
This  was  also  the  period  of  the  Substantialists. 
These  schools  were  contemporaneous. 

Francis  Bacon  had  prepared  the  way  for  this  Philosophy. 
In  his  "  Novum  Organum,"  he  shows  conclusively  that  we 
can  never  attain  knowledge  of  the  world  of  nature  by  argu- 
ing from  general  truths,  and  that  such  knowledge  may  be 
gained  by  a  study  of  particular  facts.  He  was  not  the 
founder  of  the  Inductive  method,  but  he  presented  this 
method  so  effectively  as  to  secure  attention ;  and  with  this 
he  gave  method  and  spirit  to  Modern  Empiricism.  Bacon 
virtually  confined  his  studies  to  Science,  as  distinguished 
from  Philosophy  proper.  »  Hobbes,  for  a  time  Bacon's 
secretary,  adopted  Bacon's  method  and  applied  it  to 
General   Philosophy.     The   Empiricists   who  come   after 


THE   EARLIER   EMPIRICISTS  -j^ 

Hobbes  agree  with  him  in  two  particulars.  They  hold 
that  we  do  not  know  the  reality  of  objects,  and  that  the 
immediate  object  of  knowledge  is  some  state  of  conscious- 
ness. Empiricists  approach  Philosophy  by  a  study  of 
cognition;  and  they  begin  this  specific  study  with  an 
analysis  of  the  cognitive  process.  In  this  analysis  they 
undertake  to  distinguish  the  part  which  sense-experience 
has  in  this  process  from  that  of  the  mind.  They  would 
pass  from  the  object  through  various  assumed  stages  of 
the  process  to  completed  knowledge.  It  belongs  to  Psy- 
chology to  seek  an  orderly  description  of  processes  in  con- 
sciousness ;  whereas  Philosophy  would  discover  the  import 
of  the  cognitive  consciousness  for  the  great  questions  asked 
respecting  the  world,  of  which  the  subject  has  experience, 
and  the  subject  who  has  experience  of  the  world.  From 
this  it  is  evident  that  Empiricism  arises  from  an  endeavor 
to  apply  the  Psychological  method  to  Philosophy.  Our 
first  interest  in  these  philosophers  is  their  Epistemology. 
They  hold  that  we  do  not  know  reality,  that  we  only  know 
appearance.     This  is  the  doctrine  of  Phenomenalism. 

§  41.  Specific  Doctrines  of  Early  Empiricists.  —  Three 
men  represent  this  school  —  Locke,  Berkeley,  and  Hume. 
Locke  was  an  Empirical  Realist,  Berkeley  was  an  Empirical 
Idealist,  and  Hume  was  an  Empirical  Sceptic.  They  all 
accepted  that  the  immediate  objects  of  knowledge  are  ideas. 

I.  Innate  Ideas.  —  Cicero,  of  the  Grseco-Roman 
school,  held  that  certain  ideas  —  as  duty,  freedom,  im- 
mortality —  are  inborn.  This  doctrine  of  innate  ideas 
persisted  in  Philosophy ;  and  it  was  accepted  that  these 
ideas  are  authoritative  and  that  they  constitute  rational 
knowledge.  Descartes  held  that  all  presentations  which 
are  as  clear  and  distinct  as  consciousness  of  self  are  innate ; 
Spinoza  begins  his  Philosophy  with  the  innate  idea  of 
substance;    according  to   Leibniz,   all   ideas   are   innate. 


78  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

As  the  doctrine  developed  it  came  to  mean,  not  that  man 
has  these  ideas  at  birth,  but  that  man  is  so  constituted  that 
with  the  development  of  the  individual  subject  certain  gen- 
eral notions  will  develop.  Locke  denied  that  there  are  in- 
nate ideas  which  are  authoritative  ;  but  he  recognized  that 
"  there  are  natural  tendencies  implanted  in  the  minds  of 
men."  According  to  him,  "  there  is  nothing  in  the  in- 
tellect which  has  not  been  in  sense,"  and  the  mind  at 
birth  is  like  a  wax  tablet  with  no  writing  on  it.  He  in- 
sisted that  the  mind  of  every  individual  is  at  the  begin- 
ning free  from  pre-determined  notions. 

2.  Cognition.  —  Locke  believed  that  the  capacity  of 
the  mind  for  knowing  is  merely  its  capacity  for  receiving 
impressions,  and  that  all  ideas  are  presentations  to  the 
mind,  not  constructions  of  the  mind.  He  held  that  our 
knowledge  of  the  external  world  is  through  sensation.  In 
sensation  simple  ideas  impress  themselves  upon  the  passive 
mind  ;  and  these  ideas  constitute  sensitive  knowledge.  In 
sensitive  knowledge  we  have  intuitive  certainty  that  the 
idea  is  present ;  but,  as  knowledge  of  the  external  world, 
it  lacks  certainty  and  is  inadequate.  In  reflection,  the 
subject  is  conscious  of  the  operations  of  his  mind  as  it 
combines  simple  ideas  into  complex  ideas,  as  it  perceives 
relations  and  separates  ideas  from  other  ideas  which  accom- 
pany them.  In  all  these  operations,  the  content  of  con- 
sciousness is  furnished  by  the  senses ;  and  the  knowledge 
attained  is  valid  within  the  world  of  ideas,  and  only  there. 
We  also  have  intuitive  knowledge  of  our  own  states. 

Hume  held  that  all  knowledge  is  reducible  to  impressions. 
We  are  shut  up  within  the  circle  of  impressions  and  can 
never  get  beyond  ourselves.  There  is  no  knowledge  of  an 
external  world ;  we  only  have  knowledge  of  these  im- 
pressions and  of  the  ideas  which  are  memory  images  of 
impressions.  "«^ 


THE  EARLIER  EMPIRICISTS  79 

3.  Reality.  —  Locke  accepted  the  reality  of  ideas  and 
of  spiritual  and  material  substance.  He  conceives  sub- 
stance to  be  the  unknown  substrate  of  qualities,  to  be 
that  in  which  the  qualities  of  an  object  inhere.  He  divided 
qualities  into  two  classes  —  primary  and  secondary.  The 
primary  qualities  are  solidity,  extension,  figure,  motion  or 
rest,  number;  they  represent  the  nature  of  objects.  The 
secondary  qualities  are  color,  taste,  etc.  These  secondary 
qualities  are  what  they  are  because  of  the  effect  of  objects 
upon  our  sense-organs ;  the  object  itself  does  not  have 
color  or  taste.  That  is,  the  secondary  qualities  are  de- 
pendent upon  the  mental  and  physical  organization  of  the 
subject.  Berkeley  argued  that  all  qualities,  primary  as 
well  as  secondary,  are  dependent  upon  mind.  He  held 
that  all  we  can  know  of  any  object  is  what  we  can  get  in 
sense-experience,  and  that  all  we  can  thus  obtain  is  sensa- 
tions. Sensations  are  for  him  ideas  of  sense ;  and  the 
objects  of  the  external  world  are  complexes  of  ideas  of 
sense.  An  object  is  merely  the  complex  of  perceptible 
qualities.  There  are  no  objects  outside  consciousness ; 
nature  is  merely  a  succession  of  ideas,  and  natural  laws  are 
ideas  of  succession.  With  Berkeley,  idea  meant  "  object 
presented  to  the  senses,  or  represented  in  image."  "  To 
be  is  to  be  perceived."  He  held,  therefore,  that  reality 
is  necessarily  particular  and  concrete.  Nevertheless,  he 
accepted  that  we  may  so  think  a  particular  as  to  render 
it  universal.  Thus,  in  reasoning  about  triangles  in  general, 
the  triangle  which  we  draw,  or  image,  is  an  equilateral, 
an  isosceles,  or  a  scalene  triangle ;  but  we  think  of  it  as 
representing  the  characteristics  which  are  common  to  all 
triangles.  He  would  say  that  this  general  idea  is  valid 
for  reasoning ;  but  it  is  not  a  complete  reality,  for  it  is  not 
"  an  object  presented  to  the  senses,  or  represented  in  an 
image."     As  a  consequence,  he  declared  "  material  sub- 


8o  INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

stance  "   to  be  unreal ;    but  he  assumed   the  reality  of 
"  spiritual  substance." 

Hume  declared  that  impressions  and  ideas  are  the  only 
realities  ;  and  that  view  reduces  all  reality  to  ideas.  These 
ideas  are  individual  and  disconnected.  The  mind  itself  is 
a  stream  of  disconnected  ideas,  and  different  movements 
and  situations  have  no  identity  or  bond.  There  is  no  self, 
no  world,  no  knowledge. 


CHAPTER  X 

IDEALISTIC    RATIONALISTS 

III.   Idealistic  Rationalists 

§  42.  Idealism  Defined.  —  i.  Objects  are  Embodiments 
of  Ideas.  —  At  the  beginning  of  our  study  we  described 
characteristics  of  experience  which  are  of  special  interest 
to  Philosophy  (§  2).  One  of  these  characteristics  is  that 
other  persons  and  things  and  events  have  meaning  for  us ; 
no  object  is  for  us  a  mere  actuality.  A  study  of  the  illustra- 
tion given  in  the  section  referred  to  above  will  make  this 
evident.  Your  attention  is  arrested  by  a  sound,  looking 
you  see  a  horse  running  madly  toward  you,  and  you 
hasten  to  shelter.  Every  particular  of  this  experience 
has  meaning.  Your  visual  experience  has  the  meaning 
of  a  runaway  horse  bearing  down  upon  you,  and  that  means 
danger  to  you.  The  place  to  which  you  flee  has  for  you 
the  meaning  of  safety.  Even  the  sound  has  meaning; 
it  signifies  that  something  is  occurring  to  which  it  is  worth 
your  while  to  give  attention.  All  with  which  we  have  to 
do  is  qualified  with  meaning.  To  say  that  every  object 
has  meaning,  is  to  say  that  objects  embody  ideas.  That 
the  particulars  of  the  universe  are  embodiments  of  ideas 
is  a  cardinal  doctrine  of  Idealism. 

2.  Reality  is  Rational.  —  Another  characteristic  of  ex- 
perience is  our  consciousness  of  the  reality  of  ourselves  and 
of  that  with  which  we  have  to  do.  What  is  it  to  be  real  ? 
It  may  be  difficult  if  not  impossible,  to  give  a  final  answer  to 

G  81 


82  INTRODUCTION   TO  PHILOSOPHY 

this  question ;  but  we  are  ready,  at  this  point,  to  note  a 
certain  aspect  of  reality.  Reality  is  more  than  existence. 
Whatever  is,  is  in  some  sense  or  degree  real;  but  to  be 
real  is  more  than  to  exist.  All  being  is  necessarily  of 
some  sort ;  it  is,  as  we  have  said  above,  being  with  meaning. 
Being  and  meaning  are  inseparable  aspects  of  reality; 
and  by  so  much  as  reality  has  meaning  by  that  much  it  is 
intelligible  and  may  be  known.  Idealism  holds  that  all 
reality  is  the  embodiment  of  mind;  and  that  whatever 
is,  is  rational. 

3.  Experience  has  Duality  of  Aspect.  —  It  arises  In  the 
subject-object  relation  and  is  a  consciousness  of  self  and 
of  object.  A  study  of  the  example  given  in  §  2  will  make 
this  clear.  Every  selected  particular  —  as  the  hearing, 
seeing,  fleeing  —  has  in  it  a  subject  aspect  and  an  object 
aspect.  We  do  not  know  of  any  experience,  we  cannot 
conceive  an  experience,  in  which  either  aspect  is  wanting. 
Idealism  holds,  not  only  that  these  aspects  are  inseparable, 
but  that  there  is  no  experience  where  either  subject  or 
object  is  absent.  Those  who  accept  this  doctrine  insist 
that  there  is  no  subject  who  is  not  experiencing;  and,  as 
experience  can  only  occur  in  the  subject-object  relation, 
there  is  no  subject  apart  from  this  relation.  They  also 
assert  that  there  is  no  reality  —  i.e.  no  real  object  — 
which  is  independent  of  consciousness.  That  subject  and 
object  are  interdependent,  not  independent  of  each  other, 
is  a  principle  of  Idealism. 

What  we  have  just  given  is  by  no  means  a  complete 
statement  of  Idealism.  Other  characteristics  of  this 
doctrine  will  appear  as  we  proceed. 

§  43.  Historical.  —  Idealism  has  its  roots  in  the  Socratic 
Philosophy.  Plato  held  that  each  particular  is  the  ex- 
pression of  an  idea,  and  that  the  object  comes  to  be  in 
order  that  the  idea  may  have  embodiment.     He  likewise 


IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  83 

believed  that  reality  is  in  the  idea  ;  and  from  this  it  follows 
that  for  him  the  objective  world  was  an  expression  of 
reality.  He  also  held  that  reality  is  intelligible  ;  and  that 
we  may  and  do  know  the  real.  Aristotle  was  also  an 
Idealist.  He  taught  that  objects  owe  their  being  and 
form  to  universals,  each  object  being  a  development  of 
a  universal,  the  universal  itself  determining  the  form  of 
the  matter  of  which  the  object  is  constituted.  In  this, 
he,  to  be  sure,  conceives  of  matter  as  independent  of  the 
idea,  or  universal,  except  as  to  the  form  which  it  takes ; 
nevertheless,  the  Idealistic  element  in  his  teaching  is 
evident.  So  far  as  subsequent  Philosophy  accepted  the 
Platonic  and  Aristotelian  conceptions,  it  was  Idealistic. 
Spinoza's  Idealism  is  obvious ;  and  he  profoundly  in- 
fluenced German  thought,  giving  it  an  Idealistic  cast. 
Berkeley  set  forth  a  distinct  and  extreme  doctrine  of 
Idealism.  According  to  him,  all  objects  other  than  per- 
sons are  only  ideas  of  sense.  He  insisted  that  "  there  is 
no  world  without  the  mind,  distinct  from  the  ideas  which 
are  within  us  " ;  and  that  nature  has  existence  solely  in  our 
experience.  He  was  the  author  of  the  formula.  Esse  est 
percipi  —  to  be  is  to  be  perceived ;  and  this  would  easily 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  reality  of  things  is  in  our 
perception  of  them,  not  in  their  perceptibility.  Late  in 
life  he  seems  to  have  modified  this  doctrine,  but  he  never 
worked  the  modification  into  his  system.  Kant  revolted 
from  Berkeley's  Idealism  and  from  Hume's  Scepticism. 
He  believed  that  both  doctrines  were  irrational.  Begin- 
ning with  Kant  we  will  consider  Idealism  as  represented 
by  him,  and  by  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel. 

§  44.  Kant.  —  I.  Introductory.  —  We  shall  merely  give 
a  cursory  statement  of  the  philosophical  problem  as  con- 
ceived by  this  master  mind,  without  undertaking  to  set 
forth  in  detail  the  arguments  by  which  he  would  sustain 


84  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

his  conclusions.  Our  study  of  his  system  will  necessarily 
be  limited  to  those  particulars  which  are  directly  related 
to  the  purpose  of  this  Introduction.  Criticism  has  modi- 
fied some  of  his  doctrines  and  has  rejected  others ;  but  we 
cannot  undertake  here  to  note  specific  views  or  methods 
concerning  which  there  is  reason  for  dissenting  from  him. 
Some  of  these  points  of  difference  will  appear  later.  Kant's 
motive  came  from  Hume's  conclusions.  If  Hume  were 
right,  there  is  no  knowledge  and  scientific  judgments  can- 
not be  rationally  justified.  Kant  was  unwilling  to  accept 
such  a  conclusion ;  and  he  set  out  to  investigate  knowl- 
edge, with  a  view  to  determining  its  validity  and  limita- 
tions. Hence  his  philosophy  is  primarily  a  theory  of 
knowledge,  or  an  epistemology. 

2.  His  Conception  of  the  Cognitive  Process.  —  Conse- 
quent upon  a  critical  study  of  cognition,  Kant  concluded 
that  there  can  be  no  knowledge  without  sense-experience. 
There  must  be  sense-experience  that  we  may  attain  knowl- 
edge; but  there  must  also  be  that  in  our  cognitive  con- 
sciousness which  is  not  derived  from  sense-experience.  We 
now  give  a  general  sketch  of  the  cognitive  process  as 
conceived  by  him. 

Perception.  —  External  realities  act  upon  the  sense- 
organs  of  the  subject,  and  the  subject  in  consequence  re- 
ceives disconnected  and  chaotic  sense-data.  These  data 
are  not  knowledge,  but  are  material  from  which  knowledge 
is  to  be  constructed.  Take,  for  example,  our  frequently 
used  illustration  of  the  horse  running  away.  The  data 
which  came  to  you  through  the  action  of  certain  realities 
upon  your  sense-organs  did  not  come  to  you  as  a  horse 
running  away;  the  mere  data  had  no  order  or  meaning. 
This  passive  reception  of  sense-data  Kant  speaks  of  as 
perception;  but  It  is  not  for  him  perception  of  objects. 
In  his  study  of  perception,  he  established  a  fact  of  prime 


IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  85 

importance  for  Philosophy :  Nothing  enters  into  conscious- 
ness as  a  mere  datum;  the  mind  deals  with  all  it£ecdves.  j 
He  likewise  called  attention  to  the  combining,~or  synthetic, 
activity  of  the  mind.  This  synthetic  activity  of  the  sub- 
ject makes  for  the  unification  of  the  disconnected  sense- 
data.  We  perceive  objects  in  related  positions ;  they  are 
apprehended  as  co-existing  in  apartness  from  each  other; 
and  we  also  have  a  consciousness  of  succession  in  our 
experiences.  In  other  words,  our  perceptions  have  space 
and  time  characteristics ;  they  are  not  in  disorder,  but  are 
given  a  space-order  and  time-order.  He  holds  that  the 
synthetic  activity  of  the  imagination  gives  this  space-form 
and  time-order  to  the  chaotic  sense-data.  Space  and  time 
are  of  the  mind,  and  are  contributions  of  the  mind  to 
perceptions.  Being  constituted  as  we  are,  we  treat  in  this 
way  the  data  which  we  receive  in  sensation.  According 
to  Kant,  space  and  time  do  not  come  with  the  sense-data ; 
they  are  the  contribution  of  sensibility.  Sensibility  with 
Kant  includes  imagination.  The  demand  that  there  shall 
be  in  the  cognitive  consciousness  an  element  which  is 
not  derived  from  sense-experience,  is  so  far  satisfied. 

The  Understanding  and  Knowledge.  —  Kant  held,  how- 
ever, that  perception  does  not  complete  knowledge.  In 
combining  sense-data  into  an  image,  the  imagination 
works  blindly  in  certain  fixed  ways ;  whereas  cognition 
is  a  distinctly  conscious  process.  There  is  no  attain- 
ment of  knowledge  apart  from  a  conscious  uniting  of 
ideas.  To  conclude  that  5  plus  7  equals  12,  calls  for  con- 
scious determination  of  mental  activity.  The  cognitive 
process  concludes  in  a  judgment;  and  a  judgment  is  the 
assertion  that  certain  ideas  are  conjoined.  The  synthetic 
activity  of  the  imagination  which  completes  the  process 
in  sensibility  is,  for  Kant,  the  unconscious  activity  of  the 
understanding;    the  synthetic  activity  in  judgment,  by 


86  INTRODUCTION   TO   PHILOSOPHY 

which  Ideas  are  united,  is  conscious  activity  of  the  under- 
standing. You  know  that  horse  as  one,  as  in  a  certain  re- 
lation to  you,  and  as  having  certain  characteristics.  We 
know  sensible  objects  in  terms  of  quality,  quantity,  and  as 
being  in  relation.  These  are  general  forms  in  which  all  sen- 
sible objects  are  known.  According  to  Kant,  the  under- 
standing judges  the  space-  and  time-ordered  material 
prepared  for  it,  judges  it  by  means  of  these  conceptions  — 
relation,  quality,  quantity,  etc.  These  concepts  are  its  gen- 
eral forms  of  judgments ;  being  forms  of  judgment,  they 
are  known  as  categories.  In  judgment  we  combine  ideas ; 
and  the  understanding  in  judging  combines  the  manifold 
elements  of  perception  into  one  experience.  Any  single 
object,  as  a  book,  has  many  particulars  in  it;  but  these 
particulars  are  synthesized  into  one  experience.  The 
sense-data  of  an  observed  object  are  received  as  a  series 
continuing  during  the  observation ;  but  these  perceptions 
are  united  into  one  experience  by  the  understanding. 
The  conceptions,  or  categories,  in  terms  of  which  the  un- 
derstanding frames  its  judgments  and  thus  constitutes 
knowledge,  are  supplied  by  the  mind.  All  that  sense-ex- 
perience contributes  is  the  chaotic  and  disconnected  sense- 
data,  the  mere  material  of  knowledge ;  the  mind  orders 
and  unifies  the  data,  it  contributes  that  which  gives  mean- 
ing to  the  material. 

3 .  As  to  the  Objectivity  of  what  is  Known.  —  From  the 
foregoing,  it  appears  that,  according  to  Kant,  the  objects 
of  knowledge  are  subjectively  constituted.  But,  if  the 
only  objects  which  can  be  known  are  objects  which  are 
thus  constituted,  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  the  world 
which  each  subject  knows  is  a  world  whose  appearance 
is  constituted  by  the  subject  himself.  The  characteristics 
of  the  known  world,  the  forms  in  which  it  appears,  do  not 
come  from  the  external  world  of  realities ;   they  originate 


IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  87 

in  the  subject  and  are  the  production  of  the  subject,  not 
a  reproduction  by  him.  We  might  seem  justified,  then,  in 
concluding  that  the  individual  subject's  world  and  knowl- 
edge are  merely  his  own,  and  that  this  world  is  not  an 
object  for  other  subjects.  This,  if  true,  would  be  a 
serious  criticism  of  Kant's  doctrine ;  for  he  held  that  that 
only  is  valid  knowledge  which  is  universally  valid,  and 
that  that  only  is  truly  objective  which  is  object  for  all. 
But  he  would  deny  that  his  doctrine  leads  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  individual  subject's  world  and  knowledge 
are  merely  that  subject's  own.  He  held  that  the  principles 
according  to  which  the  sensibility  and  the  understanding 
act  in  constituting  objects  from  sense-data,  are  grounded 
in  the  nature  of  mind.  These  principles  are  the  principles, 
not  of  the  individual  mind,  but  of  the  universal  human 
reason,  of  the  super-individual  consciousness.  In  Kant's 
view,  the  individual  subject  does  not  determine  the  char- 
acteristics of  the  objects  which  he  knows ;  they  are  con- 
stituted, not  by  our  known,  or  experienced,  self,  but  by 
the  super-conscious  self  which  is  the  ground  of  our  "  em- 
pirical self."  This  unknown,  but  only  real.  Self  is  in- 
dependent of  conditions  and  experience ;  and  the  princi- 
ples of  the  understanding  are  the  expression  of  the  activity 
of  this  super-conscious  Ego.  Hence  the  world  which  we 
know  is,  for  Kant,  truly  objective,  because  it  is  object  for 
all  as  it  is  for  each. 

4.  Reason  and  the  Regulative  Ideas.  —  Kant  gave  to  the 
term  "  reason  "  a  broader  and  a  more  restricted  meaning. 
In  its  broader  meaning,  it  stands  for  the  whole  mental  ac- 
tivity as  related  to  knowledge  ;  in  its  more  restricted  appH- 
cation,  it  signifies  "  a  higher  function  of  the  mind  than  the 
understanding."  The  understanding  occupies  itself  with 
the  material  which  is  given  it  through  th'e  sensibility,  i.e. 
with  the  material  of  sense-experience.     Reason,  in  its  nar- 


88  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

rower  meaning,  is  occupied  solely  with  itself  and  makes  in- 
quiry into  its  own  nature.  This  inquiry  is  not  determined 
by  the  forms  of  the  knowing  process  ;  it  is  purely  contem- 
plative. But  while  it  is  merely  contemplative,  the  in- 
quiry is  not  haphazard  and  purposeless ;  the  reason  has 
a  purpose  and  the  inquiry  is  regulated  by  certain  Ideas. 
The  purpose  is  to  discover  a  final  reason  for  all  that  is  and 
all  that  occurs.  Kant  finds  that  the  reason  is  insistent  in 
its  demand  that  we  seek  a  principle  which  shall  be  the 
ground  of  explanation  for  all  phenomena ;  and,  since  this 
principle  is  all  inclusive,  it  will  necessarily  be  a  principle 
of  unity.  From  a  study  of  this  demand  of  reason,  he 
further  concludes  that  there  are  three  Ideas  which  regulate 
the  synthetic  activity  of  reason  as  it  searches  for  such  a 
principle  of  unity.  These  Ideas  are  the  Self,  the  World, 
and  God.  By  World,  he  means  not  the  world  of  phenomena 
which  is  constituted  by  the  understanding,  but  the  totality 
of  things-in-themselves  from  which  we  receive  the  un- 
ordered material  for  knowledge.  By  Self,  he  means  not 
the  known  self  of  experience,  but  the  super-conscious  Self 
to  which  we  have  already  referred.  Space  and  time  are 
synthetic  forms  of  sensibility,  the  categories  are  syn- 
thetic forms  of  the  understanding;  the  reason  regulates 
its  synthetic  activity  by  the  three  Ideas  just  named.  It 
does  not  constitute  objects  by  means  of  them ;  but  it 
unifies  all  the  particulars  of  experience  by  assuming  that 
the  Self,  the  World,  and  God  are  realities,  and  by  referring 
all  phenomena  to  these  Ideas  as  their  ground  principle  of 
explanation.  Thus,  phases  of  inner  experience  more 
directly  related  to  our  consciousness  of  personal  identity 
are  referred  to  the  Self  as  their  principle  of  unity  and 
explanation;  and  all  phenomena  of  inner  and  outer  ex- 
perience more  directly  related  to  sense-data  are  referred 
to  the  World  as  a  system  of  related  realities  for  their 


IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  89 

principle  of  unity  and  explanation.  And  by  setting  before 
itself  God  as  "  self-subsistent,  unconditioned,  and  creative 
reason,"  reason  *'  is  enabled  to  give  the  greatest  unity, 
extent,  and  system  to  our  empirical  knowledge."  Accord- 
ing to  Kant,  we  must  regard  the  Self,  the  World,  and  God 
as  realities,  even  though  they  are  not  objects  of  knowledge. 
His  doctrine  respecting  this  will  be  further  treated  under 
the  next  two  topics. 

5.  Reality;  Phenomena  and  Noumena. — According  to 
Kant,  known  objects  are  phenomena,  not  realities.  These 
objects  are  constituted  by  sensibility  and  the  understand- 
ing out  of  sense-data.  The  space  and  time  characteristics 
and  their  categorical  forms  are  given  them  by  the  mind. 
The  mind  has  contributed  to  the  sensible  material  all  that 
the  subject  is  conscious  of ;  hence  we  do  not  perceive  things 
as  they  are  in  themselves,  but  we  perceive  objects  as  the 
mind  makes  them  to  appear  to  us.  With  Kant,  then, 
an  object  is  not  a  thing  in  itself,  but  a  phenomenon. 
Nevertheless,  Kantian  objects,  or  phenomena,  are  not 
mere  seeming,  not  pure  illusions.  These  phenomena  have 
a  reality  which  is  relative  to  the  universal  human  reason 
of  which  we  have  spoken,  reason  in  this  relation  signifying 
the  cognitive  faculty.  In  contrasting  phenomena  and 
realities,  Kant  speaks  of  the  latter  as  noumena.  A  nou- 
menon  is  not  an  object;  in  fact,  it  cannot  become  an 
object  of  knowledge ;  it  is  "  the  idea  of  an  object  which  is 
not  an  object  of  sense."  Things-in-themselves,  the  super- 
conscious  Self,  and  God  are  examples  of  noumena.  Reali- 
ties are  noumena ;  they  are  ideal  objects  and  cannot  be- 
come objects  of  sense;  hence  they  cannot  be  known. 
That  reality  cannot  be  known,  is  a  cardinal  Kantian  doc- 
trine. What  is  more,  according  to  Kant,  knowledge  gives 
us  no  warrant  to  assert  that  noumena  really  exist.  It 
follows  that,  so  far  as  knowledge  goes,  we  may  not  affirm 


90  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

that  there  is  any  real  Self  or  World,  or  that  God  is.  But 
it  is  also  true  that  no  man  has  warrant  to  deny  their 
actuality;  for,  though  the  understanding  does  not  give 
knowledge  of  what  is  not  phenomena,  it  suggests  the  possi- 
bility of  the  existence  of  noumenal  reality. 

6.  That  Noumena  are  Real,  not  Simply  Ideal.  —  The 
agnostic  conclusion,  that  knowledge  does  not  give  warrant 
for  asserting  or  denying  the  actuality  of  supersensuous 
reality,  opens  the  way  to  the  more  constructive  part  of 
Kant's  system.  He  insisted  that  the  regulative  Ideas  of 
reason  have  a  significance  which  calls  for  more  than  ex- 
perience can  supply.  Reason,  as  "  a  higher  function  than 
the  understanding,"  makes  a  demand  which  experience 
cannot  satisfy ;  it  demands  more  than  the  understanding 
can  give.  We  are  not  bounded  by  experience,  even  though 
our  knowledge  is  thus  limited.  We  are  conscious  of  our- 
selves; this  is  an  assured  fact.  But  the  objects  of  the 
world  of  knowledge  are  not  conscious  of  themselves. 
Kant  held  that  the  self  of  experience  is  a  known  self,  not 
the  knowing  Self.  The  knowing  Self  is  a  superconscious 
Self,  a  self  that  is  not  known  and  cannot  be  known.  But 
that  we  are  conscious  of  ourselves  is  an  indubitable  fact ; 
and  this  fact  shows  that  we  are  not  shut  up  within  the 
world  of  knowledge,  that  we  are  not  mere  phenomena. 
The  noumenal  Self  is  regarded  as  an  actuality,  even  though 
it  cannot  be  known.  For  we  must  assume  that  there  is 
a  knowing  Self  if  we  would  render  the  fact  of  self-con- 
sciousness intelligible.  We  do  not  know  this  supercon- 
scious Self;  but  we  posit,  or  affirm,  that  this  ideal  Self 
is  a  reality.  Further,  we  act  as  well  as  know;  and,  in 
our  acting,  we  judge  that  there  is  that  which  we  ought 
to  do.  In  this,  also,  we  distinguish  between  ourselves  and 
the  objects  of  the  known  world  ;  "  ought "  has  no  meaning 
for  them.     We  are  certain  that  we  are  subject  to  the  moral 


IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  91 

imperative,  Thou  oughtest.  This  law  is  universal  and 
unconditional ;  and  "  it  has  no  meaning  unless  I  can  do 
what  I  ought  to  do."  The  reality  of  the  moral  law  is  in- 
dubitable. But  freedom  is  essential  to  the  reality  of  the 
moral  law;  therefore  we  must  believe  that  we  are  free. 
The  free  Self  is  a  posited  reality.  Kant  held  that  we  do 
not  know  that  we  are  free ;  for  freedom  is  supersensuous 
and  cannot  be  known.  Nevertheless  we  affirm  our  free- 
dom ;  it  is  an  affirmation  of  faith.  Faith  is,  with  Kant,  a 
rational  belief;  and,  in  the  realm  beyond  sense,  it  is  as 
universal  and  necessary  a  principle  as  the  categories  are 
in  the  realm  of  experience.  Here  Kant  reached  the  end 
for  which  he  set  out.  From  the  posited  reality  of  the  free 
Self,  he  argues  to  the  existence  of  God  and  the  immortality 
of  the  soul. 

7.  Mechanism  and  Teleology.  —  Kant  holds  that  "  the 
very  nature  of  intelligence  compels  us  to  regard  every 
whole  in  nature  as  ...  a  mechanical  system."  He  con- 
ceives such  a  whole  to  be  an  aggregation  of  parts  which 
are  externally  joined  and  related.  Objects  and  parts  of 
objects  are  conceived  as  influencing  other  objects  and 
parts  of  objects,  from  without.  Hence  every  event  in  the 
world  is  known  as  the  effect  of  a  cause  which  is  externally 
related  to  the  object  in  which  the  event  takes  place.  Never- 
theless, Kant  recognizes  that  this  does  not  afford  a  com- 
plete explanation  of  the  world  of  nature.  He  allows  that 
the  parts  of  organisms  have  their  significance  because  of 
the  idea,  or  significance,  of  the  whole.  In  organisms, 
the  whole  appears  as  constituting  the  parts ;  they  are, 
and  they  are  what  they  are,  because  of  their  relation  to  an 
end,  and  that  end  is  expressed  in  the  whole.  Kant  argues 
that  this  demands  a  cause  "  that  acts  by  ends,  i.e.  a  will  " ; 
and  he  agrees  that  such  a  cause  is  not  mechanical.  He  in- 
sists, therefore,  that  we  are  compelled  to  utilize  the  teleologi- 


92  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

cal  conception  in  the  explanation  of  organized  beings  ;  and 
that  this  forces  us  to  conceive  nature  as  a  system  in  which 
changes  are  determined  with  respect  to  ends.  According 
to  Kant,  this  teleological  conception  does  not  come  of 
sense-experience,  neither  is  it  a  category ;  hence  it  is  not 
an  element  of  knowledge.  It  merely  conditions  our  knowl- 
edge of  nature.  He  holds,  therefore,  that  all  objects  are, 
and  must  be,  mechanically  related  and  determined; 
but  he  concedes  that  the  teleological  idea  is  essential  to 
the  extension  of  knowledge  and  the  fuller  apprehension  of 
natural  objects  and  events.  It  is  noumenal,  however, 
and  falls  within  the  field  of  the  reason  as  distinguished 
from  the  understanding. 

8.  His  Dualism.  —  Despite  Kant's  insistence  that 
reason  demands  a  ground  principle  of  unity,  his  system 
has  many  dualistic  features. 

Subject  and  Object.  —  He  conceives  the  subject  to  be 
passively,  as  well  as  actively,  related  to  the  activity  of  the 
opposing  object.  The  data  which  come  to  the  under- 
standing through  the  sensibility  are  set  over  against  the 
understanding,  as  something  foreign  to  it.  The  activity 
of  the  subject  is  related  by  Kant  to  something  which  is 
independent  of  the  consciousness  of  the  subject.  There 
is  a  definite  dualism  in  his  conception  of  the  supercon- 
scious  and  unknowable  Self,  as  subject,  and  the  empirical, 
or  known,  self,  who  is  object.  In  his  treatment,  inner  and 
outer  experience  appear  as  parallel  kinds  of  knowledge, 
whereas  his  system  should  have  led  him  to  treat  them  as 
dual  aspects  of  a  unitary  knowledge. 

Phenomena  and  Noumena.  —  Kant  presents  two  worlds 
for  acceptance :  the  world  of  sensibility  and  the  under- 
standing, and  the  world  of  reason.  The  former  is  a  world 
of  phenomena ;  the  latter  is  a  world  of  noumena.  The 
world  of  phenomena  is  known;    the  world  of  reality  is 


IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  93 

unknowable,  it  is  a  posit,  or  affirmation,  of  faith.  The 
world  of  phenomena  is  constituted  by  us ;  the  noumenal 
world  conditions  our  thought.  Man  is  of  both  worlds. 
As  of  the  known  world,  he  is  under  the  law  of  necessity ; 
as  of  the  world  of  reality,  he  is  free. 

Perception  and  Conception.  —  Kant  regards  perception 
and  conception  as  essential  elements  of  knowledge,  dif- 
fering in  kind,  not  degree.  In  connection  with  this  sharp 
distinction  between  perception  and  conception,  he  relates 
the  sensibility  and  the  understanding  to  each  other  as 
distinct  faculties.  They  are  regarded  by  him  as  depart- 
ments of  niental  activity,  not  as  aspects  of  a  unitary 
activity. 

9.  Summary.  —  Kant  was  a  Realist  in  so  far  as  he  held 
that  there  are  "  realities  which  are  independent  of  con- 
sciousness." He  was  an  Idealist  in  so  far  as  he  taught 
that  the  mind  contributes  to  the  object,  and  that  the  ex- 
ternal object  exists  only  for  a  subject.  His  Idealism 
has  a  subjective  cast;  and,  as  he  gives  intelligence  the 
primacy  in  his  Epistemology,  his  system  may  be  classed 
as  Intellectual  Idealism.  Although  he  held  that  freedom, 
the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  God  are  not  objects  of 
knowledge,  he  insisted  that  they  have  all  the  reality  that 
may  be  ascribed  to  known  objects.  He  established  three 
facts  :  that  self-consciousness  and  consciousness  of  object 
are  inseparable ;  that  the  mind  is  active  in  perception ; 
that  the  teleological  conception  is  essential  to  Philosophy. 
He  also  served  in  directing  attention  to  the  synthetic 
activity  of  the  mind,  and  in  undertaking  to  give  it  critical 
and  extended  treatment.  The  synthesizing  mind  unifies 
the  diverse  elements  of  experience  and  makes  the  experi- 
ence of  the  past  an  element  in  the  experience  of  the  pres- 
ent. By  constituting  a  unitary  experience  out  of  ele- 
ments which  are  diverse  and  which  enter  experience  at 


94  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

different  times,  it  gives  us  a  consciousness  of  self-sameness. 
It  likewise  presses  us  to  seek  a  ground  principle  of  unity 
for  the  World  and  the  Self.     His  service  to  Philosophy  is 
of  incalculable  worth ;   but  he  left  the  problem  unsolved. 
According  to  his  Epistemology,  we  know  phenomena  and 
only  phenomena.    The  philosophers  who  followed  him  and    | 
who  recognized  the  cogency  of  his  reasoning  were  shut     '' 
up  to  one  of  two  positions :   they  must  accept  that  all  is 
phenomenal  and  that  the  noumenal  is  for  exact  thought     j 
a  fiction  ;   or  they  must  show  that  reality  may  be  known.     ' 
He  had  separated  the  subject  from  reality.     Rationality 
will  not  accept  such  a  conclusion  as  satisfactory ;  and  those 
who  came  after  him  sought  to  open  a  way  to  reality. 


CHAPTER  XI 

IDEALISTIC    RATIONALISTS    (cOTltinUed) 

§  45.  Fichte.  —  I.  His  Motive.  —  Fichte's  earlier  phil- 
osophic thought  was  largely  derived  from  Spinoza ;  but 
he  was  distressed  by  Spinoza's  insistence  that  the  universe 
including  man  is  subject  to  necessity  and  that  freedom  is 
an  illusion.  In  this  particular,  Spinozism  seemed  to 
him  both  unanswerable  and  unbearable.  Kant's  Critique 
of  the  Practical  Reason  gave  him  relief  and  turned  the 
current  of  his  thought.  In  Kant's  system,  he  had  found 
ground  for  asserting  that  man  is  not  subject  to  the  in- 
variable law  of  the  physical  world.  But  he  was  dissatisfied 
with  Kant's  dualistic  conception  of  necessity  and  freedom. 
According  to  Kant,  the  physical  world  is  a  realm  of  neces- 
sity; whereas  the  noumenal  Self  is  of  a  world  in  which 
the  order  is  free  and  uncaused.  This  gives  us  two  anti- 
thetical worlds,  each  having  its  own  principles  and  order; 
and  man  is  in  both.  Fichte  could  not  accept  such  a  con- 
clusion; he  was  too  conscious  of  the  reason's  command 
that  we  seek  a  ground  principle  of  unity,  and  he  was  too 
certain  of  the  fundamental  unity  of  all  that  is,  to  give  full 
consent  to  such  a  doctrine.  He  insisted  that  one  of  these 
orders  —  that  of  necessity  or  that  of  freedom  —  is  ultimate 
and,  therefore,  primal ;  and  he  felt  that  one  of  them  must 
be  reduced  to  the  other.  Ultimately  he  came  to  agree 
with  Kant  that  the  imperative,  "  Thou  oughtest,"  with 
its  implicate  of  freedom,  is  an  indubitable  fact.  He  says, 
"  That  I  myself  am  a  freely  acting  individual  must  be  the 

95 


96  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

fundamental  thought  of  every  true  philosopher."  But 
Idealism  is  in  his  view  the  inclusion  of  the  phenomenal 
series  within  consciousness.  This  means  for  him  that  the 
necessitated  series  is  an  aspect  of  a  series  which  is  essentially- 
free. 

2.  His  Epistemology.  —  Fichte  objects  to  the  dualistic 
features  of  Kant's  account  of  cognition  —  e.g.  the  sharp 
distinction  between  sensation  and  thought,  and  the  as- 
sumption of  things-in-themselves  which  are  independent 
of  consciousness  and  yet  obtrude  into  consciousness.  He, 
Fichte,  had  no  need  of  the  Kantian  thing-in-itself,  for  he 
has  the  ego  originate  the  process  which  gives  sensations. 
He  holds  that  the  ego  must  act,  and  must  act  freely.  The 
necessity  that  it  act,  is  in  its  own  nature ;  for  it  is  only  in 
acting  that  the  ego  can  become  —  i.e.  come  into  self-con- 
sciousness. The  lowest  form  of  this  activity  is  uncon- 
scious, and  the  product  of  such  activity  is  sensations. 
They  seem  to  come  from  a  source  that  is  other  than  our- 
selves and  to  be  thrust  upon  us,  simply  because  they  are 
our  unconscious  creation;  but  they  really  have  their 
origin  in  us.  He  holds  further  that  the  ego  in  creating 
sensations  has  limited  itself  and  has,  in  this  self-limiting 
act,  become  self-conscious.  Although  self-consciousness 
is  of  the  nature  of  the  ego,  we  are  only  self-conscious  as  we 
distinguish  self  from  what  is  not-self.  In  perceiving  the 
sensation  as  other  than  itself,  the  ego  becomes  self-con- 
scious and  posits  itself  as  real.  In  creating  the  non-ego, 
the  ego  gives  it  —  the  non-ego  —  space  form  and  time 
form.  Hence  we  know  all  objects  as  spatial  and  all 
changes  as  occurring  now  or  then;  and  we  can  only  know 
them  thus.  In  all  cognitive  and  practical  dealing  with 
objects,  we  find  ourselves  conditioned  by  space  and  time. 
Reflecting  on  the  non-ego,  the  ego  passes  to  fuller  develop- 
ment of  the  non-ego  in  terms  of  the  categories.     In  this 


IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  97 

higher  stage,  the  self  is  still  limited  by  what  it  has  created  ; 
for  the  ego  in  all  its  dealings  with  objects  is  conditioned 
by  their  quality,  quantity,  etc.  Thus  the  ego  passes  from 
sensation  through  perception  and  reflection  towards  com- 
plete knowledge.  This  higher  knowledge  is  a  completer 
knowledge  of  self  and  is  attained  through  the  ego's  own 
activities.  The  highest  stage  for  the  finite  ego  is  reached 
in  the  apprehension  of  the  moral  imperative;  and  here 
the  ego  is  fully  conscious  of  itself  as  self-determined. 
The  world  which  is  known  in  the  process  outlined  above 
is  the  creation  of  the  ego  and  exists  only  in  the  ego ;  and 
this  is,  according  to  Fichte,  the  one  world  of  reality  and 
knowledge.  In  short,  the  conscious  self  is  the  sole  reality. 
3.  The  Ego.  —  Kant  distinguishes  the  empirical  self 
from  the  superconscious  Self.  Fichte's  Ego  presents 
itself  in  two  aspects :  the  ego  which  is  limited  by  con- 
sciousness of  the  not-self,  and  the  Ego  which  brings  the 
not-self  into  existence  and  determines  its  characteristics. 
The  first  of  these  is  the  individual  subject;  the  other  is 
the  Universal  Ego  which  creates  the  finite  ego,  or  individ- 
ual subject.  The  finite  ego  is  a  self-limitation  of  the 
Universal  Ego.  The  Universal  Ego  is  the  self  of  practical 
thought.  We  have  seen  that  knowledge  is  knowledge  of 
the  ego  itself  and  is  attained  by  the  ego  through  reflection 
upon  its  own  activities ;  it  is  purely  subjective.  And 
since  he  holds  that  the  Ego  is  the  only  reality,  Fichte's 
reality  is  also  subjective.  His  Idealism  has,  therefore, 
been  known  as  Subjective  Idealism.  Nevertheless,  the 
object  —  i.e.  the  not-self  —  has  one  characteristic  of  ob- 
jectivity ;  it  is  object  for  all  as  it  is  for  each.  The  world 
of  objects  is  not  the  creation  of  the  individual  finite  subject, 
but  of  the  Universal  Ego.  This  gives  ground  for  uni- 
versality in  characteristics  of  objects  and  principles  of 
cognition ;    they  are  created  by  one  Ego  and  for  one  in- 

H 


98  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

elusive  end.  Fichte's  Universal  Ego  is  the  Absolute,  and 
is  impersonal.  This  distinguishes  it  from  Kant's  super- 
conscious  Self,  which  is  individual,  conditioned,  and  per- 
sonal. 

4.  His  Teleology.  —  According  to  Fichte,  things  do 
not  come  to  be,  neither  do  events  take  place,  simply  be- 
cause something  else  is,  or  some  other  event  has  occurred. 
All  things  and  events  are  linked  to  the  ego ;  but  the  linkage 
is  not  external  and  mechanical.  The  bond  which  unites 
things  and  events  is  immanent;  it  is  the  purpose  of  the 
ego.  The  world  which  we  create  and  know,  is  created  in 
order  that  we  may  perform  our  task,  in  order  that  we  may 
do  our  duty. 

5.  His  Idealism.  —  We  have  said  that  Fichte's  Idealism 
is  subjective.  It  is  also  distinctly  ethical.  Moral  obli- 
gation is  at  the  foundation  of  his  system.  For  him  the 
characteristic  spiritual  quality  of  man  is  will,  not  intelli- 
gence. The  end  of  man  is  the  performance  of  his  task. 
In  this,  as  in  the  attainment  of  knowledge,  man  is  limited 
by  the  not-self.  We  can  neither  know  anything  nor  do  our 
work  apart  from  the  not-self;  nevertheless  the  not-self 
limits  our  knowledge  and  thwarts  our  performance. 
Hence  life  is  a  continuous  struggle.  The  process  is  unend- 
ing ;  but  virtue  and  development  are  in  the  striving. 

§  46.  Schelling.  —  i.  His  Statement  of  the  Problem.  — 
In  his  earlier  philosophical  studies,  Schelling  was  greatly 
influenced  by  Fichte ;  in  fact,  he  at  first  adopted  Fichte's 
system,  and  he  began  a  work  which  was  to  supplement 
what  his  master  had  done.  But  he  was  from  the  first 
much  disturbed  by  a  feeling  that  Fichte  erred  in  not  rec- 
ognizing the  reality  of  the  world  of  nature;  and  ulti- 
mately he  became  convinced  that  Fichte's  conception  of 
the  object  as  a  purely  subjective  product  does  not  properly 
interpret  nature.     Schelling  was  certain  that  "  there  exist 


IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  99 

things  outside  of  us,"  and  that  what  is  thus  objective  Is 
not  the  product  of  the  subject.  Being  assured  of  this, 
he  made  it  his  task  to  construct  a  philosophy  which  would 
recognize  the  reality  of  both  matter  and  mind,  subject  and 
object.  His  thought  was  In  constant  change,  and  his 
views  at  different  periods  of  his  activity  were  by  no  means 
consistent ;  nevertheless  he  was  true  to  his  purpose  through 
all  these  changes. 

2.  Matter  and  Mind.  —  Fichte  begins  with  mind  and 
ends  with  mind  ;  Schelling  begins  with  unorganized  matter 
and  represents  the  human  organism  as  evolved  from  un- 
organized matter.  During  this  evolution,  spirit  enters 
into  immanent  relation  with  what  is  evolved,  and  does 
this  in  ever  increasing  degree.  With  him,  matter  is  not 
inert,  it  is  unconscious  activity  of  spirit;  it  is  the  lowest 
expression  of  spirit,  spirit's  expression  of  itself  to  the  senses. 
From  unorganized  matter,  he  would  pass  through  the  plant 
and  animal  until  we  have  in  the  brain  of  man  the  highest 
product  of  matter.  Schelling  regarded  spirit  as  invisible 
nature.  What  is  subjective  is  the  invisible  expression 
of  spirit ;  and  in  man  the  increasing  immanency  of  spirit 
in  the  higher  evolved  products  of  matter  issues  in  perfect 
ideality.  Objectively  regarded,  man  is  the  perfected 
evolution  of  matter;  subjectively  regarded,  he  is  ideality 
perfected.  The  objective  world  is  a  manifestation  of 
spirit,  the  same  principle  whose  activity  is  the  inner 
world  of  experience.  The  same  spirit  is  in  man  and  nature. 
Since  matter  and  mind,  man  and  nature,  have  the  same 
root,  they  are  not  alien  to  each  other. 

3.  His  Absolute. — The  ground  principle  of  unity  is 
denominated  by  him  the  Absolute.  In  his  earlier  thought, 
he  conceives  the  Absolute  to  be  distinctionless.  No  attri- 
bute may  be  affirmed  of  it ;  it  is  neither  matter  nor  mind, 
subject  nor  object ;  it  is  mere  self-identity.     The  Absolute 


lOo        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

and  the  universe  are  simply  two  "  aspects  of  one  and  the 
same  thing."  Later,  however,  in  his  Philosophy  of  Re- 
ligion, he  recognizes  a  personal  God. 

4.  Knowledge  and  Reality.  —  According  to  Schelling, 
there  is  no  thing-in-itself  from  which  the  knowing  subject 
is  cut  off.  The  known  world  is  a  world  of  reality,  not  a 
world  of  phenomena.  In  this  he  breaks  with  Kant. 
Nevertheless  his  conception  of  the  ultimate  reality  — 
the  Absolute  as  he  termed  it  —  makes  it  unknowable. 
It  may  not  be  said  to  be  of  any  kind,  for  it  is  distinctionless. 
What  is  not  of  any  assignable  kind  cannot  be  known. 
Kant's  limitation  of  knowledge  arises  from  the  limitations 
of  our  mental  constitution ;  Schelling's  comes  of  the  con- 
ception of  the  Absolute  as  being  without  distinction. 

5.  His  Ideal  sm.  —  With  Schelling,  the  highest  ex- 
pression of  reality  is  in  genius ;  the  highest  objective  ex- 
pression is  in  art.  Kant's  Idealism  is  intellectual  with 
subjective  features ;  Fichte's  is  subjective  and  ethical ; 
Schelling's  is  objective  and  sesthetical. 

§  47.  Hegel.  —  I.  Nature  of  Reality.  —  We  have  said 
that  Idealism  conceives  reality  as  being  with  meaning. 
Thus  in  the  illustration  which  we  have  so  often  used  — 
that  of  the  horse  running  away* —  the  reality  of  that  mov- 
ing mass  was  for  you  inseparably  associated  with  its 
meaning.  That  object  from  which  you  ran  was  not  a  mere 
that  without  significance ;  it  was  for  you  an  embodiment 
of  danger.  The  idea  of  which  it  was  the  expression  was 
an  essential  element  of  its  reality.  Hegel  calls  attention 
to  the  fact  that  "  reality  "  is  used  in  two  relations.  When 
a  man's  purpose  —  e.g.  to  found  a  hospital  —  has  been 
carried  out,  that  man's  idea  has  had  expression  given  it. 
The  hospital,  as  a  reality,  is  the  expression  in  actual  being 
of  the  founder's  idea.  The  hospital  is  the  idea  realized ; 
in  that  institution,  the  idea  of  the  founder  has  come  to 


IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  loi 

concrete  objectivity.  This  is  "  reality  "  in  one  of  the 
two  relations  noted  by  Hegel.  If  we  should  say  of  the 
institution,  "  That  is  a  real  hospital,"  we  would  indicate 
by  that  statement  that  the  institution  completely  expresses 
its  own  ideal  nature.  This  is  "  reality  "  in  the  other  re- 
lation. We  see  that  "  reality  "  is  in  both  relations  the 
correlate  of  "  ideality."  In  other  words,  reality  is  the 
concrete  expression  of  ideality,  and  ideality  is  the  essential 
nature  of  reality.  An  object  is  actualized  —  i.e.  realized 
—  idea  ;  and  reality  is  significant  being.  In  keeping  with 
this,  Hegel  held  that  "  all  reality  is  rational."  By  this 
he  meant  that  the  essential  nature  of  all  reality  is  kindred 
with  mind. 

2.  Ultimate  Reality ;  The  Absolute.  —  From  this  it 
follows  that,  for  Hegel,  ultimate  reality  is  rational.  Be- 
cause he  so  conceives  it,  he  speaks  of  it  as  the  Absolute 
Idea;  for  in  his  thought  the  Absolute  is  unconditioned 
reality.  In  characterizing  the  ultimate  reality  as  the 
Absolute,  he  means  that  it  is  self-subsistent  and  self- 
explanatory;  its  reality  is  complete  and  underived.  But 
to  understand  what  he  means  by  the  Absolute  Idea,  we 
must  also  note  his  conception  of  rationality.  The  term 
"  rationality  "  is  usually  restricted  in  its  application ;  for 
it  is  generally  taken  to  refer  solely  to  man's  intellective 
capacity,  to  his  faculty  for  framing  judgments  of  truth. 
In  other  words,  when  men  speak  of  "  rationality,"  they 
do  not  as  a  rule  include  the  willing  and  feeling  functions 
in  their  thought.  And  the  term  "  thought  "  generally 
suffers  a  similar  restriction,  for  it  is  usually  assumed  to 
denote  merely  the  intellective  activity,  or  that  which  is 
the  product  of  purely  intellective  activity.  But  these 
terms  and  the  ideas  to  which  they  correspond  are  not  so 
restricted  by  Hegel.  He  believed  that  the  mind  acts  as 
a  unit,  and  that  will  and  feeling  and  the  understanding. 


I02         INTRODUCTION   TO   PHILOSOPHY 

or  judging  activity,  are  not  really  distinct  forms  of  activ- 
ity, but  are  three  inseparable  aspects  of  one  activity. 
For  reasons  which  seemed  good  to  him,  he  assigned  to  the 
terms  "  rational  "  and  "  thought  "  a  wider  meaning  than 
that  usually  given  them.  He  would  include  in  the  single 
term  all  three  aspects  of  mental  activity.  Hence,  in  speak- 
ing of  the  ultimate  reality  as  the  Absolute  Idea,  he  means 
that  the  ultimate  reality  is  rational  in  this  inclusive  sense. 
He  proves  to  his  own  satisfaction  that  the  Absolute  is 
Person  and  is  One.  In  his  conception  of  the  Absolute,  he 
differs  from  both  Fichte  and  Schelling.  Fichte's  Absolute 
is  impersonal ;  Schelling's  Absolute  is  distinctionless  and 
undefinable,  no  attribute  may  be  assigned  to  it ;  hence  it 
may  not  be  thought  of  as  having  personality.  Hegel 
insisted  that  an  undefinable  Absolute,  or  Pure  Being,  is 
pure  nothing.  With  Schelling,  mind  and  nature,  as 
distinguished,  are  wanting  in  the  ultimate  reality;  in 
Hegel's  conception  of  the  ultimate,  mind  (or  Spirit)  has 
supremacy  over  nature. 

3,  The  Absolute  as  the  True  Universal.  —  For  Hegel, 
the  universe  is  a  setting-forth,  or  an  expression,  of  the 
Absolute  Idea.  Every  particular  of  nature  and  history, 
every  object  and  every  event,  is  a  manifestation  of  the 
ultimate  reality.  No  particular  is  a  complete  actualization 
of  the  Idea ;  but  it  is  a  true  realization  of  the  Idea  for 
that  particular's  place  and  part  in  the  system.  From 
this  it  is  evident  that,  in  Hegel's  view,  the  Absolute  Idea 
is  the  only  true,  the  only  complete,  universal.  In  this 
he  advanced  beyond  Aristotle.  According  to  Aristotle, 
the  universal  which  thought  discovers  —  e.g.  "  man," 
"  horse,"  or  "  dog  "  —  is  concrete  in  the  individual,  i.e. 
in  the  individual  man  or  horse  or  dog.  The  Aristotelian 
universal  has  no  reality  except  as  it  is  actualized  in  the 
particular;  and  it  is  real  in  the  particular  as  the  essence 


IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  103 

of  It.  From  this  it  follows  that  there  is  for  Aristotle  no 
particular  which  is  a  mere  particular ;  for  its  essence  is  a 
universal,  and  it  is  itself  the  realization  of  a  universal. 
But  Hegel  insisted  that  such  universals  or  ideas  are  only 
partly  true  to  the  essential  nature  of  objects.  Such  uni- 
versals include  the  likenesses  of  individuals,  but  they  have 
no  place  for  the  differences.  He  held  that  the  whole  nature 
of  every  object,  what  is  revealed  in  the  differences  as  well 
as  in  the  likenesses,  is  the  manifestation,  or  actualizing, 
of  the  true  universal.  From  this  it  follows  that,  for  him, 
the  universal  is  not  a  mere  distinctionless  identity ;  it  is 
many  in  one,  diversity  in  unity.  In  an  organism',  the  idea 
which  is  the  universal  —  i.e.  the  essential  nature  —  of  each 
of  the  parts  as  parts  of  the  organism,  completes  itself  in 
the'  harmonious  diversity  of  the  parts.  For  example, 
the  idea  of  the  body  of  a  man  taken  as  a  whole  is  the  idea 
of  each  part  of  the  body  as  a  part  of  the  whole.  As  the 
universal  of  the  body,  it  includes,  and  thus  unifies,  the 
parts.  In  a  word,  Hegel's  Absolute  is  the  complete  uni- 
versal in  which  all  likenesses  and  differences  are  imma- 
nent. 

The  Categories.  —  From  the  preceding  it  appears  that 
with  Hegel  the  true  universal  is  mind  (or  Spirit),  and  that 
every  particular  is  a  finite  expression  of  this  universal. 
In  his  view,  therefore,  the  essential  nature  of  every  object 
is  constituted  by  mind.  Hence,  whatever  is  true  of  ra- 
tionality is  true  of  reality  ;  and  in  whatever  measure  any 
object  is  a  manifestation  of  reality,  in  that  measure  will 
it  have  the  characteristics  of  reason.  This  leads  him  to 
differ  from  Kant's  conception  of  the  categories  —  relation, 
quality,  quantity,  etc.  For  Kant,  they  are  not  char- 
acteristics of  reality,  but  are  imposed  by  the  subject  upon 
sense-perceptions.  According  to  Hegel,  they  are  not 
mere  processes   of  thought,   they   are    characteristics   of 


I04         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

objective  realities ;    every  object  is  a  concrete  identity, 
and  the  categories  are  diverse  aspects  of  it. 

4.  Knowledge  and  Reality,  —  According  to  Kant,  we 
know  phenomena,  and  only  phenomena ;  we  do  not,  and 
cannot,  know  reality.  Hegel  held,  on  the  contrary,  that 
reality  is  cognizable;  and  he  offered  incisive  criticism 
of  Kant's  agnosticism  and  proffered  extended  argument 
in  support  of  his  own  doctrine.  Kant's  doctrine  that  there 
are  things-in-themselves  which  are  independent  of  cogni- 
tive consciousness,  is  vital  to  the  Kantian  system.  Fichte 
and  Schelling  had  rejected  this  Kantian  conception ; 
Hegel  contended  that  it  was  inherently  inconsistent.  He 
calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  Kant  conceives  these  things- 
in-themselves  to  be  causes  of  sensations.  In  conceiving 
them  thus,  he  relates  them  to  the  consciousness  of  the 
subject  through  the  sensations.  These  sensations  enter 
into  consciousness  as  content  of  knowledge,  and  by  that 
much  the  things-in-themselves  are  not  of  a  world  which  is 
independent  of  the  subject.  He  argued  further  that  we 
cannot  affirm  such  realities  without  giving  them  some  char- 
acteristics which  relate  them  to  consciousness ;  we  at  least 
think  of  them  as  conceivable  entities.  Hegel  conceived  the 
universe  as  a  system,  and  all  objects  as  particulars  of  the 
system  and  so  related  to  each  other.  For  him,  no  object 
is  what  it  is,  no  object  even  exists,  by  and  for  itself;  its 
existence  is  only  possible  through  its  relation  to  other 
things,  through  its  relation  to  all  the  particular  realities 
of  the  system.  The  conscious  subject  is  one  of  these 
realities ;  in  fact,  the  conscious  subject  is  that  for  which 
the  object  exists.  The  end  of  the  object  is  the  fuller  life 
of  the  subject ;  and,  for  the  development  of  the  subject, 
it  must  be  in  relation  to  consciousness.  In  the  develop- 
ment of  the  life  of  the  subject,  the  ideality  of  the  object 
is  realized.     For  such  reasons,  he  refused  to  accept  the 


IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  105 

doctrine  that  there  are  realities  independent  of  con- 
sciousness. 

Limitations  of  Knowledge.  —  Hegel  agreed  with  Kant 
and  Schelling  that  knowledge  is  subject  to  limitations, 
but  he  differed  from  them  as  to  what  sets  the  limitations. 
Schelling  found  the  limitation  in  the  nature  of  the  Ab- 
solute. He  held  that  we  may  not  give  the  Absolute  any 
attribute,  hence  it  cannot  be  known.  Kant  found  the 
limitation  in  the  nature  of  intelligence.  Hegel  found  it  in 
the  limited  nature  of  the  object  when  apprehended  apart 
from  the  world  system.  No  object  by  itself  expresses  the 
whole  of  itself;  no  object  in  any  single  relation  fully  ex- 
presses its  reality.  To  separate  the  arm  in  thought  from 
the  body  is  to  exclude  from  thought  what  is  essential  to 
the  meaning,  and  hence  to  the  reality,  of  the  arm.  The 
significance  of  a  book  to  the  author  is  not  the  same  with 
its  meaning  to  the  publisher  or  the  reader.  Its  complete 
reality  is  not  expressed  in  any  one  of  these  relations. 
Knowledge  is  subject  to  limitations  ;  but  it  is  not  limited, 
according  to  Hegel,  because  intelligence  is  incapable  of 
apprehending  reality;  it  is  limited  because  the  whole  of 
reality  is  not  expressed  in  any  one  relating  of  an  object. 
Nevertheless,  what  we  apprehend  is  reality. 

5 .  Identity  of  Subject  and  Object.  —  What  did  Hegel 
mean  by  asserting  the  identity  of  subject  and  object  t 
Of  course  he  did  not  mean  to  affirm  that  they  are  spatially 
one,  that  you  and  the  building  which  you  perceive  are 
spatially  identified.  Kant  opened  the  way  toward  Hegel's 
view  by  distinguishing  between  externality  for  conscious- 
ness and  externality  to  consciousness.  Objects  known 
through  sense-perception  are  known  as  "  out  from,"  or 
external  to,  each  other ;  they  are  for  consciousness  external 
to  one  another.  And,  if  the  subject  be  regarded  as  an 
object  among  other  objects,  the  other  objects  appear  "  out 


io6         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

from,"  or  external  to,  the  subject ;  that  is,  they  are  external 
for  consciousness.  But  these  objects  are  actually  per- 
ceived ;  hence  they  are  not  wholly  apart  from  conscious- 
ness. In  some  very  real  sense  they  are  not  external  to 
consciousness,  but  are  in  consciousness.  Since  Hegel 
believed  that  every  object  is  in  its  essential  nature  con- 
stituted by  mind,  and  is  in  nature  one  with  mind,  it  would 
follow  for  him  that  the  essential  nature  of  objects  is  not 
subject  to  spatial  limitations.  There  is  no  spatial  apart- 
ness to  ideas  ;  they  do  not  displace  one  another.  The  same 
idea  may  be  in  the  mind  of  any  number  of  subjects ;  the 
same  meaning  may  have  expression  in  many  particulars. 
An  object  —  say  a  book  —  is  for  itself  the  idea  which  it 
embodies ;  and  it  is  so  much  of  the  Absolute  Idea  as  it 
expresses.  The  degree  in  which  it  embodies  the  Absolute 
Idea  is  the  degree  of  its  reality.  Now,  assume  that  you 
know  the  book,  that  you  have  to  some  extent  come  into 
possession  of  its  contents.  So  far  as  you  have  made  its 
contents  yours,  that  far  the  book  is  for  your  consciousness 
what  it  is  for  itself.  In  that  degree,  the  object  as  it  is 
in  itself  is  also  in  your  consciousness.  If  the  book  should 
become  for  your  consciousness  all  that  it  is  for  itself,  then 
its  reality  would  be  wholly  realized  in  you.  In  that  case, 
the  identity  of  yourself  as  subject  and  the  book  as  object 
would  be  complete ;  it  would  have  no  externality  for  you. 
Complete  knowledge  means  complete  identity  of  subject 
and  object.  Complete  identity  is  only  attained  in  self- 
consciousness.  In  self-consciousness,  self  as  object  pre- 
sents no  externality,  no  aspect  of  apartness,  to  self  as 
subject. 

6.  The  Self.  —  Hegel  held  that  the  self  is  freely  self- 
determined  ;  and  he  agreed  with  Kant  that  the  self  is 
more  than  the  conscious  self  at  any  moment.  He  sub- 
mitted self-consciousness  to  an  exhaustive  analysis ;   and, 


IDEALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  107 

as  a  result  of  this  study,  he  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that 
"  all  consciousness  is  an  appeal  to  other  consciousnesses  " 
than  the  consciousness  of  the  instant,  or  of  the  private 
self.  Thus,  the  knowledge  which  we  have  of  ourselves 
at  any  moment  is  really  knowledge  of  what  we  have  been, 
not  of  what  we  are  in  the  instant  of  knowing.  It  may  be 
knowledge  of  just  the  instant  previous  ;  it  may  be  knowl- 
edge of  some  time  farther  in  the  past.  But  this  much  is 
certain :  you  may  at  some  future  moment  know  by  re- 
flection what  you  are  now,  but  you  do  not  know  in  this 
instant  what  you  are  in  this  instant.  Not  only  is  this  true ; 
but  no  self  is  a  real  self  when  isolated  from  other  selves. 
To  think  of  a  person  as  separate  from  his  relations  to 
others  is  to  separate  him  in  thought  from  much  of  his  real 
self.  The  idea  of  personality  includes  the  social  virtues ; 
these  virtues  have  no  significance,  and  can  have  no  ex- 
pression, apart  from  social  relations.  Hence  the  real 
self  is  an  actual  social  self.  In  short,  Hegel  taught  that 
the  real  self  is  more  than  the  conscious  self  of  any  instant, 
more  than  the  self  of  one's  private  individual  experience. 

7.  Conclusions.  —  There  are  few,  if  any,  students  of 
Philosophy  who  agree  wholly  with  Hegel  in  his  application 
of  the  principles  of  his  system ;  and  there  are  not  many 
who  accept  his  reasoning  in  all  instances  as  conclusive. 
But  not  a  few  men  of  repute  in  philosophic  circles  believe 
that  he,  in  principle,  gave  the  final  answer  to  some  ques- 
tions, and  that  he  indicated  in  general  the  true  course 
for  Philosophy.  They  would  hold  that  he  established 
certain  facts,  of  which  we  note  only  four.  First,  the  unity 
of  subject  and  object  is  the  point  of  beginning  for  Epis- 
temology;  to  separate  subject  and  object  is  to  destroy 
experience  and  make  Philosophy  impossible.  Second, 
judgment  in  the  same  instant  unites  and  distinguishes 
subject   and    predicate,    object    and    characteristic;     i.e. 


io8         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

synthesis  and  analysis  are  aspects  of  an  irresoluble  activity. 
Third,  perception  and  conception  are  not  distinct  activi- 
ties, they  are  inseparable  factors  of  a  unitary  activity. 
Lastly,  we  know  reality.  We  have  called  attention  to 
particulars  in  which  Hegel  differed  from  Kant;  but  it 
must  not  be  thought  that  their  systems  are  so  fundamentally 
opposed  as  these  references  might  seem  to  indicate.  On 
the  contrary,  sympathetic  students  of  both  systems  in- 
sist that  Hegel  developed  the  Kantian  principles,  giving 
them  proper  criticism  and  correct  statement.  They 
hold  that  Hegel's  doctrine  tends  to  unify  our  conception 
of  the  universe  by  reason  of  its  more  inclusive  and  con- 
sistent application  of  Kantian  principles.  For  example, 
Kant  saw  that  his  mechanical  conception  of  the  world 
was  defective ;  but  he  so  qualified  his  recognition  of  this 
defect  as  to  leave  his  known  world  a  world  of  externally 
related  objects  and  mechanically  related  events.  In 
HegeFs  system,  Kant's  acknowledgment  that  the  teleo- 
logical  conception  is  essential  to  an  intelligible  under- 
standing of  experience  has  its  realization  in  the  acceptance 
of  the  teleological  relation  of  universal  and  particular,  and 
in  the  doctrine  that  all  processes  are  really  immanent  and 
developmental,  and  not  mechanical.  The  inclusiveness  of 
his  thought  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  the  relation  of  the  con- 
cept, or  universal,  and  the  object  is  at  once  logical,  teleo- 
logical, and  essential;  and  the  universal  is  conceived  as 
the  source  of  differences  as  well  as  likenesses.  In  this  we 
have  the  Socratic,  the  Platonic,  and  the  Aristotelian  views 
included,  with  advance  beyond  Aristotle.  Hegel's  system 
is  generally  known  as  Absolute  Idealism. 


CHAPTER  XII 

REALISTIC   rationalists;    LATER   EMPIRICISTS 

§  48.  Realism.  —  I .  Definition.  —  The  German  his- 
torians classify  the  various  systems  of  Philosophy  as 
Idealistic  and  Realistic.  The  preceding  chapter  has  in- 
troduced us  to  Idealism ;  we  come  now  to  the  consideration 
of  Realism.  [Idealism  holds  that  subject  and  object  are 
interdependent  realities ;  Realism  insists  that  they  are 
independent  realities.  From  the  fact  that  the  horse  from 
which  you  fled  existed  before  you  saw  it  and  continued  to 
exist  after  you  ceased  to  see  it,  Realists  argue  that  objects 
are  in  no  way  affected  by  being  known  or  ceasing  to  be 
known.  If  ideas  should  vanish,  it  would  make  no  dif- 
ference to  objects ;  such  is  the  conclusion  of  Realism.  But 
it  is  doubtful  if  any  Realists  would  agree  to  the  converse 
statement  —  if  objects  should  vanish,  ideas  would  remain 
unaffected.  From  this  it  would  appear  that  the  subject 
is  recognized  as  in  some  degree  dependent  upon  the  object. 
Hence  the  description  of  Realism  given  above  should  be 
further  defined.  What  Realism  insists  upon  in  respect 
of  subject  and  object  is  that  the  reality  of  each  is  in  no 
way  dependent  upon  its  being  related  to  the  other. 
In  other  words,  the  reality  of  any  particular  —  any  sub- 
ject or  object  —  is  wholly  independent  of  the  subject- 
object  relation.  The  question,  then,  that  remains  to  be 
answered  is.  What  do  we  mean  by  reality  ^  What  is 
it  for  any  thing  to  be  real  ?  A  further  difference  be- 
tween Idealism  and  Realism  develops  from  the  realistic 

109 


no         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

doctrine  of  a  worid  constituted  of  objects  which  are  in- 
dependent of  relation  to  a  subject.  This  doctrine  is  that 
the  independent  objects  of  the  external  world  awaken 
ideas  in  us.  The  cognitive  process  is  believed  to  originate 
thus. 

2.  Kinds  of  Realism.  —  The  various  forms  of  Realism 
may  be  reduced  to  two  types  :  Representative  Realism  and 
Presentative  Realism.  According  to  the  former,  the 
tree  which  you  perceive,  by  its  action  upon  your  sense- 
organs,  awakens  in  you  an  idea  which  is  an  image  of  the 
tree ;  some,  however,  regard  the  idea  as  a  symbol  of  the 
object.  But  all  Realists  of  this  class  would  agree  that  what 
you  perceive  is  not  the  tree  itself,  but  an  ideational  rep- 
resentation of  the  tree.  Duns  Scotus,  William  of  Ockham, 
and  Locke  are  examples  of  philosophers  who  held  a  doctrine 
of  Representative  Realism.  Presentative  Realism  is  the 
doctrine  that  through  the  action  and  reaction  of  the  in- 
dependent subject  and  object,  the  subject  has  an  immediate 
perception  of  the  object,  without  the  mediation  of  an  in- 
tervening idea.  That  is,  you  perceive  the  tree,  not  a  state 
of  consciousness,  not  some  idea  which  is  in  some  way  a 
representation  of  the  tree.  Reid  and  Hamilton,  whose 
views  will  be  stated  later,  are  examples  of  teachers  who 
claimed  to  be  Presentative  Realists.  At  the  present  time 
there  is  a  revival  of  Realism ;  and  the  proponents  of  the 
New  Realism  believe  that  their  Realistic  doctrine  is  free 
from  the  innate  weaknesses  of  Representationism.  In  its 
latest  form,  it  is  spoken  of  as  the  New  Realism  or  Critical 
Realism. 

§  49.  Realistic  Rationalism.  —  i .  Rise  and  Charac- 
teristics. —  Idealistic  Rationalism  arose  in  Germany 
through  Kant's  recoil  from  Hume's  scepticism ;  Realistic 
Rationalism  arose  in  Scotland  at  the  same  time  and  from 
a  similar  impulse.     Reid,  a  contemporary  of  Kant,  had 


REALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  in 

accepted  Locke's  presuppositions  and  had  also  virtually 
accepted  Berkeley's  conclusions.  But  the  sceptical 
doctrine  which  Hume  so  incontestably  drew  from  Locke's 
and  Berkeley's  principles  forced  him  to  reexamine  his 
philosophy.  As  a  result  of  this  study,  Reid  insisted  that 
philosophers  had  erred  in  assuming  that  "  all  the  objects 
of  knowledge  are  ideas  "  in  the  subject's  mind.  In  order 
to  combat  this  error  and  to  lay  the  foundation  of  his  own 
philosophic  faith,  Reid  undertook  the  study  of  sense- 
perception.  He  and  those  who  adopted  his  principles 
believed  that  a  true  theory  of  knowledge  could  only  be 
found  thus.  Hence  they  sought  a  description  of  the  cogni- 
tive process,  instead  of  endeavoring  to  discover  the  signifi- 
cance of  experience  for  questions  respecting  itself  and 
the  world.  In  other  words,  they  took  a  psychological, 
and  not  a  philosophical,  point  of  view.  In  fact,  Hamilton 
—  usually  accounted  the  most  notable  of  the  Scottish 
school  —  insisted  that  Psychology  is  synonymous  with 
Philosophy.  Realists  have  generally  approached  Phi- 
losophy through  Psychology ;  and  they  have  been  in- 
clined to  state  the  problem  of  Philosophy  as  the  giving 
of  a  reasoned  account  of  the  process  in  cognition,  and  they 
have  tended  to  ignore,  or  exclude,  questions  respecting 
the  nature  of  reality. 

2.  Views  of  Representative  Teachers.  —  (i)  Reid.  —  Reid 
believed  that  Hume's  philosophic  doubt  came  of  the  as- 
sumption that  the  immediate  objects  of  perception  are 
ideas  of  external  objects,  not  external  objects  themselves. 
This  assumption  shuts  the'  subject  up  with  himself; 
if  there  were  an  external  world,  no  one  could  know  it,  and 
the  subject  has  no  rational  ground  for  asserting  that  any 
reality  besides  himself  exists.  Reid  desired  to  set  the 
subject  free  and  to  bring  him  into  immediate  relation  with 
the  object.     He  held  that  in  perception  we  come  into  im- 


112         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

mediate  relation  with  the  object  which  is  in  presentation, 
and  that  the  reality  of  the  object  is  not  dependent  upon 
its  being  perceived.  According  to  Reid,  the  unit  of 
knowledge  is  a  judgment,  not  a  particular  impression  or 
an  idea.  He  also  held  that  "  all  knowledge  must  be 
built  upon  principles  which  are  self-evident,"  and  that 
the  subject  in  judging  organizes  sensations  according  to 
these  principles.  "  Judgments  of  existence,  substance, 
quality,"  etc.  —  Kant's  categories  —  "  are  implied  in  the 
judgment  unit."  Except  for  his  assertion  that  the  sub- 
ject is  in  immediate  relation  with  the  real  object,  this  is 
very  much  like  Kant's  teaching;  the  resemblance  to 
Kant's  doctrine  of  the  categories  and  the  synthetic 
activity  of  the  understanding,  is  obvious.  Reid's  criticism 
of  Representationism  —  a  theory  held  by  Idealists  as  well 
as  Realists  —  may  be  regarded  as  final. 

(2)  Hamilton.  —  Hamilton's  philosophy  contains  Kant- 
ian elements.  He  held  that  the  reality  of  the  external 
world  is  independent  of  its  being  an  object  of  consciousness, 
and  that  the  mind  is  "  the  universal  and  principal  con- 
current cause  in  every  act  of  knowledge."  So  far  he  is 
in  virtual  agreement  with  both  Reid  and  Kant.  Beyond 
this  he  parts  from  Reid,  for  he  holds  that  "  the  immediate 
object  of  perception  is  some  quality  of  the  organism  "  of 
the  subject,  and  not  the  thing  which  is  apprehended; 
and  he  differs  yet  more  in  what  is  known  as  his  doctrine 
of  the  Relativity  of  Knowledge  and  the  Philosophy  of 
the  Unconditioned. 

Relativity  of  Knowledge.  —  With  Hamilton  this  doc- 
trine signifies  that  we  do  not  know  any  object  out  of 
relation  to  other  objects.  Thus,  that  chair  is  known  for 
itself  as  being  like  other  objects  and  different  from  them, 
as  related  to  them  in  space,  as  "  before  "  or  "  behind," 
as   "  larger "   or  "  smaller,"   etc.     This   doctrine  of  the 


REALISTIC  RATIONALISTS  113 

Relativity  of  Knowledge  is  to  be  taken  in  conjunction 
with  his  insistence  that  we  do  not  know  objects,  that  we 
only  know  their  phenomenal  states.  This  is  true  not  only 
as  to  objects  of  external  perception,  but  as  to  the  self. 
The  known  self  is  for  Hamilton  a  phenomenal  self,  not  the 
real  self ;  so  also  is  the  known  world  a  phenomenal  world, 
not  the  real  world.     The  influence  of  Kant  is  evident. 

Philosophy  of  the  Unconditioned.  —  Hamilton  argued 
that  to  think  anything  is  to  condition  it;  and  from  this 
he  concluded  that  we  cannot  know  the  infinite ;  hence 
God  is  unknowable.  This  limitation  of  knowledge  is 
due  to  the  weakness  of  our  faculties.  He,  nevertheless, 
held  ^that  we  have  grounds  for  a  rational  belief  in  the 
reality  of  the  external  world,  and  the  self  and  God. 

3.  Relation  to  Other  Schools.  —  The  Scottish  Realists 
are  Empiricists  in  that  they  undertake  to  ground  Phi- 
losophy in  the  Psychology  of  cognition.  This  would  class 
them  with  Locke  and  Berkeley.  Berkeley  is  an  empirical 
Idealist;  the  Scotch  Realists  are  empirical  Realists. 
Their  empiricism  explains  the  sympathetic  attitude  of 
the  Later  Empiricists  toward  them.  But  Reid  and  Ham- 
ilton are  Rationalists  in  that  they  find  the  constitutive 
factor  of  knowledge,  not  in  sense-data,  but  in  the  rational- 
ity of  the  subject. 

Later  Empiricists 

§  50.  General  View.  —  Hume's  Empiricism  is  rooted 
in  the  older  Associational  Psychology;  and  the  Later 
Empiricism  is  based  upon  that  same  Psychology 
somewhat  modified.  This  Psychology  undertook  to 
construct  a  theory  of  perception ;  and  in  that  theory  it 
gave  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Association  of  Ideas  a  place 
analogous  to  that  which  Kant  assigns  to  the  synthetic 
activity  of  the  mind  in  his  Epistemology.     Empiricists, 


114        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

beginning  with  Hume  and  some  of  the  Scotch  Realists, 
adopted  this  doctrine  as  the  basis  of  their  Philosophy. 
Kant  has  sensibility  and  the  understanding  order  the 
sense-data  and  thus  constitute  objects  and  construct 
knowledge.  According  to  the  Associational  Psychology 
and  the  Philosophy  which  is  based  upon  it,  the  sense-data 
order  themselves  and  thus  constitute  knowledge.  These 
data  are  conceived  to  be  disconnected  units,  unchange- 
able in  their  nature  and,  in  the  later  form  of  the  doctrine, 
of  one  kind ;  and  every  sensation,  feeling,  or  idea  is  a 
group  of  these  units.  This  school  in  Psychology  holds  that 
sensations,  feelings,  or  ideas  which  occur  once  in  connection 
or  close  succession,  tend  to  grow  together  and  so  form  a 
larger  complex  unit ;  and  the  subsequent  occurrence  of 
any  one  of  the  components  of  this  complex  unit  tends  to 
call  up  the  other  components.  Thus,  the  word  "  house  " 
and  the  idea  of  an  external  object  of  a  certain  general 
character  have  been  connected  in  our  experience;  and, 
if  either  is  presented  in  consciousness,  the  other  Is  as- 
sociated with  it  in  consciousness.  Similarly,  also,  the 
sight  of  a  horse  running  away  is  associated  with  the  idea 
of  danger  to  any  one  who  may  be  in  the  course  it  is  taking. 
What  we  have  thus  described  and  illustrated  is  known  as 
the  law  of  the  Association  of  Ideas.  Hume  and  the  Later 
Empiricists  held  that  all  the  products  of  mental  life,  all 
the  particulars  of  consciousness,  are  constituted  by  this 
mechanical  ordering  of  the  disconnected  units  of  sense- 
data.  In  the  extreme  form  of  Empiricism,  there  is  no 
place  for  a  rational  factor  in  cognition ;  knowledge  is,  as 
to  both  content  and  form,  a  datum  to  the  subject.  Hume 
has  ideas  relate  themselves  by  this  law  to  other  ideas ; 
but  the  Later  Empiricists  found  it  necessary  to  recognize 
a  rational  factor.  The  doctrine  of  association  which  we 
have  presented  above  is  to   be  distinguished   from   the 


LATER  EMPIRICISTS  115 

conception  of  association  which  is  held  by  most  psy- 
chologists now.  The  earlier  conception  of  it  was  that 
it  was  explanatory  of  all  forms  of  consciousness.  But  this 
view  is  now  generally  discarded ;  and  psychologists  are 
inclined  to  regard  association  as  simply  one  kind  of  mental 
reaction,  and  as  a  mode  of  activity  which  needs  explana- 
tion and  is,  therefore,  incapable  of  explaining  experience 
in  general. 

These  thinkers  agree  in  holding  that  we  only  know  phe- 
nomena. Realistic  Rationalism  is  peculiarly  a  Scottish 
philosophy;  Empiricism  is  peculiarly  English,  although 
one  Scotch  thinker  —  Bain  —  and  one  French  thinker  — 
Condillac  —  adopted  it.  Scotch  Realism  and  English 
Empiricism  differed  fundamentally  in  this,  that  Realism 
had  a  definitely  rationalistic  cast  and  Empiricism  was  just 
as  certainly  a  form  of  sensationalism.  But  they  were  in 
accord  at  one  point :  both  believed  that  the  key  to  Phi- 
losophy would  be  found  in  Psychology.  Scotch  Realists 
gave  impetus  to  the  study  of  Empirical  Psychology,  and 
some  of  them  —  as  Brown  —  were  hearty  in  their  support 
of  Associationism. 

§51.  Specific  Views  of  Later  Empiricists.  —  We  will 
only  consider  two  representatives  of  this  school  —  John 
Stuart  Mill  and  Herbert  Spencer.  Spencer  is  not  easily 
classified ;  we  place  him  here,  however,  because  of  his 
methods  and  his  immediate  philosophic  affiliations. 

I.  Mind.  —  Mill  held  that  mind  is  "  a  series  of  feelings 
with  a  background  of  possibilities  of  feelings."  The  psy- 
chical unit  for  him  is  a  feeling ;  and  Spencer  also  reduces 
all  forms  of  consciousness  to  simple  feeling.  Sensations, 
feelings,  and  ideas  are  said  to  be  constituted  of  feeling 
units  in  various  combinations.  The  groups  of  units  which 
constitute  sensations,  emotions,  and  ideas  are  composed 
of  units  which  are  held  by  us  in  ^'inseparable  association  " 


ii6         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

through  their  constant  conjunction  in  experience.  This 
"  inseparable  association  "  in  experience  is  declared  to  be 
their  only  bond.  Mill  recognizes  that  it  is  difficult  to 
reconcile  this  view  with  self-consciousness.  He  acknowl- 
edges that  we  are  driven  to  believe  that  a  series  of  feelings 
can  be  aware  of  itself,  or  that  the  mind  is  something  differ- 
ent from  the  series  of  feelings. 

2.  Knowledge.  —  Mill  declared  that  we  only  know  par- 
ticular phenomena ;  the  universals  of  geometry  may  not 
be  true  in  another  world.  We  say  that  two  straight  lines 
cannot  enclose  a  space ;  but  Mill  held  that  it  is  not  impos- 
sible they  should.  It  only  seems  to  us  impossible  because 
two  straight  lines  and  the  non-enclosure  of  space  have  al- 
ways been  associated  in  our  experience ;  and  this  "  insep- 
arable association  "  makes  it  impossible  for  us  to  conceive 
of  two  straight  lines  enclosing  space.  The  notion  that 
3  plus  4  equals  6  is  not  inherently  contradictory;  it 
appears  contradictory  to  us  because  3  plus  4  and  7  have 
always  been  associated  in  our  experience.  All  so-called 
universal  truths  are  for  Mill  simply  instances  of  "  inseparable 
association."  Spencer  says  that  what  is  "  primarily  known 
is  .  .  .  that  there  exists  an  outer  object."  This  seems 
to  be  a  definite  affirmation  of  immediate,  not  inferential, 
knowledge  of  external  objects.  But  he  says  elsewhere 
that  "  we  can  know  only  certain  impressions  produced  on 
us,"  and  that  we  are  "  compelled  to  think  of  these  in 
relation  to  a  cause,"  and  from  this  there  develops  "  the 
notion  of  a  real  existence  which  generated  these  impres- 
sions." It  is  difficult  to  reconcile  these  two  statements  : 
that  we  know  the  external  object  primarily,  and  that 
we  can  know  only  impressions. 

3 .  Relativity  of  Knowledge.  —  We  have  made  mention 
of  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  the  Relativity  of  Knowledge. 
Spencer  gave  this  doctrine  a  development  peculiar  to  him- 


LATER  EMPIRICISTS  117 

self.  He  held  that  to  know  is  to  limit  or  relate.  Thus, 
in  knowing  this  desk,  I  separate  it  from  a  whole  which  is 
left  unrelated  and  unlimited.  This  desk  is  for  me,  there- 
fore, a  limited  and  related  part  of  an  unlimited  and  unre- 
lated whole.  Now,  this  whole,  being  unrelated  and  un- 
limited, is  unknowable.  From  this  it  follows  that  this  desk 
—  so  also  any  other  object —  exists  as  a  part  of  an  unknow- 
able whole.  There  must  be  an  unknowable  that  there  may- 
be a  known  object.  The  objects  of  science  are,  according 
to  Spencer,  known  but  unreal ;  the  objects  of  religion  are 
real  but  unknown. 

4.  Objective  Reality.  —  According  to  Mill,  extra-mental 
existence  is  actual,  but  it  cannot  be  known.  Spencer 
affirmed  that  subject  and  object,  mind  and  matter,  are 
absolutely  distinct,  but  are  identical  in  nature.  We  can 
never  know  what  that  nature  is.  In  holding  to  the  in- 
dependent reality  of  the  object,  he  is  a  Realist;  but  in 
defining  reality  as  persistence  in  consciousness,  he  would 
seem  to  be  an  Idealist. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

PHILOSOPHIC   THOUGHT    OF    TO-DAY 

§  52.    Questions  settled ;    Points   of  Difference.  —  Our 

study  thus  far  is  a  general  characterization  of  philosophic 
thought  up  to  the  latter  part  of  the  last  century.  It  is 
such  a  statement  of  Philosophy's  own  report  of  itself  as 
comes  within  the  purpose  of  this  Introduction.  At  the 
present  time,  systems  and  theories  are  undergoing  vigorous 
criticism.  In  the  nature  of  the  case,  a  period  of  criticism 
cannot  be  readily  defined.  We  can  do  no  more  than  sug- 
gest points  of  general  agreement  and  indicate  some  of  the 
outstanding  features  of  philosophic  discussion.  There  is 
general  objection  to  any  theory  of  Knowing  which  does 
not  give  the  subject  grasp  of  trans-subjective  reality.  An 
Epistemology,  which  does  not  connect  the  subject  with 
what  is  other  than  the  mere  product  of  his  own  mental 
activity,  is  spoken  of  as  subjectivistic;  and  to  prove  con- 
clusively that  a  theory  of  cognition  is  subjectivistic  would 
mean  its  rejection  by  teachers  of  Philosophy.  There  is  a 
like  accord  in  the  rejection  of  an  Epistemology  which  ob- 
viously makes  knowledge  a  mere  datum  to  the  subject.  In 
other  words,  Sensationalism  is  a  theory  whose  history  is 
complete.  If  one  should  also  say  that  Representationism 
has  had  its  day,  and  that  its  record  is  closed,  there  would  be 
few  to  demur.  One  of  the  fundamental  questions  con- 
cerning which  there  is  sharp  difference  at  present  may  be 
stated  thus :    How,  and  to  what  extent,  may  Philosophy 

118 


PHILOSOPHIC  THOUGHT  OF  TO-DAY     119 

keep  in  touch  with  the  concrete  ?  It  has  been  charged 
against  Philosophy  that  it  is  apart  from  life,  and  that  it 
concerns  itself  with  the  abstract,  with  mere  fictions  which 
are  little,  if  any,  more  than  empty  names.  If  this  be  true, 
the  mother  of  the  sciences  has  forgotten  her  mission ; 
for  it  is  the  task  of  Philosophy  to  help  us  discover  the 
nature  of  the  realities  with  which  we  are  in  constant 
commerce.  These  realities  are  concretes,  and  we  must 
never  get  out  of  touch  with  them.  What  it  means  for 
our  study  that  we  avoid  abstractions  and  keep  in  the 
realm  of  the  concrete,  will  become  evident  later.  Another 
question  arises  from  two  demands  which  are  certainly  not 
easily  reconciled.  One  of  these  is  the  demand  of  reason 
that  we  shall  not  give  over  the  endeavor  to  ground  all 
the  particulars  of  experience  in  a  fundamental  principle 
of  unity.  It  is  generally  recognized  that  Kant  was  right 
in  regarding  this  as  an  insistent  demand  of  reason.  The 
urgency  of  this  demand  is  manifest  in  the  unremitting  en- 
deavor of  Philosophy  to  find  an  ultimate  reality  which 
shall  be  the  ground  of  all  being  and  activity.  But  it  is 
charged  against  Monistic  systems  —  i.e.  systems  which 
derive  all  phenomena  from  a  unitary  ultimate  —  that  they 
rob  the  individual  subject  of  his  individuality.  Now,  if 
reason  demands  a  unitary  ground  for  all  experience,  ex- 
perience just  as  certainly  demands  that  our  free  initiative 
—  an  essential  of  personality  —  shall  remain  inviolate. 
Philosophers  are  not  yet  agreed  as  to  these  demands  and 
their  possible  reconciliation.  A  third  leading  particular 
of  difference  arises  from  this  question  :  How  may  we  con- 
strue experience  so  that  rational  activity  shall  always  be 
recognized  as  inseparably  intellective,  emotional,  and 
volitional .?  How  shall  these  phases  of  mental  activity 
be  related  to  each  other  and  to  life  activities  in  general  t 
Some  have  given  primacy  to  intellection,  others  to  voli- 


120        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

tion,  still  others  to  feeling.  How  shall  these  differences 
be  settled  ?  A  conclusive  answer  to  this  question  would 
mean  much  for  philosophical  theory. 

Idealism  and  Realism  continue  to  represent  opposed 
views ;  but  the  matter  of  difference  is  not  what  it  was  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Modern  Age.  They  differed  then  as 
to  the  source  of  knowledge.  Idealism  believed  that  the 
source  of  knowledge  is  in  the  subject;  Realism  would 
find  it  in  the  object.  Realism  now  agrees  that  there  is  a 
subjective  element  in  knowledge ;  and  Idealism  —  Per- 
sonal Idealism  possibly  excepted  —  holds  that  there  is 
an  objective  element  in  knowledge.  The  difference  at 
present  is  in  respect  to  the  relation  of  subject  and  object 
to  each  other,  and  the  position  to  be  assigned  experience  in 
constructing  Philosophy.  The  Realist  would  begin  his  Phi- 
losophy with  the  subject  and  object  conceived  as  independ- 
ent realities.  The  Idealist  insists  that  we  do  not  know, 
and  cannot  conceive,  subject  or  object  apart  from  experi- 
ence; therefore,  since  Philosophy  deals  with  subject  and 
object,  it  must  begin  with  experience  and  never  break  with 
experience.  Or  the  Idealistic  doctrine  may  be  stated  thus  : 
Experience  is  constituted  in  the  subject-object  relation 
and  cannot  continue  apart  from  that  relation ;  hence,  if 
our  analysis  gives  us  subject  apart  from  object,  or  object 
apart  from  subject,  we  have  no  experience  left  and  nothing 
with  which  to  construct  a  Philosophy. 

There  is  urgent  advocacy  of  Personal  Idealism  and 
Pragmatism.  We  cannot  at  this  point  give  a  detailed 
statement  of  these  theories ;  what  follows  will  serve  our 
purpose.  Personal  Idealism  is  the  theory  that  "  all 
reality  is  in  souls  and  their  experiences."  It  is  evidently 
a  form  of  Berkeleyism.  Pragmatism  —  known  also  as 
Humanism  and  Radical  Empiricism  —  has  able  propo- 
nents.    This  theory  agrees  with  Idealism  in  asserting  the 


PHILOSOPHIC  THOUGHT  OF  TO-DAY    121 

interdependence  of  subject  and  object,  and  it  agrees  with 
Realism  in  holding  that  only  the  particular  is  real.  Its 
Empiricism  is  shown  in  its  insistence  that  a  large  element 
of  knowledge  is  a  mere  datum,  a  something  which  cannot 
be  subjected  to  the  forms  of  knowledge. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE    PROVINCE    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

.  §  53.  Historical.  —  Ancient  Philosophy  dealt  with  all 
questions  raised  by  cultured  thought;  it  investigated 
the  whole  system  of  things,  man  included.  It  gives  us 
Metaphysics,  Cosmogonies,  Theology,  Anthropology,  Psy- 
chology, Ethics,  Logic,  Esthetics,  Politics,  Mathematics, 
Physics.  In  the  Aristotelian  period  of  Mediaeval  Phi- 
losophy, Mathematics  and  the  Natural  Sciences  began  to 
be  cultivated  apart  from  General  Philosophy.  Later,  the 
Arabians  and  Jews,  having  become  acquainted  with  the 
works  of  Aristotle,  pursued  philosophic  studies  with  ardor, 
but  gave  special  attention  to  Science.  Still  later,  there 
appeared  Christian  thinkers  in  this  distinctive  field  of 
study,  notably  Roger  Bacon  and  Copernicus.  In  respect 
of  time,  Francis  Bacon  marks  the  close  of  the  Mediaeval 
Age  and  the  beginning  of  the  Modern ;  but  his  scientific 
method  and  spirit  are  characteristically  modern.  Since 
Bacon  the  line  of  scientists  has  been  unbroken.  He  re- 
garded his  work  as  Philosophy ;  and  it  is  certain  that  he 
greatly  influenced  philosophic  thought.  It  is  also  true 
that  modern  philosophers  have  forwarded  the  scientific 
movement.  Some,  as  Descartes  and  Leibniz,  were  them- 
selves notable  scientists  ;  and  the  more  pretentious  systems 
of  Philosophy  have  sought  to  relate  themselves  to  the 
whole  range  of  cultured  thought.  Hegel's  work  was  en- 
cyclopaedic ;  and  the  same  might  be  said  of  that  mapped 
out  by  Spencer.     But  until  relatively  late,  there  has  been 

122 


THE   PROVINCE   OF   PHILOSOPHY         123 

no  urgent  insistence  that  a  separate  realm  of  thought 
should  be  assigned  to  Science.  At  present,  however, 
philosophers  of  widest  range  of  work  recognize  that  there 
is  ground  of  distinction  between  Science  and  Philosophy. 
§  54.  The  Plain  Man  and  the  Scientist,  or  Common 
Sense  and  Science.  —  Our  earliest  view  of  the  world  and 
life  is  the  uncritical  "  common  sense  "  view ;  and  that  is 
the  conception  which  most,  if  not  all,  of  us  have  of  ex- 
perience. Relatively  few  men  have  given  their  opinions 
concerning  the  ordinary  and  commonest  experiences  severe 
and  methodical  criticism ;  and  still  fewer  have  undertaken 
to  organize  their  views  into  systems  of  thought.  Never- 
theless, the  general  dissemination  of  scientific  education 
and  the  scientific  spirit  of  the  age  have  given  the  Plain 
Man  something  in  common  with  the  Scientist.  The  boy 
says  that  the  apple  fell  because  the  stem  broke;  but,  if 
he  is  pressed  to  explain  why  it  fell  when  the  stem  broke, 
he  will  say  that  the  earth  attracted  it.  He  has  learned 
so  much  as  that  at  school.  The  illiterate  dweller  by  the 
sea  says  that  the  moon  causes  the  tides ;  and  he  says  that, 
not  only  because  he  has  heard  that  such  is  the  case,  but 
because  he  has  noticed  that  the  tidal  movements  and  the 
changing  and  rising  of  the  moon  occur  in  close  connection. 
The  view  of  the  Scientist  is  virtually  the  same  with  that 
of  the  boy  and  the  shoreman ;  but  he  would  state  it  dif- 
ferently. The  Plain  Man  has  not  given  the  views  which  he 
holds  in  common  with  the  Scientist  the  rigid  criticism  and 
the  extended  application  that  the  Scientist  has  given  them. 
The  Scientist  not  only  refers  the  falling  of  the  apple  to  the 
influence  of  the  earth,  but  he  adds  to  this  the  statement 
that  the  earth  is  influenced  by  the  apple ;  and  in  addition 
to  this  he  will  give  the  law  which  determines  the  relative 
measure  of  their  influence.  He  will  likewise  set  forth 
carefully  elaborated  reasons  for  what  he  says  respecting 


124         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  falling  of  the  apple  and  the  relation  of  the  moon  to  tidal 
movements ;  and  he  will  explain  apparent  exceptions  and 
irregularities.  He  will  also  show  how  the  succession  of 
night  and  day,  the  changes  of  the  moon,  and  the  changes 
in  the  location  of  groups  of  stars  are  related  to  the  falling 
of  the  apple.  Beside  this,  the  Scientist  will  generally  re- 
port facts  with  greater  exactness,  for  he  has  been  trained  to 
observe.  In  a  word.  Science  gives  our  knowledge  greater 
accuracy,  and  it  systematizes  and  extends  it.  Special 
training  in  interpreting  observations  and  making  calcula- 
tions, the  accumulated  body  of  critical  observations  which 
are  at  hand,  and  the  invention  of  instruments  and  develop- 
ment of  methods  enable  the  Scientist  to  correct  and  extend 
knowledge. 

§  55.  Science  and  Philosophy.  —  All  our  knowledge 
of  ourselves  and  the  world  comes  to  us  through  our  ex- 
perience of  the  world  of  persons  and  things  and  events. 
Science  enlarges  experience  and  gives  it  definlteness. 
Having  noted  so  much  as  this,  we  undertake  now  to  dis- 
tinguish the  field  of  Science  and  the  province  of  Philosophy. 

In  the  case  of  the  falling  apple.  Science  deals  with  the 
process,  or  event,  and  the  objects  involved  in  it ;  and  that 
is  true  of  all  its  thought.  Objects  and  changes  make  up 
the  subject-matter  of  Science.  The  term  phenomena  has 
come  to  be  used  of  the  particulars  of  its  subject-matter; 
it  is  applied  both  to  objects  and  changes.  With  this  in 
view,  we  may  for  the  present  say  that  Science  studies 
phenomena ;  it  endeavors  to  relate  phenomena  to  each 
other.  For  example,  it  tries  to  discover  how  the  moon 
and  the  tides  and  their  changes  are  related  ;  in  other  words, 
it  would  find  the  order  of  their  related  changes.  To  take 
again  our  former  illustration.  Science  undertakes  to  dis- 
cover in  what  way  your  hearing  the  noise  and  seeing  the 
horse  and  fearing  and  fleeing  are  related  to  one  another. 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY         125 

To  begin  with,  it  assumes  that  these  changes  in  your  con- 
sciousness are  related  to  phenomena  which  are  external 
to  you.  Science  does  not  ask  after  the  nature  of  the 
reality  whose  phenomena,  or  appearances,  it  studies;  it 
does  not  inquire  as  to  what  stuff  it  is  made  of.  It  merely 
studies  the  way  this  assumed  reality  behaves.  Also,  when 
Science  concludes  that  the  changes  in  the  moon  are  caus- 
ally related  to  tidal  movements,  it  is  not  required  to  go 
farther  and  explain  the  nature  of  causal  connection,  to 
state  what  it  is  in  either  the  moon  or  the  sea  or  both  that 
links  them.  It  accepts  that  phenomena  —  as  a  running 
horse,  or  darting  flames  —  have  meaning  for  you,  and 
it  classifies  the  changes  in  your  consciousness  attendant 
upon  your  discovery  of  meaning  in  phenomena ;  but  it 
does  not  inquire  as  to  what  must  be  your  essential  nature 
that  you  should  find  ideas  in  things  and  happenings,  or 
what  the  nature  of  phenomena  is  that  ideas  should  be 
found  in  them.  Philosophy  recognizes  that  reality  in  you 
finds  expression  in  consciousness  of  yourself  and  of  the 
external  world,  and  that  reality  in  the  world  of  nature  ex- 
presses itself  in  filling  space,  in  being  extended ;  and  it 
seeks  to  know  how  it  is  that  your  reality,  apparently  so 
difi'erent  from  that  of  things,  can  have  commerce  with 
things.  It  asks  after  the  essential  nature  of  reality  in 
mind  and  reality  in  matter,  reality  in  the  subject  and  in 
the  object. 

Science  employs  certain  concepts  in  its  thinking  and  its 
descriptions  —  as  atoms,  electrons,  energy,  space,  time, 
etc. ;  and  it  treats  them  as  real.  It  assumes  that  there  is 
an  external  world,  that  changes  in  nature  follow  a  fixed 
order,  and  that  every  event  is  determined  by  an  ante- 
cedent event.  Philosophy  criticizes  these,  and  all  other, 
assumptions;  and  it  inquires  into  the  reality  of  all 
concepts. 


126         INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

Science  is  of  course  a  general  term  for  the  many  special 
sciences,  each  of  which  studies  a  certain  group  of  phe- 
nomena. It  groups,  and  thus  classifies,  its  objects  accord- 
ing to  discovered  likenesses.  Botany,  for  example,  groups 
its  objects  into  families,  genera,  species,  and  varieties. 
Science  also  notes  likenesses  of  conditions  and  results; 
and  by  its  study  of  these  likenesses  and  results  it  is  en- 
abled to  state  the  conditions  under  which  certain  events 
will  take  place,  or  it  can  predict  what  will  result  from  a 
given  set  of  conditions.  Thus,  it  is  said  that  a  low  barom- 
eter generally  presages  a  storm.  These  discovered  re- 
lations of  conditions  and  results,  when  formally  stated, 
are  known  as  scientific  laws.  Now,  the  findings  of  some 
of  the  special  sciences  can  be  to  some  extent  related  to 
one  another ;  as  in  the  instance  of  Biology  and  Physiology 
and  Botany.  But  it  is  not  the  task  of  Science  to  complete 
the  relating  of  the  work  of  the  special  sciences ;  it  leaves  us 
with  unrelated  groups  of  related  objects  and  processes.  It 
is  the  task  of  Philosophy  to  relate  all  particulars  and  groups 
to  the  whole  of  all  that  is ;  it  sets  out  to  make  it  plain 
that  all-that-is  is  a  rational  system.  Each  special  science 
tests  its  conclusions  by  their  consistency  with  all  that  falls 
within  the  province  of  the  special  science  itself  and  of 
those  more  immediately  related  to  it.  Philosophy  criti- 
cises all  processes  of  thought,  even  its  own ;  and  it  tests 
conclusions  by  their  consistency  with  the  whole  of  experi- 
ence. 

§  56.  Descriptive  and  Normative  Sciences.  —  In  what 
precedes  we  have  had  in  mind  sciences  which  give  us  con- 
clusions as  to  what  is;  they  describe  objects  and  processes 
and  are,  therefore,  known  as  Descriptive  Sciences.  There 
are  Sciences,  however,  that  do  not  merely  describe  actual 
objects  and  state  the  fixed  order  of  change  in  nature. 
These  other  sciences  come  of  the  fact  that  we  judge  opin- 


THE   PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY         127 

ions  as  true  or  false,  and  conduct  as  good  or  bad,  and  prod- 
ucts —  as  those  of  nature  and  art  —  as  beautiful  or  want- 
ing in  beauty.  In  these  judgments,  we  set  value  on  what 
we  have  under  consideration ;  and  we  determine  its  worth 
by  applying  standards  of  truth  or  goodness  or  beauty. 
That  is,  we  judge  what  is  by  comparing  it  with  what  ought 
to  he.  These  sciences  apply  ideal  standards  to  conclusions 
and  conduct  and  objects ;  they  determine  the  value  of 
phenomena  in  respect  of  truth,  goodness,  and  beauty. 
They  seek  regulative  principles  or  rules ;  and  these  regu- 
lative principles  are  not  statements  of  what  occurs  under 
certain  conditions,  but  of  what  ought  to  be  or  occur.  They 
are  known  as  the  Normative  Sciences ;  and  there  are 
evidently  three — Logic,  Ethics,  and  ^Esthetics.  Science 
assumes  that  man  is  a  moral  being,  and  that  we  may  dis- 
cover what  constitutes  truth,  goodness,  and  beauty.  Phi- 
losophy inquires  as  to  the  reality  of  the  moral  order,  as  to 
the  nature  of  morality,  as  to  the  source  and  validity  of 
these  concepts.  Here,  as  elsewhere  in  the  realm  of 
thought.  Philosophy  has  for  its  province  ultimate  ques- 
tions respecting^  the  validity  of  the  assumptions  of  all 
forms  of  thought,  the  nature  of  reality,  and  the  ground  of 
Being  and  Change. 


PART  III 

ELEMENTS  OF  GENERAL  PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER  XV 

EXPERIENCE 

§  57.  Standpoints  of  Psychology  and  Philosophy  dis- 
tinguished. —  I.  How  Psychology  views  Experience.  — 
You  hear  a  clear  sound ;  you  conclude  that  it  is  the  tele- 
phone bell,  not  the  door  bell ;  you  go  to  the  telephone  and 
enter  upon  conversation.  Psychology  has  its  own  in- 
terest in  this  experience,  and  its  study  is  determined  by 
this  interest.  The  particulars  of  special  value  to  this 
science  are  the  changes  which  occur  in  your  consciousness. 
It  analyses  the  experience  and  distinguishes  the  auditory 
sensation,  the  localization  of  the  source  of  the  sound,  the 
fact  that  you  distinguish  the  clang  of  the  bell  from  that  of 
the  door  bell,  the  motor  reactions  (in  localizing  the  sound 
and  going  to  the  telephone  and  taking  up  the  receiver), 
and  the  attendant  sense  of  effort  and  tone  of  pleasure  or 
displeasure  in  being  thus  interrupted.  To  be  sure,  this 
is  only  a  general  and  partial  indication  of  what  Psychology 
finds  pertinent  to  its  purpose.  It  will  be  seen,  however, 
that  the  Psychologist  is  specially  interested  in  the  changes, 
or  processes,  in  consciousness.  He  assumes  the  reality 
and  separateness  of  the  physical  world  —  the  bell,  your 
body  and  brain  and  nervous  system  and  muscles,  etc. ;  and 
he  accepts  what  the  physical  sciences  have  to  say  of  the 

128 


EXPERIENCE  129 

processes  in  the  physical  world  which  are  more  immediately 
related  to  your  experience.  He  makes  some  study  of 
these  physical  processes ;  but  his  assumptions  and  investi- 
gations have  as  their  end  the  scientific  study  of  the  phases 
of  consciousness.  In  order  that  he  may  pursue  his  study 
critically  and  thoroughly,  he  distinguishes  these  changes 
in  respect  of  their  characteristics ;  and  he  classifies  them 
as  sensations,  ideas,  feelings,  attention,  perception,  etc. 
He  undertakes  to  discover  the  fixed  order  of  these  mental 
processes ;  and,  having  discovered  an  order  of  change,  he 
states  the  order  as  a  psychological  law.  His  purpose  is 
a  scientific  description  of  experience.  We  conclude,  there- 
fore, that  experience  is  for  Psychology  a  phase,  or  mode, 
of  change  in  consciousness. 

In  studying  the  procedure  of  the  Psychologist,  as  illus- 
trated above,  it  becomes  evident  that  he  separates,  or 
abstracts,  the  phases  of  the  experience  from  you,  the  sub- 
ject of  them.  His  immediate  interest  is  in  the  phases  and 
modes  of  change,  not  in  you.  Thus  he  notes  your  sensa- 
tions, not  you  ;  your  ideas,  not  you  ;  your  motor  reaction, 
not  you.  These  processes  are  necessarily  regarded  as 
apart  from,  or  external  to,  each  other ;  but  you  do  not  ex- 
perience them  as  distinct  from  you,  or  external  to  each 
other.  You  and  your  ideas  and  sensations  and  feelings 
are  not  distinct,  although  you  and  they  are  distinguish- 
able by  thought.  The  processes  thus  abstracted  are  bare 
concepts;  separate  from  you  they  have  no  reality,  they 
cannot  have  aiiy  reality.  Nevertheless,  they  are  rightly 
treated  by  Psychology  as  reals ;  for  every  science  must  deal 
with  its  concepts  as  though  they  were  reals.  But  it  must 
not  be  forgotten  that  the  concepts  of  Psychology,  being 
abstracted  from  the  subject,  have  no  reality  in  themselves. 
They  are  not  the  subject,  neither  can  we  constitute  the  sub- 
ject by  aggregating  these   abstracted   phases.     We  can 


I30        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

never  constitute  a  real  by  aggregating  abstract  particulars 
none  of  which  are  in  themselves  real. 

2.  How  Philosophy  views  Experience.  —  We  will  see 
in  a  general  way  how  Philosophy  would  interest  itself  in 
the  illustrative  case  given  above.  Philosophy  notes  that 
the  sound  has  meaning  for  you.  You  recognized  the  sound 
as  something  to  which  you  should  give  attention ;  then 
you  interpreted  it  as  meaning  that  the  telephone  bell  was 
ringing;  and  this  you  interpreted  as  a  possible  call  for 
you.  Along  with  your  finding  meaning  in  the  object  of 
your  attention  and  as  a  part  of  that  meaning,  Philosophy 
notes  that  you  assigned  value  to  the  sound  as  first  appre- 
hended, and  to  the  sound  when  distinguished  as  the  tele- 
phone bell,  and  so  to  all  the  distinguishable  moments  of 
the  experience.  You  gave  them  such  value  that  you  di- 
rected your  attention  and  your  motor  activities  with  a 
developing  purpose,  up  to  the  beginning  of  the  conversa- 
tion. In  other  words.  Philosophy  recognizes  that  you 
think  and  feel  and  will  with  reference  to  objects  ;  you  relate 
your  entire  self  to  them.  It  further  notes  that  your  ex- 
perience is  in  all  stages  of  it  a  thinking-feeling-willing 
awareness,  or  consciousness.  Every  moment  of  it  in- 
volves you  as  subject  and  something  as  object;  and  there 
is  in  the  whole  of  it  a  conviction  of  the  reality  of  yourself 
and  the  object.  The  distinctive  interest  of  the  Psycholo- 
gist is  in  the  sensations,  ideas,  feelings,  etc.,  quite  apart 
from  you  and  the  objects  with  which  you  are  in  relation. 
The  interest  of  the  Philosopher,  on  the  other  hand,  is  in 
you  as  a  thinking-feeling- willing  reality  and  in  the  object 
as  a  reality  which  is  significant  for  your  thought  and  feel- 
ing and  will.  That  is.  Psychology  is  not  distinctly  in- 
terested in  the  subject  as  a  subject^  nor  in  the  object  as  an 
object;  whereas  Philosophy  studies  the  related  subject 
and  object.     It  is  a  critical  consideration  of  experience,  as 


EXPERIENCE  131 

such ;  and  experience  only  arises  in  the  subject-object  re- 
lation. Philosophy  seeks  to  know  the  nature  of  the  reality 
in  us  and  the  world ;  and  it  is  in  experience  that  we  know 
ourselves  and  know  the  world  of  other  persons  and 
things  and  happenings.  Experience  is  real,  and  it  gives 
us  our  conviction  of  the  reality  of  the  world  and  ourselves  ; 
and  Philosophy  holds  that  a  critical  study  of  experience 
will  open  the  way  to  a  knowledge  of  what  the  world  is  and 
what  we  are  and  what  is  our  destiny,  a  way  also  by  which 
we  may  reach  a  rational  answer  to  the  questions  of  the 
religious  consciousness. 

Since  Philosophy  studies  the  related  subject  and  object, 
it  does  not  regard  experience  as  a  mere  phase  or  mode  of 
consciousness ;  it  is  for  Philosophy  a  concrete  whole  of 
consciousness.  Experience  subsists  in  the  subject,  and 
can  only  subsist  thus ;  but  the  subject  only  experiences 
when  related  to  an  object.  Hence  we  may  not  abstract 
experience  from  the  subject  or  the  object,  certainly  not 
from  both.  To  reason  to  ultimate  conclusions  respecting 
anything,  we  must  think  of  it  in  its  true  relations.  To  sep- 
arate experience  or  any  phase  of  it  from  the  subject  is  to 
take  it  out  of  its  true  relations  and  to  relate  it  externally 
to  the  subject  and  to  experience ;  whereas  it  is  in  and  of 
the  subject  and  is  therefore  internally  related. 

Summary :  Psychology  conceives  an  experience  as  a 
phase  or  mode  of  consciousness ;  for  Philosophy,  an 
experience  is  a  concrete  whole  of  consciousness.  Psy- 
chology abstracts  the  phases  of  consciousness  from  the 
subject  and  treats  these  concepts  as  its  distinctive  subject- 
matter;  and  it  seeks  the  order  of  processes  in  conscious- 
ness. Hence,  for  Psychology,  experiences  are  unrelated 
to  the  self  as  subject ;  and  they  are  externally  related  to 
each  other.  For  Philosophy,  experiences  are  organically 
related  to  the  subject  and  to  each  other ;  and  the  subject, 


132        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

consciously  related  to  an  object,  and  the  object,  attended 
to  by  a  subject,  are  its  immediate  interest.  It  is  the  aim 
of  Philosophy  to  discover  what  a  critical  study  of  experi- 
ence will  yield  us  respecting  the  nature  of  the  reality  of 
subject  and  object. 

§  58.  Dual  Aspect  of  Experience.  —  Early  in  our  study 
we  said  that  experience  has  two  contrasted  aspects ;  and, 
in  the  preceding  section,  we  have  noted  that  experience  is 
always  of  a  subject  who  is  consciously  related  to  an  object, 
i.e.  the  experience  has  a  subject-aspect  and  an  object- 
aspect.  As  this  fact  is  cardinal  for  Philosophy,  we  shall 
give  it  more  detailed  consideration  here.  For  our  present 
study,  we  recall  that  in  considering  your  experience  with 
the  telephone  bell,  we  found  that  it  was  a  thinking-feeling- 
willing  experience.  All  experience  has  these  character- 
istics. In  solving  a  problem,  you  direct  your  attention 
to  the  analysis  of  the  problem  and  determine  the  whole 
thought-process  ;  and  this  directing  of  the  thought-process 
is  evidently  a  matter  of  your  will.  During  your  endeavors 
to  effect  a  solution,  you  have  a  feeling  of  satisfaction  or  dis- 
satisfaction with  possible  methods  and  with  results 
achieved.  The  dealing  with  the  problem  yields  one  ex- 
perience, every  moment  of  which  has  these  three  charac- 
teristics. These  characteristics  of  experience  are  insepa- 
rable, nevertheless  we  may  give  special  emphasis  now  to 
one  characteristic,   and   again  to  another. 

I.  Duality  of  Experience  as  Thinking.  —  You  see  a 
painting  —  say  a  landscape  —  or  hear  music.  The  ex- 
perience of  color  or  tone  you  refer  to  something  other  than 
yourself,  something  which  is  relatively  independent  of 
you  and  your  act  of  seeing  or  hearing.  This  is  true  even 
of  perception  of  sound  when  we  do  not  perceive  any  occur- 
rence which  might  answer  as  the  source  of  the  sound. 
Thus,  we  hear  what  sounds  like  an  explosion,  but  we  do 


EXPERIENCE  133 

not  see  a  gun  fired  or  a  blast  sprung.  Nevertheless  we 
refer  the  sound  to  some  unperceived  source  which  is 
regarded  as  other  than  ourselves.  In  perceptions  the 
object-aspect  is  usually  so  distinct  and  pronounced  as  to 
hold  our  attention  and  thus  obscure  the  subject-aspect; 
but  the  subject-aspect  is  present  even  though  it  is 
vague  as  compared  with  the  other  aspect.  The  subject 
regards  the  object  as  other  than  himself  and  distinguishes 
it  as  spatially  apart  from  himself.  This  "  otherness  " 
of  the  object  involves  the  reference  to  the  self  and  is  only 
possible  because  of  the  subject-aspect  of  the  perception. 
We  have  one  experience  with  duality  of  aspect. 

The  above  holds  true  also  for  experience  which  is  dom- 
inantly  ideational  —  as  in  describing  a  journey  which  we 
have  taken,  or  in  demonstrating  a  proposition.  In  describ- 
ing the  journey,  we  have  images  for  our  objects.  The 
images  which  we  construct  and  in  constructing  which  we 
reinstate  the  experiences  of  the  journey,  are  for  the  subject 
who  is  telling  the  story,  other  than  himself.  So  also  as 
to  the  geometrical  figure  and  axioms  and  mathematical 
principles  utilized  in  the  demonstration  of  a  proposition. 
We  have  in  both  cases  idea-data  for  object  reference  in  the 
experience,  and  these  have  their  objectivity  through  their 
being  distinguished  by  the  subject  from  himself.  This 
last  involves  the  subject-aspect. 

2.  Experience  in  Connection  with  Effort  to  do  Something; 
i.e.  Conative  Experience.  —  This  is  experience  as  willing. 
A  complete  volition,  e.g.  that  of  going  to  the  post-office, 
takes  the  form  of  action  in  which  there  is  effort  to  accom- 
plish what  is  purposed.  The  object-aspect  of  experience 
so  regarded  is  obvious ;  for,  in  solving  a  problem  or  going 
to  the  post-office,  you  are  directing  your  thought  and 
energy  toward  something.  You  are  conscious  of  the 
effort  as  yours ;   it  is  begun  and  carried  through  for  your- 


134         INTRODUCTION   TO  PHILOSOPHY 

self.  You  relate  the  principal  object  —  i.e.  the  end  — 
and  all  subsidiary  objects  to  yourself.  In  the  urgency  of 
the  purpose,  the  end  or  the  means  for  securing  the  end 
may  have  the  chief  place  in  attention ;  but  the  effort  is 
sustained  because  the  subject  relates  the  end  and  the 
steps  taken  to  attain  the  end  to  himself.  Experience  as 
conation  has  duality  of  aspect. 

3.  Experience  as  Feeling  or  Affection.  —  When  attend- 
ing to  an  object,  e.g.  when  listening  to  the  rendition  of  a 
musical  composition,  there  is  a  tone  of  pleasure  or  displeas- 
ure in  our  experience.  This  tone  is  known  as  Feeling,  or 
Affection.  It  arises  from  the  value  we  set  on  this  object; 
and  feeling,  or  affection,  may  in  general  be  described  as 
our  "  sensitiveness  to  the  values  of  objects."  In  the 
contemplation  of  an  object,  there  is  this  attendant  tone 
which  lies  between  the  extremes  of  pleasure  and  displeas- 
ure ;  and  there  must  be  apprehension  of  an  object  in  order 
that  there  may  be  feeling.  It  may  be  that  the  object  is 
subjective  in  character,  as  when  you  recall  your  enjoyment 
of  a  beautiful  sunset  or  when  you  attend  to  the  present 
discomfort  of  a  severe  toothache ;  but  then,  as  always, 
there  is  an  object.  We  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  feel- 
ing-characteristic of  experience  presents  a  subject-  and 
an  object-aspect. 

§  59.  Characteristics  of  Consciousness  and  Experience. 
—  We  have  spoken  of  two  characteristics  of  experience : 
that  there  is  always  a  feeling-thinking-willing  conscious- 
ness;  and  that  it  has  two  inseparable  aspects.  We  now 
call  attention  to  certain  other  characteristics  which  are 
important  for  our  study. 

I.  The  Objects  of  your  Experience  are  Many,  but  the  Sub- 
ject of  them  is  One.  —  The  things  and  persons  and  events 
to  which  we,  each  of  us,  direct  our  attention  are  past 
numbering.     It  is  probable  that  no  two  instants  of  life 


EXPERIENCE  135 

find  any  one  of  us  with  exactly  the  same  mental  content. 
But  in  the  case  of  each  of  us,  the  numberless  objects  of 
interest  and  ends  of  endeavor  are  all  related  to  one  subject. 
I  am  the  I  that  was  a  pupil  in  the  primary  school,  the  I 
that  was  passed  from  grade  to  grade,  the  I  who  am  now  a 
teacher.  This  I  is  the  one  subject  of  all  the  objects  in 
the  unnumbered  experiences  that  make  up  my  life  between 
the  first  day  in  the  schoolroom  and  the  present  moment. 
Those  experiences  were  the  experiences  of  one  self,  of  an 
identical  subject.  Our  experiences  seem  quite  distinct  and 
individual ;  nevertheless  our  consciousness  is  not  many, 
but  one.  It  is  the  unitary  consciousness  of  one  subject. 
We  find  a  suggestive  analogy  in  organisms.  Varied  ele- 
ments are  appropriated  by  the  plant  or  animal.  Those 
elements,  as  they  are  at  the  time  of  their  being  appro- 
priated, seem  quite  apart  and  distinct  from  one  another. 
But  when  they  have  been  appropriated  by  the  organism, 
they  are  organized  into  a  whole  which  is  a  unit,  into  one 
plant  or  one  body.  The  plant  or  the  body  is,  to  be  sure, 
a  very  imperfect  individual  as  compared  with  conscious- 
ness ;  nevertheless  it  is  a  unit.  In  the  next  paragraph  we 
shall  see  how  the  apparent  distinctness  of  our  experiences 
is  lost  in  the  unitary  nature  of  our  consciousness. 

2.  The  one  Subject  of  the  many  Experiences  of  each  of  us 
is  in  Constant  Change.  —  You  are  the  identical  self  of  the 
years  of  your  boyhood ;  but  that  same  self  is  now  a  very 
different  self.  Once  you  thought  as  a  child,  and  felt  and 
acted  as  a  child ;  and  now  you  think  and  feel  and  act, 
but  not  as  when  you  were  a  child.  Your  conceptions 
of  yourself  and  the  world  and  life,  your  likes  and  dislikes 
and  ideals,  have  so  changed  as  to  present  few  points  of 
likeness  with  what  they  then  were.  Our  moods  change 
from  hour  to  hour.  Nay  more,  the  consciousness  of  any  of 
us  in  any  instant  is  in  some  respect   different  from  the 


136         INTRODUCTION   TO  PHILOSOPHY 

consciousness  of  the  preceding  and  following  instants. 
Every  subject  is  the  same  self  through  all  his  changes  of 
consciousness  ;  but,  although  he  can, never  become  another 
self,  he  is  ever  becoming  other  than  what  he  was.  A 
growing  organism  presents  an  illustrative  analogy.  A 
tulip  is  throughout  its  life  constantly  becoming  other  than 
what  it  was  ;  but  it  never  becomes  another  tulip,  nor  some- 
thing which  is  not  a  tulip.  So  with  us,  the  subject  is  the 
same  subject,  but  a  changing  subject.  In  other  words, 
the  subject  is  identical,  but  not  static. 

3 .  Experience  is  a  Development.  —  We  have  spoken  of 
experience  as  "  any  whole  of  consciousness."  This  would 
seem  to  imply  that  consciousness  is  made  up  of  succeeding 
wholes.  But  our  present  study  will  make  it  clear  that 
consciousness  is  not  so  constituted.  When  one  listens 
to  a  musical  presentation,  his  previous  musical  experience 
determines  to  no  small  extent  the  experience  which  comes 
with  the  present  listening.  The  same  presentation  will 
have  a  greatly  different  value  for  a  subject  before  he  has 
had  critical  musical  training  from  what  it  would  have 
after  such  training.  There  was  a  time  when  sentences 
in  our  mother-tongue  had  little  or  no  significance  for  us, 
and  a  time  still  later  when  this  was  also  true  of  the  terms 
and  symbols  of  arithmetic.  Now  we  understand  our 
mother-speech  without  conscious  effort;  and  there  are 
those  of  us  who  readily  follow  processes  in  higher  mathe- 
matics. This  gain  in  comprehension  comes  of  the  fact 
that  any  present  experience  is  not  wholly  a  new  experience ; 
it  has  in  it,  as  a  largely  determinative  element,  our  ex- 
perience up  to  that  present.  The  experience  of  the  present 
is  a  combination  of  past  experience  and  of  what  comes  into 
consciousness  in  the  present.  This  combining  of  the  past 
and  present  in  consciousness  is  frequently  spoken  of  as 
Apperception ;    and  Kant  would  say  that  it  comes  of  the 


EXPERIENCE  137 

synthesizing  activity  of  reason.  This  much  is  certain : 
your  experience  in  any  instant  has  in  it  what  is  of  the  past 
and  what  is  new.  From  this  it  becomes  evident  that 
experience  as  a  whole  is  a  development;  it  is  not  con- 
stituted of  a  series  of  independent  experiences.  Experi- 
ence is  continuous ;  it  is  a  stream  or  flux,  not  a  series  in 
the  strict  sense  of  that  term.  Our  apparently  distinct 
experiences  are  really  emphasized  moments  of  one  con- 
tinuous experience. 

4.  Experience  as  the  Realization  of  the  Object  by  the  Subject. 
—  But  how  is  it  possible  that  experience  should  persist  ? 
Hume  regarded  perceptions  as  "  distinct  existences,"  and 
he  confessed  himself  unable  to  "  explain  the  principles 
that  unite  our  successive  perceptions  in  our  thought  or 
consciousness  " ;  but  he  recognized  that  they  are  united. 
Mill  acknowledged  that  he  could  not  reconcile  his  serial 
view  of  consciousness  with  self-consciousness.  We  have 
concluded  that  consciousness  is  not  constituted  of  a  series 
of  experiences,  but  is  a  continuity.  If  it  be  a  continuity, 
the  experience  of  any  instant  does  not  vanish  with  the 
instant ;  it  persists.  How  does  it  persist .?  We  appeal  to 
experience  for  the  answer.  We  think  of  the  pianist  as 
having  mastery  of  the  piano  in  the  measure  in  which  the 
significance  of  that  Instrument  for  a  thinking-feeling- 
acting  being  has  become  a  part  of  himself.  That  is,  the 
reality  of  the  piano,  as  a  musical  instrument,  has  become 
in  some  measure  an  element  in  his  own  reality.  This  has 
come  through  his  experience  with  the  piano.  There  is  in 
the  Instrument  content  for  consciousness,  meaning  for  a 
subject;  and  experience  is  the  process  in  which  this  con- 
tent has  come  to  reality  in  the  pianist.  This  content  hav- 
ing become  an  element  of  a  subject's  reality,  it  persists 
in  and  with  the  subject.  The  next  paragraph  will  con- 
tinue our  answer  to  the  question  asked  above. 


138         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

5.  Experience  as  the  Process  in  which  the  Subject  realizes 
Himself.  —  In  the  preceding  paragraph  we  have  noted 
that  experience  is  a  process  in  which  we  organize  the  ap- 
propriated meaning  of  things  into  our  own  reality.  This 
aspect  of  the  process  is  analogous  to  that  in  which  an 
organism  sustains  life  and  develops.  The  plant  takes 
up  material  from  the  soil  and  the  air  and  organizes  it  into 
root,  stem,  leaf,  flower,  and  seed.  The  self  is  such  an 
organizing  principle;  but  there  is  another  aspect  of  its 
organizing  activity  for  which  it  is  not  easy  to  find  a 
fitting  analogy.  We  have  called  attention  to  the  fact 
that  extended  critical  experience  in  any  department  of 
life  makes  for  skill  in  that  line  of  activity.  This  is  but 
another  way  of  saying  that  the  subject  is  developed  in 
that  particular.  One  says  of  a  certain  man,  "  He  is  a  real 
mechanic."  This  statement  means  that  the  subject 
spoken  of  has  so  far  realized  in  himself  the  significance  of 
objects  for  mechanical  thought  and  effort  that  he  has 
developed  his  own  reality  well  toward  the  mechanical 
ideal.  We  have  each  of  us  acquired  some  facility  in  relat- 
ing objects  to  ourselves.  We  can  use  the  pen  or  the  type- 
writer with  such  ease  that  the  effort  required  does  not  in- 
terrupt the  course  of  our  thought.  This  means  that  we 
have  not  only  organized  the  reality  of  these  objects  into 
our  reality,  but  that  we  have  also  organized  our  activities  ; 
we  have  organized  and  thus  developed  our  own  reality. 
The  self  is  the  organizing  principle  of  experience  and  life ; 
and  experience  persists  because  it  is  an  element  in  the  sub- 
ject as  organized. 

6.  Conclusions.  —  In  a  plant  and  animal  the  unit  or- 
ganism builds  up  Its  own  particulars  and  orders  them  in 
respect  of  each  other.  Thus,  in  a  body  the  Individual 
organism  appropriates  content  and  disposes  the  content 
into  flesh,  skin,  blood,  hair,  etc.     It  builds  up  the  mem- 


EXPERIENCE  139 

bers ;  and,  in  so  doing,  it  organizes  the  appropriated  con- 
tent and  develops  itself.  The  subject  in  his  experience 
appropriates  content  for  himself  as  a  thinking-feeling- 
acting  unit ;  he  organizes  this  content  into  his  reality, 
and  thus  develops  and  organizes  his  own  reality.  The 
relation  of  the  activities  of  an  organism  to  the  appro- 
priated material  and  to  the  parts  of  the  organism  is  in- 
ternal, or  immanent.  The  relation  of  the  activity  of  the 
subject  to  the  particulars  of  his  experience  is  develop- 
mental and  immanent.  There  is  nothing  like  this  in  the 
relation  of  the  machine  to  what  organizes  it,  or  to  its  own 
parts,  or  to  the  material  which  it  works.  We  conclude, 
therefore,  that  the  mechanical  idea  and  mechanical  rela- 
tions are  not  applicable  to  experience ;  they  are  mislead- 
ing. For  the  study  of  experience,  we  must  recognize 
that  it  has  its  origin  and  its  being  in  organic  relations. 

In  concluding  our  consideration  of  this  subject,  we  recall 
some  facts  noted  above.  Experience  is  a  continuous 
whole.  What  appear  to  us  to  be  separate  experiences  are 
emphasized,  or  selected,  wholes  of  experience,  selected 
to  serve  the  subject's  momentary  purpose.  In  view  of 
this,  it  may  be  well  to  modify  our  provisional  definition 
of  an  experience  as  conceived  by  Philosophy  and  to  state 
it  thus  :  an  experience  is  a  selected  whole  of  consciousness. 
Every  whole  of  consciousness  has  three  characteristics ;  it 
is  a  thinking-feeling-willing  awareness.  And  every  whole  of 
consciousness  has  two  aspects :  a  subject-aspect  and  an 
object-aspect.  We  may  also,  without  danger  of  confusion, 
speak  of  any  content  for  consciousness  which  we  have 
organized  into  our  own  reality  as  an  experience ;  or  we  may 
use  this  same  term  to  signify  the  process  by  which  content 
for  consciousness  is  realized  in  the  self. 


DIVISION   A:    COGNITION  AND   REALITY; 
EPISTEMOLOGY 

CHAPTER  XVI 

SCEPTICISM 

§  60.  Historical.  —  The  uncritical,  or  naive,  man  never 
doubts  but  that  it  is  possible  to  know  objects.  Most  men 
are  certain  that  they  know  objects  and  occurrences ;  and 
they  would  be  surprised  if  one  should  seriously  assert  that 
there  is  no  assurance  whatever  that  any  of  their  sup- 
posed knowledge  is  valid.  But  some  philosophers  have 
doubted  the  possibility  of  attaining  valid  knowledge; 
and  others  have  gone  so  far  as  to  declare  that  knowledge  of 
what  is  real  is  impossible.  Scepticism,  or  doubt  of  the 
possibility  of  knowledge,  began  to  take  form  with  the 
Sophists.  According  to  Protagoras,  knowledge  of  an 
object  is  only  the  momentary  opinion  of  the  individual 
knower ;  it  is  not  valid,  because  it  is  not  universally  true, 
i.e.  true  for  that  individual  always  and  for  all  subjects. 
His  doctrine  is,  to  be  sure,  a  modified  form  of  doubt ;  for 
he  grants  a  knowledge  of  changing  appearances  which  is, 
at  the  time  of  the  perception,  true  for  the  individual  who 
perceives.  But  Protagoras  denies  knowledge  of  reality, 
and  he  also  denies  that  different  subjects  have  a  common 
content  of  knowledge.  With  Gorgias  scepticism  became 
absolute;  he  denied  both  the  fact  of  reality  and  the 
possibility  of  knowledge.  The  Sceptics,  a  Graeco-Roman 
school,  were  open  proponents  of  doubt.     Pyrrho,  whom 

140 


SCEPTICISM  141 

we  know  through  his  pupil,  Timon,  was  a  thoroughgoing 
sceptic.  He  taught  that  knowledge  of  things  is  impossible, 
and  that  the  principle  of  doubt  is  itself  open  to  doubt. 
Some  of  those  who  came  after  Pyrrho  were  ready  to  grant 
that  we  may  attain  degrees  of  probability  approximating 
certainty.  Hume  seems  to  have  been  the  last  thorough- 
going sceptic  of  prominence.  The  prevailing  form  of 
modern  philosophical  scepticism  is  expressed  in  the  doctrine 
that  the  objects  of  perception  are  only  temporal  and  spatial 
appearances,  or  phenomena ;  that  we  do  not,  and  cannot, 
know  reality.  This  view  takes  various  forms ;  but  in 
general  it  would  mean  that  in  seeing  or  touching  this 
desk  —  i.e.  in  perceiving  it  —  you  do  not  perceive  the 
reality  itself,  but  the  appearance  of  a  reality,  the  reality 
being  itself  unperceived.  The  doctrine  just  described  is 
known  as  Phenomenalism. 

§  61.  Our  Purpose.  —  We  do  not  purpose  in  this  chap- 
ter to  establish  the  validity  of  knowledge;  neither  will 
we  undertake  a  detailed  examination  of  Phenomenalism 
at  this  point.  That  will  come  later.  We  wish  to  set 
forth  the  irrationality  of  general  philosophic  doubt,  to 
indicate  the  inherent  inconsistency  and  intellectual  folly 
of  asserting  or  assuming  that  we  cannot  attain  to  such  a 
degree  of  validity  as  will  satisfy  the  demands  of  reason. 
In  other  words,  this  chapter  is  merely  a  general  criticism 
of  philosophic  scepticism. 

§  62.  Grounds  of  Doubt.  —  Why  have  thoughtful  men 
doubted  the  possibility  of  knowledge  .?  Facts  of  common 
experience  seem  at  first  sight  to  justify  their  questioning. 

I.  The  sun  appears  larger  at  some  times  than  at  others  ; 
a  tree  appears  blue  at  a  distance,  near  at  hand  it  is  seen  to 
be  green  ;  a  man  appears  larger  when  standing  by  a  small 
boy  than  when  he  stands  by  a  large  man ;  a  stick  which  is 
straight  in  the  air  will  appear  broken  if  part  of  it  be  thrust 


142         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

obliquely  into  water.  These  experiences  show  that  the 
same  object  appears  different  at  different  times,  from  dif- 
ferent points  of  view,  and  in  different  relations.  Other 
examples  abound.  Thus,  a  weight  seems  heavier  and  a 
road  longer  when  we  are  weary  than  when  we  are  in  full 
vigor;  an  object  may  feel  cold  to  one  hand  and  warm  to 
the  other  hand  of  the  same  subject;  and  persons  do  not 
agree  as  to  the  size  of  the  full  moon.  That  is,  the  same 
object  will  be  differently  perceived  by  different  persons, 
also  by  the  same  person  in  different  moods.  Now,  the 
sun  and  the  man  cannot  be  both  large  and  small,  the  tree 
both  green  and  blue,  the  stick  both  straight  and  broken ; 
and  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  other  differing  perceptions 
of  the  same  object.  Such  experiences,  it  is  said.  Indicate 
that  our  knowledge  is  a  momentary  and  individual  knowl- 
edge of  appearances  and  does  not  have  validity  for  all 
subjects  and  all  experiences  of  the  same  subject.  The  man 
who  would  be  rational  must,  therefore,  be  sceptical  respect- 
ing knowledge. 

2.  In  our  study  of  Experience,  we  found  that  every 
present  experience  is  largely  determined  by  past  experience. 
The  farmer  concludes  that  the  soil  and  exposure  of  a  cer- 
tain field  are  such  that  it  would  be  well  to  use  it  for  the 
culture  of  grapes.  The  geologist  says  that  the  valley  he 
is  studying  has  been  greatly  affected,  if  not  caused,  by 
glacial  action.  They  both  base  their  judgments  upon 
opinions  which  they,  at  the  time  of  their  viewing  the  field 
and  the  valley,  assume  to  be  true.  This  is  true  of  all  of  us 
in  our  attaining  knowledge ;  we  all  begin  with  something 
which  we  accept  as  true.  If  we  are  asked  to  prove  that 
these  basal  judgments  are  true,  we  must  argue  from  other 
judgments  which  are  yet  more  general.  To  justify  these 
more  general  opinions,  we  must  find  premises  that  are 
still  more  fundamental.     From  this  it  is  evident  that  the 


SCEPTICISM  143 

ultimate  basis  of  our  knowledge  is  some  principle  which  is 
taken  to  be  true  without  proof.  In  view  of  this,  it  is 
claimed  that  what  we  call  knowledge  rests  upon  an  un- 
proven  basis,  and  that  our  knowledge  must  in  consequence 
lack  validity. 

3.  Much  of  our  knowledge  is  incomplete  and  imper- 
fect ;  it  is  not  certain  that  our  knowledge  of  anything  is 
complete.  We  are  constantly  supplementing  and  revis- 
ing what  we  know  or  think  we  know.  This  is  so  notably 
true  in  the  realm  of  science  that  examples  need  not  be 
given.  Our  knowledge  of  the  external  world  comes  to 
us  through  sensation  and  is,  therefore,  subject  to  this 
limitation.  The  blind  do  not  know  colors,  and  the  deaf 
do  not  know  sounds;  and  some  who  have  vision  and 
hearing  do  not  see  and  hear  all  that  is  visible  and 
audible,  because  their  sensibility  in  these  respects  is 
not  sufficiently  acute.  We  have  reason  to  believe  that 
animals  can  see  and  hear  and  smell  what  we  cannot.  In 
addition  to  this,  it  is  not  certain  that  we  are  so  furnished 
with  sense-organs  as  to  give  us  a  complete  knowledge  of 
things  and  happenings.  We  are  far  from  having  made  a 
complete  account  of  the  knowledge  possible  through  our 
normal  sensibility ;  and  the  foregoing  considerations  would 
indicate  the  possibility  that  what  we  perceive  is  but  a  very 
small  fraction  of  what  exists  and  occurs.  The  sceptic  in- 
sists that  this  fact  puts  our  present  knowledge  in  doubt. 

4.  We  have  spoken  of  thoroughgoing  scepticism  the  na- 
ture of  whose  doubt  Is  so  radical  as  to  call  for  special  men- 
tion. It  Is  frequently  called  Pyrrhonism  after  the  founder 
of  the  ancient  school  of  sceptics.  This  name  is,  how- 
ever, sometimes  applied  to  views  which  are  by  no  means 
so  consistently  extreme  as  those  of  Pyrrho  and  his  fol- 
lowers. For  a  Pyrrhonic  sceptic,  this  universe  is  a  universe 
of  unreason,  "  a  chaos  of  unrelated  phenomena."     Objects, 


144         INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

events,  and  experiences  cannot  be  reduced  to  order.  This 
disorder  and  unreason  is  even  a  characteristic  of  mental 
operations,  and  as  a  consequence  we  ought  to  doubt  our 
doubts.  Hume's  scepticism  is  related  to  that  which  we 
have  just  described.  He  held  that  "  a  true  sceptic  will 
be  diffident  of  his  philosophic  convictions,"  and  that 
"  in  all  the  incidents  of  life,  we  ought  still  to  preserve 
our  scepticism."  He  also  says  that  "  all  who  reason  or 
believe  anything"  are  guilty  of  folly.  From  this  it  is  evi- 
dent that  he  felt  bound  to  doubt  the  validity  of  his  prin- 
cipal doctrines,  and  among  these  doctrines  we  find  his 
doubt  of  reason. 

§  63.  Scepticism  Examined.  —  We  are  not  at  liberty 
to  reject  a  doctrine  simply  because  its  logical  consequences 
are  alarmingly  destructive.  But  if  it  involves  conclusions 
which  are  grave  and  revolutionary,  this  fact  should  put 
us  on  our  guard ;  and  we  should  submit  the  doctrine  to 
exacting  criticism  before  accepting  it.  Now,  the  logical 
consequences  of  scepticism  are  revolutionary.  If  the 
sceptic  is  right,  the  assertions  and  procedure  of  ordinary  life 
are  irrational,  for  we  make  assertions  which  imply  a  valid 
knowledge  of  things,  events,  and  persons ;  and  we  base 
our  life  activities  upon  the  certainty  that  we  have  knowl- 
edge which  will  hold  true.  Scepticism  likewise  robs  the 
processes  and  findings  of  science  of  all  value.  The  reason- 
ing which  leads  to  such  destructive  conclusions  must  be 
itself  without  flaw.  If  there  is  no  knowledge  which  is 
valid,  no  knowledge  upon  which  we  may  confidently  rely, 
none  that  will  stand  the  test  of  reason,  then  all  thinking 
and  all  speech  are  folly.  We  cannot  know  that  there  is 
anyone  to  whom  to  express  thought,  or  anything  to  think 
about,  or  anyone  to  think.  To  accept  this,  would  be  the 
suicide  of  reason ;  and  the  argument  in  support  of  such  a 
conclusion  must  be  unimpeachable. 


SCEPTICISM  145 

1.  As  to  the  sceptical  argument  which  is  based  upon 
the  asserted  variant  perceptions  of  the  same  object  by- 
different  subjects,  or  by  the  same  subject  in  different  moods 
and  relations.  A  study  of  Appearance  and  Reality  will 
best  discover  for  us  how  differing  perceptions  arise  and 
what  their  significance  is  for  Philosophy ;  and  that  study 
comes  later.  We  shall  then  see  whether  variant  percep- 
tions furnish  ground  for  concluding  that  we  know  appear- 
ance only,  and  not  reality.  At  this  point,  however,  we  call 
attention  to  two  facts.  First,  despite  these  differing  per- 
ceptions the  object  is  somehow  and  to  some  extent  known ; 
for  it  is  known  to  be  the  same  object.  The  doubter  grants 
this  fact;  indeed  he  bases  his  argument  upon  it.  It  is 
evident,  then,  that  our  knowledge  in  such  instances  is  not 
wholly  invalid ;  it  has  some  worth.  The  second  fact  is 
this  :  the  sceptic  affirms  knowledge  —  that  the  object  is 
the  same  —  and  he  makes  this  assertion  of  valid  knowl- 
edge a  premise  for  his  argument  that  there  is  no  valid 
knowledge.  His  premise  and  his  conclusion  cannot  both 
be  true. 

2.  As  to  the  argument  based  upon  the  fact  that  the 
ultimate  basis  of  knowledge  must  be  some  principle  which 
is  taken  to  be  true  without  formal  proof.  This  statement 
is  not  open  to  doubt.  All  science  assumes  the  uniformity 
of  nature.  It  postulates  that,  as  nature  now  acts  under 
any  given  conditions,  so  nature  has  acted  in  the  past  and 
will  act  to-morrow.  Our  fundamental  assumption  in 
practical  life,  in  Science,  and  in  Philosophy  is  that  the 
universe,  including  man,  is  intellectually  reliable.  This 
implies  first  that  reason  is  self-consistent.  That  is,  in 
fact,  simply  saying  that  self-consistency  is  essential  to 
right  reasoning.  If  any  view  includes  two  particulars 
which  are  inconsistent  with  each  other,  that  is  of  itself 
an  indication  that  further  thought  is  required.     We  will 


146         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

not  have  come  to  complete  rationality  respecting  the 
matter  in  question  until  we  have  found  what  reconciles 
the  conflicting  particulars  or  what  gives  ground  for  the 
rejection  of  one  of  them.  The  assumption  that  reason 
is  self-consistent  is  really  no  assumption;  it  is  merely 
another  way  of  saying  that  reason  is  what  it  is.  Self- 
consistency  is  of  the  nature  of  rationality.  Our  assump- 
tion that  the  universe  is  universally  reliable  implies, 
secondly,  that  the  universe  is  intelligible.  To  question 
the  intelligibility  of  the  universe,  to  doubt  whether  it  has 
a  discoverable  meaning  is  to  begin  our  study  with  a  pre- 
supposition which  renders  investigation  fruitless.  The 
assumption  that  the  universe  with  which  we  have  inter- 
course has  a  discoverable  meaning,  is  essential  to  the  study 
of  the  experience  which  arises  from  our  dealings  with  per- 
sons, things,  and  events  ;  hence  it  is  a  reasonable  assump- 
tion. The  self-consistency  of  reason  and  the  intelligibility 
of  the  universe  justify  us  in  holding  that  any  characteris- 
tic of  thought  which  is  essential  to  the  self-consistency  of 
reason  and  the  intelligibility  of  the  universe,  may  be  taken 
to  be  true. 

We  will  now  apply  the  test  of  self-consistency  to  the 
reasoning  of  the  philosophical  sceptic.  The  sceptic  is  a 
sceptic  because  he  is  unwilling  to  accept  mere  assertion 
as  valid  knowledge.  He  holds  that  that  only  is  knowledge 
which  has  for  its  ground  an  assignable  reason,  that  an 
affirmation  which  is  not  so  grounded  is  without  value. 
But  this  holds  also  for  his  doubt;  for  his  doubt  is  an 
affirmation  of  the  invalidity  of  knowledge.  His  affirma- 
tion of  invalidity  must,  therefore,  be  based  upon  an  as- 
signed reason.  But  to  assign  a  reason  is  to  declare  that 
he  has  some  valid  knowledge,  and  this  is  inconsistent  with 
his  assertion  that  there  is  no  valid  knowledge.  A  reasoned 
scepticism  is  inherently  self-contradictory. 


SCEPTICISM  147 

3.  As  to  the  incompleteness  and  consequent  imperfec- 
tion of  our  supposed  knowledge.  It  is  true  that  our 
knowledge  is  incomplete ;  but  incompleteness  is  not  to  be 
confounded  with  invalidity.  Our  earliest  geometrical 
knowledge  was  valid  although  it  was  the  mere  beginning ; 
our  later  advanced  mathematical  acquirements  do  not  put 
in  question  the  first  facts  acquired  in  arithmetic.  What  we 
came  to  know  in  the  study  of  the  first  proposition  of  geom- 
etry made  possible  what  came  after ;  it  in  fact  constituted  a 
part  of  the  later  knowledge.  Mere  extension  of  knowledge 
does  not  prove  the  initial  forms  of  it  invalid.  The  dis- 
covery of  the  law  of  gravitation  did  not  render  invalid 
previous  knowledge  of  physical  facts  ;  it  simply  gave  more 
adequate  explanation  of  them.  Incomplete  knowledge 
only  becomes  untruth  when  it  is  taken  to  be  the  whole 
truth.  A  being  endowed  with  a  sense  not  had  by  us  might 
have  elements  in  his  knowledge  which  are  not  in  ours  ;  but 
that  does  not  force  the  conclusion  that  ours  is  without 
value.  The  blind  and  the  deaf  are  cut  off  from  knowledge 
which  we  have ;  but  blindness  does  not  invalidate  the 
knowledge  which  comes  through  hearing  and  touch,  nor 
deafness  that  which  we  attain  through  touch  and  vision. 
Knowledge  obtained  through  the  senses  which  we  have 
would  still  be  truth,  even  though  it  were  but  a  part  of 
the  truth. 

There  will  always  be  a  possibility  that  our  judgments 
will  need  correction.  The  Copernican  theory  led  men  to 
correct  some  of  their  astronomical  ideas  ;  but  the  observed 
facts  of  eclipses  and  the  lunar  month  and  the  like  remained, 
and  these  facts  constituted  a  body  of  knowledge.  This 
theory  did  not  make  it  necessary  that  any  astronomical 
facts  should  be  discarded  ;  it  opened  the  way  to  a  new  and 
more  adequate  explanation  of  known  facts.  We  call 
attention  to  an  important  fact  in  this  connection  :  Thought 


148         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

corrects  itself.  The  latest  conclusion,  that  which  is  free 
from  some  particular  of  error,  has  come  by  way  of  knowl- 
edge ;  and  the  extension  and  completion  of  knowledge 
must  necessarily  come  thus.  This  puts  in  evidence  the 
authority  of  thought  to  sit  in  judgment  on  itself,  and  its 
efficiency  in  so  judging.  Cognitive  experience  is  its  own 
lav/giver  and  judge.  This  is  to  be  seen  also  in  the  fact 
that  the  denial  of  knowledge  involves  an  affirmation  of 
knowledge. 

4.  From  what  precedes  it  is  clear  that  reasoned  scepti- 
cism is  irrational.  All  thinking  assumes  the  competency  of 
thought,  it  assumes  that  reasoned  thinking  will  lead  to 
valid  conclusions.  Scepticism  itself  makes  this  assump- 
tion in  presenting  reasons  for  its  doubt.  In  addition  to 
this,  the  scepticism  which  we  have  thus  far  examined, 
bases  its  doubt  upon  what  must  be  valid  If  Its  objection 
holds.  Its  thesis  and  its  argument  are  Inconsistent. 
So  much  seems  evident;  but  thoroughgoing  scepticism 
requires  further  consideration.  The  radical  sceptic  doubts 
his  doubt;  and  in  this  his  scepticism  differs  from  that 
which  we  have  thus  far  examined.  According  to  radical 
scepticism,  it  is  useless  to  ask  that  reason  be  self-consistent. 
Hume  accepted  the  fact  of  the  unity  of  consciousness,  and 
along  with  this  he  Insisted  that  perceptions  are  absolutely 
distinct  existences.  He  declared  that  both  these  were 
for  him  assured  principles,  although  he  at  the  same  time 
recognized  their  Inconsistency  with  each  other.  And  this 
was  not  strange,  for  he  also  asserted  the  falsity  of  reason. 
To  state  it  briefly,  the  thoroughgoing  sceptic  consistently 
refuses  to  be  bound  to  self-consistency;  he  takes  this 
position  in  order  that  he  may  be  consistent.  Such  a 
scepticism  cannot  be  refuted  by  its  own  principles. 
It  will  not  accept  what  is  not  proved,  and  it  holds  a  con- 
ception of  the  world  and  life  which  makes  it  impossible 


SCEPTICISM  149 

to  frame  a  cogent  argument.  There  is  that,  however,  in 
the  preceding  statement  which  makes  the  case  clear  to  us. 
Radical  scepticism  refuses  to  be  bound  to  self-consistency ; 
such  a  doctrine  proclaims  itself  irrational. 

§  64.  Conclusion.  —  As  previously  indicated,  the  logi- 
cal consequences  of  the  doctrine  we  have  been  examining 
are  so  destructive  as  to  forbid  its  acceptance  unless  the 
reasons  proffered  in  its  support  are  unimpeachable.  It 
fails  to  meet  this  test ;  it  is  inherently  inconsistent.  The 
philosophical  sceptic  is  irrational  in  his  attitude  and  pro- 
cedure. The  process  and  activities  by  which  we  examine 
and  judge  knowledge  must  be  the  processes  and  activi- 
ties of  cognition  itself.  If  we  deny  the  reliability  of 
cognition  or  put  it  in  doubt,  we  deny  or  put  in  doubt  the 
validity  of  our  scepticism ;  for  the  doubt  must  itself  come 
through  the  knowing  process.  We  may  with  reason  doubt 
particulars  of  knowledge ;  but,  in  doing  this,  cognition 
is  judging  itself.  The  cognizing  activity  of  reason  is  also 
the  explanatory  and  critical  activity  of  reason.  In  the 
nature  of  the  case,  there  can  be  no  explanation  or  criticism 
of  knowledge  except  upon  the  assumption  that  the  knowing 
activity  is  reliable.  "  The  validity  of  knowledge  as  suck 
is  an  ultimate  and  inevitable  assumption." 


/     /  / 


CHAPTER  XVII 

SOLIPSISM 


;^ 


§  65.  The  Doctrine  Stated.  —  The  world  of  persons  and 
things  seems  to  us  to  be  very  real.  In  our  normal  ex- 
perience, we  never  appear  to  ourselves  to  be  the  only- 
reality.  On  the  contrary,  each  of  us  thinks  of  himself 
as  a  single  reality  among  an  incalculable  number  of  reali- 
ties ;  for  the  world  in  which  we  are  and  the  particulars 
with  which  we  have  to  do,  are  taken  by  us  to  be  real  as  we 
ourselves  are.  It  is  the  task  of  Philosophy  to  criticise 
any  view  which  may  possibly  be  open  to  doubt ;  but  this 
element  of  experience  —  assurance  of  the  reality  of  things 
and  other  persons  —  is  so  accordant  with  the  whole  of 
experience  that  Western  Philosophy  has  accepted  it  as  a 
true  account  of  the  world.  It  is  doubtful  if  any  Western 
thinker  has  ever  seriously  insisted  that  he  was  himself  the 
sole  reality ;  but  some  philosophers  have  propounded 
views  which  their  critics  declare  involve  the  strange 
doctrine  that  nothing  but  the  individual  self  exists.  This 
doctrine  is  known  as  Solipsism.  But,  while  it  would  be 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  find  a  Western  thinker  who 
would  deny  that  there  is  any  reality  other  than  himself, 
there  have  been  philosophers  who  insisted  that  we  have 
no  evidence  that  anything  else  than  the  self  exists.  Ac- 
cording to  them  you  know  that  you  yourself  are ;  but  the 
reality  of  all  else,  of  the  persons  with  whom  you  have  inter- 
course and  of  the  objects  you  handle,  is  for  you  only  prob- 
lematical.    A  few  seem  to  hold  to  the  reality  of  other 

ISO 


SOLIPSISM  151 

persons  as  Indubitable ;  but  they  either  deny  the  reality 
of  things,  or  hold  their  reality  to  be  doubtful.  They 
insist  that  our  supposed  knowledge  Is  not  knowledge  of 
things  as  they  are.  They  assert  that  the  world  you  know 
is  no  more  nor  less  than  an  Idea  In  your  mind ;  and  It  Is 
by  no  means  certain  that  the  external  world,  granting  that 
there  Is  one,  Is  what  you  take  It  to  be.  The  term  Solipsism 
has  also  been  applied  to  this  doctrine.  Solipsism  In  this, 
its  epistemologlcal,  reference  takes  various  forms ;  but 
it  may  be  said  In  general  to  stand  for  the  doctrine  that, 
granting  that  there  Is  trans-subjective  reality,  what  any 
of  us  knows  Is  not  that  reality.  It  Is  rather  the  projection 
of  the  subject's  own  subjectivity.  In  other  words,  the 
world  which  each  subject  knows  has  Its  existence  solely  in 
that  subject's  consciousness.  It  is  evidently  a  form  of 
Subjectivism. 

§  66.  Our  Purpose.  —  We  do  not  purpose  to  examine 
Solipsism,  using  that  word  rigorously  as  signifying  the 
doctrine  that  the  individual  subject  is  the  sole  reality. 
That  view  has  no  standing  place  in  the  province  of  reason. 
Neither  will  we  at  this  point  give  a  detailed  study  of 
Subjectivism  with  a  view  to  establishing  the  actuality  of 
knowledge  of  objective  reality ;  that  study  comes  later. 
In  this  chapter  we  examine  the  doctrine  that  the  world 
of  our  experience  Is  the  construct  of  the  Individual  subject. 
For  example.  In  the  Instance  of  the  book  which  you  think 
you  are  holding  In  your  hand  and  reading ;  granting  that 
there  is  some  reality  other  than  your  own  self  In  a  certain 
conscious  state,  you  do  not  apprehend  that  objective 
reality.  In  connection  with  your  relation  to  that  reality, 
you  have  certain  sense-Impressions ;  what  these  are  in 
detail  Is  determined  by  what  you  are.  You  project  them 
out  from  yourself;  and,  thus  projected,  they  become  for 
you  the  symbol  of  an  unapprehended  reality.     You  call 


152         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

it  a  book ;  but  its  details  as  a  book  it  has  received  from 
you.  A  study  of  this  form  of  Solipsism  will  show  that  it 
is  inherently  inconsistent. 

§  67.  The  Doctrine  Explained.  —  Professor  Karl  Pear- 
son gives  a  very  able,  reasoned  statement  of  this  doctrine. 
It  has  the  form  of  a  scientific  description  ;  but  it  is  in  effect 
an  argument  in  support  of  this  thesis  :  Granting  that  there 
is  an  external  world,  even  then  the  world  as  known  to  us 
is  merely  a  projection  of  our  individual  subjectivity.     He 


"  How  close  then  can  we  get  to  this  supposed  world 
outside  ourselves  t  Just  as  near  but  no  nearer  than  the 
brain  terminals  of  the  sensory  nerves.  We  are  like  the 
clerk  in  the  telephone  exchange  who  cannot  get  nearer 
to  his  customers  than  his  end  of  the  telephone  wires.  We 
are  indeed  worse  off  than  the  clerk,  for  to  carry  out  the 
analogy  properly  we  must  suppose  him  never  to  have  been 
outside  the  exchange,  never  to  have  seen  a  customer  or  anyone 
like  a  customer  —  in  short,  never,  except  through  the  telephone 
wire,  to  have  come  in  contact  with  the  outside  universe.  Of 
that  *  real  '  universe  outside  himself  he  would  be  able 
to  form  no  direct  impression ;  the  real  universe  for  him 
would  be  the  aggregate  of  his  constructs  from  the  messages 
which  were  caused  by  the  telephone  wires  in  his  office. 
About  those  messages  and  the  ideas  raised  in  his  mind  by 
them  he  might  reason  and  draw  his  inferences ;  and  his 
conclusions  would  be  correct  —  for  what  t  For  .  .  .  the 
type  of  messages  that  go  through  the  telephone.  Some- 
thing definite  and  valuable  he  might  know  with  regard  to 
the  spheres  of  action  and  of  thought  of  his  telephone  sub- 
scribers, but  outside  those  spheres  he  could  have  no  ex- 
perience. .  .  .  He  could  never  have  seen  or  touched  a 
telephonic  subscriber  in  himself.  Very  much  in  the  posi- 
tion of  such  a  telephone  clerk  is  the  conscious  ego  of  each 


SOLIPSISM  153 

one  of  us  seated  at  the  brain  terminals  of  the  sensory  nerves. 
Not  a  step  nearer  than  those  terminals  can  he  get  to  that 

*  outside  '  world.  .  .  .  Messages  in  the  form  of  sense- 
impressions  come  flowing  in  from  that  *  outside  world,' 
and  these  we  analyse,  classify,  store  up,  and  reason  about. 
But  of  the  nature  of  '  things-in-themselves,'  of  what  may 
exist  at  the  other  end  of  our  system  of  telephone  wires, 
we  know  nothing  at  all."  .  .  . 

"  So  it  is  with  our  brain.  The  sounds  from  [the] 
telephone  .  .  .  correspond  to  .  .  .  sense-impressions. 
These  sense-impressions  we  project  as  it  were  outwards 
and  term  the  real  world  outside  ourselves.  But  the  things- 
in-themselves  which  the  sense-impressions  symbolize,  the 

*  reality,'  as  the  metaphysicians  call  it,  at  the  other  end 
of  the  nerve,  remains  unknown  and  u  knowable.  Reality 
of  the  external  world  lies  for  science  and  for  us  in  com- 
binations of  form  and  color  and  touch  —  sense-impres- 
sions as  widely  divergent  from  the  thing  *  at  the  other 
end  of  the  nerve  '  as  the  sounds  of  the  telephone  from  the 
subscriber  at  the  other  end  of  the  wire.  ...  As  his  [the 
telephone  clerk's]  world  is  conditioned  and  limited  by  his 
particular  network  of  wires,  so  ours  is  conditioned  by  our 
nervous  system,  by  our  organs  of  sense.  Their  peculi- 
arities determine  what  is  the  nature  of  the  outside  world 
which  we  construct.  It  is  the  similarity  in  the  organs  of 
sense  and  in  the  perceptive  faculty  of  all  normal  beings 
which  makes  the  outside  world  the  same,  or  practically 
the  same,  for  them  all.  ...  It  is  as  if  two  telephone  ex- 
changes had  very  nearly  identical  groups  of  subscribers. 
In  this  case  a  wire  between  the  two  exchanges  would  soon 
convince  the  imprisoned  clerks  that  they  had  something 
in  common  and  peculiar  to  themselves.  That  conviction 
corresponds  ...  to  the  recognition  of  other  consciousness." 

§  68.   Examination   of  the   Preceding    Exposition    and 


154         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Argument.  —  i.  The  foregoing  exposition  affirms  and  im- 
plies certain  realities  and  relations ;  and  these  are  made 
the  basis  of  the  explanation  and  argument.  The  nerves, 
the  brain,  the  flowing  in  of  messages  from  without,  the 
similarity  of  sense-organs,  the  situation  of  the  ego  at  the 
brain  terminal  of  the  nerves,  and  the  likenesses  of  our 
experiences  are  regarded  as  settled  facts.  If  the  nerves, 
the  coming  of  messages  along  the  nerves,  the  situation  of 
the  ego,  and  other  stated  and  implied  actualities  are  not  as 
Pearson  says,  the  exposition  and  argument  fail,  and  his  denial 
that  the  realities  of  the  external  world  are  known  fails  also. 

2.  If,  as  he  says,  the  ego  is  no  nearer  the  external  world 
than  the  brain  terminal  of  the  nerves,  then  the  nerves  are 
external  to  the  ego ;  so  also  are  other  persons  and  their 
experiences.  But,  by  his  own  admission,  the  nerves,  and 
the  work  which  the  nerves  do,  are  all  known.  This  would 
indicate  that  we  do  know  the  external  world  as  it  is.  If 
his  thesis  is  true,  his  affirmation  of  knowledge  respecting 
nerves  and  sense-impressions  is  without  warrant.  If  he 
is  warranted  in  these  affirmations,  his  thesis  is  false. 

3.  He  accepts  the  fact  of  the  practical  agreement  in 
experience  of  different  subjects.  He  must  account  for  this 
agreement ;  for  his  view  —  that  our  knowledge  is  purely 
subjective  and  personal  —  would  seem  to  preclude  such 
agreement.  In  stating  the  ground  of  this  agreement,  he 
says  that  the  organs  of  sense  and  the  perceptive  faculty 
of  all  persons  are  the  same.  Here  again  he  affirms  exact 
knowledge  of  what  is  objective  —  not  merely  knowledge 
that  something  is,  but  knowledge  of  what  it  is.  But  this 
does  not  agree  with  his  thesis,  for  his  thesis  denies  the 
fact  of  such  knowledge. 

4.  His  assertion  that  the  ego  is  seated  at  the  brain 
terminal  of  the  nerves,  is  crassly  materialistic  and  without 
warrant.     It    conceives    mind    spatially.     Science    gives 


SOLIPSISM  155 

no  warrant  for  such  a  statement.  We  have  reason  to  con- 
clude that  physiological  processes  related  to  sensations  — 
as  of  color,  sound,  taste,  etc.  —  are  located  in  the  brain. 
But  the  psychical  processes  —  the  color,  the  sound,  or  the 
quality  of  the  taste  —  have  never  been  found  there. 

5.  If  the  Subjectivism  which  we  have  just  examined 
would  be  consistent,  it  must  go  further  and  assert  that  the 
reality  of  all  except  the  individual  subject  is  in  the  highest 
degree  doubtful.  Pearson  says,  "The  field  [of  science]  is 
essentially  the  contents  of  the  mind."  According  to  this, 
the  subject-matter  of  geology,  botany,  and  chemistry 
is  the  consciousness  of  the  individual  student.  Other 
students  and  the  contents  of  their  consciousness  are  for 
each  of  us  simply  states  of  our  own  individual  conscious- 
ness. We  have  no  warrant  for  asserting  that  rocks, 
plants,  animals,  and  other  persons  have  an  existence  apart 
from  our  personal  and  private  consciousness.  We  have 
seen  in  what  precedes  that  the  Subjectivist  cannot  assume 
the  reality  of  the  external  world  in  order  to  explain  his 
consciousness ;  for  the  assumption  and  the  explanation 
involve  him  in  inconsistencies.  To  be  consistent,  the 
Subjectivist  must  also  hold  that  the  house  in  which  I  am, 
the  grounds  on  which  it  stands,  the  chair  on  which  I  sit, 
the  pen  with  which  I  write  are  for  exact  knowledge 
mere  states  of  my  consciousness.  In  a  word,  the  only 
reality  for  each  of  us  is  his  own  states  of  consciousness; 
but  all  thinkers  agree  in  rejecting  this  extreme  doctrine* 

§  69.  Conclusions.  —  Our  study  of  Philosophical  Scep- 
ticism led  to  the  conclusion  that  rationality  requires  us 
to  assume  that  experience  gives  us  valid  knowledge,  and 
that  we  must  leave  to  cognition  itself  to  fix  the  degree  of 
validity  of  particular  cognitions.  Whether  you  are  right 
in  concluding  that  the  telephone  bell  rang,  that  the  un- 
signed letter  is  from  a  certain  correspondent,  that  the 


156         INTRODUCTION   TO  PHILOSOPHY 

markings  on  Mars  are  canals,  or  that  Chemistry  is  right  in 
treating  radium  as  an  element  —  the  validity  of  these  or 
other  particulars  of  what  you  hold  for  knowledge,  can  only 
be  determined  by  assuming  the  validity  of  knowledge  as 
such.  We  are  not  free  to  doubt  the  validity  of  knowledge. 
Our  study  of  Solipsism  forces  the  conclusion  that,  if  we 
would  preserve  self-consistency  in  thought,  we  must  accept 
that  there  is  other  reality  than  states  of  consciousness  and 
that  the  individual  subject  knows  what  is  not  purely  sub- 
jective. Your  world  of  other  persons  and  things  and  events 
is  not  a  mere  projection  of  your  consciousness.  In  dealing 
with  the  world  known  to  you  —  In  thinking  about  it, 
feeling  with  respect  to  it,  handling  its  objects,  and  taking 
part  In  its  doings  —  you  are  dealing  with  what  is  not 
merely  your  states  of  consciousness  or  the  reflection  or 
representation  of  those  states.  Following  upon  these 
conclusions,  two  questions  call  for  answer.  Granting 
the  validity  of  knowledge  and  that  we  may  have  knowl- 
edge of  what  is  not  purely  subjective,  granting  also  that 
the  world  of  each  of  us  Is  not  a  mere  expression  or  pro- 
jection of  the  self,  we  have  still  to  determine  whether  what 
we  know  is  the  reality  of  objects  or  merely  appearance. 
Thus,  in  apprehending  a  chair  or  a  portrait,  do  I  apprehend 
the  reality  In  each  of  these  or  merely  the  appearance  of 
a  reality .?  This  is  one  question.  The  other  arises  out 
of  the  Sollpsistic  view  that  knowledge  is  purely  personal. 
You  and  I  see  a  house.  Is  the  house  known  by  you  the 
same  with  the  house  known  by  me  ?  Are  the  objects  of 
your  external  world  objects  for  all  subjects  as  they  are 
objects  for  you  ?  Or  to  make  It  more  general,  granted 
that  the  Individual  subject  knows  what  is  not  purely  sub- 
jective. Is  there  in  objects  as  known  by  the  individual 
subject  that  which  is  common  to  the  cognitive  experience 
of  all  subjects  .?  These  questions  will  occupy  our  attention 
in  a  number  of  the  chapters  which  follow. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

APPEARANCE    AND     REALITY 

§  70.  The  Question  Stated.  —  In  answering  the  ques- 
tion, Do  we  know  reality  ?  we  will  first  consider  experiences 
which  seem  to  support  the  doctrine  that  we  know  Ap- 
pearance only,  and  not  Reality. 

1.  We  are  so  impressed  with  the  reality  of  persons  and 
things,  there  is  such  a  general  agreement  between  the 
world  as  we  think  of  it  and  the  experiences  which  we  have 
in  dealing  with  it,  that  it  scarcely  occurs  to  us  to  question 
whether  the  world  as  we  know  it  is  the  world  of  reality. 
We  uncritically  accept  that  we  know  the  world  in  its  reality, 
that  what  we  see  and  hear  and  smell  and  taste  and  touch 
is  reality,  not  appearance.  But  certain  experiences  have 
led  men  to  doubt  the  correctness  of  this  common  conviction. 
A  piece  of  cloth  may  have  a  different  color  in  lamplight 
from  that  which  it  has  in  sunlight;  and  this  is  also  true 
of  gems.  In  the  shadow  of  the  bridge,  the  clear  water 
of  the  brook  is  a  dark  brown.  From  some  points  a  round 
disk  is  seen  as  oval,  and  the  parallel  rails  of  the  railway 
seem  to  meet  in  the  distance.  Such  experiences  have  led 
men  to  distinguish  between  appearance  and  reality. 
Many  have  conceived  of  reality  as  that  which  is  back  of 
appearance ;  and  they  have  also  concluded  that  what  we 
know  is  the  appearance  of  things,  not  the  reality  of  them. 

2.  Besides  these  common  experiences  there  are  facts 
which  the  analytical  study  of  perception  forces  us  to  take 
account  of.     We  commonly  think  of  the  red  or  pink  color 

IS7 


iS8         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  rose  as  being  in  the  rose,  of  the  sound  which  comes 
of  the  plucking  of  the  harp  string  as  being  in  the  harp. 
For  the  uncritical  man,  the  taste  quality  of  his  experience 
in  eating  an  orange  is  in  the  fruit,  independent  of  its  being 
experienced  by  him  or  any  other  person.  But  very  early 
in  the  history  of  Philosophy,  men  began  to  question 
whether  color,  sound,  smell,  and  taste  are  qualities  of  the 
object  considered  apart  from  the  subject.  These  and 
other  qualities  were  put  in  a  class  by  themselves  as  qualities 
which  are  not  actual  qualities  of  objects,  but  marks  rather 
as  to  how  objects  affect  us.  Many,  if  not  most,  thinkers 
now  hold  that  all  the  qualities  which  we  assign  to  objects 
are  not  purely  of  the  object,  but  that  the  qualities  which 
objects  have  as  we  perceive  them  are  conditioned  by  the 
subject.  They  hold  that  at  least  two  factors  enter  into  the 
determination  of  the  qualities  which  objects  are  perceived 
to  have  —  the  nature  of  the  object  and  the  nature  of  the 
subject.  From  this  some  would  conclude  that  we  per- 
ceive the  appearance  of  objects,  not  their  reality. 

3.  It  is  likewise  urged  that  this  conclusion  would  follow 
from  the  scientific  conception  of  the  constitution  of  matter. 
According  to  that,  the  top  of  this  desk  is  not  continuous 
as  it  appears  to  be;  it  is  constituted  of  atoms  no  two  of 
which  are  in  actual  contact.  That  is,  the  appearance  of 
the  desk,  and  of  all  other  objects,  is  quite  other  than  the 
i-eality  of  the  objects ;  they  appear  to  be  continuous,  but 
are  in  reality  discontinuous.  We  do  not  perceive  them  as 
they  are  really  made  up;  we  perceive  them  merely  as 
they  appear  to  us,  and  the  appearance  is  not  identical 
with  the  reality. 

4.  From  the  preceding  it  is  evident  that  we  cannot  an- 
swer the  question.  Do  we  know  reality  ?  until  we  have 
determined  the  relation  of  appearance  and  reality.  Those 
who  answer  our  question  in  the  negative  generally  assume 


APPEARANCE  AND  REALITY  159 

that  appearance  and  reality  are  separable  in  fact  just  as 
they  are  in  thought,  and  that  one  may  know  appearance 
without  at  the  same  time  knowing  reality.  In  fact  they 
are  regarded  by  many  as  actually  exclusive  of  each  other ; 
to  cognize  appearance  is  not  to  cognize  reality,  and  to  know 
reality  would  be  to  know  it  apart  from  its  appearance. 

§  71.  Criticism  of  the  Doctrine  that  Appearance  and 
Reality  are,  for  Cognition,  mutually  exclusive.  —  The 
doctrine  which  we  are  to  examine  in  this  section  regards 
appearance  as  a  seeming,  hack  of  which  there  is  a  reality. 
For  this  doctrine,  appearance  is  not  mere  illusion. 

I.  As  to  the  Argument  which  is  based  upon  the  Fact  that 
the  Qualities  which  we  assign  to  Objects  are  Phases  of  our 
Consciousness.  —  That  experience  which  you  interpret 
as  a  bird  flying  is  a  phase  of  your  consciousness ;  but  such 
a  statement  is  not  a  complete  account  of  the  experience. 
We  have  examined  the  doctrine  that  the  objects  of  ex- 
perience are  only  rnodifications  of  the  individual  conscious- 
ness, and  have  rejected  it  because  of  its  irrationality.  The 
doctrine  under  review  also  rejects  it.  It  recognizes^Jihat 
your  experience  *in  seeing  a  bird  or  hearing  the  door-bell 
is  not  purely  subjective;  it  is  experience  with  respect  to 
something  which  is  actually  other  than  yourself.  What 
the  doctrine  under  consideration  holds  is,  that  the  per- 
ceived qualities  and  relations  which  you  interpret  as  a  bird 
or  a  door-bell  are  appearances ;  and,  being  appearances, 
they  are  other  than,  and  exclusive  of,  the  reality  of  the 
object.  This  view  declares  that  we  know  that  the  object  is, 
but  we  do  not  know  the  nature  of  the  reality  of  the  object. 
In  reply  we  say  that,  in  knowing  how  the  object  appears, 
we  know  something  of  the  nature  of  the  reality.  We  know 
that  the  reality -'which  appears  as  a  bird  presents  certain 
marks  which  enable  us  to  identify  it.  So  with  all  objects 
of  perception,   they  present  certain  qualities   in   certain 


i6o         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

relations  to  one  another.  The  related  qualities  which  con- 
stitute the  appearance  of  an  object  to  a  subject  are  the 
expression  (literally,  the  thrusting  out)  of  the  reality  itself  as 
it  is  related  to  a  subject.  In  knowing  the  appearance,  we 
know  something  of  the  nature  of  the  reality ;  for  we  know 
how  it  expresses  itself  to  a  subject.  Appearance  is  not 
exclusive  of  reality;  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  expressive  of 
reality. 

2.  As  to  the  Varying  Appearances  of  the  same  Object  in 
Varying  Relations.  —  We  have  such  experiences  in  the  case 
of  lavender-colored  cloth  which  appears  gray  in  lamplight, 
the  circular  disk  when  viewed  otherwise  than  perpendicular 
to  its  plane,  the  moon  in  its  changes,  and  a  straight  stick 
thrust  obliquely  into  water.  What  was  urged  in  the  pre- 
ceding paragraph  holds  here.  In  the  instance  of  each  of 
these  perceptions,  we  not  only  know  that  a  reality  is; 
but,  in  knowing  its  varying  appearances,  we  know  how 
it  behaves  in  certain  relations.  But  knowledge  as  to  how 
a  reality  expresses  itself  in  certain  relations  is  knowledge 
of  the  reality ;  and  this  knowledge  is  obtained  in  the  per- 
ception of  its  appearances.  Knowledge  of  appearances, 
then,  is  not  apart  from  knowledge  of  reality ;  the  appear- 
ances are  expressions  of  reality  to  a  perceiving  subject. 

3.  As  to  the  Scientific  Doctrine  that  the  Constitution  of 
Objects  is  not  what  it  appears  to  be.  —  Sense-objects  — 
e.g.  the  leaf  of  a  book,  or  the  top  of  a  desk — appear  to  be 
continuous ;  but  it  is  said  that  science  has  discovered  that 
they  are  really  made  up  of  atoms  no  two  of  which  are  in 
immediate  contact  with  each  other.  That  is,  the  matter 
of  sense-objects  is  discontinuous,  not  continuous.  From 
this,  it  is  concluded  that  perception  yields  us  knowledge 
of  appearance  only,  not  knowledge  of  reality.  In  review- 
ing this  argument,  we  should  first  note  that  the  atomic 
conception  of  the  constitution  of  matter  is  regarded  by 


APPEARANCE  AND   REALITY  i6i 

many  as  an  hypothesis  rather  than  a  determined  actuality. 
But  if  the  atomic  constitution  of  matter  should  come  to  be 
accepted  as  incontrovertible,  that  would  not  make  against 
the  doctrine  that  we  know  reality  in  perception.  If  the 
top  of  that  table  is  known  to  be  discontinuous,  it  is  known 
to  be  so  constituted  by  inference  from  knowledge  obtained 
through  sense-perception.  That  is,  the  doctrine  of  the 
atomic  constitution  of  sense-objects  is  reached  through 
inference  from  observed  facts.  Inference  has  supple- 
mented and  extended  the  knowledge  obtained  by  direct 
observation.  This  fact  does  not  prove  that  we  do  not 
know  reality  in  our  perception  of  objects  ;  it  simply  shows 
that  there  are  some  facts  respecting  reality  which  we  ob- 
tain, not  in  perception,  but  by  inference  from  knowledge 
of  reality  attained  in  perception.  In  other  words,  it  would 
show  that  the  knowledge  of  objects  which  is  attained 
through  sense-perception  is  incomplete ;  but  incomplete 
knowledge  is  valid  if  we  recognize  its  limitations  and  do  not 
regard  it  as  complete.  The  revelations  of  the  microscope 
supplement  the  knowledge  of  unaided  vision.  What  we 
attain  through  aided  and  unaided  vision  is  in  both  cases 
knowledge  obtained  in  perception  of  appearances.  All  our 
knowledge  of  sensible  objects  is  knowledge  of  reality ;  for 
it  is  knowledge  obtained  by  interpreting  the  behavior  of 
reality  in  various  relations.  Appearances  are  modes  in 
which  reality  manifests  itself ;  they  do  not  exclude  reality 
from  cognition,  they  exprjbss  it  to  the  knowing  subject. 

§  72.  The  Doctrine  that  Appearances  are  Illusory.  — 
It  is  obvious  that  whatever  knowledge  we  may  have  of 
objects  Is  obtained  through  perception  of  appearances ; 
i.e.  it  is  mediated  by  appearaiices.  If,  then,  it  be  true 
that  appearance  is  illusory,  it  follows  of  necessity  that 
reality  cannot  be  known.  This  doctrine  is  based  upon  a 
conception  of  the  nature  of  reality  which  makes  it  im- 


i62        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

possible  that  reality  should  be  known.  From  these  con- 
siderations, it  is  evident  that  the  doctrine  which  we  are  now 
examining  differs  essentially  from  that  which  we  reviewed 
in  the  section  preceding  this.  That  doctrine  regards  ap- 
pearances as  expressions  of  a  reality  which  is  back  of  them  ; 
according  to  this  doctrine  appearances  are  illusory.  This 
latter  view  has  been  clearly  stated  and  ably  advocated  by 
Bradley  in  a  work  entitled  Appearance  and  Reality.  A 
full  examination  of  this  teaching  does  not  fall  within  the 
scope  of  this  Introduction ;  we  will  merely  present  certain 
features  of  it  which  are  pertinent  to  the  question  now 
before  us. 

I .  General  View.  —  According  to  this  doctrine,  ap- 
pearances are  "  illusory,"  "  self-contradictory,"  "  irra- 
tional," and  "  essentially  made  up  of  inconsistencies." 
This  condemnation  of  appearance  and  consequent  denial 
of  the  possibility  of  attaining  knowledge  of  reality  is  based 
upon  a  distinctive  conception  of  the  nature  of  reality.  A 
doctrine  which  is  so  revolutionary  in  its  conclusions  as  this 
ought  to  have  an  assured  basis ;  and  we  naturally  ask, 
What  is  the  warrant  for  a  theory  of  reality  which  leads  to 
such  conclusions  ^  The  argument  which  sustains  this 
doctrine  is  grounded  on  two  postulates ;  one  of  these  is 
explicitly  stated,  and  the  other  is  persistently  applied. 
The  first  of  these  postulates  is,  that  the  one  criterion  of 
reality  is  self-consistency ;  no  exception  can  be  taken  to 
this.  The  second  postulate  is,  that  Identity  and  Diversity, 
and  Unity  and  Plurality  are  inherently  contradictory. 
It  is  clearly  shown  that  in  all  appearances  we  have  Identity 
and  Diversity,  Unity  and  Plurality;  and,  if  Identity  be 
contradictory  of  Diversity,  and  Unity  be  contradictory 
of  Plurality,  it  would  follow  from  the  self-consistency  of 
reality  that  appearance  misrepresents  reality.  From  this 
it  is  concluded  that  we  must  get  beyond  appearance  if 


APPEARANCE  AND  REALITY  163 

we  would  attain  reality.  The  doctrine  is  as  old  as  the 
Eleatics,  and  the  line  of  argument  by  which  the  writer 
seeks  to  sustain  it  is  virtually  the  same  with  that  used 
by  the  Sceptics. 

2.  These  Postulates  applied  to  Experience.  —  Every 
known  object  is  known  as  having  various  qualities.  For 
example,  we  speak  of  the  piece  of  marble  as  "  white  with 
party-colored  veins,"  "  partly  smooth  and  partly  rough," 
"  square,"  "  heavy,"  "  beautiful."  That  is,  it  is  many  in 
one.  But  how  can  we  constitute  one  out  of  many }  If 
we  had  all  the  qualities  and  added  them  together,  we  would 
still  lack  the  characteristic  of  wholeness.  How  shall  we 
account  for  the  wholeness  of  the  whole  t  We  are  told  that 
to  affirm  that  many  are  one,  or  that  one  is  many,  is  to 
affirm  the  identity  of  contradictories.  By  a  similar  argu- 
ment change  is  condemned.  The  plant  full  grown  is 
diverse  from  the  plant  partly  grown  ;  yet  we  speak  of  them 
as  the  same  plant.  It  is  for  appearance  one  plant;  but 
it  also  presents  diiferent  appearances.  To  say  that  that 
which  is  after  a  change  is  the  same  with  that  which  was 
before  the  change,  is  "to  assert  two  of  one";  but  this  is 
inconsistent.  Hence  what  changes  is  not  reality ;  and, 
so  far  as  we  know  change,  we  do  not  know  reality.  This 
analysis  is  also  applied  to  relation,  cause,  and  other  modes 
in  which  we  cognize ;  and  a  similar  conclusion  is  drawn  in 
each  instance.  Bradley  likewise  insists  that  we  do  not 
know  a  real  self ;  for  the  self  we  know  is  many  states  of  con- 
sciousness in  one,  a  diverse  unity ;  and  this  inconsistency 
shows  that  we  have  only  apprehended  appearance.  Reality 
is  not  presented  in  appearance :  this  is  the  conclusion. 
Hence  we  cannot  know  reality. 

3 .  Law  of  Identity  Misinterpreted.  —  This  doctrine  has 
its  origin  in  a  misinterpretation  of  the  logical  law  of  Iden- 
tity.    According   to   this   erroneous   interpretation,   if   I 


i64         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

should  say,  "  An  Italian  is  a  European,"  the  statement 
would  not  accord  with  reality,  because  "  Italian  "  and 
"European"  are  not  absolutely  indentical ;  each  idea  is  in 
some  particulars  diverse  from  the  other.  But  to  require 
that  the  subject  and  predicate  shall  be  absolutely  identical 
would  bring  thought  to  a  dead  stop.  There  can  be  no 
progress  in  thought  unless  subject  and  predicate  are  identi- 
cal in  some  particulars  and  diverse  in  others.  Judgments 
of  the  form  A  is  A  and  B  is  B  would  meet  the  require- 
ment of  absolute  identity ;  but  thought  confined  to  such 
judgments  cannot  move.  It  cannot  connect  A  and  B 
with  each  other,  or  with  anything  else  than  A  or  B.  This 
interpretation  of  the  law  of  Identity  condemns  all  thought, 
for  thought  is  impossible  except  as  we  apprehend  Plurality 
in  Unity  and  Identity  in  Diversity.  In  thus  making  prog- 
ress in  thought  impossible,  this  interpretation  condemns 
the  argument  by  which  it  is  sought  to  sustain  the  doctrine 
under  consideration.  Thought  is  "  illusory,"  it  does  not 
deal  with  reality ;  it  would  follow,  then,  that  the  thought 
of  this  argument  is  "  illusory."  What  does  the  law  of 
Identity  demand  ^  For  example,  what  does  it  demand  in 
the  judgment,  "  An  Italian  is  a  European  ^  "  It  requires 
that  the  concept  "  Italian  "  shall  include  marks  which 
are  identical  with  marks  included  in  the  concept  "  Euro- 
pean." In  respect  of  the  concrete  Italian  and  European, 
it  demands  that  an  Italian  shall  have  some  characteristic 
which  is  identical  with  a  characteristic  found  in  all  Euro- 
peans. This  law  requires  that  the  subject  and  the  predi- 
cate have  a  common  ideational  content;  and  thought 
requires  that  each  shall  have  ideational  content  that  is  not 
had  by  the  other.  In  a  word.  Identity  and  Diversity, 
Unity  and  Plurality  are  not  contradictories ;  they  are 
complementaries.  There  can  be  no  thought  except  as  we 
apprehend  Identity  and  Diversity,  Plurality  and  Unity, 


APPEARANCE  AND   REALITY  165 

and  as  we  recognize  that  each  member  of  these  pairs  is 
complementary  to  the  other.  We  are  unready  to  accept 
a  doctrine  that  makes  all  thought  "  illusory." 

4.  Is  Reality  Alien  to  Thought?  —  According  to  the 
doctrine  under  consideration,  reality  is  alien  to  thought. 
What,  then,  is  its  conception  of  reality }  Reality  is  for 
this  view  "  mere  sentient  experience,"  an  experience  in 
which  "  all  distinctions  lapse  " ;  it  is  an  experience  of  all- 
alike  sentience.  No  such  experience  is  known ;  it  could 
not  be  known  to  the  subject  of  it,  for  it  is  purely  sentient. 
That  reality  is  all-alike  experience,  is  an  assumption 
following  a  course  of  reasoning  in  which  another  postulate 
is  introduced.  This  postulate  is  that  "  there  is  no  being 
or  fact  outside  that  which  is  commonly  called  psychical," 
i.e.  experience  is  the  only  reality.  The  argument  con-  / 
densed  runs  thus :  Reality  is  self-consistent ;  Identity  in 
Diversity  and  Plurality  in  Unity  are  inconsistent;  hence 
reality  must  be  absolute  Identity,  simple  Unity.  There 
must  be  in  it  no  diversity  and  therefore  no  distinctions. 
But  reality  is  experience;  hence  reality  is  experience  in 
which  there  is  no  diversity.  It  is  assumed  that  mere 
sentient  experience  meets  these  requirements;  it  is  ex- 
perience, and  there  are  no  distinctions  in  it. 

Two  objections  present  themselves.  This  conception 
rests  upon  the  assertion  that  Identity  and  Diversity,  and 
Unity  and  Plurality,  are  contradictories;  and  the  asser- 
tion that  they  are  contradictories  rests  upon  an  inter- 
pretation of  the  logical  law  of  Identity  which  invalidates 
all  thought  and  which  logic  refuses,  in  self-defence,  to 
accept.  Since  logic  refuses  to  accept  this  interpretation 
of  the  law  of  Identity,  the  claim  that  reality  must  be 
absolute  Identity  fails  of  justification.  The  second  ob- 
jection has  respect  to  the  assumed  "  mere  sentient  ex- 
perience."    It  has  been  suggested  that  we  may  find  such 


i66         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

experience  in  the  instance  of  the  Infant  before  conscious- 
ness of  the  distinction  between  self  and  not-self  has  been 
developed.  Is  there  experience  where  there  is  no  con- 
sciousness ?  Such  sentience,  if  It  be  possible,  has  no  right 
to  the  name  experience ;  for  surely  there  is  no  experience 
apart  from  consciousness.  By  what  right  do  we  take 
that  to  be  the  reality  in  experience  which  lacks  the  essential 
characteristics  of  experience  as  known  to  us  ^  But  leav- 
ing this  aside,  mere  sentience  is  not  experience;  no  more 
can  be  said  of  it  than  that  It  is  the  material  out  of  which 
the  subject  constructs  experience.  Further,  what  war- 
rant have  we  for  assuming  that  the  earliest  and  simplest 
experience  of  the  infant  Is  absolutely  unorganized,  that 
there  is  in  it  no  distinction  of  quality  or  relation  ?  If  we 
speak  of  the  little  chick  pecking  at  a  seed  as  having  an 
experience,  even  that  has  distinction  and  relation  in  it. 
The  seed  is  distinguished  from  other  objects,  and  its  posi- 
tion is  distinguished  from  other  positions.  We  have  no 
warrant  for  asserting  that  there  is  an  experience  of  ab- 
solute Identity,  an  experience  in  which  there  is  no  dis- 
tinction of  quality  or  relation.  We  decline  to  accept 
the  conception  of  reality  propounded  In  this  doctrine ; 
and  we  discover  no  reason  for  holding  that  the  nature  of 
reality  precludes  Its  being  known. 

§  73.  Shall  we  discard  the  Concept  Reality  ?  —  Some 
have  suggested  that  we  discard  the  concept  "  reality." 
If  we  should  adopt  this  suggestion,  we  would  have  no 
need  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  appearance  and 
reality.  The  most  cogent  reasons  urged  for  our  ceasing 
to  inquire  as  to  whether  we  can  know  reality  are  (i)  That 
the  search  for  reality  is  fruitless,  because  what  we  seek  Is, 
and  always  must  be,  beyond  us ;  (2)  If  we  could  arrive  at 
reality,  it  would  have  no  special  value  for  us,  because  it 
could  only  be  known  and  stated  in  terms  of  appearance; 


APPEARANCE  AND  REALITY  167 

and  (3)  We  do  not  need  the  concept.     This  view  is  not  a 
distinct  philosophical  doctrine ;   it  is  an  attitude. 

1.  It  is  true  that  reality  is  always  beyond  us  and  is, 
because  of  this,  elusive  if  we  separate  it  in  thought  from 
appearance  and  then  try  to  image  it.  Those  who  make  this 
suggestion  seem  to  be  seeking  an  Intelligent  grasp  of  reality 
apart  from  appearance.  That  is,  of  course,  impossible; 
for  we  can  only  conceive  what  is  not  present  in  sense- 
perception,  by  an  ideational  production  of  appearances. 
It  is  thus  we  present  to  ourselves  a  triangle,  a  house,  a  city, 
or  any  object  which  may  be  apprehended  through  sense- 
perception.  The  imaged  appearance  makes  it  idea- 
tionally  present.  To  image  a  pure  concept  —  as  justice, 
goodness,  time,  or  reality  —  by  itself  is  impossible.  We 
can  only  have  it  present  ideationally  by  imaging  an  object 
or  occurrence  whose  qualities  and  relations  —  i.e.  whose 
appearances  —  express  the  concept.  Concepts  have  their 
reality  in  objects,  and  cannot  be  imaged  apart  from  them ; 
but  we  do  not  discard  concepts  because  of  this.  We  can- 
not think  without  them. 

2.  It  is  true  that,  if  reality  could  be  known,  it  could 
only  be  known  and  stated  in  terms  of  appearance.  An 
object  can  only  be  known  when  it  is  in  presentation  to  a 
subject;  and  the  form  in  which  it  is  presented  to  the  sub- 
ject is  its  appearance  to  that  subject.  Thus,  the  pen  with 
which  I  am  writing  is  known  by  me  in  the  forms  in  which 
it  has  been  presented  to  me ;  and  these  apprehended 
forms  are  its  appearances  to  me.  What  I  know  of  it  and 
what  I  may  state  of  that  knowledge  is  known  and  stated 
in  terms  of  appearance.  So  likewise  as  to  reality ;  our 
knowledge  of  it  and  our  statement  of  that  knowledge 
would  be  in  terms  of  appearance.  But,  is  the  appearance 
an  actual  presentation  of  reality  t  This  is  the  important 
question.     Are  the   appearances   in   and   through  which 


i68         INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

you  have  come  to  know  the  house  in  which  you  live,  actual 
presentation  of  the  house  reality?  If  they  are  not,  and 
if  appearance  in  general  is  not  actual  presentation  of  reality, 
this  fact  might  be  urged  as  a  reason  for  discarding  the 
concept  of  reality.  But,  if  an  appearance  is  an  actual 
presentation  of  reality,  —  and  we  shall  later  argue  that  it 
is,  —  when  we  know  appearance,  we  therewith  know 
reality,  for  appearance  is  in  that  case  reality's  own  pres- 
entation of  itself. 

3.  To  the  assertion  that  we  do  not  need  this  concept, 
we  reply  that  Philosophy  cannot  solve  the  problem  set  it 
if  it  shall  refuse  to  seek  the  nature  of  reality.  That  has 
been  its  quest  from  the  beginning.  If  we  give  up  our 
endeavor  to  determine  whether  we  know  reality,  we  for- 
sake our  task.  This  quest  is  a  persistent  element  of  ex- 
perience. We  are  constantly  asking,  "Is  it  real  I  "  and 
we  subject  to  this  test  all  that  is  proifered  as  knowledge. 
"  That  bridge  appears  to  be  safe ;  is  it  really  safe .?  " 
We  put  such  questions  every  day.  The  all-around 
sceptic,  the  man  who  doubts  scientific  and  philosophic 
statements,  takes  this  attitude  because  he  wants  to  know 
the  reality  of  things.  He  doubts  because  he  can  only 
be  satisfied  when  he  is  made  certain  he  has  attained  the 
reality  of  things.  He  demands,  all  of  us  demand,  that 
seeming  or  appearance  shall  be  related  to  reality.  This 
question  will  not  down.  This  persistent  call  for  reality 
and  refusal  to  be  satisfied  with  mere  seeming  is  an  abiding 
element  of  experience ;   and  philosophy  may  not  ignore  it. 

4.  The  search  for  reality  cannot  be  satisfied  short  of 
assurance  that  we  have  intercourse  with  what  is  objective, 
with  reality  which  is  other  than  the  individual  self.  We 
have  a  common  conviction  that  the  world  of  persons  and 
things  and  events  which  we  know  and  with  which  we  have 
dealings,  is  a  world  of  realities.     Is  this  conviction  un- 


APPEARANCE  AND   REALITY  169 

justified  ?  That  with  which  we  have  dealings,  is  it  other 
than  that  which  we  know  ?  Are  these  objects,  as  we  know 
them,  realities  or  only  appearances  ?  It  will  not  do  to 
wave  this  question  aside.  Our  life  loses  its  ethical  quality 
if  we  cease  to  recognize  that  we  are  dealing  with  what  is 
real ;    it  becomes  pretence. 

§  74.  Conclusions.  —  i.  If  we  were  cut  off  from  know- 
ing reality,  we  could  not  know  that  the  objects  of  our 
knowledge  are  only  appearance  and  not  reality.  For 
to  know  that  they  are  appearance  and  not  reality,  we 
must  be  able  to  distinguish  them  from  what  is  not  mere 
appearance,  i.e.  from  reality.  In  other  words,  reality 
must  be  known  in  order  that  we  may  know  that  an  ob- 
ject of  cognition  is  not  reality. 

2.  There  are  two  facts  which  we  hold  fast :  (i)  That  we 
know  ourselves ;  (2)  That  we  are  reality,  not  mere  phe- 
nomena. Introspection  shows  that  we  do  not  know  Self 
apart  from  a  phase  of  consciousness.  You  know  yourself 
as  hearing  something,  as  feeling  disturbed  by  uncertainty 
as  to  what  caused  the  sound,  and  as  determining  to  find 
out  the  source  of  the  noise.  Your  Self  always  appears  to 
you  in  what  you  call  a  phase  of  consciousness.  Phases  of 
consciousness  do  not  exist  by  then^selves.  They  have  a 
relation  to  the  Self  similar  to  that  which  the  varying 
qualities  of  objects  have  to  objects.  The  Self  reality  comes 
to  expression  in  these  phases  ;  that  Is,  the  Self  becomes  an 
object  of  cognition  in  your  apprehension  of  yourself  as 
willing,  feeling,  and  knowing.  Your  moods,  attitudes, 
and  longings  are  not  apart  from  your  Self;  neither  are 
they  separable  from  the  Self.  We  do  not,  and  cannot, 
know  the  phases  of  our  consciousness  without  at  the  same 
time  knowing  the  Self. 

3.  We  also  recognize  that 'these  phases  of  the  Self  vary, 
that  consciousness  changes ;   but  this  does  not  lead  to  the 


I70        INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

conclusion  that  the  Self  is  phenomenal.  On  the  contrary, 
the  continuous  change  in  consciousness  makes  for  our 
assurance  of  our  reality.  If  our  consciousness  were  with- 
out change,  if  it  were  an  all-alikeness,  we  could  not  know 
it.  To  know  any  object  we  must  distinguish  this  of  it  from 
that  of  it.  For  example,  in  knowing  a  watch,  we  dis- 
tinguish one  side  from  the  other,  the  dial  from  the  works, 
the  hands  from  the  dial,  etc.  This  is  true  of  the  simplest 
object,  as  a  piece  of  wood.  If  there  were  no  distinction 
in  an  entity,  it  could  not  be  an  object  of  knowledge.  We 
distinguish  one  phase  of  our  experience  from  other  phases 
of  our  experience,  and  we  apprehend  thes^^hases  and 
moments  as  phases  and  moments  of  ^-jS^^Htperience 
which  is  the  experience  of  an  identical  Se^^pie  phases 
and  moments  of  my  experience  are  also  phases  and  mo- 
ments of  my  Self.  Our  changes  of  consciousness  to- 
gether with  our  experience  of  self-sameness,  the  fact  that 
I  am  I  through  all  my  varying  phases  of  consciousness,  — 
this  is  the  ground  of  my  assurance  of  my  own  reality. 
Each  of  us  in  respect  of  his  phases  of  consciousness  is 
many ;  our  consciousness  is  many  in  one.  This  is  only 
possible  if  there  be  some  common  principle  in  which  the 
many  are  grounded.  The  Self  which  is  the  subject  of 
these  phases  is  such  a  principle.  The  Self  being  unitary, 
our  experience  Is  unitary;  and  its  phases  and  moments 
are,  for  knowledge,  appearances  of  Self  as  object  to  Self 
as  subject.  These  conclusions  follow:  (i)  The  Self  is 
diversity  in  unity,  the  unification  of  apparently  con- 
tradictory elements ;  (2)  In  knowing  the  phenomena  of 
consciousness,  we  therewith  know  the  Self;  (3)  In  know- 
ing the  Self,  we  know  reality ;  (4)  Variability  of  appearance 
is  consonant  with  reality. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

APPEARANCE    AND    REALITY    (continued) 

§  75.  Appearance  is  Reality  Expressed. — Another  view 
of  the  relation  of  appearance  to  reality  remains  to  be 
discussed;  viz.,  that  appearance  is  reality  expressed. 
Your  knife  as  seen  by  you  is  the  reality  of  the  knife  pre- 
sented to  vision ;  the  roughness  or  smoothness  of  the  sur- 
face of  the  stone  is  the  reality  of  the  stone  present  to 
tactual  sense;  the  clang  of  the  bell  is  the  reality  of  the 
vibrating  bell  present  to  audition.  Appearance  as  thus 
conceived  is  not  mere  semblance  or  seeming;  it  is  not 
thrown  off  from  the  reality ;  it  is  the  reality  itself  present  to 
perception.  The  appearance  of  any  object  is  the  nature  of 
the  reality  of  that  object  as  it  presents  itself  to  rationality. 
If  we  should  accept  this  account  of  the  relation  of  ap- 
pearance to  reality,  it  would  follow  that  when  we  know 
appearance,  we  therewith  know  reality. 

1.  Appearance  cannot  arise  from  nothing;  it  must  be 
an  expression  of  what  is  actual.  To  appear  is  to  become 
an  object  of  perception  ;  appearance  is  always  to  a  subject. 
To  constitute  an  appearance,  an  object  reality  must  be  in 
presentation  to  a  subject  reality.  That  is,  appearance 
is  always  in  the  subject-object  relation ;  and  it  is  the  ex- 
pression of  an  object  reality  to  a  subject  reality. 

2.  From  the  foregoing  it-iollows  that  appearance  and 
reality  are  correlatives  in  cognition.  They  are  not 
mutually  exclusive ;  they  are  inseparable,  neither  can  be 
without  the  other.  Apart  from  the  subject-object  re- 
lation, there  is  no  appearance  to  be  related  to  reality ;  in 

171 


fta< 


172         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

that  relation  the  reality  becomes  object  in  the  appearance 
which  is  the  expression  of  its  nature  in  the  particular  rela- 
tion in  which  it  appears.  Of  course  there  cannot  be  an 
appearance  except  there  be  an  appearing  reality. 

3.  We  have  insisted  that  appearance  and  reality  are 
correlatives  for  cognition,  and  that  there  is  no  appearance 
apart  from  the  subject-object  relation.  Does  it  follow 
that  there  can  be  no  reality  apart  from  that  relation  ? 
In  answering  this  question,  we  must  keep  in  mind  the 
fact  that  we  are  not  studying  the  nature  of  reality,  we  are 
considering  reality  in  respect  of  cognition.  With  this  in 
view,  the  question  may  be  stated  thus  :  Can  there  be  some- 
what for  experience  which  is  not  in  present  experience? 
There  may  assuredly  be  reality  apart  from  human  ex- 
perience of  it.  We  do  not  say  that  nothing  exists  apart 
from  relation  to  a  human  subject.  The  objects  discovered 
in  scientific  research  and  unscientific  endeavor  do  not 
come  into  existence  in  the  instant  of  their  discovery. 
What  we  say  is  that  reality  is  more  than  mere  existence. 
The  significance  of  reality  will  be  considered  more  fully 
later;  It  Is  sufficient  for  our  present  discussion  to  note 
that,  for  cognition,  reality  Includes  expressibillty  to  a  sub- 
ject. There  are,  doubtless,  many  realities  which  are  not 
in  present  presentation  to  a  human  subject;  but,  by  so 
much  as  these  realities  are,  they  are  expressible  to  and 
perceptible  by  a  subject.  They  are  possible  presentations ; 
and  this  is  included  in  the  Idea  of  their  reality.  A  subject 
can  relate  them  to  himself  as  objects  ;  and.  In  this  relation, 
they  express  their  reality  In  appearances.  The  fauna  and 
flora  of  an  unexplored  region  are  realities  for  human  ex- 
perience ;  when  discovered,  they  become  realities  in 
human  experience.  Reality  is  possible,  as  well  as  actual, 
content  of  consciousness.  Appearance  is  reality  in  pres- 
entation to  a  subject. 


APPEARANCE  AND  REALITY  173 

§  76.  The  Apparent  and  the  Real.  —  i.  Why  Appear- 
ance and  Reality  have  been  Conceived  to  be  Mutually  Ex- 
clusive. —  There  must  be  some  reason  for  the  persistency 
with  which  many  have  urged  that  reality  is  not  present  in 
appearance.  This  urgency  has  its  origin  in  those  ex- 
periences in  which  the  apparent  and  the  real  are  not  in 
accord  with  each  other.  We  find  such  experiences  in  the 
case  of  the  straight  stick  which  is  apparently  broken  when 
it  is  thrust  obliquely  into  water,  the  apparent  con- 
verging of  the  parallel  lines  of  the  railway  track,  and  the 
varying  color  of  objects  in  varying  lights.  Such  experi- 
ences are  common ;  and  they  are  so  intimately  related  to 
practical  undertakings  that  they  have  led  men  to  con- 
clude that  the  reality  of  an  object  is  not  necessarily  the 
same  with  what  the  object  seems  to  be.  In  situations 
which  we  believe  to  be  critical,  we  are  given  to  asking, 
"  Is  it  real,  or  does  it  only  seem  so  t  "  Even  in  the  lowest 
stages  of  human  existence,  man  is  compelled  to  distinguish 
between  what  is  apparent  and  what  is  real.  The  pres- 
ervation of  life  is  dependent  upon  ability  to  make  this 
distinction.  The  primitive  fisherman  would  strike  in 
vain  for  the  coveted  fish  if  he  did  not  distinguish  be- 
tween its  apparent  and  its  real  position  in  the  water.  It 
was  necessary  that  primitive  man  should  learn  the  nature 
of  the  objects  with  which  he  had  to  deal,  the  objects  es- 
sential to  the  support  of  life ;  and  for  this,  he  must  dis- 
tinguish between  what  they  might  seem  to  be  and  what 
they  really  were.  This  necessity  is  upon  us  also.  Ex- 
perience has  taught  us  that  the  apparent  is  not  always  the 
same  with  the  real ;  and  this  has  not  unnaturally  led  to 
the  virtual  acceptance  of  a  world  of  appearance  distinct 
from  the  world  of  reality.  Appearance  has  been  conceived 
as  uncertain  and  inconstant  semblance ;  reality  is  thought 
of  as  reliable  and  unchanging.     This  is,  at  least,  the  Plain 


174         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Man's  view  of  it ;  and  in  these  experiences  and  this  con- 
ception we  find  that  which  commends  the  doctrine  that 
appearance  and  reality  are  mutually  exclusive. 

2.  Appearance  and  Perception.  —  An  appearance  is 
related  to  the  object  and  the  subject.  In  the  former  re- 
lation, it  is  the  expression  of  the  object  reality;  in  the 
latter,  it  is  the  subject's  interpretation  of  this  expression. 
The  former  is  for  the  perceptive  activity  of  the  subject; 
the  latter  is  the  perception.  You  sat  at  your  desk  writing 
with  your  attention  centered  upon  the  work  at  hand.  You 
came  to  a  halt  in  your  writing  and  heard  an  insistent 
noise.  You  listened  attentively  and  then  said  to  yourself : 
"  There  is  a  game  of  ball  on  at  the  park ;  and  some  one  has 
made  a  good  play."  You  interpreted  what  was  pre- 
sented and  concluded  that  it  was  a  sound,  and  you  con- 
tinued the  interpreting  until  you  had  assigned  to  the  sound 
the  meaning  indicated;  and  the  interpretation  was  an 
essential  part  of  the  perception.  There  is  no  perception 
without  thought;  and  the  simplest  thought  is  an  inter- 
pretation, a  judgment.  In  discussing  those  experiences 
which  seem  to  indicate  that  an  appearance  is  a  changeful 
and  unreliable  semblance  rather  than  an  actual  presenta- 
tion of  reality,  it  is  essential  that  due  value  be  given  to 
the  interpretive  activity  of  the  subject.  This  makes  it 
necessary  that  we  distinguish  between  appearance  as  the 
expression  of  object  reality  and  appearance  as  expressed  in 
the  subject's  perception.  They  are  not  separate  in  ex- 
perience ;  but  confusion  will  be  avoided  if  we  at  this  point 
distinguish  them  in  thought.  For  the  remainder  of  this 
chapter,  we  shall  narrow  the  meaning  of  the  term  Appear- 
ance and  shall  apply  it  to  the  object-reality's  expression 
of  itself  for  experience;  and  the  term  Perception  will 
signify  the  appearance  as  interpreted  by  the  subject,  the 
expression  of  reality  in  experience. 


APPEARANCE  AND  REALITY  175 

We  have  learned  that  our  judgments  respecting  objects 
do  not  always  accord  with  the  reality.  You  saw  something 
in  the  gloaming  and  concluded  that  it  was  a  large  dog  in 
a  threatening  attitude ;  but  closer  inspection  showed  that 
it  was  only  a  bush.  We  thought  it  was  a  street-car  we 
heard ;  but  when  it  came  around  the  corner,  we  saw  that 
it  was  an  automobile  truck.  The  development  of  our 
knowledge  of  the  external  world  has  been  attended  by 
constant  correction  of  conclusions  which  we  have  formed ; 
and  it  has  been  greatly  aided  by  our  consciousness  of  the 
fact  that  we  must  exercise  care  if  we  would  avoid  error. 
But  the  element  of  error  in  these  judgments  is  not  due 
to  the  unreliability  of  appearances  as  expressions  of  reality 
for  experience;  it  arises  from  our  misintrepretation  of 
these  appearances.  The  error  is  in  the  perception  as  we 
constitute  it.  The  disagreement  is  not  between  the  ap- 
pearances and  the  reality;  it  is  between  reality  and  the 
element  of  error  in  our  interpretation. 

§  77.  Sources  of  Error.  —  i.  The  experience  of  any 
instant  is  not  a  wholly  new  experience ;  it  is  a  combina- 
tion of  past  experiences  and  the  experience  of  the  moment. 
Past  experience  greatly  affects  our  perceptions.  Lack  of 
the  experience  had  in  acquiring  a  particular  language  — 
say  the  French  —  would  make  an  address  in  that  language 
seem  an  unmeaning  jumble  of  sounds ;  whereas  one  who 
had  had  experience  which  had  given  him  mastery  of  the 
French  would  find  significance  in  every  sentence  of  the  ad- 
dress, and  meaning  in  the  gestures  and  the  facial  expres- 
sion of  the  speaker.  The  man  who  is  expert  at  detecting 
counterfeit  bank-notes  is  thus  expert  because  his  extended 
experience  conditions  his  perception  and  so  enters  into 
his  judgments.  In  a  word,  when  we  perceive  an  object, 
our  perception  is  conditioned  by  our  previous  experience 
with  that  object  or  objects  like  it.     We  know  by  the  laws 


176         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

of  perspective,  that  the  rectangular  top  of  the  table  is 
a  rhomboidal  presentation  to  the  percipient ;  but  we  rightly 
judge  it  to  be  rectangular,  not  rhomboidal.  We  are  ac- 
customed to  seeing  such  an  object,  and  we  judge  correctly 
without  hesitation.  From  certain  points  of  view,  a  cir- 
cular disk  is  apparently  oval;  but  that  will  deceive  few 
persons,  because  most  of  us  have  seen  like  objects  in  a 
similar  relation  so  often  that  we  are  not  likely  to  frame 
an  erroneous  judgment  respecting  their  shape.  Previous 
experience,  or  lack  or  paucity  of  previous  experience, 
affects  judgments  and  so  conditions  perception. 

2.  An  object  is  not  known  by  itself;  it  is  known  in  re- 
lation to  the  subject  and  to  other  objects.  Turner's 
Venice^  if  viewed  from  a  proper  distance  and  in  the 
right  light,  is  definite  in  outline,  and  the  lines  and  colors 
of  the  painting  have  significance;  but,  viewed  close  at 
hand,  it  is  to  most  persons  a  mere  jumble  of  colors.  Our 
perception  of  objects  and  our  judgments  respecting  them 
are  conditioned  by  the  relation  in  which  they  come  to 
presentation.  A  radical  change  in  the  attire  of  one  whom 
we  know  may  lead  us  to  think  him  a  stranger.  One  who 
is  expert  at  spearing  or  shooting  fish  will  judge  correctly 
as  to  the  position  of  the  fish,  even  though  the  line  of  direc- 
tion to  the  fish  is  broken  to  vision,  just  as  the  straight  stick 
is  when  thrust  obliquely  into  water.  But  to  most  of 
us  this  presentation  of  the  fish  is  in  relations  to  which  we 
are  relatively  unaccustomed,  and  we  are  not  sufficiently 
experienced  to  judge  aright.  The  difficulty  does  not 
arise  from  disagreement  of  appearance  with  reality;  it 
arises  from  our  erroneous  judgment,  and  this  is  due  to 
insufficiency  of  experience.  The  appearance  is  a  true 
presentation  of  reality  in  those  relations.  The  laws  of 
refraction  require  that  the  straight  stick  shall  seem  broken 
in  those  relations ;  it  must,  if  it  shall  be  a  true  presentation 


APPEARANCE  AND  REALITY  177 

of  the  reality  when  so  related  to  a  subject.  The  hue  of 
the  cloth  and  the  gem  should  vary  in  varying  lights.  In 
none  of  these  instances  is  there  any  falsity  in  appearance, 
or  any  disagreement  between  appearance  and  reality. 
We  standardize  the  color  of  objects  by  their  color  when 
seen  in  relatively  colorless  light.  As  this  is  the  standard, 
one  is  liable  to  misjudge  the  color  of  an  object  when  he 
sees  it  in  lamplight  or  gaslight ;  for  this  is  not  the  stand- 
ard relation  for  color.  But  this  error  is  not  due  to  un- 
reality in  appearance ;  it  is  constituted  by  us  in  judging, 
and  it  com.es  of  want  of  such  experience  of  these  objects 
in  these  unusual  relations  as  is  necessary  to  a  correct 
perception  of  them. 

3.  The  principles  above  stated  and  illustrated  hold 
true  for  illusions  in  general  —  as  those  respecting  the  size 
of  objects.  They  also  hold  true  for  those  experiences 
which  are,  by  way  of  distinction,  called  hallucinations  — 
as  when  we  think  we  hear  some  one  speak,  although  no 
one  has  spoken  within  our  range  of  hearing;  or  when  a 
man  thinks  he  feels  the  movement  of  the  fingers  of  his 
amputated  arm.  In  our  hallucinations,  we  are  dealing 
with  reality;  there  is  at  least  a  real  cortical  change,  an 
event  in  the  central  nervous  system.  Our  accompanying 
judgment  respecting  it  is  erroneous.  When  we  wish 
to  decide  as  to  whether  our  perception  is  correct,  we  try 
to  set  the  presentation  in  other  relations.  Thus,  we  may 
test  the  stick  by  passing  the  hand  along  it  or  by  taking 
it  out  of  the  water.  We  make  certain  of  the  color  of  the 
cloth  or  gem  by  putting  the  object  in  the  sunlight  or  where 
disturbing  shades  may  not  fall  on  it;  and  we  test  the 
spectre  by  trying  to  touch  it  or  photograph  it.  That  is, 
we  determine  the  correctness  of  our  perceptions  by  so 
relating  presentations  that  our  experience  may  be  most 
effectually  utilized  in  judging  them. 


178         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

4.  Conclusion.  —  Every  appearance  is  a  true  expres- 
sion of  reality  in  the  relations  in  which  the  subject-object 
relation  is  constituted.  All  seeming  disagreement  be- 
tween appearance  and  reality  is  constituted  by  the  erro- 
neous judgment  of  the  subject.  In  knowing  appearances, 
we  therewith  know  reality. 


CHAPTER  XX 

REALITY 

§  78.  Kinds  of  Reality.  —  This  chapter  deals  with  our 
conviction  of  the  reality  of  the  things  we  handle,  the  per- 
sons with  whom  we  have  intercourse,  and  the  happenings 
in  which  we  are  interested.  The  book  you  were  reading 
to  a  friend  last  evening,  that  friend  and  those  with  whom 
you  are  acquainted,  and  the  incidents  in  their  lives  and 
yours  of  which  you  spoke,  are  realities.  The  colors  in 
the  illustrations  of  the  book  are  real ;  so  also  are  the  rela- 
tions of  the  lines  of  the  drawings,  and  even  the  thoughts 
which  you  interchanged  respecting  the  illustrations.  The 
furnishings  of  the  room  were  in  actual  position-relation, 
and  there  was  an  actual  passing  of  time.  Things,  events, 
and  persons  are  concrete  object- realities  in  the  world 
which  we  know  through  sense-experience.  "  Red," 
"  loud,"  "  hard,"  "  soft,"  etc.,  are  quality  realities. 
"Here"  and  "there,"  "then"  and  "now,"  are  relational 
realities.  Qualities  and  relations  have  no  reality  by  them- 
selves ;  but  there  is  no  known  reality  that  does  not  have 
some  quality  and  exist  in  some  relation.  There  is  no 
experience  that  does  not  include  experience  of  quality 
and  relation ;  they  are  in  experience  and  are  as  real  as 
the  experience  itself.  Notions  —  as  space,  time,  and 
number  —  and  qualities  have  a  reality  different  in  kind 
from  that  of  objects.  Hence  in  affirming  or  denying  reality, 
we  should  keep  in  mind  the'  world  of  thought  in  which 
we  are  moving  and  the  kind  of  reality  under  consideration. 

179 


i8o         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

§  79.  Degrees  of  Reality.  —  Whatever  is,  is  in  some 
sense  real ;  but  all  objects  do  not  express  reality  in  the 
same  degree.  Our  moods  are  real.  My  present  joyous- 
ness  is  as  certainly  real  as  the  objects  of  the  external 
world.  This  joyousness  may  have  ceased  by  to-morrow, 
and  a  mood  of  sadness  may  take  its  place ;  but  my  pres- 
ent mood  is  a  reality,  and  that  of  to-morrow  will  be  a 
reality.  We  are  as  certain  of  the  reality  of  our  feelings 
and  our  ideas  as  we  are  of  our  own  reality.  But  our  moods 
as  such  do  not  have  the  concreteness  which  we  take  to  be 
a  characteristic  of  reality ;  they  are  not  so  content-full,  so 
substantive  as  is  the  self.  Then,  too,  our  moods  and  our 
ideas  are  thought  of  as  having  their  being  in  us  ;  they  have 
no  existence  by  themselves.  They  come  to  be  in  us,  and 
they  cease  to  be  when  they  cease  to  be  of  us.  Com- 
paring our  moods  with  our  self,  we  note  that  the  moods 
are  inconstant  and  their  duration  uncertain ;  whereas  the 
self  has  a  quality  of  permanency  which  is  revealed  in  our 
consciousness  of  self-sameness.  Reality  in  its  perfection 
would  be  content-full,  concrete,  self-existent,  and  un- 
varying in  its  nature.  It  is  evident  that  no  finite  self  is 
a  perfect  expression  of  reality ;  but  it  is  also  obvious  that 
a  self  expresses  reality  in  a  higher  degree  than  do  the  moods 
of  the  self.  The  self  has  a  greater  relative  independence ; 
it  is  manifestly  concrete  and  content-full,  and  it  has  the 
characteristic  of  permanence.  What  is  true  of  our  moods 
compared  with  the  self  is  also  true  of  the  qualities  and 
relations  of  objects.  The  color  of  the  flower,  the  tone  of 
the  bell,  and  the  taste  of  the  apple  are  real ;  their  reality 
is  as  certain  as  the  reality  of  the  flower,  the  bell,  and  the 
apple.  And  the  relative  positions  of  the  objects  which 
we  see  and  touch  are  as  assuredly  real  as  are  the  objects 
themselves.  But  these  qualities  and  relations  do  not 
give  so  full  an  expression  of  reality  as  do  the  objects. 


REALITY  i8i 

Compared  with  the  objects,  they  are  relatively  dependent 
and  changeful  and  are  wanting  in  content-fullness ;  they 
do  not  express  so  high  a  degree  of  reality.  The  subject 
expresses  a  higher  degree  of  reality  than  the  moods  of  the 
subject ;  the  object  as  a  whole,  a  higher  degree  of  reality 
than  the  qualities  and  relations  of  the  object.  If  we  would 
deal  accurately  with  experience,  we  must  recognize  dif- 
ferent kinds  and  degrees  of  reality. 

§  80.  Reality  as  the  Common  Content,  or  the  Universal, 
in  Experience.  Tn  our  sketch  of  the  views  of  the  Sophists, 
we  stated  that  they  held  that  a  subject  perceives  merely  a 
particular  appearance,  one  that  is  particular  and  indi- 
vidual in  all  its  characteristics.  Thus,  according  to  their 
teaching,  when  I  see  a  horse,  I  only  perceive  that  momen- 
tary and  changing  appearance.  What  I  perceive  is  an 
isolated  and  independent  element  of  my  consciousness ; 
it  has  its  complete  being,  whatever  that  may  be,  apart 
from  all  else.  In  this  section,  we  purpose  to  examine 
experience  with  a  view  to  determining  whether  the  Soph- 
ists are  right  in  this  contention. 

I.  Particular  Experience  in  Respect  of  Extent.  —  In  the 
simplest  form  of  experience,  the  object  is  "this  thing" 
or  "  that  thing  " ;  it  is  in  "  this  place  "  or  in  "  that  place." 
It  is  distinguished  as  "  this  "  or  "  that,"  and  as  being 
"  here "  or  "  there."  The  qualifications  "  this  "  and 
"  that,"  and  "  here  "  and  "  there,"  seem  to  be  separative 
and  particularizing;  they  apparently  serve  to  separate 
the  qualified  object  or  place  from  other  objects  and  places. 
And  they  doubtless  are  expressions  of  separating  and 
particularizing  thought;  they  denote  an  isolating  and 
separative  experience.  But  they  are  not  merely  separa- 
tive ;  they  conjoin.  When  we  think  of  any  object  as 
"  this  thing  "  or  "  that  thing,"  we  set  it  apart  from  all 
other  objects;    but  the  thought  which  sets  it  apart  rec- 


i82         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

ognizes  the  actuality  of  other  objects.  There  can  be  no 
setting  apart  without  such  recognition.  In  the  statement, 
"  I  prefer  that  cane,"  the  thought  expressed  in  the  word 
"  th^t "  includes  recognition  of  the  existence  of  other 
canes  than  the  one  which  is  designated.  In  any  experi- 
ence of  "  this  "  or  "  that,"  there  is  a  real,  but  possibly 
undefined,  consciousness  of  a  whole  in  which  the  selected 
particular  has  its  being  and  with  all  the  particulars  of 
which  it  is  conjoined.  Similarly  in  the  expression,  "  You 
will  find  him  there^"^  there  is  consciousness  of  the  whole  of 
space ;  the  place  designated  is  simply  the  centre  of  atten- 
tion for  the  moment.  This  much  is  evident :  we  qualify 
a  particular  thing  or  quality  or  relation  by  such  partic- 
ularizing and  separative  terms,  because  that  which  we 
thus  qualify  does  not  exist  in  our  experience  apart  and  by 
itself;  it  is  of  the  universe,  and  the  universe  is  in  the 
background  of  our  experience  when  we  particularize. 
When  we  individualize  an  object  —  a  thing,  an  event,  a 
quality,  or  a  relation  —  we  actually  conjoin  it  with  all  else 
in  the  very  experience  in  which  we  distinguish  it  from  all 
else.  Every  object  of  your  experience  has  its  being  in 
the  universe  of  your  experience ;  it  is  a  part  of  the  universe 
as  you  conceive  it  and  is  organically  united  in  your  ex- 
perience with  everything  with  which  you  have  had  com- 
merce. An  arm  has  its  being  and  its  meaning  as  an  or- 
ganic part  of  a  body.  When  we  think  of  a  man's  arm,  our 
thought  involves  an  implicit  recognition  of  his  body.  So 
every  particular  of  your  experience  has  its  being  and  its 
meaning  for  you  in  its  organic  union  with  your  experience 
as  a  whole ;  and  when  you  think  that  object  apart  from  the 
whole,  there  is  involved  in  your  thought  an  implicit  rec- 
ognition of  the  whole.  No  portion  of  experience  can  be 
particularized  without  implication  of  the  whole  of  experi- 
ence.    No  particular  experience  is   merely  a  particular 


REALITY  183 

experience.  No  experience  is  simply  an  experience  of 
the  particular  object. 

2.  Particular  Experience  in  Respect  of  Time.  —  Our  ex- 
perience of  events  gives  a  time  element  to  consciousness. 
For  us,  every  event  occurs  "  now  "  or  "  then."  The  ele- 
ment of  experience  which  we  express  by  such  terms  as 
"  now  "  and  "  then  "  separates  the  time  of  that  event 
from  the  whole  of  time.  A  statement  is  made  in  your 
hearing  and  you  say,  "  I  have  heard  that  before.^^  In 
that  thought  you  separate  a  portion  of  time  from  all 
the  rest  of  time.  But  in  so  isolating  that  moment  of 
time,  you  recognize  that  the  previous  experience  did  not 
have  its  being  apart  and  by  itself,  but  in  the  whole  of 
experience  regarded  temporally.  Every  experience  derives 
its  temporal  being  and  meaning  from  its  being  included 
in  the  total  of  experience.  An  experience  has  its  origin 
in  what  is  "  past  "  to  the  experience,  and  it  has  its  com- 
pletion in  what  is  "  future  "  to  it.  That  is,  the  experience 
of  each  of  us  is  in  reality  one  developing  experience.  The 
total  of  your  experience  is  not  a  sum  of  experiences ;  it 
is  a  whole  from  which  you  separate  particulars  and  so 
think  of  them  as  isolated  and  independent  experiences. 
But  these  so-called  separate  experiences  are  incomplete 
if  separated  from  what  precedes  and  what  follows.  This 
indicates  that  no  experience  selected  from  the  total  of  a 
subject's  experience  is  a  mere  particular  in  respect  of  time ; 
it  has  that  in  it  which  is  common  to  all  the  subject's  ex- 
perience. 

But  this  is  not  all.  "  Now  "  and  "  then  "  are  common 
to  your  experience  and  mine.  "  Now  "  is  the  same  for 
both  of  us ;  any  moment  in  the  past  of  the  world's  changes 
is  the  same  for  both  of  us,  the  same  in  respect  of  time  how- 
ever much  it  may  bring  us  that  is  different  content  to  us  in 
other  respects  than  temporally.     This  temporal  unity  in 


1 84         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

experience  is  internal  and  organic,  not  external  and  me- 
chanical. The  parts  of  a  chair  are  made  separately  and  are 
put  together  afterward.  The  parts  of  an  organism — as  the 
body  of  a  plant  or  an  animal  —  come  into  being  in  the 
whole  body ;  they  are  united  in  their  coming  to  be.  That 
is,  they  are  united  in  the  ground,  or  source,  of  their  being. 
So  the  experiences  of  all  individuals  have  their  temporal 
unity  in  their  coming  to  be;  and  the  moment  of  their 
occurrence  is  an  essential  element  of  time.  In  respect 
of  time  they  are  organically  related.  As  to  the  time  ele- 
ment, the  experiences  of  all  individuals  have  a  ground 
unity. 

3.  Particular  Experience  in  Respect  of  the  Subject.  — 
Is  there  complete  experience  which  is  wholly  that  of  the 
particular  subject  ?  In  other  words,  is  there  a  purely 
"  private  "  experience  }  The  question  is  not  as  to  whether 
there  are  elements  of  experience  which  are  the  "  private 
property  "  of  the  individual  subject.  It  is  this :  Take 
any  moment  of  your  experience,  is  such  a  moment  ever 
made  up  of  elements  which  are  entirely  yours,  in  which 
there  is  no  element  which  you  have  in  common  with 
others  t  It  would  appear  from  the  preceding  paragraph 
that  there  is  no  experience  which  is  wholly  that  of  a  par- 
ticular subject;  in  the  matter  of  the  time  element,  our 
experiences  have  a  common  content.  But  this  is  not  all ; 
there  are  other  elements  of  experience  which  are  had  in 
common.  They  enter  into  all  human  experience.  Ex- 
perience is  largely  effected  by  language ;  our  meditations 
are  mediated  by  unuttered  speech.  Our  apprehension 
of  our  own  pleasure  or  displeasure,  our  purposing,  and  our 
knowledge  of  ourselves  —  all  these  activities  are  carried 
on  with  the  aid  of  language.  Now,  language  is  not  a  col- 
lection of  mere  vocables.  The  experiences  of  men  have 
been  a  factor  in  the  coining  of  words  and  phrases ;  for 


REALITY  i$5 

language  has  come  of  endeavor  to  express  experience. 
Words  and  phrases  are  a  living  embodiment  of  a  common 
experience.  They  express  attitudes  toward  the  universe 
and  life ;  they  affect  and  reveal  our  experience.  Hence, 
in  acquiring  our  mother  tongue,  we  acquire  a  content  of 
experience  which  is  not  merely  ours  as  individuals.  Lan- 
guage, attitudes  toward  life  and  its  great  questions,  and 
forms  of  thought  become  ours  as  members  of  society. 
There  is  in  them  a  common  inheritance  of  experience,  and 
they  affect  our  thought  and  feelings  and  purposes  some- 
what as  they  affect  the  thinking  and  the  life  of  others. 
How  much  of  our  knowledge  of  the  world  is  our  individual 
creation  }  Can  we  truly  say  that  any  of  it  originated  with 
us  and  is  purely  our  own  ^  By  far  the  greater  part  of  the 
experience  of  each  of  us  comes  to  us  from  a  common 
source  of  human  experience ;  much  of  it  is  universal.  Our 
individual  experience  points  beyond  us  to  others ;  it  has 
In  it  elements  which  are  not  individual  and  "  private," 
but  common  and  "  public." 

4.  Conclusions.  = —  We  find  that  every  experience  of  an 
individual  subject  is  organically  related  to  all  that  subject's 
experience.  To  separate  any  moment  of  experience  from 
the  whole  is  to  lessen  its  significance,  to  sunder  it  from  that 
in  union  with  which  it  has  its  life.  When  we  give  atten- 
tion to  any  part  of  our  experience,  the  whole  of  experience 
is  the  necessary  background  of  such  particularized  ex- 
perience. We  find,  further,  that  the  experience  of  any  one 
subject  includes  content  of  the  experience  of  other  subjects. 
There  is  experience  which  is  common  to  all  men  —  as  the 
rising  and  setting  of  the  sun,  the  changes  of  the  moon  and 
seasons  ;  the  distinguishing  of  positions  and  time  ;  count- 
ing and  measuring;  longing,  fearing,  and  purposing;  a 
sense  of  opposition  between  right  and  wrong;  a  sense  of 
the  reality  of  self  and  other  persons,  of  things  and  events. 


1 86         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

This  much  at  least  may  be  said  of  this  universal  in  experi- 
ence :  it  is  subjective  reality,  and  it  comes  of  experience 
with  objective  reality.  It  is  reality.  We  may  not  ques- 
tion this  fact ;  for  to  do  so  would  be  to  land  in  scepticism 
with  its  destructive  contradictories.  This  reality  is  not 
merely  subjectively  real.  It  must  arise  from  commerce 
with  what  is  objectively  real,  with  what  is  possible  object 
for  all  subjects.  Only  thus  can  we  account  for  its  being 
in  the  experience  of  all.  We  have  already  seen  (§  59, 
4  and  5)  that  experience  is  the  realization  of  objects  by 
the  subject.  In  his  experience,  the  artisan  obtains  mastery 
of  the  tools  of  his  craft ;  what  those  tools  are  for  thinking, 
feeling,  and  doing  has  become  a  part  of  his  own  reality. 
We  have  each  of  us  in  our  experience  thus  realized  within 
ourselves  what  the  common  objects  of  life  are  for  our 
doing,  thinking,  and  feeling.  The  common  object-reali- 
ties thus  realized  become  a  common  subjective  reality, 
the  universal  reality  of  experience. 

§  81.  The  Nature  of  Reality.  —  We  discussed  the  nature 
of  reality  in  §§  42,  2  ;  and  75,  3.  We  now  purpose  to  give 
it  fuller  consideration. 

I.  Few  will  controvert  the  statement  that  whatever  is, 
is  real ;  but  we  too  readily  conclude  from  this  that  to  be 
real  means  to  exist.  Reality,  however,  is  more  than  mere 
existence.  Mere  being  is  impossible ;  to  conceive  mere 
existence  would  be  to  conceive  nothing.  Whatever  is, 
has  some  quality ;  it  is  being  of  a  kind.  In  keeping  with 
this,  Idealists  have  regarded  reality  as  being  with  meaning; 
and  they  have  insisted  that  we  may  not  strip  being  of 
meaning  or  sunder  meaning  from  being.  In  separating 
them,  we  lose  both.  Since  reality  is  being  of  a  kind,  it  is 
being  with  a  nature.  Men  have  felt  this,  and  they  have 
sought  to  know  what  that  nature  is.  That  has,  in  fact, 
been  the  quest  of  Philosophers  from  the  beginning.     The 


REALITY  187 

earliest  of  them  sought  to  know  what  the  world  is  made  of ; 
and  in  that  they  were  inquiring  after  the  nature  of 
reality. 

2.  If  we  inquire  of  the  Physical  Sciences  —  Physics, 
Chemistry,  Mechanics,  and  Biology  —  we  shall  find  that 
they  agree  in  conceiving  reality  as  active.  The  atoms, 
electrons,  and  ions  of  Science  are  centres  of  energy.  When 
the  sciences  have  reduced  the  reality  with  which  they  deal 
to  its  lowest  terms,  they  find  that  they  have  being  with 
energy.  The  Biologist's  irreducible  unit  is  also  being 
with  energy.  That  is,  the  ultimate  of  reality  as  conceived 
by  Science  is  active  being.  This  conception  determines 
its  descriptions  of  objects  and  processes  and  is  the  import 
of  its  conclusions.  When  we  speak  of  reality  as  active 
being,  "  active "  is  not  used  as  signifying  in  motion; 
neither  is  it  to  be  taken  as  the  synonym  of  "  dynamic," 
as  though  it  meant  having  the  property  of  producing  motion. 
These  conceptions  are  mechanical  and  would  relate  the 
activity  externally  and  mechanically;  and  we  wish  to 
avoid  spatial  and  mechanical  suggestions  so  far  as  pos- 
sible. In  characterizing  reality  as  active  beings  the  activity 
we  have  in  mind  is  such  activity  as  is  present  in  the  growth 
of  plants  and  animals.  The  activity  which  effects  and 
determines  the  growth  of  a  body  is  in  the  body  and  of  the 
body ;  it  is,  in  a  word,  the  immanent  activity  of  the  body. 
This  activity  serves  to  give  expression  to  the  nature  of  the 
reality.  The  result  is  in  one  instance  a  rose,  in  another 
a  geranium,  in  another  a  sheep,  in  yet  another  a  dog. 
Stating  it  generally,  we  may  say  that  the  growing  body  is 
a  developing  expression  of  the  nature  of  the  reality  which 
is  thus  embodied.  Hence,  in  characterizing  reality  as 
active  being,  we  have  in  mind  activity  which  is  immanent 
and  developmental.  This  conception  of  activity  has  its 
best  illustration  in  the  changes  in  our  own  consciousness. 


i88         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

The  self  is  reality ;  the  self  is  active  being,  and  the  changes 
in  the  self  are  immanent  and  developmental. 

This  conception  accords  with  what  we  have  previously 
said  respecting  reality.  We  have  held  that  it  is  being 
with  meaning.  That  being  true,  it  is  in  its  nature  intel- 
ligible ;  it  may  be  known  if  it  shall  come  into  presentation 
to  a  subject.  We  have  also  concluded  that  reality  is 
active  being.  That  being  true,  it  can  express  itself.  As 
to  nature,  then,  reality  is  expressible  and  intelligible  j  it 
can  be  presented  to  a  subject  and  it  can  be  known.  This  is 
what  is  meant  when  it  is  said  that  "  the  reality  of  an  en- 
tity is  in  its  perceptibility." 

§82.  Reality  comes  to  Expression  and  Development  in 
the  Subject-Object  Relation,  and  only  in  this  Rela- 
tion. — 

I.  Reality  as  Object.  —  Reality  is  being  with  meaning. 
But  meaning  implies  an  intelligent  perceiver,  and  it  is 
obvious  that  the  meaning  of  reality  cannot  be  developed 
except  there  be  a  subject  to  whom  the  object  has  mean- 
ing. The  full  significance  of  an  axe  or  a  gun  can  only  be 
realized  when  it  is  related  to  a  man.  •  It  is  generally  agreed 
that  there  can  be  no  color,  taste,  or  sound  apart  from  sen- 
sation. We  may  not  affirm  them  or  other  qualities  of  an 
object  except  as  it  is  in  presentation  to  a  subject.  The 
color  of  the  painting,  the  flavor  of  the  fruit,  the  smooth- 
ness and  hardness  of  the  marble,  and  the  tone  of  the 
harp  are  not  realized,  do  not  come  to  full  expression,  unless 
the  painting,  the  fruit,  the  marble,  and  the  harp  are  re- 
lated to  a  sentient  being.  Their  meaning  can  only  be 
developed  when  they  become  objects  for  an  intelligent 
subject.  When  the  activity  of  the  object  and  the  subject 
are  interrelated,  then  the  reality  of  the  object  is  developed, 
then  and  then  only  does  its  nature  find  completed  expres- 
sion.    It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  conceive  a  reality  or 


REALITY  189 

to  think  intelligibly  of  any  reality  except  as  il^  Is  set  in  the 
subject-object  relation. 

2.  Reality  as  Subject.  —  Rationality  —  i.e.  thinking, 
feeling,  and  purposing  —  Is  one  mark  of  reality  as  subject. 
We  too  often  think  of  ourselves  as  first  being  rational  and 
then  becoming  conscious  of  objects;  whereas  we  must 
be  conscious  in  order  that  we  may  be  rational.  To  be 
rational  Is  to  think  and  feel  and  wilf;  and  we  only  think 
and  feel  and  will  when  we  think  of  some  object  and  feel 
concerning  some  object  and  will  respecting  some  object. 
Our  rationality  is  developed  and  finds  expression  in  ex- 
perience and  through  experience ;  and  we  have  no  experi- 
ence except  as  we  are  related  to  an  object.  In  a  word,  it  Is 
In  our  conscious  relation  to  objects  that  the  rational  na- 
ture of  each  of  us  comes  to  realization.  Consciousness 
of  self  Is  another  characteristic  of  subject-reality.  We 
only  know  an  object  as  we  distinguish  it  from  what  is  not 
itself.  You  can  only  be  conscious  of  yourself  as  you  dis- 
tinguish yourself  from  what  is  not  yourself.  That  is, 
we  come  to  consciousness  of  ourselves  in  the  experience 
in  which  we  become  conscious  of  other  objects.  Hence 
the  nature  of  our  reality,  in  respect  of  consciousness  of 
self,  Is  developed,  and  so  finds  expression,  in  the  subject- 
object  relation. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

IS   THE    COGNITIVE    EXPERIENCE    RESOLUBLE  ? 

§  83.  What  the  Resolution  of  Cognitive  Experience 
Signifies.  —  A  card  is  handed  you,  and  you  perceive  that 
it  is  a  photograph.  This  may  be  taken  as  an  illustration 
of  cogiiitive  experience.  It  has  been  held  that  this  ex- 
perience yields  two  factors  upon  analysis  —  a  mental 
factor  and  a  physical  factor.  Speaking  in  general  terms, 
the  physical  factor  includes  the  photograph  and  your  phys- 
ical organism,  with  special  reference  in  the  case  of  the 
latter  to  your  sense-organs  of  vision  and  touch,  and  your 
nervous  system.  Thus  conceived,  the  object  is  thought 
to  act  upon  your  sense-organs  and,  through  afferent 
nerves  connecting  the  sense-organs  with  the  cerebral  cor- 
tex, to  cause  effects  in  the  cortex.  These  effects  are  that 
particular  of  the  physical  factor  which  is  most  directly 
related  to  the  mental  factor.  These  two  factors  —  the 
mind  and  the  affected  cortex  —  are  set  over  against  each 
other;  they  are  conceived  to  be  independent  realities, 
each  being  thought  to  be  complete  in  itself  without  regard 
to  the  other.  Those  who  follow  this  method  insist  that 
Epistemology  must  begin  with  such  an  analysis  and  must 
undertake  to  construct  the  cognitive  experience  out  of  the 
action  and  reaction  of  these  two  factors. 

The  analysis  of  experience  which  we  have  just  described, 
regards  experience  as  a  result,  i.e.  as  an  accomplished  fact. 
Experience  may  also  be  conceived  as  a  process,  and  there 
are  those  who  prefer  so  to  regard  it.     Many  who  conceive 

190 


THE   COGNITIVE  EXPERIENCE  191 

experience  thus,  Insist  that  we  must  follow  the  genesis 
of  perception  if  we  would  construct  a  theory  of  Knowing. 
In  order  to  trace  the  genesis  of  Knowledge,  they  analyze 
the  cognitive  experience  into  a  physical  process  and  a  psy- 
chical process.  In  the  instance  of  the  illustration  used 
above,  this  analysis  would  give  us  stimulation  of  the  retina 
by  the  card,  consequent  excitation  of  the  optic  nerve,  trans- 
ference of  this  excitation  to  the  occipital  lobe  of  the  cere- 
brum, and  consequent  changes  in  the  cortex.  This  method 
also  discovers  psychical  changes  —  known  as  sensation 
and  ideation ;  and  these  conclude  in  the  judgment  that  the 
card  is  a  photograph.  These  psychical  changes  are  con- 
comitant with  the  cortical  changes.  Here  we  have  the 
outline  of  a  scientific  description  of  the  process  in  cogni- 
tion. It  is  held  that  an  acceptable  theory  of  knowledge 
can  be  had  if  we  shall  study  perception  in  its  genesis,  and 
that  such  an  analysis  as  we  have  roughly  sketched  presents 
perception  In  process.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  two 
factors  of  the  former  conception  and  the  two  processes 
in  the  latter  are  In  mutually  exclusive  realms;  and  they 
—  the  factors  and  the  processes  —  are  represented  as  hav- 
ing a  distinct  apartness  In  nature  and  In  operation. 

§  84.  Why  Cognition  is  thus  Analyzed.  —  Can  Phi- 
losophy forward  its  work  and  Interest  by  trying  to  resolve 
the  cognitive  experience .?  This  Is  the  question  we  have 
to  answer.  The  Interest  of  Philosophy  in  the  study  which 
we  now  have  in  hand  Is  distinctly  practical.  It  is  a  mis- 
take to  assume  that  Philosophy  is  moved  by  mere  curi- 
osity in  any  of  its  investigations.  We  will  note  the  prac- 
ticality of  Its  Interest  at  this  point.  Suppose  I  say,  "  The 
telephone  bell  just  rang ;  I  heard  it."  That  is  an  assertion 
of  perceptual  experience  and  knowledge  on  my  part. 
What  about  the  reality  of  the  bell  ?  and  what  does  this 
experience  mean  for  that  reality .?     Philosophy  asks  these 


192        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

questions.  The  earliest,  and  the  abiding,  desire  of  Phil- 
osophy is  to  determine  what  the  world  is  made  of  and 
what  we  ourselves  are.  Or,  to  state  it  briefly  and  compre- 
hensively. Philosophy  wishes  to  know  the  nature  of  reality. 
In  trying  to  satisfy  this  desire,  men  have  thought  it  nec- 
essary to  justify  our  certainty  that  our  world  of  persons 
and  things  and  happenings  is  real.  We  doubt  the  phil- 
osophical value  of  this  inquiry.  All  thinking  and  all 
intersubjective  intercourse  assumes  the  reality  of  our- 
selves and  our  world ;  it  cannot  do  otherwise.  But  the 
question  of  the  reality  of  the  world  has  been  raised ;  and, 
in  seeking  an  answer,  men  have  been  led  to  inquire  respect- 
ing the  validity  of  knowledge.  Is  my  knowledge  of  the 
world  valid  for  you  }  Does  cognition  put  us  in  possession 
of  reality  ?  Nothing  else  than  commerce  with  reality  can 
meet  the  demands  of  thought  and  the  requirements  of 
life.  Now,  it  has  been  held  by  many  that,  if  we  would 
satisfy  this  desire,  our  first  step  is  to  resolve  the  cognitive 
experience  as  indicated  above.  Can  the  resolution  of  the 
cognitive  experience  into  two  factors  or  two  processes 
forward   this   interest }     We   think   not. 

§  85.  The  Resolution  of  Cognitive  Experience  criti- 
cised. —  This  method  would  seem  to  commend  itself  to  us, 
for  it  is  in  keeping  with  the  method  usually  followed  by 
Science.  In  scientific  investigations,  we  believe  that  we 
can  best  understand  a  complex  reality  if  we  shall  break 
it  up  into  its  elements  and  then  discover  how  these  com- 
bine. This  is  the  method  of  Chemistry,  Biology,  and 
Psychology ;  and,  in  our  Historical  Introduction,  we  have 
called  attention  to  eff"orts  made  to  apply  the  analytic 
method  in  Philosophy.  (See  especially  §§  18,  2;  36, 
2-4;   40;  "41.)     Why  do  we  decline  to  adopt  it  .^ 

I.  It  has  proved  Ineffective  and  Unsatisfactory.  —  After 
we  have  separated  the  mental  and  the  physical  factors, 


THE   COGNITIVE  EXPERIENCE  193 

we  have  to  decide  which  of  these  shall  be  accepted  as  the 
controlling  factor  in  any  given  case.  Was  it  the  card  or 
your  mind  which  determined  what  you  saw  when  the  card 
was  handed  you  ?  The  Plain  Man  will  say  that  it  must 
be  the  card ;  and  not  a  few  thinkers  will  agree  with  the 
Plain  Man.  The  thinker  who  holds  this  view  will  prob- 
ably refer  your  perception  to  the  physical  factor  as  a 
whole  —  the  card  and  your  body,  with  special  reference 
in  the  instance  of  the  body  to  your  organs  of  vision  and 
your  nervous  system.  Similarly,  it  would  be  said  that 
the  vibrating  bell  and  my  reacting  physical  organism 
determine  what  I  perceive  when  I  hear  the  bell.  Empiri- 
cists take  this  view;  and  the  more  pronounced  would 
substantially  agree  with  Locke's  theory,  and  he  would  say 
that  ideas  are  impressed  on  our  minds  when  you  see  the 
card  and  I  hear  the  bell.  This  approach  regards  the  par- 
ticulars of  our  knowledge  as  a  contribution  of  the  object 
to  the  subject,  a  contribution  made  through  sense- 
experience.  But  this  is  unsatisfactory.  Whether  we  con- 
ceive perception  as  resulting  from  the  interaction  of  physi- 
cal and  mental  factors  or  as  resoluble  into  concomitant 
physical  and  psychical  processes,  there  is  one  fact  that 
renders  this  method  ineffective.  That  fact  is,  that  con- 
ditions of  the  cortex  and  changes  in  the  cortex  bear  no 
resemblance  whatever  to  knowledge ;  they  and  knowledge 
have  no  discoverable  community  of  nature  or  similarity 
in  expression.  Such  conditions  or  changes  have  no  de- 
finable likeness  to  our  consciousness  of  color  or  sound,  or 
taste,  or  to  our  feeling  of  satisfaction  or  dissatisfaction. 
But  if  this  method  shall  advance  our  thinking,  it  must  find 
such  likeness  there.  We  have  separated  the  physical  and 
psychical  factors,  but  we  cannot  so  construe  their  com- 
bination as  to  show  how  knowledge  results.  Analysis 
yields  two  processes;    but  these  processes  are  in  spheres 


194        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

which  are  conceived  as  radically  different  in  nature,  and 
we  cannot  logically  connect  them  so  as  to  show  how  knowl- 
edge arises.  Why  should  a  process  in  the  cortex  be  ac- 
companied by  the  perception  of  a  photograph  ?  The 
method  under  consideration  does  not  help  us  to  answer 
this  question.  We  have  the  knowledge  previous  to  the 
analysis ;  but  we  cannot  construct  the  knowledge  from 
what  the  analysis  discovers.  This  method  is  ineffective; 
in  the  hands  of  Empiricists  it  yields  nothing  which  makes 
for  or  against  the  validity  of  knowledge.  It  separates 
subject  and  object,  and  it  cannot  unite  them. 

Rationalists  begin  with  the  mental  factor.  Some,  Kant 
for  example,  believe  that  the  mind  determines  form  and 
contributes  matter  of  knowledge.  According  to  Leibniz, 
all  there  is  in  knowledge  is  contributed  by  the  intellect. 
They  agree  in  recognizing  a  fact  overlooked  by  extreme 
Empiricists  —  viz.,  that  your  perception  (of  the  photo- 
graph) and  my  perception  (of  the  ringing  of  the  telephone 
bell)  are  accomplished  through  thinking.  According  to 
those  who  hold  that  the  subject  determines  the  form  of 
knowledge,  you  perceive  a  photograph  because  you  have 
given  photographic  form  to  material  furnished  you  in  sen- 
sation. So  also  as  to  my  perception  of  the  bell.  For  them, 
the  form  which  is  given  by  us  to  the  sense-data  is  not  a 
purely  individual,  or  personal,  construction ;  it  is  deter- 
mined by  principles  of  thought  which  are  common  to  all 
subjects.  Hence  all  normal  subjects  give  the  same  form 
to  the  same  material  of  experience. 

The  doctrine  just  stated  is  unsatisfactory;  it  raises  a 
question  which  it  cannot  answer.  Is  that  which  stimu- 
lated sensation  in  your  instance  really  a  photograph, 
just  as  it  is  known  to  you?  Is  it  in  my  instance  actually 
a  bell,  constituted  as  it  is  known  by  me?  If  this  doctrine 
be  true,  we  have  no  warrant  that  the  world  which  we  know 


THE   COGNITIVE  EXPERIENCE  195 

is  the  world  of  reality.  This  question  demands  answer  of 
those  also  who  hold  that  the  mind  contributes  content 
and  form  to  knowledge,  and  who  at  the  same  time  sunder 
subject  and  object  in  their  study  of  cognition.  The  an- 
alytic method  cannot  meet  this  demand.  We  have  found 
that  Empiricism  cannot  pass  from  object  to  subject;  it 
is  also  true  that  the  Rationalist  who  thus  analyses  cog- 
nition, cannot  pass  from  the  subject  to  the  object.  This 
method  fails  to  connect  the  knower  with  reality  which  is 
other  than  himself.  In  resolving  the  cognitive  experience, 
we  sunder  the  subject  and  the  object;  and  we  cannot, 
from  the  sundered  subject  and  object,  reconstruct  the 
knowledge  which  we  broke  up  in  our  analysis.  The  sun- 
dered subject  and  object  cannot  testify  respecting  the 
validity  of  knowledge ;  but  they  were  separated  in  order 
that  we  might  obtain  such  testimony.  This  method  is 
ineffective. 

2.  In  this  Resolution  of  Experience,  Knowledge  Vanishes, 
—  This  treatment  of  cognitive  experience  gives  us  changes 
in  consciousness  instead  of  knowledge.  When  you  hear 
the  door-bell,  there  is  doubtless  a  change  in  your  con- 
sciousness ;  but  that  change  is  not  knowledge.  The  knowl- 
edge is  the  apprehended  meaning  of  an  occurrence,  the  oc- 
currence being  an  object  in  the  external  world.  So  when 
I  see  the  morning  paper,  there  is  a  change  in  my  conscious- 
ness ;  but  the  item  of  knowledge  is  not  this  change.  The 
knowledge  is  the  meaning  of  an  object  external  to  me.  A 
process  in  consciousness  or  a  state  of  consciousness  is  not 
meaning  and  is  not  to  be  taken  for  knowledge.  In  the 
proposed  analysis  of  cognition,  knowledge  disappears; 
and  no  reflection  upon  the  resulting  factors  or  processes 
can  recall  it. 

3.  The  Analysis  leads  to  incorrect  Views  respecting 
Knowledge.  —  Many  who  follow  this  method  have  con- 


196        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

eluded  that  the  primary  object  in  cognition  is  a  state  of 
consciousness.  For  example,  I  see  this  book.  According 
to  this  view,  the  action  of  the  object,  the  book,  on  my 
retinae  has  caused  a  change  in  my  cortex  and  there  occurs 
a  resultant  or  attendant  change  in  my  consciousness ; 
and  I  have,  in  consequence,  a  mental  picture  of  this  book. 
The  term  "  picture  "  is,  of  course,  not  to  be  taken  too  literally. 
What  I  know  primarily  is  thought  to  be  a  mental  repre- 
sentation or  symbol  or  presentation  of  the  book,  not  the 
book  itself.  This  state  of  consciousness,  describe  it  as 
one  may.  Is  held  to  be  what  is  primarily  cognized.  Among 
those  who  accept  this  doctrine,  there  is  great  difference  of 
opinion  as  to  how  this  ideational  object  connects  me  with 
the  book;  i.e.  how  I  arrive  at  knowledge  of  the  book 
through  knowledge  of  the  state  of  consciousness.  But  the 
essential  fact  for  us  here  Is,  that  I  am  said  to  have  a  state 
of  consciousness  for  my  immediate  object. 

Others  who  adopt  this  analytic  method  tend  to  the  doc- 
trine held  by  Kant :  that  the  known  world  is  a  construct 
of  the  subject.  Accordihg  to  this  view,  all  that  you  are 
conscious  of  when  you  see,  handle,  or  taste  the  orange  Is 
supplied  by  you  and  is  determined  by  what  you  are.  You 
have  no  rational  grasp  of  the  reality  of  that  which  you  call 
the  orange.  We  do  not  know  the  reality  of  objects,  the 
things-in-themselves ;  we  know  the  appearances  of  things- 
In-themselves,  and  we  impose  the  known  appearances  upon 
unordered  material  which  Is  given  us  in  sense-perception. 
What  we  know  is  the  appearance  (constructed  by  the 
understanding)  of  something  which  does  not  itself  appear. 
We  cannot,  upon  the  ground  of  knowledge,  affirm  that  this 
non-appearing  reality  exists ;  we  posit  It,  i.e.  we  affirm 
that  It  Is,  although  we  do  not,  and  cannot,  know  that  it 
exists. 

The  resolution  of  cognitive  experience  shuts  us  up  to  one 


THE   COGNITIVE   EXPERIENCE  197 

or  the  other  of  the  two  views  just  described.  They  are 
both  open  to  serious  criticism ;  but  they  have  been  so 
extensively  held  and  are  so  important  as  to  call  for  sep- 
arate study. 

§  86.  Is  the  Primary  Object  in  Cognition  a  State  of  Con- 
sciousness .f* —  I.  Logical  Consequences  of  this  Doctrine. 
—  If  it  be  true  that  the  primary  object  in  cognition  is  a 
state  of  consciousness,  then  the  only  world  which  any  one 
can  know  is  the  world  of  his  own  consciousness.  This  is 
Subjectivism ;  and  we  have  rejected  Subjectivism  be- 
cause it  is  incurably  inconsistent  as  well  as  destructive. 
(See  Chap.  XVII.)  It  shuts  the  subject  up  within  him- 
self; he  and  his  knowledge  are  enclosed  in  a  sealed  cham- 
ber, a  chamber  that  is  without  door  or  window  or  sky- 
light. No  way  is  left  by  which  we  can  get  into  knowing 
relation  with  anything  outside  ourselves.  We  cannot 
know  that  there  is  an  external  world  or  that  there  are  any 
other  selves.  You  cannot  know  that  you  have  a  body; 
what  you  think  you  know  as  your  hand  is,  so  far  as  your 
knowledge  of  it  goes,  merely  a  state  of  your  consciousness. 
You  may  assert  that  there  is  an  external  world ;  but  your 
belief  that  there  is  anything  beside  your  conscious  states 
is  either  fantasy  or  groundless  assumption.  According 
to  Subjectivism,  there  is  no  way  by  which  to  test  the  va- 
lidity of  my  assumption  that  there  are  other  realities  than 
my  conscious  states ;  for  I  can  only  know  that  there  Is 
something  else  by  knowing  what  is  not  of  my  conscious- 
ness, and  such  knowledge  is  held  to  be  Impossible.  If  the 
doctrine  under  consideration  be  true,  I  cannot  argue  from 
the  fact  that  I  have  a  certain  consciousness  to  the  con- 
clusion that  there  must  be  something  else  than  myself, 
from  the  fact  that  I  see  a  tree  to  the  conclusion  that  there 
is  a  real  object  external  to  me  ;  because,  so  far  as  we  know, 
this  consciousness  may  have  its  origin  in  me.     This  doc- 


198         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

trine  makes  attempt  at  social  intercourse  folly ;  it  converts 
conscious  life,  the  great  reality  for  each  of  us,  into  an  il- 
lusion ;  and  it  is  the  death  of  Science.  Subjectivism  is, 
however,  the  logical  consequence  of  resolving  the  cogni- 
tive experience  into  a  physical  and  a  mental  factor,  or 
into  psychical  and  physical  processes.  This  analysis 
affirms  knowledge  of  an  external  world.  It  does  so  in 
teaching  that  there  is  a  physical  factor  or  process,  and  in 
stating  what  that  factor  does  or  what  is  the  course  of  the 
process.  This  affirmation  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the 
doctrine  which  follows  from  the  analysis.  We  are  unready 
to  accept  any  theory  or  procedure  which  is  inconsistent 
with  itself  and  which  commits  us  to  intellectual  despair. 

2.  It  Misconceives  the  Subject  and  Object  and  their  Re- 
lation to  each  other.  —  The  subject  and  the  object  are 
conceived  to  be  independent  of  each  other  and  are  thought 
to  be  in  a  purely  external  mechanical  relation,  such  a  re- 
lation, for  example,  as  a  hot  stove  and  an  iron  lying  upon 
it.  We  speak  of  the  stove  as  causing  the  iron  to  become 
hot;  and  in  this  we  are  describing  an  event  in  terms  of 
cause  mechanically  conceived.  Similarly,  the  stove  as 
an  object  is  regarded  as  causing  certain  sensations  in  the 
subject,  and  the  subject  is  thought  to  react  upon  these 
sensations.  From  this  it  would  seem  natural  to  conclude 
that  a  state  of  consciousness  —  whether  it  be  known  as 
idea,  impression,  or  sensation  —  is  the  object  first  per- 
ceived. This  account  appears  at  first  sight  to  be  reason- 
able ;  and  it  would  be  conclusive  if  the  subject  and  object 
were  independent  of  each  other  and  if  cognition  were  a 
purely  mechanical  process. 

Cognition  is  not,  however,  a  mere  mechanical  process ; 
and  the  subject  and  object  are  not  complete  apart  from 
each  other.  The  relation  of  the  percipient  to  the  stove 
is  not  the  same  with  that  of  the  stove  to  the  iron  lying 


THE   COGNITIVE  EXPERIENCE  199 

upon  it.  The  stove  and  the  iron  do  not  exist  for  each 
other;  neither  knows  that  the  other  is.  In  this  respect, 
they  are  independent.  But  this  is  not  true  of  the  stove 
and  the  individual  subject.  The  stove  exists  for  a  subject ; 
its  characteristic  qualities  —  those  which  we  have  in  mind 
when  we  speak  or  think  of  a  stove  —  are  not  realized  ex- 
cept when  it  is  object  for  some  subject.  A  subject  must 
consciously  relate  it  to  himself  if  its  significance  shall  come 
to  realization.  Not  only  is  the  object  dependent  upon  its 
relation  to  a  subject  for  the  expression  of  its  reality,  but 
there  is  no  subject  reality  outside  the  subject-object  rela- 
tion. We  are  real  subjects  only  as  we  think,  feel,  and  will ; 
and  we  cannot  think,  feel,  and  will  except  we  are  related 
to  an  object.  Subject  and  object  have  no  such  independ- 
ence as  is  assumed  in  the  resolution  of  the  cognitive  ex- 
perience ;   for  neither  is  complete  apart  from  the  other. 

Another  fact  shows  that  the  relation  of  the  subject  to 
the  stove  is  very  different  from  that  of  the  stove  to  the 
iron  which  lies  upon  it.  When  one  looks  at  a  stove  or 
thinks  about  it,  he,  the  subject,  determines  the  relation  in 
which  they  stand  to  each  other.  He  may  relate  his 
thought  to  its  appearance,  its  value  on  the  market,  its 
weight,  its  usefulness,  or  any  one  of  a  number  of  partic- 
ulars which  give  the  stove  meaning  for  life.  Beside  this, 
the  experience  is  on  another  and  higher  level  than  any  that 
may  be  conceived  respecting  the  iron  and  the  stove.  In 
the  latter,  we  have  two  objects ;  in  the  former,  we  have  a 
subject  and  an  object,  and  the  subject  consciously  deter- 
mines the  relation.  The  relation  of  the  iron  and  the  stove 
is  determined /or  both  of  them ;  the  relation  of  the  subject 
and  the  stove  is  determined  hy  one  of  them,  by  the  subject. 
Resolution  of  experience  errs  seriously  in  treating  the  sub- 
ject as  an  object.  A  subject  relates  himself  and  objects ; 
an  object  is  related.     We  note  still  another  fact :  the  real- 


200         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

ity  of  the  object,  its  meaning  for  life,  becomes  content 
of  the  subject's  consciousness ;  it  becomes  a  part  of  the 
subject's  reality.  The  relation  thus  constituted  is  not 
external,  like  that  of  bricks  in  a  wall ;  it  is  immanent  and 
organic,  like  that  between  a  plant  and  what  it  appropriates 
from  its  environment  and  assimilates  to  itself.  We  con- 
clude, therefore,  that  the  doctrine  under  consideration 
misconceives  the  subject  and  object  in  regarding  them  as 
independent  and  complete  apart  from  each  other ;  it  errs 
in  treating  the  subject  as  an  object;  it  errs  also  in  assum- 
ing that  the  subject  and  object  are  mechanically  related. 
3.  It  misconceives  Idea  and  the  Relation  of  Idea  to  Sub- 
ject and  to  Object.  —  This  doctrine  interposes  ideas  between 
subject  and  object,  and  it  has  the  subject  cognize  an  idea 
of  the  object.  That  is,  the  idea  of  the  external  object 
is  the  subject's  primary  object.  This  idea  is  also  regarded 
as  a  state  of  consciousness.  But  an*  idea  is  not  a  mere 
state  of  consciousness ;  it  is  the  conceived  meaning  of  an 
object.  Your  idea  of  a  house  is  not  a  mere  state  of  your 
consciousness ;  it  is  your  conception  of  the  meaning  of  a 
house  in  the  system  in  which  we  are.  It  is  not  an  image 
of  a  building;  it  is  the  significance  of  the  building  for 
thought  and  feeling  and  action.  So  far  as  it  is  your  idea, 
it  owes  its  being  to  your  mental  activity.  Ideas  have  no 
being  in  themselves ;  they  come  to  be,  and  they  continue 
to  be,  through  the  mental  activity  of  a  subject.  Failure 
to  recognize  this  fact  is  certain  to  lead  to  erroneous  con- 
clusions. Now,  those  who  hold  the  doctrine  which  we  are 
examining  conceive  the  mind  as  something  apart  from  the 
idea  and  as  possessing  the  idea ;  whereas  the  idea  is  the 
subject  judging.  Your  idea  of  the  house  is  yourself  giving 
intelligent  form  to  the  meaning  of  that  object.  This  is  the 
idea  as  related  to  the  subject.  The  idea  abstracted  from 
the  subject  ceases  to  be  a  fact.     But  the  doctrine  under 


THE   COGNITIVE   EXPERIENCE  201 

consideration  does  just  this  ;  it  abstracts  the  idea  from  the 
subject,  and  It  treats  the  idea  as  a  mere  state  of  conscious- 
ness and  regards  it  as  externally  related  to  the  subject. 
Having  done  this,  it  makes  the  idea  the  directly  perceived 
object.  The  idea  is,  however,  not  a  mere  state  of  con- 
sciousness, and  it  is  not  externally  related  to  the  subject ; 
it  is  the  subject  judging. 

What  is  the  idea  as  related  to  the  object  ^  This  doc- 
trine conceives  the  idea  as  purely  subjective;  it  would 
separate  the  idea  from  the  object  of  which  it  is  the  idea. 
We  have  seen  that  my  idea  of  a  clock  is  not  simply  in  and 
of  myself.  An  idea  is  the  conceived  meaning  of  an  object ; 
if  you  abstract  the  object,  I  will  have  no  idea.  I  see  a 
certain  object  and  conclude  that  it  is  a  clock  having  some 
features  which  are  novel  to  me.  My  idea  is  not  purely 
subjective;  it  has  an  objective  relation  and  aspect.  If 
this  objective  relation  is  broken  up,  the  idea  vanishes. 
No  idea  is  purely  subjective.  An  idea  is  not  a  mere  state 
of  a  subject;  it  is  the  significance  for  the  subject  of  some- 
thing else  than  himself,  and  he  can  only  apprehend  that 
significance  as  he  apprehends  that  something  else. 

This  misconception  of  the  relation  of  the  idea  to  the  sub- 
ject and  the  object,  has  led  In  this  instance  to  an  absolute 
distinction  between  objects  and  ideas.  This  distinction 
and  the  resolution  of  cognition  yield  a  dualistic  concep- 
tion of  reality.  The  physical  and  the  psychical  are  set 
over  against  each  other.  What  we  have  taken  to  be  a  uni- 
verse, what  reveals  itself  as  a  whole  with  all  its  parts  or- 
ganically related,  is  cloven  into  two  portions  each  of  which 
is  complete  apart  from  the  other.  If  we  undertake  to 
relate  these  realities  —  the  psychical  and  the  physical  — 
in  respect  of  their  nature,  we  can  only  say  that  each  is 
what  the  other  Is  not.  This  would  resolve  the  universe 
into  a  "  duoverse  "  of  orders  which  are  mutually  exclusive, 


202        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

being  independent  of  each  other  and  opposed  in  nature. 
If  such  a  "  duoverse  "  were  possible,  there  could  be  no 
meaning  in  one  order  for  the  other.  Our  one  certainty 
is  the  reality  of  the  mental  world  ;  we  know  that  we  think 
and  feel  and  will,  and  this  is  in  the  psychical  realm.  This 
certainty  explains  the  tendency  of  those  who  hold  a  doc- 
trine of  dualism  to  make  a  state  of  consciousness  the  pri- 
mary object  in  cognition;  and  this  theory  of  cognition  has 
reacted  on  the  dualistic  doctrine  of  reality  and  has  tended 
to  confirm  the  dualism  of  those  who  accept  it.  We  con- 
clude, however,  from  our  study,  that  the  attempt  to  resolve 
cognitive  experience  is  due  to  a  misconception  of  idea  and 
of  the  relation  of  idea  to  subject  and  to  object. 

4.  The  Primary  Object  is  not  a  State  of  Consciousness.  — 
A  state  of  consciousness  is  not  perceptible.  A  conscious 
state  has  no  existence  by  itself;  it  is  in  the  subject's  ex- 
perience. It  is  not  something  which  the  subject  possesses  ; 
it  is  the  subject  himself  experiencing.  If  I  undertake  to 
make  my  feeling  consciousness  my  object,  what  introspec- 
tion gives  me  is  not  my  feeling,  but  myself  as  feeling.  If 
I  seek  a  state  of  cognitive  consciousness,  what  I  get  is  not 
a  knowing  consciousness,  but  myself  as  knowing.  That 
is  not  all.  When  we  undertake  to  attend  to  our  conscious- 
ness at  any  time,  the  attempt  to  do  so  effects  a  change. 
That  is,  the  consciousness  which  we  sought  has  ceased 
to  be,  and  what  we  have  for  our  object  is  ourselves 
remembering.  A  concrete  state  of  consciousness  can 
never  be  made  an  object.  When  one  perceives  a  knife 
or  a  pen,  the  primary  object  of  his  cognitive  activity 
is  the  knife  or  the  pen,  not  a  state  of  consciousness. 
We  know  nothing  about  states  of  consciousness  in  per- 
ception until  we  have  reflected  upon  the  process  and 
have  submitted  it  to  analysis.  When  you  see  a  blue 
book,  touch  a  rough  surface,  or  hear  a  creaking  sound, 


THE   COGNITIVE  EXPERIENCE  203 

your  object  is  the  blue  book,  the  rough  surface,  or 
the  creaking  sound,  not  a  process  in  consciousness  nor  a 
state  of  consciousness. 

The  resolution  of  the  cognitive  experience  favors  the 
doctrine  which  we  have  just  examined  and  rejected  ;  but  we 
cannot  give  a  final  answer  respecting  the  resolubility  of 
cognition  until  we  have  examined  a  kindred  doctrine,  the 
doctrine  that  the  known  world  is  a  construct  of  the  sub- 
ject. 

§  87.  The  Kantian  Limitation  of  Knowledge.  —  i.  The 
Doctrine  Stated.  —  We  have  given  an  extended  statement 
of  Kant's  doctrine  in  §  44,  and  we  refer  to  that  for  par- 
ticulars. A  brief  statement,  relating  his  view  to  the  ques- 
tion now  under  consideration,  will  be  found  in  §  85,  3. 
The  gist  of  his  doctrine  for  us  at  the  present  is,  that  we 
only  know  appearances  and  these  appearances  are  the 
construct  of  subjective  activity.  The  appearances  are  not 
fantasy;  they  are  not  conjured  up  by  the  individual 
subject.  The  material  of  knowledge  is  given  us  through 
sense-experience;  it  comes  to  us  unordered,  and  order 
and  meaning  are  given  it  by  the  mind.  Knowledge  is 
limited  to  what  is  received  through  sense-experience  and 
has  form  and  meaning  given  it  by  the  understanding. 
The  real  world,  the  world  whence  the  material  of  knowl- 
edge comes,  is  not  known  by  us ;  and  its  reality  cannot 
be  inferred  from  what  we  know.  We  posit,  or  affirm,  its 
existence;  and  we  are  to  act  as  if  it  really  were.  This 
positing  activity  is  apart  from,  and  quite  other  than,  the 
knowing  activity  of  the  subject;  it  is  an  act  of  faith. 
Kant  thus  sets  faith  over  against  knowledge. 

2.  This  Doctrine  cuts  the  Subject  of  from  Objective  Reality, 
—  His  doctrine  is  in  this  particular  open  to  the  objection 
urged  at  length  in  §  86,  i.  Its  logical  consequences  are 
virtually  the  same  with  those  of  the  doctrine  criticised 


204        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

in  that  sub-section.  To  be  sure,  he  held  that  the  indi- 
vidual subject  does  not  fix  the  form  and  meaning  of  the  ob- 
jects which  he  perceives,  for  he  taught  that  the  forms  of 
the  objects  are  constituted  by  a  super-conscious  self 
which  is  the  ground  of  the  self  of  experience.  By  this,  he 
made  the  world  which  is  known  truly  objective  in  one 
respect;  it  is  object  for  all.  But  knowledge  remains  sub- 
jective, for  we  do  not  apprehend  reality.  We  only  know 
the  world  as  subjectively  ordered,  not  as,  it  is  objectively 
real.  He  acknowledges  that  his  view  sets  this  limitation. 
That  being  the  case,  it  commits  us  to  Subjectivism;  and 
we  have  definitely  rejected  that  form  of  epistemological 
doctrine. 

3.  We  object  to  his  Sundering  of  Knowledge  and  Faith. 
—  He  says  we  do  not  know,  and  we  cannot  know,  that 
the  external  world  is ;  but  we  are  to  affirm  that  it  is  and 
that  it  furnishes  material  for  knowledge  of  the  world  of 
Science.  He  has  man  as  will  affirm  that  something  is, 
although  man  as  intellect  does  not  know  it  to  be.  This 
would  destroy  the  subject's  psychical  unity.  It  cleaves 
the  unitary  self  into  two  parts  which  function  in  quite 
different  ways  and  independently  of  each  other.  To  tear 
the  self  apart  thus  would  be  the  death  of  both  intellect 
and  will.  He  could  not  have  constructed  such  a  theory 
but  for  the  defective  Psychology  of  his  day.  The  faculty 
Psychology  was  prevalent  at  that  time.  It  conceived  the 
mind  as  constituted  in  three  departments  —  intellect, 
feeling,  and  will ;  and  these  were  regarded  as  separate 
activities,  independent  of  each  other  and  externally  re- 
lated. It  is  now  recognized  that  the  subject's  activity  is 
unitary,  and  that  the  subject  is  in  every  moment  a  think- 
ing-feeling-willing subject.  Kant's  conception  of  the 
subject  refusing  to  affirm  as  a  knowing  subject  and,  at 
the  same  time,  affirming  as  a  willing  subject  is  irreconcil- 


THE  COGNITIVE   EXPERIENCE  205 

able  with  man's  psychical  unity.  Faith  and  knowledge 
may  not  be  set  over  against  each  other  thus ;  there  is  no 
knowledge  apart  from  rational  faith,  and  no  rational  faith 
apart  from  knowledge.  Kant's  view  would  commit  us 
to  internal  conflict.  According  to  him,  we  must  treat  that 
as  true  which  we  do  not  know  to  be  true ;  and  we 
must  regard  the  world  of  appearances  as  though  it  were 
a  true  expression  of  the  world  of  reality,  although  we  have 
no  ground  for  so  regarding  it.  Philosophy  cannot  rest  in 
this ;  and,  as  a  consequence,  those  who  followed  Kant 
sought  to  connect  the  subject  with  objective  reality. 

Kant's  doctrine  of  the  limitation  of  knowledge  owes  its 
origin,  in  part  at  least,  to  his  conception  of  the  relation  of 
the  subject  and  object.  He  conceives  the  subject  and  the 
objective  world  as  externally  related ;  and  cognition  was 
for  him  the  result  of  the  mechanical  action  and  reaction 
of  the  subject  and  the  thing-in-itself.  Elsewhere  in  his 
teaching  he  acknowledges  the  inadequacy  of  mechanism 
as  an  explanatory  theory.  We  can  scarcely  imagine  what 
it  would  have  meant  for  Philosophy  if  the  great  Kant  had 
recognized  that  the  subject  and  the  object  are  organically 
related,  and  that  cognition  is  not  a  purely  mechanical 
process. 

§  88.  Summary.  —  Resolution  of  the  cognitive  experi- 
ence has  been  found  to  be  inefi"ective  and  unsatisfactory. 
It  results  in  the  sundering  of  the  subject  and  the  object ; 
and  no  acceptable  interpretation  of  the  resultant  factors 
or  processes  will  give  the  subject  rational  seizure  of  the 
object.  Knowledge  vanishes  in  the  analysis  and  cannot 
be  reconstituted.  This  method  shuts  us  up  to  Subjec- 
tivism. This  is  shown  in  two  doctrines  which  have  been  the 
logical  outcome  of  its  application  to  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge :  the  doctrine  that  the  primary  object  in  cognition 
is  a  state  of  consciousness,  and  the  Kantian  doctrine  of  the 


2o6        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

limitation  of  knowledge.  We  conclude  that  the  cognitive 
experience  is  irresoluble.  Knowledge  is  for  Philosophy 
a  primal  and  ultimate  fact ;   and  we  shall  so  regard  it. 

It  has  been  thought  that  this  analysis  would  aid  in 
establishing  the  validity  of  knowledge.  But  analysis  of 
cognition  does  not  help  to  answer  the  question  raised ; 
it  creates  difficulties  which  cannot  be  overcome.  We 
must  assume  the  fact  and  the  validity  of  knowledge ;  we 
cannot  think  or  speak  rationally  unless  we  make  this  as- 
sumption. We  have  seen  that  those  who  express  doubt 
of  knowledge  or  of  its  validity  assume  its  validity  in  their 
doubt,  and  in  the  reasons  they  assign  for  their  doubt. 
(See  Chap.  XVI.)  Fortunately,  we  do  not  need  to  de- 
monstrate the  validity  of  knowledge;  cognition  deter- 
mines its  own  validity.  We  may  err  in  particular  judg- 
ments ;  but  knowledge  must  discover  and  correct  the  error 
if  it  shall  be  corrected.  Knowledge  passes  judgment  on 
itself;  it  is  at  once  the  court  of  original  jurisdiction  and 
the  court  of  last  resort  in  all  controversies  respecting 
validity. 


:•) 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE    TRI-PHASAL    CHARACTER    OF    COGNITIVE    ACTIVITY 

§  89.  Historical.  —  All  experience  is  reducible  to  three 
elemental  modes  of  consciousness  —  thinking,  feeling, 
willing;  or  intellection,  affection,  volition.  Thinkers 
have  tended  to  give  unequal  emphasis  to  these  three  phases 
of  experience;  many,  if  not  most,  philosophers  have  as- 
signed preeminence  to  some  one  of  them.  This  followed 
not  unnaturally  from  the  earlier  conception  of  them  as 
independent  elements  of  consciousness.  From  this  differ- 
ing emphasis  there  have  arisen  three  philosophic  attitudes. 
These  attitudes  are  so  marked  and  so  determinative  of 
philosophic  conclusions  as  to  furnish  a  principle  by  which 
we  may  classify  philosophies ;  and  Intellectualism,  Vol- 
untarism, and  Affectionism  are  now  recognized  as  terms 
which  characterize  distinctive  forms  of  philosophic 
thought.  Although  these  terms  are  virtually  self-defin- 
ing, we  add  something  by  way  of  more  specific  description, 
limiting  our  statement  to  the  consideration  of  the  terms 
as  they  are  related  to  cognition. 

I.  Pure  Intellectualism  would  regard  Reason  as  Solely 
Intellective.  —  According  to  it,  so  far  as  reality  may  be 
known,  it  will  be  known  because  the  Intellect,  acting  by 
itself,  apprehends  it.  Not  all,  however,  who  give  a  pri- 
macy to  thought  in  cognition,  hold  a  doctrine  of  pure  intel- 
lectualism; on  the  contrary,  most  Intellectualists  of  the 
present  assert  that  all  rational  activity,  the  cognitive 
not  excluded,  has  volitional  and  affective  aspects,  as  well 
as  an  intellective  aspect.     The  primacy  which  Intellec- 

207 


208         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

tualists  of  to-day  assign  to  thought  is  really  an  aspectal 
primacy.  For  them,  this  phase  derives  its  aspect  of  pri- 
macy from  the  fact  that  in  the  study  of  cognition  they  are 
regarding  experience  from  the  intellective  point  of  view. 
Greek  philosophy  gave  preeminence  to  the  intellective 
factor  of  rational  activity.  Averroes,  the  Arabian  phi- 
losopher, was  an  Intellectualist ;  and  Albertus  Magnus  and 
Thomas  Aquinas  are  representative  Mediaeval  Intellec- 
tualists.     The  Substantialists  and  Kant  belong  here. 

2.  Voluntarism  gives  Primacy  to  the  Will.  —  It  holds 
that  consciousness  is  under  the  control  of  the  will,  that  ex- 
perience originates  in  the  determination  of  the  will,  and 
that  will  determines  what  shall  be  the  content  of  experi- 
ence. According  to  this  doctrine,  thinking  is  only  for 
practical  ends,  and  thought  is  merely  an  instrument  of 
the  will.  The  Romans  and  the  Hebrews  were  Voluntarists. 
They  gave  greater  significance  to  what  we  commonly  call 
practical  considerations  than  to  theoretical;  and  with 
them  the  personal  will  takes  precedence  over  the  intellect. 
As  earlier  representative  Voluntarists,  we  may  name  Avice- 
bron  (a  Jew  who  came  into  intimate  relations  with  the 
Arabian  philosophy),  Augustine,  Duns  Scotus,  and  Will- 
iam of  Ockham ;  as  later,  De  Biran,  Fichte,  and  Schopen- 
hauer. Lotze  had  a  voluntaristic  tendency.  Personal 
Idealists  and  most  Pragmatists  are  also  Voluntarists. 

3.  Affectionism  gives  Primacy  to  Feeling.  —  For  the 
present,  this  attitude  is  more  prevalent  in  Psychology  than 
in  Philosophy.  Some  psychologists  would  derive  intel- 
lection and  volition  from  feeling ;  and  this  comes  of  their 
undertaking  to  construct  all  forms  of  consciousness  out 
of  sensation.  We  speak  of  this  psychological  doctrine 
because  philosophical  conclusions  are  Involved  In  It.  Af- 
fectionism holds  that  reality  enters  experience  through 
feeling,  not  through  thought.     Neo-Platonlsts  and  most 


COGNITIVE  ACTIVITY  TRI-PHASAL       209 

Mystics  belong  here.  With  them  the  highest  form  of 
knowledge,  the  only  true  knowledge,  is  little  else  than 
"  uninterrupted  feeling."  Their  "  super-rational  "  mode 
of  cognition  is  immediate  appropriation  of  reality  through 
feeling.  There  have  been  few  teachers  of  philosophy  who 
have  held  a  definite  and  declared  doctrine  of  Affection- 
ism.  Nicholas  of  Cusa  and  the  Victorines  —  Hugo  and 
Richard  —  are  representatives.  We  believe  that  Jacobi 
and  Fries  may  be  so  classified.  Pragmatism  as  held  and 
stated  by  James  seems  to  be  Affectionism ;  for  he  insisted 
that  Philosophy  comes  through  "  passionate  vision,"  and 
that  logic  follows  and  furnishes  reasons  for  the  doctrines 
thus  obtained. 

§90.  Consciousness  is  Unitary.  —  i.  The  older  Psy- 
chology regarded  intellect,  feeling,  and  will  as  depart- 
ments of  mental  life  independent  of  one  another.  In 
keeping  with  this  conception,  you  might  be  active  intel- 
lectually without  attendant  feeling  or  volitional  activity. 
Each  of  these  faculties  was  even  conceived  as  a  thing-in- 
itself ;  and  a  distinct  office  in  mental  life  was  assigned  to 
each  of  them.  This  faculty  psychology  has  no  acceptance 
at  present,  nevertheless  expressions  are  to  be  found  in  the 
philosophic  literature  of  to-day  which  indicate  that  thought 
has  not  wholly  freed  itself  from  bondage  to  this  discarded 
conception.  Consciousness  is  unitary ;  man,  in  his  ra- 
tionality, is  a  unit.  He  has  one  rationality,  not  three; 
and  that  one  rationality  has  three  inseparable  modes.  We 
do  not  think  and  only  think  in  one  moment,  and  will  in 
another,  and  feel  in  yet  another.  There  is  no  experience 
which  is  now  intellective,  now  volitional,  and  at  another 
moment  affective.  The  unitary  experience  may  not  be 
broken  up  thus.  Any  portion  of  concrete  experience, 
select  it  by  what  rule  we  may,  is  a  thinking-feeling-willing 
experience, 
p 


2IO         INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

2.  No  One  of  these  Modes  is  Complete  in  Itself.  —  We 
cannot  think  without  feeling  and  willing,  neither  can  we 
will  without  thinking  and  feeling,  nor  feel  apart  from 
thinking.  Feeling  is  the  agreeable  or  disagreeable  tone 
attendant  upon  our  thought  of  a  person  or  thing  or  event. 
One  cannot  have  a  feeling  —  say  of  sympathy  for  the 
suffering  or  scorn  of  evil-doing  or  dislike  of  what  is  ugly  — 
unless  some  person  or  thing  or  act  be  an  object  of  thought. 
That  respecting  which  we  have  the  feeling,  must  have  some 
meaning  for  us.  In  a  word,  feeling  involves  thought. 
The  feeling  in  any  instance  may  be  instinctive,  or  it  may 
follow  upon  careful  reasoning;  but,  in  either  case  and 
every  case,  thinking  is  essential  to  feeling.  Volition  in- 
volves feeling.  Of  several  objects  proffered  me  or  several 
courses  open  to  me,  I  choose  one,  preferring  it  to  the  others. 
This  preference  comes  of  my  feeling  respecting  the  objects. 
Taking  all  things  into  consideration,  I  am  more  favorably 
disposed  toward  the  chosen  object  or  course  than  toward 
the  others.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  volition  apart 
from  feeling,  for  feeling  has  to  do  with  the  directing  of 
volition.  It  is  obvious  that  we  cannot  will  except  we  have 
thought  of  some  object,  the  object  respecting  which  we 
will.  These  considerations  force  the  conclusions  that 
feeling  and  volition  involve  intellection,  and  that  volition 
involves  feeling.  In  the  next  section  we  shall  attend  to 
facts  which  show  that  every  moment  of  intellective  ac- 
tivity is  feeling-  and  will-directed.  It  will  suffice  here 
to  take  note  of  one  fact;  interest  and  attention  are  es- 
sential to  thought.  We  must  give  attention  to  that  about 
which  we  think,  and  we  only  give  attention  to  that  in 
which  we  have  interest.  The  interest  may  be  only  mo- 
mentary, but  for  that  moment  we  have  interest  in  it.  There 
can  be  no  sustained  attention  without  volition,  and  feel- 
ing is  essential  to  interest.     These  modes  of  experience 


COGNITIVE  ACTIVITY  TRI-PHASAL       211 

are  Inseparable;  each  is  dependent  upon  the  others,  and 
can  only  be  if  the  others  are. 

§  91.  Feeling  and  Will  are  involved  in  Cognition.  — 
We  have  insisted  that  knowledge  cannot  be  a  mere  datum 
to  consciousness.  In  concluding  that  the  rumbling  you 
hear  is  caused  by  an  automobile,  not  a  street-car,  you  re- 
late the  object  to  yourself  and  make  mental  seizure  of  it ; 
the  knowledge  that  it  is  an  automobile,  is  not  a  mere  gift 
to  you,  but  becomes  yours  through  your  rational  activity. 
The  discussion  which  follows  will  bring  to  notice  the  voli- 
tional factor  of  cognitive  activity  and  will  therein  support 
xDur  contention  that  knowledge  is  not  a  gift  to  conscious- 
ness. 

I.  Will  and  Feeling  are  present  in  the  Inception  of  the 
Cognitive  Effort.  —  Our  activity  in  perceiving  an  object 
or  in  seeking  exact  knowledge  of  it,  is  not  a  mere  general 
awareness  of  the  object ;  it  is  a  selective  awareness.  Thus, 
my  perception  that  an  object  is  a  book,  is  not  a  general 
undefined  awareness ;  it  is  an  awareness  in  which  this 
object  is  selected  out  from  all-that-is  and  is  made  the  ob- 
ject of  thought.  This  selection  is  due  to  present  interest 
in  that  object;  and  where  there  is  interest,  there  is  feel- 
ing. Having  selected  this  object,  my  further  interest  in 
it  may  be  due  to  my  seeking  information,  mental  recrea- 
tion, first  editions,  beautiful  typography,  or  any  one  of  a 
number  of  other  ends.  This  interest  will  lead  to  a  selec- 
tive apprehension  of  the  book,  the  selection  being  made  in 
keeping  with  my  special  interest  and  purpose.  Interest 
and  purpose  determine  the  initiation  of  the  cognitive  pro- 
cess. We  give  thought  to  objects  because  we  believe 
that  they  may,  or  do,  have  present  or  future  value  for  us, 
and  because  of  our  assumption  or  assurance  of  their  present 
or  future  adaptation  to  our  purposes.  That  is,  considera- 
tions of  interest  and  purpose  determine  cognition  at  its 


212        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

inception ;  and  interest  and  purpose  involve  feeling  and 
will.  The  purpose  of  cognitive  effort  may  be  the  acquire- 
ment of  knowledge  for  purely  personal  satisfaction,  quite 
apart  from  what  are  commonly  called  practical  interests. 
We  find  this  often  in  those  who  are  highly  cultured ;  it 
seems  to  be  present  also  in  the  wonder  and  the  intellectual 
curiosity  of  the  child.  But  whether  we  enter  upon  cog- 
nitive endeavor  with  a  view  to  the  attainment  of  knowl- 
edge, or  in  order  that  we  may  better  further  some  of  the 
innumerable  practical  interests  to  which  we  give  atten- 
tion, we  are  seeking  to  satisfy  the  self.  This  end  involves 
feeling.  We  conclude,  therefore,  that  feeling  and  will 
are  involved  in  the  initiation  of  the  cognitive  process. 

2.  They  are  present  in  the  Cognitive  Process.  —  The 
activity  which  directs  our  cognitive  eifort  is  the  same  with 
that  which  initiates  it.  We  too  often  regard  the  cognitive 
process  as  consisting  in  the  bare  relating  of  ideas ;  and  we 
think  of  it  as  void  of  feeling  and  undirected  by  any  purpose 
other  than  the  attainment  of  some  truth  which  is  as  yet 
wholly  undefined.  Not  so ;  the  process  is  directed  to  an 
end.  By  so  much  as  we  are  rational,  we  are  seeking  some- 
thing in  particular.  It  is  this  which  sets  us  upon  the 
endeavor  to  know ;  and  we  hold  our  attention  to  the  se- 
lected object,  and  direct  our  thinking,  in  view  of  the  selected 
end.  Volition  is  essential  to  the  continuance  and  comple- 
tion of  the  cognitive  process.  This  is  illustrated  and  con- 
firmed in  our  experience  in  study  and  in  scientific  investiga- 
tion. 

But  feeling  is  just  as  essential  as  thinking  and  willing. 
The  simplest  cognition  issues  in  a  judgment;  a  judgment 
is  the  unit  of  thought.  Aristotle  perceived  this  truth 
(§  I5>  7))  ^i^d  Kant  recognized  that  cognition  is  completed 
in  a  judgment  (§  44,  2).  When  we  attain  knowledge  of 
an  object,  that  knowledge  affirms  or  denies  something  in 


COGNITIVE  ACTIVITY  TRI-PHASAL      213 

respect  of  the  object.  You  conclude  that  a  certain  building 
is  a  school-house.  If  you  were  asked  why  you  take  it 
to  be  a  school-house,  you  might  point  out  the  perceived 
particulars  in  the  building  and  the  grounds  which  lead 
you  to  this  conclusion.  If  further  pressed,  you  can  only 
reply  that  these  characteristics  of  the  building  and  grounds 
are  for  you  a  sufficient  reason  for  your  judgment  in  the 
case.  In  other  words,  you  are  satisfied  with  that  judg- 
ment. But  an  experience  of  satisfaction  involves  feeling. 
What  is  true  in  this  respect  of  so  simple  a  cognitive  pro- 
cess, is  true  also  of  more  elaborate  processes,  of  extended 
processes  of  reasoning.  In  our  thinking,  we  are  constantly 
applying  this  law  of  Sufficient  Reason ;  and  that  means 
that  we  reject  what  dissatisfies  us  and  accept  what  satisfies 
us.  Feeling  is  always  present  in  logical  processes.  So  also 
as  to  judgments  of  value ;  as  when  we  are  determining  the 
value  of  a  certain  object  or  course  of  action  for  the  secur- 
ing of  an  end  which  we  have  in  view,  or  the  relative  worth 
of  two  or  more  objects  or  courses  of  action  from  which  we 
have  to  make  choice.  In  answering  the  questions  which 
arise  in  such  relations,  feeling  is  attendant  upon  intellec- 
tion and  has  an  important  part  in  determining  our  con- 
clusions. Our  experience  in  judging  fact  or  value  may  be 
stated  thus  :  "  I  have  a  conviction  that  that  is  right." 
Such  a  conviction  is  implied  in  every  judgment;  and  con- 
viction is,  in  its  nature,  a  feeling-thought.  It  is  also  a 
determination  of  the  subject  to  accept  a  certain  conclusion 
as  final  for  that  time;  and  this  involves  volition.  In 
judgment  we  have  a  feeling,  and  a  volitional,  as  well  as  an 
intellective,  factor. 

§  92.  Cognition  is  characteristically  a  Thought  Process. 
—  The  process  is  a  process  of  feeling-directed  and  will- 
directed  intellection.  Practical  ends  beyond  the  present 
activity  are  often,  if  not  usually,  sought;   but  the  present 


214         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

activity  is  for  knowledge.  Therefore  we  speak  of  the  whole 
as  "  thought."  The  objective  world  is  realized  in  our 
consciousness  through  the  thought  factor  of  rational 
activity ;  the  reality  of  the  external  world  is  thus  ap- 
propriated by  us.  By  this  we  mean  that  what  the  world 
is  for  beings  that  are  intelligent  and  emotional  and  capable 
of  bringing  things  to  pass  —  all  this  becomes  ours  through 
that  factor  of  rational  activity  which  expresses  itself  in 
intellection.  For  this  reason  also,  we  call  cognition  a 
thought  process  when  we  wish  to  speak  of  it  in  general 
terms.  Hence,  when  we  use  the  term  "  thought "  in 
speaking  of  rational  activity,  it  is  not  to  be  taken  as  im- 
plying that  such  activity  is  a  purely  intellective  process ; 
on  the  contrary,  thinking  is  regarded  as  an  intellect-, 
feeling-,  and  will-directed  process. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

A    CONSTRUCTIVE    STUDY    OF    COGNITION 

(See  Chapters  XFI,  XVII,  XIX,  and  §  80) 

§  93.  Review.  —  Thus  far  in  our  study  of  Cognition, 
we  have  given  special  attention  to  the  consideration  of 
defective  views  and  inadequate  methods  which  have 
developed  in  the  course  of  philosophical  inquiry.  We 
discussed  Scepticism  and  found  it  to  be  inherently  self- 
contradictory,  as  well  as  untrue  to  experience.  From  this 
we  concluded  that  criticism  of  knowledge  always  assumes 
that  cognition  is  reliable,  even  when  the  criticism  expresses 
doubt  of  the  possibility  of  attaining  valid  knowledge ;  in 
other  words,  we  cannot  avoid  accepting  the  validity  of 
knowledge.  The  discussion  of  Solipsism  led  to  the  con- 
clusion that  Subjectivism  cannot  be  self-consistent,  except 
at  the  cost  of  denying  that  there  is  any  other  reality  for 
knowledge  than  the  individual  subject's  own  states  of  con- 
sciousness. As  a  consequence,  "the  Solipsist  refutes  him- 
self by  beginning  to  prove  his  doctrine  to  others ;  "  for 
he  recognizes  those  whom  he  addresses  as  real  and  thinks 
them  to  be  other  than  himself.  Hence,  the  world  of 
things,  events,  and  other  persons  with  which  we  have 
daily  commerce,  is  a  world  of  realities ;  and  these  realities 
are  not  mere  copies  or  material  embodiments  of  our  in- 
dividual states  of  consciousness. 

Phenomenalism  —  the  doctrine  that  we  know  only  ap- 
pearances —  was  our  next  study.  An  extended  consider- 
ation of  this  doctrine  led  us  to  conclude  that  appearances 

21S 


2i6         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

are  modes  in  which  reality  expresses  itself;  that  every 
appearance  is  a  true  expression  of  reality  in  certain 
relations ;  and  that,  in  knowing  appearance,  we  there- 
with know  reality.  In  our  study  of  Reality,  we  en- 
deavored to  discover  whether  a  cognitive  experience  is 
ever  an  experience  of  a  mere  particular  object,  also  whether 
it  is  ever  merely  the  experience  of  an  individual  subject. 
We  concluded  that  no  experience  is  ever  of  a  mere  par- 
ticular, that  a  universal  element  is  always  present;  and 
that  no  experience  of  any  subject  is  complete  apart  from 
the  w'hole  of  that  subject's  experience.  We  likewise  dis- 
covered that  no  subject  has  an  experience  which  is  entirely 
"  private  " ;  every  experience  of  each  of  us  has  that  in  it 
which  is  "  public."  There  is  in  every  experience  that  which 
is  common ;  that  is,  it  has  that  in  it  which  is  possible  ex- 
perience far  all  subjects,  that  which  is  actual  experience 
for  all  who  are  in  conscious  relation  to  the  same  objects. 

§  94.  The  Universal  in  Experience.  —  Our  present 
study  connects  immediately  with  the  fact  to  which  we 
reverted  at  the  close  of  the  last  section  —  the  fact  that 
every  experience  has  a  universal  element  in  it. 

If  a  number  of  subjects  —  say  five  —  look  at  the  moon, 
no  two  will  have  exactly  the  same  experience  in  all  details ; 
nevertheless  their  perceptions  will  so  far  agree  that,  if 
any  one  of  them  shall  speak  of  the  moon,  all  the  others  will 
know  what  he  means,  and  they  will  attach  the  same  gen- 
eral significance  to  what  he  says.  In  the  consciousness 
of  each  of  these  five  men,  there  is  that  which  is  common 
to  the  consciousness  of  all.  This  common  experience  re- 
specting the  moon  makes  it  possible  that  they  shall  have 
intelligent  intercourse  with  each  other  concerning  it. 
You  and  I  could  not  understand  each  other  if  it  were  not 
that  we  have  some  experience  in  common.  Whenever 
either  of  us  begins  to  speak  of  something  in  respect  of 


A  CONSTRUCTIVE  STUDY  OF  COGNITION     217 

which  the  other  has  had  no  definite  experience,  the  speaker 
can  only  be  understood  if  he  shall  connect  what  he  says 
with  the  previous  experience  of  the  hearer.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  we  do  understand  each  other.  We  hold  intelligent 
intercourse  about  the  world  of  happenings  and  per- 
sons and  things,  the  world  as  it  is  presented  to  us  in  sense- 
experience  ;  and  we  find  that  this  intercourse  is  dependable. 
If  you  make  statements  to  me  respecting  an  object,  state- 
ments which  are  the  result  of  a  critical  study  of  the  object, 
I  will  find  upon  trial  that  my  own  experience  with  it  will 
have  a  measure  of  agreement  with  yours. 

Our  previous  study  led  to  the  conclusion  (§  69)  that  the 
world  In  which  we  find  ourselves  and  with  which  we  have 
to  do,  is  not  a  projection  of  our  individual  consciousness. 
We  concluded  thus,  because  the  assumption  that  the  world 
which  I  perceive  is  a  projection  of  my  individual  conscious- 
ness, is  found  upon  examination  to  be  inherently  self- 
contradictory.  The  fact  of  experience  to  which  attention 
is  called  in  the  paragraph  preceding  this,  takes  us  a  step 
further.  That  fact  may  be  stated  thus  :  The  perception 
of  an  object  gives  a  common  thought-content  to  those 
perceiving  it.  It  follows  from  this  that  the  being  and 
meaning  of  the  object  perceived  are  not  dependent  upon 
the  individual  subject's  perception  of  it.  Your  experience 
in  respect  of  an  object  arises  from  your  being  related  to  it ; 
and  the  experience  of  other  subjects  arises  from  their 
being  related  to  it.  Since  you  and  they  acquire  a  common 
thought  from  perception  of  the  object,  it  must  be  that 
the  object  is  common  to  you  and  them.  It  is  truly  ob- 
jective. 

In  our  consideration  of  Appearance  and  Reality,  we 
discovered  that,  in  knowing  appearance,  we  therewith 
know  reality.  From  this  it  would  follow  that  the  common 
object  of  the  five  men  who  perceive  the  moon  is  an  ob- 


2i8        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

jective  reality.  This  objective  reality,  as  realized  in  the 
common  thought-content  of  those  who  perceive  —  e.g. 
the  moon  as  realized  in  what  is  common  to  the  experience 
of  all  who  perceive  it  —  is  trans-subjective  reality ;  and 
this  reality  is  known.     We  know  trans-subjective  reality. 

§  95.  Concepts  and  Objective  Reality. — A  study  of 
concepts  and  their  relation  to  reality  leads  to  the  same 
conclusion  as  that  reached  in  the  preceding  section. 

I.  An  Illustration.  —  We  apprehend  a  number  of  ani- 
mals as  having,  each  of  them,  four  legs,  a  wool  pelt,  like 
anatomical  particulars,  and  the  same  general  import  for 
thought  and  for  practical  life.  No  two  of  them  are  ex- 
actly the  same  in  all  particulars ;  but  all  of  them  have  the 
four  legs,  the  wool  pelt,  and  they  are  alike  in  certain  par- 
ticulars of  anatomy  and  in  respect  of  their  place  in  the 
world  and  their  relation  to  our  life.  Although  they  are 
distinguished  from  one  another  in  many  details,  in  their 
likenesses  and  their  significance  for  our  thought  and  our 
activity,  each  has  that  which  is  common  to  all.  Their 
common  import  for  our  thought  and  our  practical  life  — 
i.e.  the  idea  which  is  common  to  them  —  is  what  we  mean 
by  concept.  A  concept  is  the  idea  which  is  common  to  a 
number  of  objects. 

By  common  consent,  a  word  is  accepted  as  representing 
this  idea.  In  the  illustration  we  have  just  used,  that  word 
would  be  "  sheep  "  in  our  language ;  and  its  equivalent 
would  be  found  in  the  languages  of  all  peoples  who  have 
experience  with  such  animals.  This  word,  or  name,  helps 
to  fix  the  idea  and  makes  it,  the  idea,  available  for  thought 
and  intercourse.  The  word  is  the  conventional  symbol 
of  the  concept  and  is  often  called  a  concept.  For  ex- 
ample, the  word  "  sheep  "  would  be  frequently  spoken  of 
as  a  concept.  But  it  is  well  to  remember  that  the  common 
idea  or  meaning,  the  common  import  for  thought  and  activ- 


A  CONSTRUCTIVE  STUDY  OF  COGNITION      219 

ity,  Is  the  concept  proper ;  the  word  is  simply  the  spoken 
or  written  symbol  of  the  idea-concept. 

2.  A  Concept  is  a  Condensed  Judgment.  —  When  we 
group  a  number  of  objects  and  assign  them  a  common 
name,  we  judge  that  they  have  a  common  significance  for 
our  thought,  for  our  commerce  with  the  world  of  sensible 
objects,  and  for  our  intercourse  with  other  persons.  In 
fact,  as  we  shall  see  just  below,  a  concept  is  generally, 
if  not  always,  the  result  of  many  judgments.  The  word 
by  which  we  designate  it,  is  the  expression  in  language  of 
this  concentrated  judgment.  It  is  thus  language  has  de- 
veloped. Even  proper  names  had  at  first  a  meaning  and 
use  beyond  the  mere  designation  of  the  individual  person 
or  thing;  they  were  significant  of  some  attribute  of,  or 
some  circumstance  respecting,  the  person  or  thing.  Thus, 
Jacob  meant  "  supplanter  "  and  was  thought  to  express 
a  personal  characteristic ;  similarly  Esau  signified  "  hairy" 
and  was  given  him  because  of  his  hirsute  appearance. 
Among  primitive  peoples  names  express  judgments  re- 
specting the  persons  or  things  named.  This  is  exemplified 
in  the  name  which  the  natives  of  Central  Africa  gave 
Stanley  —  Bula  Matari,  breaker  of  rocks.  It  occurs  with 
us  to-day  in  the  naming  of  places  and  things ;  e.g.  Bridal 
Veil  Falls,  Hell  Gate,  Bartholdi  Statue.  The  connecting 
of  characteristics  with  objects  is  an  act  of  judgment. 
We  have  seen  above  that  concepts  arise  thus.  In  reality, 
every  concept  is  the  result  of  a  series  of  judgments.  The 
concept  "  man  "  is  for  you  and  me  an  idea  which  includes 
many  particulars,  all  those  characteristics  which  we  take 
to  be  common  to  all  men ;  and  each  of  these  particulars 
comes  of  a  separate  judgment. 

3.  Dependence  of  Thought  on  Concepts.  —  We  employ 
concepts  in  all  cognitive  activity.  Take  for  example  a 
simple  perception,  the  perception  that  a  certain  flower 


220         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Is  a  rose.  It  would  be  stated  thus :  That  Is  a  rose.  The 
Ideas  expressed  by  "  that  "  and  "  rose  "  are  concepts. 
"  That "  Is  notably  general.  It  expresses  the  Idea  of 
objective  specification  and  Is  applicable  to  any  specified 
object.  It  Is  common  to  all  specified  objects.  "  Rose  " 
is  an  Idea  common  to  a  certain  group  of  plants  or  flowers, 
according  as  It  Is  used  with  the  more  general  botanical,  or 
the  less  general  floral,  significance.  Thought,  as  activity 
which  seeks  meaning,  Is  effected  through  concepts.  Kant 
recognizes  this.  He  says,  "  All  thought  Is  nothing  but 
conception  by  means  of  concepts."  This  Is  true  of  per- 
ception as  well  as  reflective  thought.  "  Perception  with- 
out conception  Is  blind."  Since  concepts  are  condensed 
judgments,  many  of  the  commonest  being  the  concen- 
tration of  many  judgments.  If  follows  that  thought  and 
concepts  develop  together. 

4.  Dependence  of  Thought  and  Concepts  on  Each  Other. — • 
An  examination  of  experience  makes  It  evident  that  con- 
cepts and  thought  are  dependent  upon  each  other  and  de- 
velop together.  It  Is  seen  In  individual  experience.  When 
we  first  became  conscious  of  ourselves  and  the  world,  our 
stock  of  Ideas  was  very  meagre.  During  the  earlier  period 
of  our  life,  preceding  our  entering  school,  we  were  con- 
stantly enlarging  our  knowledge  of  objects,  our  grasp  of 
their  import ;  that  is,  our  concepts  were  developing.  This 
augmentation  of  our  stock  of  concepts  continued  through 
all  our  student  life  and  will  not  cease  until  our  mental 
vigor  begins  to  decline.  It  Is  manifestly  true  of  the  race. 
The  Intellectual  development  of  any  people  Is  attended  and 
effected  by  their  acquirement  of  new  concepts.  Some 
of  those  more  lately  developed  will  be  recognized  In  the 
following  word  symbols  :  "  automobile,"  "  aeroplane," 
"  wireless."  Each  of  these  concepts  embodies  thought. 
Not  only  are  new  concepts  developed ;   but  the  concepts 


A  CONSTRUCTIVE  STUDY  OF  COGNITION      221 

themselves  develop  significance  with  enlarging  experience 
and  thought.  When  the  child  first  appropriated  the  idea 
which  we  express  by  the  word  "  school,"  the  concept  did 
not  have  so  full  a  content  as  it  did  after  he  became  a 
pupil ;  and  it  has  a  much  larger  content  to  the  young  man 
graduating  from  college  than  to  the  same  student  while 
in  his  preparatory  course.  When  Morse  sent  his  first 
message,  "  telegraphy  "  meant  much  less  than  it  does  to- 
day. They  mistake  who  speak  of  concepts  as  imprisoning 
or  petrifying  thought ;  on  the  contrary,  concepts  are  the 
product  of  the  life  of  thought,  and  they  are  essential  to  the 
being  and  development  of  the  thought-life. 

5.  The  Ground  of  the  Concept.  —  Objects  which  differ 
in  detail  are  apprehended  as  having  likeness  in  appearance 
and  in  significance  for  life  activities.  The  concept  is  the 
common  idea,  or  import,  of  the  objects  which  exhibit 
such  likeness ;  and  it  is  objectively  expressed  in  the  char- 
acteristics common  to  these  objects.  For  example,  the 
concept  which  has  its  linguistic  expression  in  the  word 
"  sheep,"  has  objective  expression  in  the  characteristics 
which  are  common  to  the  animals  thus  grouped  and  named. 
So  with  other  concepts.  The  ground  of  the  concept,  or 
common  import,  of  a  number  of  objects  will  be  the  same 
with  the  ground  of  likeness  of  appearance  or  characteristics 
of  these  objects.  What,  then,  is  the  ground  of  likeness,  or 
phenomenal  oneness,  of  the  objects  of  which  a  concept 
is  the  common  idea  .^  The  characteristics  of  an  appearance 
express  the  nature  of  the  reality  that  appears ;  and  like- 
ness in  appearance  implies  likeness  in  nature  of  the  reali- 
ties which  appear.  Phenomenal  oneness,  or  likeness,  of 
objects  must  be  grounded  in  oneness  of  nature,  in  oneness 
of  reality.  These  objects  are  embodiments  of  a  common 
reality.  Concepts  are  objectively  grounded  in  the  com- 
mon reality  of  objects. 


222         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

We  have  found  that  the  objective  ground  of  a  concept 
is  the  common  reality  of  the  objects  to  which  it  is  appli- 
cable. But  we  have  not  fully  answered  our  question ; 
for  there  is  no  concept  without  thought,  and  the  concept 
must  be  subjectively  grounded.  It  has  its  subjective 
ground  in  the  cognitive  activity  of  the  subject.  This 
has  become  evident  in  our  discussion  of  "  The  Concept 
as  Condensed  Judgment "  and  "  The  Dependence  of 
Thought  and  Concept  on  each  other."  So  much,  then, 
for  the  concept  as  idea:  it  has  Its  origin  In  cognition  of 
objective  reality  which  Is  common  to  a  number  of  objects. 

We  now  seek  the  ground  of  the  word-concept.  The 
word  "  oak  "  is  the  speech  symbol  of  the  idea-concept 
which  is  grounded  objectively  in  the  reality  which  is 
common  to  all  trees  of  that  class.  This  idea  has  come 
into  our  experience  In  our  cognition  of  this  common  ob- 
jective reality.  But  this  word  "  oak  "  passes  current  in 
intellectual  intercourse ;  and  It  passes  current,  because 
the  object  which  It  names  has,  in  some  measure,  the  same 
import  for  all  who  have  had  experience  with  it.  It  is 
accepted  and  used  for  the  expression  of  thought,  because 
men  have  acquired  a  common  thought-content  in  their 
experience  with  reality  which  is  common  to  a  number  of 
like  objects.  We  have  seen  (§  94)  that  such  a  common 
element  in  experience  comes  of  cognition  of  trans-sub- 
jective reality  —  reality  which  Is  object  for  all  subjects. 
From  this  it  follows  that  word-concepts  are  grounded  in 
knowledge  of  trans-subjective  reality.  They  testify  to 
the  fact  that  we  have  such  knowledge ;  for  they  owe  their 
being  to  it. 

§  96.  *'  Identity  in  Difference."  —  In  the  last  section,  we 
recognized  that  the  individual  animals  classed  as  "  sheep  " 
differ  in  particulars ;  no  two  of  them  are  identical  in  all 
respects.     Now,  if  their  likeness  in  appearance  comes  of 


A  CONSTRUCTIVE  STUDY  OF  COGNITION      223 

their  being  expressions  of  a  common  reality,  how  is  it  that 
such  differences  appear  ?  Would  not  their  identity  in 
nature  demand  identity  in  characteristics  ?  This  raises  a 
question  as  to  whether  identity  and  difference  are  incom- 
patible and  hence  mutually  exclusive.  We  give  it  a  brief 
discussion  here  because  of  its  bearing  on  our  conception  of 
the  relation  of  knowledge  of  an  object  to  the  object  known. 

1.  What  Identity  Signifies. — The  term  "identity" 
is  confessedly  ambiguous,  and  much  confusion  has  arisen 
from  its  use;  but  we  cannot  avoid  employing  this  term 
and  the  kindred  term  "  same,"  despite  the  ambiguity 
which  attaches  to  them.  "  Identity  "  sometimes  signifies 
"  individual  sameness  "  —  as  when  we  say  of  two  men, 
"  They  attended  the  same  college."  In  "the  same  college" 
we  have  numerical  identity,  an  instance  of  a  single  object 
which  is  the  same  with  itself.  But,  if  one  should  say 
of  the  same  men,  "  They  have  the  same  mode  of  thought," 
the  statement  would  express  "  distinguishable  likeness  " 
in  two  objects  —  the  modes  of  thought  of  the  two  men. 
When  we  speak  of  the  identity  of  reality,  or  nature,  in 
all  "  sheep,"  it  is  obvious  that  we  do  not  mean  that  the 
same  individual  real  is  in  all;  we  simply  affirm  likeness 
of  reality  in  all.  However  much  sounds  may  differ,  every 
sound  is  a  sound,  whether  it  be  the  filing  of  a  saw  or  the 
singing  of  a  mocking-bird.  In  respect  of  their  likeness, 
they  are  the  same,  they  have  identity ;  for  they  are,  all 
of  them,  sounds.  So  always  with  what  is  common  to 
any  group  of  particulars,  i.e.  with  universals.  Thus  the 
apple  and  the  peach  are  rosacece  (of  the  rose  family) ;  they 
and  the  common  rose  have  likeness  which  the  botanist 
recognizes.  To  that  extent  they  are  identical  with  each 
other  and  with  the  common  rose.  We  regard  those  objects 
as  identical  which  present  distinguishable  likeness. 

2.  Concrete    Identity    is    "  Identity    in    Difference.^^  — 


224        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

We  know,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  the  particulars  of  every 
group  present  differences.  We  are  conscious  of  self- 
identity;  this  is  for  each  of  us  indubitable.  But  in  my 
consciousness  of  self,  I  have  experience  of  identity  through 
differencing  changes.  Your  consciousness  of  your  own 
identity  is  of  an  identical  self  that  is  different  from  your 
former  self.  There  cannot  be  experience  of  identity  apart 
from  difference;  for  identity  can  only  be  apprehended 
when  different  terms  or  relations  are  compared.  The 
Secretary  of  State  says,  "  That  is  the  pen  with  which  the 
bill  was  signed."  In  this  statement  he  affirms  identity; 
but  he  also  implicates  difference  —  a  difference  in  time 
relation  and  a  difference  in  that  the  pen  is  not  now  being 
used  for  that  purpose.  The  identity  is  identity  in  dif- 
ference ;  and  it  is  in  the  contrast  that  the  identity  gets  its 
significance.  There  cannot  be  any  bare  distinctionless 
identity;  for  identity  is  a  relation,  and  there  can  be  no 
relation  except  between  different  terms.  Hejice  reality 
is  unity  in  diversity ;  and  the  reality  common  to  a  group 
includes  both  the  likenesses  and  differences  of  the  in- 
dividuals which  embody  it.  What  we  are  here  insisting 
upon  —  that  identity  is  always  "  identity  in  difference  " 
—  is  conceded  by  most,  if  not  all,  philosophical  writers 
of  the  present. 

3.  "  Identity  in  Difference "  of  Knowledge  and  the 
Object.  —  We  have  said  that  experience  is  the  realization 
of  the  object  as  content  of  consciousness  ;  that  the  object, 
as  somewhat  which  has  import  for  the  subject,  is  realized 
in  the  subject.  That  being  true,  we  may  affirm  the  identity 
of  knowledge  of  an  object  and  the  object.  Our  individual 
and  finite  knowledge  is,  to  be  sure,  incomplete  and  im- 
perfect ;  but  there  is,  in  this  incomplete  knowledge,  some 
appropriation  of  the  reality  of  the  object,  and  our  knowl- 
edge and  the  object  are  to  that  extent  identical.      Liszt 


A  CONSTRUCTIVE  STUDY  OF  COGNITION      225 

had  a  remarkable  conception  of  the  reality  embodied  in 
the  piano,  of  its  significance  for  thought  and  feeling  and 
will.  The  extent  to  which  this  was  realized  in  him,  was 
the  extent  of  his  knowledge  of  the  piano ;  and,  in  that  re- 
spect, his  knowledge  was  identical  with  its  object.  But 
while  it  is  identical  with,  it  is  also  other  than,  and  different 
from,  its  object.  Cognitive  experience  is  a  consciousness 
of  "  identity  in  difference  "  of  knowledge  and  object. 

§  97.  The  Particulars  of  Experience  are  organically 
Related.  —  If  this  be  true,  it  follows  that  the  factors  of 
cognition  are  organically  related,  for  cognition  is  a  process 
in  consciousness. 

I.  Characteristics  of  Organic,  as  distinguished  from 
Mechanical,  Relatedness.  —  A  mechanical  whole  —  as  a 
machine  or  a  brick  wall  —  is  constituted  by  putting  its 
parts  together.  We  have  the  parts  before  we  have  the 
whole,  and  we  construct  the  whole  by  combining  the  parts. 
The  construction  is  accomplished  by  a  man  or  some  men ; 
i.e.  by  what  is  other  than  the  whole.  In  the  constitution 
of  an  organism,  —  as  a  plant  or  an  animal, —  a  radically 
different  procedure  presents  itself.  The  parts  of  an  or- 
ganism are  constituted  in  and  through  the  whole ;  and  this 
is  true  of  an  organism  in  all  stages  of  its  existence.  The 
trunk,  the  branch,  the  leaf,  the  bud,  and  the  flower  are 
products  of  the  activity  of  the  whole.  So  with  the  parts 
of  the  body. 

Organic  activity  is  developmental.  The  full-grown 
plant,  in  its  typical  and  essential  characteristics,  is  the 
realization  of  what  was  implicit  in  it  from  the  beginning. 
Thus,  an  oak  and  a  horse  are,  in  their  typical  characteristics, 
the  developed  expression  of  what  was  implicit  in  the  cells 
from  which  they  sprang.  The  reality  in  the  original  cell 
of  an  organism  comes  to  explicit  embodiment  by  an  inner 
and  developmental  process.     The  oak  itself  determines 

Q 


226         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  being  and  typical  characteristics  of  its  parts.  So  the 
unit  whole,  i.e.  the  organism,  determines  the  being  and  the 
character  of  the  parts;  and,  in  so  doing,  it  reveals  its 
own  character.  In  respect  of  the  way  in  which  they  are 
constituted  and  of  the  relation  of  the  whole  to  the  parts, 
the  organic  and  the  mechanical  diifer  radically.  As 
mechanically  conceived,  an  object  is  constructed  from 
without  and  according  to  an  ideal  which  is  external  to 
the  incomplete  object.  As  organically  conceived,  an  ob- 
ject is  developed  through  the  activity  of  the  object;  and 
it  is  at  every  stage  the  expression  of  an  ideal  which  is 
implicit  in  the  object. 

If  we  wish  to  make  an  intelligent  statement  as  to  how  a 
machine  is  constituted,  we  may  begin  with  the  parts. 
By  noting  the  significance  of  the  various  parts  for  the  ma- 
chine and  the  purpose  it  is  to  serve,  we  shall  be  able  to 
obtain  a  conception  of  the  machine.  But  this  is  not  the 
logical  procedure  in  the  instance  of  a  plant  or  an  animal. 
We  cannot  give  a  satisfactory  account  of  the  genesis  of 
a  plant  by  beginning  with  its  developed  parts,  for  the  plant 
itself  constitutes  the  parts.  If  we  sum  up  the  various 
parts  of  a  plant,  we  will  not  have  the  living  plant;  for 
we  shall  yet  lack  that  unitary  whole  by  reason  of  which 
the  parts  have  their  being  and  typical  characteristics. 

The  primary  reality  in  an  organism  is  protoplasm,  the 
physical  basis  of  life.  Most,  if  not  all,  biologists  are 
unready  to  speak  of  protoplasm  as  organized,  because  the 
term  "organized"  is  reserved  by  them  for  what  is,  by 
ordinary  vision  or  with  the  aid  of  a  microscope,  percep- 
tibly constituted  of  differing  parts  each  of  which  has 
its  own  office.  But  all  agree  that  it  is  complex,  not  simple. 
If  this  complex  be  broken  up,  we  no  longer  have  what  will 
develop  into  an  organism.  It  is  the  primary  reality  in 
organisms.     We  cannot  tell  how  the  elements  of  this  com- 


A  CONSTRUCTIVE  STUDY  OF  COGNITION     227 

plex  when  thus  combined,  constitute  what  will,  under 
proper  conditions,  develop  into  a  plant  or  animal.  For 
a  description  of  the  processes  by  which  organisms  come  to 
be,  this  complex  reality  is  a  primary  and  irresoluble  reality. 

2.  All  Particulars  of  Experience  are  constituted  by  and 
in  the  experiencing  Self.  —  The  particulars  of  your  experi- 
ence —  your  judgments,  memories,  images,  emotions, 
purposes  —  are  not  made  ready  apart  from  you  and  then 
imparted  to  you.  On  the  contrary,  they  come  to  be 
through  your  activity  in  your  commerce  with  objects. 
Their  origin  and  their  relation  to  you,  as  an  experiencing 
self,  are  radically  different  in  kind  from  the  origin  of  the 
parts  of  a  machine  and  the  relation  of  the  parts  to  the  ma- 
chine. The  origin  and  relations  of  the  particulars  of  your 
experience  are  of  a  kind  with  the  origin  and  relations  of  the 
parts  of  an  organism  to  the  organism.  The  parts  come  to 
be  through  the  interrelated  activity  of  the  plant  and  its  en- 
vironment; just  so  the  particulars  of  the  experience  of 
each  of  us  come  to  be  through  the  interrelated  activity 
of  each  of  us  and  our  individual  environment.  Any  selected 
experience,  also  every  selected  part  of  an  experience,  is 
organically  related  to  the  self,  and  to  all  the  particulars 
of  that  self's  experience. 

The  subject  develops  his  potential  reality  in  experience 
(§  59>  5)-  We  come  to  consciousness  of  self  only  in  our 
experience  of  what  is  other  than  self.  This  is  the  law  of 
self-consciousness :  one  is  conscious  of  self  only  as  he  is 
conscious  of  some  object.  It  is  in  experience,  with  its 
duality  of  aspect,  that  self-consciousness  develops.  But 
self-consciousness  is  an  essential  element  of  subject  reality ; 
and  it  is  through  experience  that  we  come  to  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  reality  which  is  implicit  in  us.  We  are  rational ; 
and  we  too  often  think  we  have  spoken  the  whole  truth 
when  we  say  that,  being  rational,  it  is   possible  that  we 


228         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

should  know.  But  it  is  also  true  that  we  develop  our 
rationality  in  experience.  Without  experience  we  would 
not  be  actually  rational ;  and,  if  we  were  not  implicitly 
rational,  we  could  not  have  human  experience.  Further, 
it  is  in  our  experience  of  persons  that  we  come  to  know 
that  we  are  persons,  not  things.  The  apprehended  dis- 
tinction between  persons  and  things  and  the  consciousness 
that  we  are  persons,  and  quite  other  than  things,  develop 
together.  This  development  makes  explicit  what  was 
implicit  in  the  subject,  and  it  is  effected  through  the  im- 
manent activity  of  the  subject.  A  process  in  which  what 
was  implicit  is  thus  realized,  is  an  organic  process ;  it  is 
of  a  kind  with  what  we  perceive  in  the  development  of 
organisms. 

Experience  also  reveals  its  organic  character  in  this, 
that  we  cannot  obtain  a  satisfactory  account  of  it  by 
studying  its  factors  apart  from  each  other,  and  thus  apart 
from  the  experience  as  a  whole.  We  have  learned  that,  if 
we  undertake  to  find  knowledge  in  the  psychical  and  phys- 
ical factors  regarded  apart  from  each  other,  the  attempt 
ends  in  failure.  Reflective  thought  cannot  discover  the 
cognitive  experience  in  these  processes  or  factors,  abstracted 
from  the  experience.  We  may  find  the  factors  in  the  ex- 
perience, but  not  the  experience  in  the  factors.  We  have 
simply  to  accept  knowledge  as  a  primary  irresoluble  fact ; 
in  this  respect,  we  have  to  accept  it  much  the  same  as  the 
unreflective  accept  it.  These  facts  support  our  conten- 
tion that  the  particulars  of  experience  are  not  mechan- 
ically related,  and  that  cognition  is  an  organic  process  and 
knowledge  is  an  organic  product. 

§  98.  Conclusions ;  Questions.  —  In  closing  this  con- 
structive study,  we  restate  some  of  the  more  important 
conclusions,  and  suggest  answers  to  certain  questions  of 
fundamental  import. 


A  CONSTRUCTIVE  STUDY  OF  COGNITION       229 

1 .  Conclusions  Restated.  —  Our  constructive  considera- 
tion of  cognition  leads  to  conclusions  which  are  in  full 
agreement  with  what  we  discovered  in  our  earlier  study 
of  experience  (Chap.  XV)  and  our  examination  of  de- 
fective theories  of  knowledge.  Concrete  experience  is 
complex,  however  simple  and  primary  the  experience 
may  be.  It  is  unitary ;  but  its  unity  is  the  unity  of  diverse 
particulars,  the  coherence  of  differents.  Any  selected 
whole  of  experience  presents  duality  of  aspect;  and  to 
separate  the  subjective  from  the  objective.  Is  to  destroy 
the  experience.  We  have  to  accept  the  validity  of  the 
conviction  that  the  world  of  persons  and  things  and  oc- 
currences is  real,  and  that  the  objects  of  that  world  are 
not  dependent  upon  our  individual  perception  for  their 
being  and  meaning.  We  do  not  constitute  the  objects 
of  that  world,  neither  do  we  constitute  the  relations  In 
which  we  perceive  them.  We  apprehend  the  objects  in 
their  relations,  and  our  knowledge  Is  our  report  respecting 
the  objects  and  their  relations.  We  know  them  as  they 
appear.  Their  appearance  is  the  expression  of  the  reality 
—  i.e.  of  the  nature  —  of  the  objects;  hence  our  knowl- 
edge is  knowledge  of  objective  reality. 

2.  Questions.  —  We  have  found  that  the  subject  and 
the  object  are  organically  related.  The  subject  is  other 
than  the  object,  and  the  object  other  than  the  subject; 
nevertheless  they  are  Indissolubly  united  in  knowledge. 
These  conclusions  raise  questions  which  call  for  answer. 

(i)  Some  have  asked  how  it  is  possible  that  mind  and 
object  should  be  thus  Intimately  related,  seeing  that  the 
object  remains  other  than  the  mind.  Or,  the  query  may 
be  stated  thus,  How  is  it  that  mind,  which  is  unextended, 
apprehends  what  is  apart  from  the  subject  ^  We  frankly 
confess  that  we  do  not  know  how  the  mind  becomes  con- 
scious of  the  object;    but  we  know  that  It  does  become 


230         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

aware  of  it.  All  experience  testifies  to  this,  for  there  is 
no  experience  in  which  there  is  not  awareness  of  an  object ; 
and,  in  addition  to  this,  we  have  shown  that  we  know 
trans-subjective  reality.  This  question  is,  in  effect,  a 
demand  to  be  shown  what  constitutes  the  subject  a 
thinking-feeling-willing  self;  it  is  a  request  that  we  indi- 
cate what  gives  the  mind  capacity  for  determining  the 
meaning  and  value  of  things,  events,  and  persons.  The 
only  possible  reply  is  that  experience  yields  the  fact  that 
mind  does  just  this ;  experience  itself  comes  of  this  func- 
tioning of  the  mind. 

(2)  Although  the  question  just  considered  cannot  be 
answered  in  the  terms  in  which  it  is  stated,  something  re- 
mains to  be  said  respecting  the  ability  of  the  mind  to 
apprehend  what  is  other  than  the  mind.  In  the  beginning 
of  our  study,  we  assumed  that  the  universe  is  intelligible. 
This  is  an  inevitable  presupposition  if  our  thinking  shall 
settle  anything.  To  begin  with  denying  intelligibility  to 
the  universe,  would  be  to  invalidate  our  conclusions  pre- 
vious to  entering  upon  study.  Neither  can  we  leave  the 
question  open ;  for  the  study  of  experience  assumes  that 
the  world  which  is  presented  to  us  in  experience,  may  be 
understood  and  will  give  response  to  intelligent  inquiry. 
This  presupposition  is  also  justified  by  experience.  The 
predictions  of  Science,  —  e.g.  of  eclipses  and  comets  by 
Astronomy,  and  of  reactions  by  Chemistry,  —  the  cer- 
tainty which  attends  our  every-day  activities,  all  advance 
in  knowledge,  and  the  great  body  of  indubitable  facts 
which  are  in  the  possession  of  the  race,  all  testify  that  the 
universe  is  intelligible.  The  universe  as  a  whole  and 
persons,  things,  and  events  have  meaning  and  value. 

We  hold  that  both  subject  and  object  contribute  to 
the  knowledge  of  an  object.  We  have  also  insisted  that 
the  reality  of  an  object  only  comes  to  expression  in  the 


A  CONSTRUCTIVE  STUDY  OF  COGNITION      231 

subject-object  relation.  In  illustration  and  enforcement 
of  this  last  statement,  attention  was  called  to  the  fact 
that  color,  sound,  taste,  etc.,  are  not,  and  cannot  be, 
wholly  objective.  The  color  of  the  violet,  the  acid  of  the 
vinegar,  the  perfume  of  the  rose,  and  the  tone  of  the  violin 
come  to  realization  only  when  they  are  objects  for  a  subject. 
It  would  seem,  then,  that  when  you  see  a  flower,  hear  a 
bell,  taste  an  orange,  or  feel  cloth,  you  contribute  some- 
thing to  the  perception.  But  this  is  not  all.  If  knowledge 
be  an  indissoluble  union  of  subjective  and  objective  ele- 
ments, it  follows  that  the  subject  contributes  to  knowledge. 
These  facts  make  it  necessary  that  we  determine  whether 
the  subject's  contribution  to  knowledge  introduces  an 
element  which  is  foreign  to  the  object.  If  it  should  in- 
troduce anything  foreign,  that  foreign  element  would 
vitiate  the  report  which  knowledge  gives  of  the  object. 

We  grant  that  the  knowing  activity  of  any  finite  indi- 
vidual is  imperfect;  our  knowledge  is  certainly  incom- 
plete, and  much  of  it  calls  for  correction.  But  the  ques- 
tion before  us  concerns  the  knowing  act  as  such,  and  not  our 
finiteness  and  imperfection.  The  question  is  not.  Does 
my  imperfection,  my  finiteness,  so  affect  my  knowing  as 
to  render  my  knowledge  of  an  object  imperfect  t  This 
is  the  question,  Is  there  in  the  knowing  act  as  such  that 
which  introduces  into  the  knowledge  of  an  object  what  is 
foreign  to  the  object  ?  In  answering  this  inquiry,  we  revert 
to  our  initial  assumption :  that  the  universe  is  intelligible. 
If  the  universe  Is  intelligible  (and,  in  consequence,  the 
objects  in  the  world-system),  it  must  be  because  the  modes 
in  which  objective  reality  reveals  its  nature  are  at  one 
with  the  laws  of  the  mind's  functioning.  If  the  mind  should 
function  after  one  order  and  objective  reality  should 
express  its  nature  after  another  order,  the  world  would 
not   give   intelligent    response   to   the   mind's   inquiries. 


232         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

That  the  order  of  rational  activity  and  modes  of  object- 
expression  are  at  one,  is  really  implicate  in  our  funda- 
mental and  inevitable  assumption.  And  we  repeat  here 
the  contention  which  we  urged  above :  The  experience  of 
man  at  large  shows  that  the  assumption  Is  accordant  with 
actuality.  Since  the  mind  functions  after  an  order  which 
is  identical  with  that  of  the  object's  expression,  the  judg- 
ments of  the  mind  respecting  the  object  are  one  with  the 
modes  of  the  object.  Mind  does  not  contribute  to  knowl- 
edge any  element  which  is  foreign  to  the  object. 

(3)  We  have  insisted  upon  the  distinct  "  otherness  " 
of  subject  and  object.  Now,  if  the  object  be  distinctly 
"  other  "  than  the  subject,  how  can  they  come  Into  the 
intimate  relation  indicated  by  the  term  "  organic  "  f 
We  reply  that  they  can,  because  the  subject  is  the  com- 
plementary "  other  "  of  the  object,  and  the  object  is  the 
complementary  "  other "  of  the  subject.  Instead  of 
thrusting  each  other  away  or  holding  each  other  at  a  dis- 
tance, each  is  essential  to  the  other.  Experience  is  neces- 
sary to  the  development  of  the  subject.  The  personality 
implicit  in  each  of  us  at  birth  becomes  explicit  through 
experience,  through  commerce  with  objects,  and  only  thus  ; 
that  is,  we  come  to  our  own  through  intercourse  with  the 
objective  world.  On  the  other  hand,  the  object  needs 
the  subject  for  the  actualizing  of  its  potential  reality.  The 
instrument  is  dumb  if  it  be  untouched  by  the  musician ; 
and  this  is  true  of  those  objects  which  we  call  "  natural." 
Their  perfume,  color,  strength,  potential  usefulness,  and 
beauty  are  for  a  subject;  and  their  nature  cannot  find  its 
complete  expression  apart  from  a  subject.  The  object 
exists  for  the  subject  as  the  subject  does  not  for  the  object. 
The  object  as  such  does  not  know  the  subject,  but  is  known 
by  the  subject ;  it  does  not  relate  itself  to  the  subject,  but 
is  related  by  the  subject.       The  object  is  not  dependent 


A  CONSTRUCTIVE  STUDY  OF  COGNITION      233 

upon  the  individual  subject  for  its  being  and  nature ; 
it  has  a  being  that  is  its  own.  But  the  object  finds  its 
completion  only  as  mind  directs  both  the  use  of  the  object 
and  its  own  activity  in  keeping  with  the  activity  of  the 
ultimate  reality,  and  thus  in  keeping  with  the  fundamental 
order  of  the  universe.  The  world  of  persons  and  things 
and  events  in  which  we  find  ourselves,  is  a  universe  of 
objective  reals ;  and  the  world  we  know  and  with  which 
we  have  commerce,  is  this  objective  world  of  reality. 


DIVISION  B :  THE  CATEGORIES  AND 
REALITY;  ONTOLOGY 

CHAPTER  XXIV 

GENERAL  VIEW  OF  THE  CATEGORIES 

§  99.  Introductory.  —  You  think  of  a  house  as  occupy- 
ing space,  of  a  train  as  arriving  at  a  certain  time,  of  a 
table  as  larger  than  a  hat,  of  an  orange  as  yellow,  of 
velvet  as  soft  and  marble  as  hard,  and  of  a  fire  or  an  ex- 
plosion as  having  a  cause,  of  a  man  running  as  having 
a  purpose  in  so  doing.  To  make  this  more  general,  objects 
as  thought  of  by  you  are  set  in  space,  they  have  quality 
and  they  exist  in  quantity;  events  are  thought  by  you 
to  be  caused ;  and  in  your  conception  of  objects  they  are 
regarded  as  related  to  one  another  in  position,  order  of 
occurrence,  by  comparison  of  quantity  or  value,  or  other- 
wise. That  is,  our  thought  of  objects  sets  them  in  space 
and  time ;  it  ascribes  to  them  quality,  quantity,  motion, 
rest,  cause,  etc. ;  and  it  relates  them  to  one  another.  We 
also  think  of  persons  as  having  motives,  as  acting  with 
purpose,  and  as  seeking  ends. 

Space,  time,  quantity,  quality,  relation,  and  purpose 
are  obviously  not  things ;  neither  are  they  persons  or 
events.  They  are.  modes  according  to  which  we  think 
of  things,  events,  and  persons.  We  cannot  form  an  image 
of  space,  time,  or  relation  as  such;  but  the  notion  of  space 
is  always  present  in  our  thought  of  sensible  objects  ;  and 
the  notion  of  time  is  present  in  our  thought  of  changes 
or   events.     Similarly  with  respect  to  quality,    quantity, 

234 


GENERAL  VIEW  OF  THE   CATEGORIES      235 

relation,  change,  permanence,  cause,  etc. ;  we  cannot 
image  them  by  themselves.  They  are  notions,  or  pure 
conceptions.  To  repeat  what  we  have  already  said,  these 
notions  are  present  in  our  thought  of  what  is  existent. 

Since  the  unit  of  thought  is  a  judgment,  we  may  speak 
of  these  notions  as  general  forms,  or  modes,  of  judgment. 
These  conceptions,  or  general  forms  of  judgments,  are 
known  as  Categories ;  and,  for  the  present,  we  may  de- 
scribe the  Categories  as  modes  in  which  Being  is  thought 
of,  or  modes  in  which  reality  is  known.  This  may  be  ac- 
cepted as  a  provisional  definition  of  them.  Our  purpose 
in  the  study  of  these  elements  of  experience  is  to  discover 
what  information  they  may  yield  as  to  the  nature  of 
Reality. 

§  100.  Historical.  —  i.  Aristotle  recognized  the  fact 
that  there  are  general  modes  in  which  men  thinkof  objects, 
and  he  introduced  this  conception  and  the  term  "  cate- 
gory "  into  Western  Philosophy.  The  Greek  term  used 
by  him,  from  which  we  have  the  word  "  category,"  had 
been  previously  used  to  signify  an  accusation;  but  in  his 
use  of  it,  the  word  acquired  a  philosophical  reference. 
Interpreters  of  Aristotle  have  differed  as  to  the  significance 
he  attached  to  this  concept.  Is  a  category  for  him  merely 
a  general  mode  in  which  we  think  of  objects .?  That  is, 
Is  it  wholly  of  the  thinker  and,  hence,  purely  subjective  ? 
Did  he  regard  the  categories  merely  as  modes  of  thought, 
modes  to  which  the  subject  is  shut  up,  and  so  leave  it  an 
open  question  as  to  whether  Being  is  itself  thus  limited, 
or  determined }  We  agree  with  those  who  hold  that 
Aristotle  conceived  the  categories  (i)  As  general  modes 
in  which  Being  is  limited,  or  determined,  as  an  object  of 
thought ;  and  (2)  As  general  modes  "  in  which  Being  may 
be  expressed."  With  him,  quantity,  quality,  relation, 
place,   time,   etc.,   are    not    merely    forms    which    limit 


236         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

thought.  They  do  not  simply  determine  how  the  subject 
shall  think;  they  are  also  modes  in  which  Being  mani- 
fests itself.  They  are  not  merely  subjective  modes, 
but  are  also  modes  of  objective  reality.  The  Stoics, 
Plotinus,  and  Augustine  utilized  the  conception  of  the 
category;  but  for  some  time  previous  to  Kant  it  had 
virtually  dropped  out  of  philosophical  discussion.  He 
restored  it  to  reflective  thought;  and  part  of  the  large 
and  valuable  inheritance  which  he  bequeathed  to  students 
of  Philosophy  is  his  demonstration  of  the  importance  of 
this  conception.  This  much  must  be  granted,  even 
though  we  are  forced  to  conclude  that  his  doctrine  of  the 
categories  is  defective. 

2.  Kant.  —  To  give  a  full  account  of  Kant's  doctrine 
of  the  categories  would  virtually  require  the  presentation 
of  the  entire  Kantian  philosophy.  So  full  a  discussion, 
however,  is  not  necessary  since  it  is  our  purpose  merely 
to  relate  his  conception  of  the  categories  to  reality.  What 
is  given  in  §  44,  2  and  3,  and  the  partial  statement  which 
follows,  will  suffice.  Kant  held  that  the  space  and  time 
elements  of  experience  are  forms  which  the  sensibility 
gives  to  the  material  of  knowledge  which  is  furnished  by 
the  senses  ;  and  the  understanding  contributes  the  quantity, 
quality,  relation,  and  other  non-sensational  elements.  The 
categories  were  conceived  by  him  to  be  modes  of  the 
understanding,  —  i.e.  forms  of  the  conceiving  or  judging 
activity ;  because  he  held  that  the  understanding  is  the 
faculty  of  conception,  and  that  the  categories  are  general 
concepts.  Consistent  with  this,  he  did  not  regard  space 
and  time  as  categories  ;  for  he  insisted  that  these  elements 
of  knowledge  are  contributed  by  "  sense,"  and  not  by 
"  thought."  From  this  it  appears  that,  according  to 
Kant,  space  and  time  and  the  categories  —  relation, 
quality,  quantity,  cause,  etc.,  —  are  simply  forms  of  the 


GENERAL  VIEW  OF  THE   CATEGORIES      237 

mind's  activity.  In  his  system,  these  modes  of  experiences 
are  related  to  the  subject,  and  not  to  the  real  external 
world.  He  argued  that  our  objective  world,  the  world 
which  we  know,  gets  these  forms  from  the  mind ;  that  the 
mind  gives  spatial,  temporal,  quantitative,  qualitative, 
and  causal  character  to  the  unordered  sense-data  with 
which  it  deals.  Hence  we  may  not  say  that  the  world  of 
reality  is  in  space  and  time  ;  neither  may  we  affirm  quality, 
quantity,  relation,  or  cause  and  effect  of  things  in  them- 
selves. In  other  words,  space  and  time  and  the  categories 
are  modes  of  the  phenomenal  world  or  world  of  appearance, 
not  of  the  noumenal  world  or  world  of  reality. 

Kant's  refusal  to  regard  space  and  time  as  categories 
came  of  his  sharp  and  overwrought  distinction  between 
"  sense  "  and  "  thought."  He  himself  recognizes  that 
there  is  no  spatial  or  temporal  perception  apart  from  the 
activity  of  the  understanding;  from  this  it  follows  that 
the  space  and  time  elements  enter  cognitive  experience 
through  the  judging  activity  of  the  mind.  He  was  not 
wholly  consistent,  then,  in  refusing  to  list  space  and  time 
with  the  categories.  It  is  also  evident  that  he  gave  the 
categories  an  external,  or  merely  mechanical,  relation  to 
the  material  of  knowledge;  for  he  has  the  material  of 
knowledge  ordered  in  keeping  with  these  forms.  The 
forms  are  imposed  upon  the  material;  they  are  not  an 
expression  of  the  nature  of  the  material  itself.  He  limited 
the  categories  to  the  province  of  sense-experience.  He 
could  not  do  otherwise;  for  the  understanding,  in  his 
system,  only  deals  with  material  which  is  furnished  by  the 
senses.  As  a  consequence,  Kant's  doctrine  of  the  cate- 
gories leaves  them  unrelated  to  the  moral  order  and  to 
judgments  of  value  and  purpose.  Having  limited  cogni- 
tive experience  to  the  phenomenal  world,  a  world  formally 
constituted  by  the  mind  out  of  sensuous  material,  he  was 


238         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

obliged  to  assign  the  moral  order  and  judgments  of  value 
and  purpose  to  a  realm  beyond  experience.  His  refusal 
to  recognize  space  and  time  as  categories,  the  extreme 
subjectivity  of  his  conception  of  the  categories,  and  their 
inapplicability  (as  conceived  by  him)  to  the  moral  order 
and  to  judgments  of  value  and  purpose,  lead  us  to  con- 
clude that  his  doctrine  is  inadequate. 

3.  Hegel. — The  doctrine  of  the  categories  has  a 
central  place  in  Hegel's  philosophy.  In  his  Logic,  he 
undertakes  to  set  forth  their  nature  and  the  mode  of  their 
development.  Our  present  interest  in  his  system  does 
not  require  that  we  make  an  extended  statement  of  his 
doctrine  of  the  categories ;  we  only  seek  at  this  point  to 
emphasize  his  conception  of  their  relation  to  reality.  For 
Hegel,  all-that-is  is  a  "  unitary  world  of  thought  and 
things  " ;  and  the  categories  are  principles  that  obtain  in 
this  unitary  world.  They  are  principles  of  thought  and  at 
the  same  time  principles  of  things.  With  Kant,  they  are 
'*  forms  imposed  by  thought  on  sense ;  "  with  Hegel,  they 
are  expressions  of  reality,  of  both  subjective  and  ob- 
jective reality.  Hegel  held  that  the  relation  of  the  cate- 
gories to  the  material  and  product  of  thought  is  organic, 
not  external ;  and  he  also  argued  that  the  categories  are 
so  related  to  one  another  that  they  form  a  perfect  system. 
Unlike  Kant,  Hegel  includes  in  the  categories  those  forms 
of  thought  under  which  we  experience  Personality.  As 
a  consequence,  the  moral  order  and  judgments  of  value 
and  purpose  are  not  assigned  by  him  to  a  world  beyond, 
and  other  than,  the  known  world.  This  is  a  distinct  ad- 
vance beyond  the  Kantian  doctrine. 

§  1 01.  The  Categories  and  Reality.  —  i.  Kant  was 
clearly  right  in  teaching  that  the  categories  are  subjective. 
You  see  a  bird  flying,  lighting  on  a  branch,  and  later  taking 
wing  again  as  a  boy  throws  a  stone  at  it.     So  far  as  mere 


GENERAL  VIEW  OF  THE   CATEGORIES      239 

sense  is  concerned,  you  have  a  series  of  visual  impressions  ; 
but  you  judge  that  you  have  seen  three  objects,  each  of 
which  remained  identical  with  itself  while  it  or  a  part  of  it 
was  changing  place.  You  have  combined  the  different 
impressions  and  have  given  unity  and  identity  to  certain 
of  those  impressions  —  the  bird,  the  boy,  the  tree,  and  the 
stone ;  and  you  have  distinguished  motion  and  rest. 
Apart  from  rational  activity,  no  instant  of  sense-impres- 
sion lives  beyond  itself,  neither  will  any  of  the  impressions 
remain  after  that  instant.  But  motion  and  rest  and 
identity  involve  a  continuity;  that  is,  there  is  a  con- 
tinuity in  e^erience  of  identity  and  motion  and  rest. 
It  is  evident  that  mere  sense-impressions  cannot  con- 
tribute this  continuity ;  for,  as  we  have  said,  they  are  only 
for  the  instant  of  their  being.  It  is  the  combining,  or 
synthetic,  activity  of  the  mind  that  gives  you  the  ex- 
perience of  unity,  identity,  motion,  and  rest.  This  simple 
experience  illustrates  a  number  of  categories;  of  these 
we  name  a  few  —  individuality  (of  the  bird,  the  tree,  the 
boy,  the  stone),  rest,  motion,  change,  permanence,  space, 
time,  cause,  purpose  (of  the  boy).  Mere  sense  does  not 
give  your  thought  these  forms ;  they  are  modes  of  your 
activity  as  a  rational  being.  These  and  other  categories 
are  fundamental  forms  in  which  we  think  of  persons, 
things,  and  events.  In  other  words,  they  are  primary 
forms  of  subject  activity,  fundamental  forms  in  which 
subject  reality  expresses  itself. 

2.  The  Categories  and  Objective  Reality.  —  According 
to  the  paragraph  preceding  this,  the  categories  are  ele- 
ments which  the  subject  contributes  to  experience.  Does 
our  mind  contribute  to  our  knowledge  of  an  object  any 
element  which  is  foreign  to  that  object  ?  Are  the  spatial, 
causal,  relational,  qualitative,  and  quantitative  elements  of 
our  knowledge  of  objects  foreign  to  the  reality  of  the  ob- 


240         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

jects  ?  Does  my  mind,  in  giving  these  forms  to  its  thought 
of  objects,  impose  upon  the  world  of  reality  what  is  alien 
to  reality  ?  Are  space,  time,  relation,  etc.,  only  subjec- 
tively real  ?  We  have  considered  this  question  in  §  98,  2 
(2) ;  and  we  there  assigned  reasons  for  concluding  that 
the  mind,  in  its  cognition  of  objects,  does  not  contribute 
what  is  foreign  to  objects.  In  the  course  of  that  discus- 
sion, we  concluded  that  the  modes  in  which  objective 
reality  expresses  itself  are  at  one  with  the  laws  of  the  mind's 
activity;  our  judgments  respecting  objects  are  identical 
with  the  modes  of  the  objects.  We  may  err,  and  it  is 
certain  that  our  knowledge  is  incomplete;  nevertheless 
the  act  of  knowing  as  such  does  not  give  to  knowledge 
content  which  is  foreign  to  the  object.  In  respect,  then, 
of  the  object,  the  categories  are  fundamental  forms  of  the 
object's  expression  to  rational  activity.  From  this  it 
follows  that  the  categories  are  not  limits  set  to  the  attain- 
ment of  knowledge,  as  Kant  thought;  they  are,  on  the 
contrary,  expressions  of  the  nature  of  reality. 

3.  The  Categories  of  Themselves  give  Content  to  Thought. 
—  We  have  spoken  of  the  categories  as  forms  or  modes ; 
but  it  must  not  be  assumed  that  they  are,  therefore,  with- 
out content  in  themselves.  Kant  conceived  them  to  be 
mere  forms  ;  and  Hegel  seems  to  have  followed  him  in  this 
misconception,  for  he  regarded  the  categories  as  mere 
unities  in  our  consciousness,  having  no  content  which  is 
their  own.  They,  on  the  contrary,  contribute  specific 
and  important  content  to  our  thought  of  the  world.  In 
making  this  statement,  we  do  not  have  in  mind  the  mere 
concept  —  say  quality,  quantity,  relation,  or  change  — 
abstracted  from  experience;  we  refer  to  the  category  as 
it  comes  into  experience.  The  categories  are  forms  of 
thought  in  which  we  connect  and  relate  objects.  Thus, 
a  stone  is  thrown  against  a  pane  of  glass,  and  the  glass 


GENERAL  VIEW  OF  THE  CATEGORIES      241 

breaks.  Here  we  have  two  Incidents ;  but,  to  think  of 
the  former  of  the  two  as  related  causally  to  the  latter  is  to 
add  content  to  the  thought  of  these  occurrences,  a  con- 
tent not  present  in  the  incidents  considered  apart  from 
this  category.  To  think  of  one  event  as  occurring  "  be- 
fore "  or  "  after  "  another  gives  a  content  to  thought 
which  is  not  present  in  the  thought  of  the  events  without 
this  relating  idea.  There  is  specific  content  in  that  special 
form  of  the  temporal  notion.  To  relate  objects  is  to 
think  them  together.  The  thought,  or  idea,  which  con- 
nects them  has  meaning  in  itself  and  so  presents  content 
to  thought.  The  categories  are  forms  of  thought;  but 
they  are  not  themselves  without  content.  The  form  itself 
has  significance,  and  that  significance  is  material  for 
thought;  it  has  in  it  content  for  knowing,  valuing,  and 
purposing  activity. 

§102.  Characteristics  of  the  Categories.  —  i.  They 
have  an  Inner  and  Principial  Unity.  —  The  inner  struc- 
tural unity  of  the  categories  has  been  generally  recog- 
nized ;  and  not  a  few  of  those  who  have  given  them  special 
study,  have  sought  to  reduce  all  of  them  to  one.  But 
this  undertaking  has  failed ;  for  thought,  they  are  pri- 
mary laws  or  principles.  Although  all  efforts  to  reduce 
them  have  failed,  they  give  evidence  that  they  are  at 
core  one;  for  no  one  of  them  can  be  rightly  described 
without  reference  to,  or  implication  of,  others.  In  our 
further  study,  we  shall  discover  that  space  involves  posi- 
tion relation,  and  time  involves  relation  of  sequence ;  that 
change  implies  permanence ;  that  motion  involves  space 
and  activity;  and  that  purpose  involves  individuality  and 
activity.  In  short,  "  the  course  of  reflective  thinking 
permits  and  requires  free  movement  from  each  one  to 
every  other  "  of  the  categories ;  "  but  the  path  is  not 
equally  direct  between  them  all."     We  conclude,  there- 


242        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

fore,  that  they  are  forms  of  a  principle  common  to  all  of 
them.  Since  they  are  expressions  of  reality,  that  common 
principle  must  be  in  the  nature  of  the  ultimate  and  highest 
reality,  the  Ground  Reality  of  the  universe. 

2.  Classification.  —  No  complete  list  of  the  categories 
has  been  given.  Aristotle  named  ten,  Kant  found  twelve, 
Hegel  listed  one  hundred  and  fifty.  It  is  also  difficult  to 
effect  a  wholly  satisfactory  classification  of  them. 

§103.  Conclusions. — The  categories  are  non-sensa- 
tional elements  of  experience.  They  are  the  primary 
modes  of  our  thought  of  objects  —  of  things,  events,  and 
persons;  and  they  are  also  the  fundamental  modes  of 
Being.  In  other  words,  they  are  the  fundamental  forms 
in  which  reality,  both  subjective  and  objective,  expresses 
itself.  Since  they  are  the  modes  in  which  objects  are  re- 
lated, they  proffer  content  for  thought.  They  are  har- 
monious forms  of  a  common  principle,  and  that  principle 
has  its  being  in  the  nature  of  the  Ground  Reality  of  the 
universe.  Their  harmony  and  structural  unity  indicate 
that  they  constitute  a  system,  and  that  the  activity  of  the 
Ground  Reality  is  coherent,  orderly,  and  systematizing. 
We  will  not  attempt  to  classify  the  categories  and  will  only 
discuss  those  which  are  most  usually  considered. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

RELATIONS    IN    GENERAL 

§  104.  Characteristics  of  Relation.  —  The  word  "  re- 
lation "  is  in  frequent  use,  and  we  have  no  difficulty  in 
recognizing  its  significance  in  every-day  intercourse.  In 
this  study,  however,  we  are  not  dealing  with  a  word,  but 
with  an  element  of  experience,  an  essential  element  of  the 
experience  of  each  of  us ;  and  what  we  seek  is  a  satisfac- 
tory conception  of  this  experience. 

I.  I  have  an  experience  which  I  express  in  the  judgment, 
"  The  chair  is  in  the  room."  In  this  experience,  "  the 
chair  "  and  "  the  room  "  are  known  in  relation  to  each 
other.  We  have  one  fact  of  relation,  and  the  relation 
itself  has  two  terms  —  "  the  chair  "  and  "  the  room." 
You  say,  "  The  son  is  taller  than  the  father."  Your 
thought  relates  "  the  son  "  and  "  the  father,"  and  the  one 
relation  has  two  terms.  It  is  obvious  that  a  relation  is 
necessarily  of  more  than  one  term.  Further,  "  the  chair  " 
is  related  to  "  the  room  "  as  content ;  and,  in  relation  to 
"  the  chair,"  "  the  room  "  is  that  which  contains.  This 
single  space  relation  has  two  aspects  —  the  space  which 
contains  and  that  which  is  contained.  In  "  The  son  is 
taller  than  the  father,"  we  have  a  number  of  relations  — 
the  parental,  the  filial,  quantitative,  etc. ;  and  it  is  evident 
that  each  of  these  has  two  aspects.  The  parental  involves 
the  filial ;  and  the  filial  involves  the  parental.  In  the 
quantitative  relation,  "  taller  "  involves  "  shorter  "  as 
its  correlative.     We  may  state  the  characteristic  of  re- 

243 


244         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

lation  to  which  we  have  here  called  attention  thus :    A 
relation  has  two  terms  and  duality  of  aspect. 

2.  Referring  again  to  the  illustrations  given  above,  it 
will  be  seen  that  "  the  chair  "  qualifies  our  thought  of 
"  the  room,"  and  "  the  room  "  qualifies  our  thought  of 
"  the  chair."  So  also  in  the  instance  of  "  the  son  "  and 
"  the  father."  Each  object  in  these  related  pairs  contrib- 
utes something  to  our  thought  of  the  other.  When  we  re- 
late objects,  the  relating  contributes  content  to  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  objects ;  we  know  something  respecting  them 
which  we  would  not  know  if  we  appreliended  them  apart 
from  each  other.  To  think  of  "  the  son  "  by  himself  in 
respect  of  height,  would  not  give  the  experience  of  "  taller," 
which  is  had  when  "  the  son  "  and  "  the  father  "  are  con- 
joined in  relating  thought.  We  may  state  this  charac- 
teristic of  relation  thus :  Each  of  two  related  objects 
contributes  content  to  our  knowledge  of  the  other ;  and 
that  content  is  mediated  by  the  relating  idea. 

3.  From  what  precedes  it  is  evident  that  we  relate  ob- 
jects by  thinking  them  in  connection  with  each  other. 
The  relation  is  not  itself  an  object  of  sense-experience; 
it  comes  into  experience  through  our  thought  of  the  ob- 
jects when  we  take  them  in  connection  with  each  other. 
We  perceive  the  two  persons ;  we  think  the  relation  of 
parent  and  child.  We  perceive  each  as  having  height; 
we  think  the  relative  measurements.  We  perceive  the 
chair  and  the  room ;  we  think  the  "  withinness  "  and 
"  aboutness."  The  perception  contributes  sensational 
elements  to  experience;  the  relating  introduces  an  idea- 
tional element.  We  may  state  this  fact  thus :  Relation 
is  an  ideational,  not  a  sensational,  element  of  experience. 

§  105.  All  Thought  is  mediated  by  Relation.  —  Relation 
is  essential  to  thought;  there  is  not,  there  cannot  be, 
any  thought  in  which  relation  is  not  present.     To  think 


RELATIONS   IN  GENERAL  245 

is  to  relate.  The  unit  of  thought  is  a  judgment;  and  a 
judgment,  in  its  simplest  form,  is  a  thought  in  which  an 
object  and  a  characteristic  or  determination  of  the  object 
are  related  to  each  other.  For  example,  "  The  book  is 
new."  This  thought  relates  "  the  book  "  and  "  newness." 
Again,  in  the  judgment,  "  The  boat  carried  many  passen- 
gers," "  the  boat "  is  related  to  "  passengers."  It  is 
obvious  that  relation  is  an  essential  element  of  thought. 
"  Relation  is  the  mother  of  the  categories  "  —  a  common- 
place of  Philosophy  —  is  justified,  because  all  thought  has 
its  origin  in  the  relating  activity  of  the  mind.  As  a  con- 
sequence, all  other  modes  must  come  of  this  same  relating 
activity.  Some  have  even  thought  to  reduce  all  categories 
to  this  one.  But  it  is  one  thing  to  recognize  that  other 
categories  —  e.g.  space  and  time  —  are  forms  of  relation ; 
it  is  quite  another  thing  to  identify  them  with  relation. 
Relation  is  indeed  the  mother ;  but  the  children  are  them- 
selves, and  each  of  them  has  its  own  place  and  function 
in  thought.  We  cannot  afford  to  ignore  the  irreducible 
differences  which  distinguish  the  categories,  nor  the  shad- 
ing of  thought  which  is  present  in  the  other  categories 
(change,  quantity,  quality,  identity,  etc.),  but  is  not  dis- 
tinctly expressed  in  relation,  as  relation. 

§106.  Relation  and  Reality.  —  We  have  discovered 
that  relation  is  an  ideational  element  of  experience;  and 
this  would  seem,  at  first  sight,  to  make  it  purely  subjective. 
But  we  have  also  insisted  that  the  categories  are  expres- 
sions of  the  nature  of  objective  reality;  and,  if  this  be 
true,  relation  must  be  objectively  real.  The  intelligibility 
of  the  universe  involves  the  objectivity  of  relation.  Phi- 
losophy, science,  and  inter-subjective  intercourse  proceed 
upon  the  assumption  that  the  world  and  its  particulars  — 
things,  persons,  and  events  —  are  intelligible.  '  We  cannot 
avoid  this  assumption  —  that  objects  have  meaning  and 


246        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

that  we  can,  to  some  extent,  discover  their  meaning. 
What  is  it  that  gives  meaning  to  an  object  —  say  a  house, 
an  apple,  or  an  occurrence  ?  A  building  which  we  know 
as  a  "  house  "  has  meaning,  first,  because  the  different 
parts  of  it  are  so  related  to  each  other  that  they  express  an 
idea,  the  idea  which  we  symbolize  by  the  word  "  house." 
And  second,  it  has  meaning  for  life,  because  it  is  related 
to  the  world  system  and  thus  to  us.  An  event  is  intelli- 
gible, it  has  significance  for  us,  because  its  particulars  are 
related  to  the  whole  of  it  and  so  give  it  meaning ;  and  also 
because  the  event  as  a  whole  is  related  to  the  system  in 
which  we  are.  The  relation  of  an  event  and  its  partic- 
ulars to  the  course  of  events  gives  it  significance  for  life. 
To  make  it  general,  an  object  is  intelligible  (i)  Because  its 
particulars  are  related  in  idea,  and  their  relation  to  one 
another  and  to  the  whole  constitutes  the  object  a  system, 
though  it  be  but  a  limited  system;  and  it  is  intelligible 
(2)  Because  it  is  itself  a  particular  in  the  world  system  and 
is  thus  related  to  us.  In  a  word,  the  universe  of  persons, 
things,  and  events  is  intelligible,  because  its  particulars  are 
related  to  one  another  and  to  the  whole.  To  assume  that 
we  give  to  the  world  the  relations,  and  hence  the  intelli- 
gibility, which  we  find  there,  and  to  assume  therewith  that 
the  world  of  reality  is  possibly  unrelated,  is  to  go  back  to 
the  Kantian  Phenomenalism;  and  this  we  have  found 
reason  to  reject.  In  fact,  Kant  actually  related  his  un- 
known world  of  reality  to  us ;  for  he  held  that  it  is  the 
cause  of  sensible  experience,  that  it  sets  the  boundaries 
of  knowledge,  and  that  it  is  the  world  of  the  unities  of 
reason  and  reality.  In  holding  thus,  he  related  that  world 
specifically  to  us,  and  he  conceived  it  as  a  unit  of  related 
parts.  Relation  is  real  objectively;  and,  in  knowing,  we 
think  relations  which  are  objectively  real. 

§  107.   Is  Relation  External  or  Internal  to  the  Related 


RELATIONS   IN  GENERAL  247 

Objects  ?  —  The  question  of  the  externality  or  internallty 
of  relations  has  acquired  special  importance  of  late  by 
reason  of  the  discussions  which  New  Realism  has  insti- 
gated. 

1.  The  facts  seem  at  first  glance  to  favor  the  view  that 
relations  are  external.  Suppose  we  take,  as  examples,  in- 
stances of  relation  to  be  found  in  the  page  of  a  book.  The 
page  number,  the  page  title,  and  the  text  are  related. 
They  certainly  appear  to  common-sense  to  be  independent 
of  the  relations  which  they  sustain  to  each  other.  At 
first  thought  it  seems  obvious  that  the  page  number  is 
itself,  whether  It  be  related  to  this  text  or  not.  Would  it 
not  be  in  another  book  just  what  it  is  in  this  book  ?  So 
also  as  to  the  page  title.  If  it  were  at  the  head  of  some 
other  page  in  this  book,  or  if  it  were  by  itself  and  not  at 
the  head  of  a  page,  would  it  not  be  just  what  it  is  here  ? 
Some  students  of  Philosophy  would  answer  these  questions 
in  the  affirmative.  They  insist  that  the  number,  the 
title,  and  the  text,  if  unrelated,  would  not  be  different 
from  what  they  are  as  related.  If  related  objects  are  in- 
dependent of  the  relation,  it  follows  that  relation  is  exter- 
nal to  the  objects  related.  This  illustration  would  seem 
to  close  the  inquiry.  But  the  case  is  not  so  simple  as  the 
doctrine  of  externality  would  Imply ;  for  some  facts  which 
should  be  considered,  have  been  overlooked. 

2.  An  instance  of  relation  is  a  case  of  Many  In  One. 
For  example,  "  The  chair  is  In  the  room."  In  judging 
thus,  we  do  not  think  "  chair  '*  and  "  room  "  and  "  with- 
Inness,"  and  then  adjoin  them.  We  perceive  a  whole, 
the-chair-In-the-room ;  and  in  this  unitary  whole,  we 
distinguish  "  the  chair,"  "  the  room,"  and  the  relation 
expressed  by  the  word  "  in."  In  judging,  we  apprehend 
a  whole;  and  In  this  whole,  we  distinguish  the  subject 
and  predicate  and  their  relation  to  each  other.     In  "  the 


248        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

book  is  new,"  we  perceive  the  unitary  whole,  the-new- 
book ;  and  thought  analyzes  this  unit  and  expresses  in  the 
judgment,  both  the  unitary  thought  and  that  thought 
analyzed.  An  instance  of  relation  is  a  unitary  whole  in 
which  thought  discovers  related  objects  and  a  relating 
idea.  A  judgment  —  hence  also  a  case  of  relation  —  is 
not  a  mere  conjunction  of  ideas ;  it  is  one  idea  in  which 
analyzing  thought  finds  ideas  synthesized.  It  is  a  case  of 
Many  existing  in  One,  and  not  a  case  of  One  constituted 
by  the  adjoining  of  Many.  The  One  is  for  it  the  ground 
of  the  Many ;  for  a  unit  is  "  an  original  one,  not  a  total." 

Those  who  insist  that  relation  is  external,  misconceive 
the  nature  of  that  with  which  they  are  dealing.  They  re- 
gard an  instance  of  relation  as  constituted  by  the  adjunc- 
tion of  independent  particulars.  Take  the  instance  of 
"  the  chair  in  the  room."  According  to  this  teaching, 
we  have  "  the  chair,"  "  the  room,"  and  the  relation,  all 
of  them  independent  of,  and  external  to,  one  another. 
The  result  is  a  mere  adjunction  of  these  particulars; 
and,  inasmuch  as  the  relation  (of  "  withinness  ")  is  some- 
how related  to  both  the  objects  and  is  also  external  to  them, 
it  really  separates  them.  A  relation  is  a  unitary  thought ; 
and  a  collection  of  independent  ideas  would  not  be  a  unit 
idea.  The  mere  adjunction  of  particular  ideas  cannot 
constitute  a  unitary  whole;  and  the  relating  of  objects 
does  constitute  a  unitary  whole.  Hence,  the  relating  of 
objects  is  not  the  linking  in  thought  of  independent  par- 
ticulars through  that  which  is  external  to  what  is  related. 
Relation,  subjectively  regarded,  is  not  external. 

3.  In  the  instance  of  "  the  chair  in  the  room,"  the  rela- 
tion of  "  withinness,"  objectively  regarded,  is  dependent 
for  its  being  upon  these  objects  thus  related.  We  may 
have  an  abstract  relational  idea  apart  from  objects.  We 
may,  for  example,  have  the  notion  of  "  withinness  "  when 


RELATIONS   IN  GENERAL  249 

no  objects  are  in  presentation.  But  in  such  case,  we  have 
merely  a  notion  of  relation,  not  an  actual  relation ;  and 
Philosophy  is  safe  only  when  it  keeps  in  touch  with  the 
concrete.  There  is  no  real  relation  apart  from  experience 
of  related  reals.  Thus,  the  relation  which  we  express  by 
the  word  "  greater,"  is  not  objectively  real  except  when 
objective  reals  are  related  in  respect  of  quantity;  but 
when  such  reals  are  so  related,  it  is  objectively  real.  When 
you  conclude  that  "  the  book  is  new,"  you  relate  "  the 
book "  to  your  standard  of  "  newness,"  this  standard 
being  for  you  an  objective  real.  Relation,  then,  as  an 
objective  fact  is  dependent  upon  related  objects ;  it  has 
no  being  apart  from  them.  Beside  this,  relation  derives 
its  specific  character  in  each  instance  from  the  nature  of 
the  related  objects.  Since  relation  has  its  being  in,  and 
derives  its  character  from,  the  nature  of  the  objects  re- 
lated, it  must  be  internal  to  them. 

What  has  just  been  said  holds  for  relation  as  an  objective 
fact.  An  analogous  conclusion  follows  from  a  study  of 
relation  as  a  subjective  fact.  "  The  room  "  is  a  room  in 
which  *'  that  chair  "  is ;  and  "  the  chair  "  is  a  chair  which 
is  in  "  that  room."  It  is  obvious  that  the  relation  of 
"  withinness  "  has  its  being  in,  and  derives  its  character 
from,  the  significance  of  each  of  these  objects  for  the  other ; 
"  the  chair  "  is  content  for  "  the  room,"  and  "  the  room  " 
is  space  for  "  the  chair."  A  relation  has  its  subjective 
origin  in  the  subject's  apprehension  that  one  of  two  per- 
ceived objects  gives  some  meaning  to  the  other,  when  they 
are  thought  together.  It  derives  its  being  and  character 
from  the  subject's  conception  of  the  meaning  of  each  of 
the  objects  for  the  other.  It  is,  therefore,  internal  to  the 
objects   as   apprehended   by  the   subject. 

§  108.  Does  the  Relating  of  Objects  modify  them.? — 
We  have  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  objects  are  modi- 


250        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

fied  by  their  relations.  This  has,  however,  been  denied ; 
and  the  question  has  acquired  such  importance  of  late 
that  we  think  it  well  to  give  it  fuller  consideration. 

I.  Are  the  page  number,  the  page  title,  and  the  text 
of  a  page  modified  in  their  being  related }  We  have  said 
that  they  seem  to  be  independent  of  the  relations  in  which 
they  are  found ;  but,  if  objects  are  modified  by  their  re- 
lations, they  would  not  be  the  same  if  they  were  in  some 
other  book  or  were  apart  and  by  themselves  as  individual 
objects.  What  are  the  facts  in  the  case  .?  In  this  relation, 
the  page  number  is  an  ordinal  and  signifies  the  place  this 
page  would  have  in  the  make-up  of  the  book.  Unrelated, 
it  is  a  certain  term  in  our  series  of  cardinal  numbers ; 
it  would  not  imply  pages  or  any  other  collection  of  objects. 
The  page  title  by  itself  would  express  an  idea ;  here  it  sig- 
nifies that  this  idea  is  discussed  in  the  text.  In  this  re- 
lation, the  text  is  not  merely  a  number  of  connected  state- 
ments ;  it  is  an  elucidation  of  the  idea  expressed  in  the 
page  title.  The  page  as  a  whole  is  a  unit;  and  this  uni- 
tary character  cannot  be  accounted  for  if'we  regard  it  as 
made  up  of  conjoined  particulars.  If  we  aggregate  the 
significance  of  the  particulars,  the  "  oneness  "  of  the  page, 
i.e.  its  unitary  quality,  will  still  be  lacking;  and  the 
*'  oneness  "  is  essential  to  it  as  a  page.  This  "  oneness  " 
qualifies  the  whole  and  thus  modifies  all  the  particulars 
of  the  whole.  The  significance  of  every  particular  is  in 
some  respect  dependent  upon  the  significance  of  the  page 
as  a  unit.  A  change  in  relations  does  effect  a  change  in 
the  significance  of  the  related  terms.  We  recognize  this 
in  life.  In  interpreting  documents  and  the  utterances- 
of  public  men,  we  take  into  consideration  the  relations  in 
which  the  documents  were  drawn  up  and  the  words  spoken. 
What  we  have  said  respecting  the  modifying  of  objects 
by  relations,  holds  true  even  of  spatial  relations.     Whether 


RELATIONS  IN  GENERAL  251 

a  man  lives  on  the  east  or  west  side  of  the  street,  would 
probably  make  no  difference  as  to  his  character  or  pe- 
culiarities of  speech ;  but  it  would  qualify  him  in  respect 
of  his  place  of  residence.  Objects  are  modified  by  their 
relations. 

2.  The  view  set  forth  above  is  further  sustained  when 
we  consider  chemical  and  organic  changes.  The  action 
and  meaning  of  chlorine  and  sodium  are  both  changed 
by  their  coming  into  such  relation  as  to  produce  common 
salt ;  and  the  same  is  true  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen  when 
they  are  so  related  as  to  form  water.  The  modifications 
to  which  the  constituents  of  plants  and  animals  are  sub- 
jected when  they  enter  into  organisms,  are  myriad. 

3.  A  question.  How  is  it  possible  that  a  change  In  the 
relations  of  objects  should  be  accompanied  by  a  change 
in  the  objects .?  The  following  answer  suggests  itself. 
If  the  world  is  a  system,  —  and  it  must  be  a  system 
if  it  be  intelligible,  —  any  change  in  one  or  more  ob- 
j6tts  would  be  accompanied  by  an  adjusting  change  in 
others.  This  would  be  necessary  that  the  harmony 
of  the  system  might  be  preserved.  We  find  this  to 
be  true  in  systems  established  by  us  —  as  in  a  machine 
or  a  system  of  classification ;  any  change  in  one  particu- 
lar forces  change  in  other  particulars.  Those  who  have 
undertaken  to  elaborate  systems  of  thought,  have  often 
found  it  necessary  to  effect  such  readjustments.  Again, 
objects  express  their  nature  in  relation,  and  only  in  relation. 
It  follows,  then,  that  a  change  in  relation  involves  another 
expression  of  the  meaning  of  an  object.  From  this  it  would 
appear  that  an  object  is  not  fully  known  if  it  be  known  in 
only  one  relation ;  and  this  we  find  to  be  true.  The  mean- 
ing of  an  object  is  only  adequately  known  when  we  study  it 
in  many  relations.  In  every  new  relation,  it  gives  a  report 
of  itself  which  is  not  given  in  other  relations. 


252        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

§  109.  The  Ground  of  Relation.  —  Relation  is  an  ex- 
pression, first,  of  the  cohering  and  orderly  activity  of 
object  reality.  The  cohering  orderly  activity  of  reality 
constitutes  all  its  particulars  in  relation;  it  cannot  do 
otherwise.  In  other  words,  reality,  by  reason  of  its  sys- 
tematizing activity,  presents  to  the  subject  a  world  which 
is  intelligible.  Relation  is  an  expression,  second,  of  the 
rational  activity  of  subject  reality.  The  rational  activity 
of  subject  reality  expresses  itself  in  an  effort  to  understand 
the  meaning  of  persons,  things,  and  events.  Subject  and 
object  reality  are  organically  related ;  for  they  are  of  the 
one  world  system.  Object  reality  is  the  complementary 
"  other  "  of  subject  reality,  and  the  relating  activity  of  the 
one  is  complementary  to  the  relating  activity  of  the  other. 
(§  9^7  2  (3)).  Relation,  then,  is  grounded  in  the  Ultimate, 
or  Absolute,  Reality  which  is  the  ground  of  the  being  and 
activity  of  all  subjects  and  objects. 

§110.  Conclusions.  —  Every  case  of  relation  is  an 
instance  of  Many  in  One.  We  can  recognize  the  Many  in 
One ;  but  we  cannot  construct  the  One  out  of  the  Many ; 
for,  if  we  should  conjoin  the  Many,  the  "  oneness,"  that 
which  makes  the  related  terms  a  One,  would  still  be  want- 
ing. Each  of  a  number  of  related  objects  gives  signifi- 
cance to  all  the  objects  with  which  it  is  related.  There  is 
no  relational  experience  apart  from  experience  of  objects ; 
nevertheless,  relation  is  an  ideational  element,  and  not  a 
sensational  element,  of  experience.  Although  relation  is 
ideational  and  is,  therefore,  a  subjective  real,  it  is  none  the 
less  objectively  real.  It  comes  into  experience  through 
the  interpreting  activity  of  the  subject;  and,  in  this  in- 
terpreting activity,  the  mind  reports  what  is  real  objec- 
tively. Relation  is  obviously  internal  to  the  unit  which 
the  relating  thought  apprehends.  Certain  facts  go  to  show 
that  it  is  internal  to  the  related  objects,     (i)  The  objects 


RELATIONS   IN   GENERAL  253 

of  a  relation  are  not  merely  adjoined.  Thought  does  not 
constitute  a  relational  unit  out  of  unrelated  particulars ; 
it  perceives  the  particulars  in  the  relational  unit.  (2)  Re- 
lation, objectively  regarded,  is  itself  an  expression  of  the 
nature  of  the  related  objects  and  is,  therefore,  dependent 
upon  them  for  its  being  and  character.  As  it  effects  an 
expression  of  the  nature  of  objects,  it  must  be  internal  to 
them.  (3)  Different  relatings  effect  different  expressions 
of  the  nature  of  an  object.  This  would  indicate  that  re- 
lations are  internal.  The  changes  in  the  modifications  of 
objects  which  accompany  changes  of  relation,  result  from 
the  new  adjustments  in  the  world  system  which  neces- 
sarily follow  when  a  particular  of  the  system  is  subjected 
to  change.  Relation  is  grounded  in  the  systematizing 
activity  of  the  Ultimate  Reality,  the  ground  of  being  and 
activity. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

PERMANENCE    AND    CHANGE 

§  III.  Introductory.  —  I  insist  that  this  dog-eared  dis- 
colored book  is  the  same  with  the  beautiful  book  which 
I  purchased  some  years  since.  That  garden  all  aglow  with 
bright  flowers  is,  you  say,  the  same  plot  of  ground  and 
collection  of  plants  that  gave  no  show  of  leaf  or  flower  last 
January.  That  dilapidated  old  house  in  the  alley  is  iden- 
tical with  the  attractive  mansion  that  stood  fifty  years 
ago  well  back  in  spacious  grounds.  In  giving  expression 
to  our  experiences  with  these  objects,  we  affirm  both  change 
and  permanence  of  the  same  things ;  and  this  is  true  of  all 
persons  and  things  with  whom  we  have  to  do.  It  is  also 
paralleled  in  our  consciousness  of  self.  Consciousness  is  in 
constant  change ;  and  we  are  each  of  us  certain  that  these 
changes  are  changes  in  an  identical  self.  Our  experience 
of  self  and  the  world  is  experience  of  change  and  perma- 
nence. 

§112.  Historical.  —  The  earliest  Philosophers  recog- 
nized the  seeming  stability  and  changefulness  of  the  world  ; 
and  this  led  them  to  assume  that  the  world-stuff  is  a  sub- 
stance which  readily  changes  its  form  (§  ii,  i).  But  per- 
manence and  change  appear  to  be  mutually  exclusive; 
how  can  anything  change  and  still  be  the  same  ^  The 
Eleatics  felt  this  antithesis,  and  they  undertook  to  solve 
this  apparent  contradiction  in  experience  by  denying  the 
reality  of  change.  They  argued  that  change  is  incompre- 
hensible and,  therefore,  impossible;  and  they  insisted 
that  our  experience  is  an  illusion.     Heracleitus  opposed  the 

254 


PERMANENCE  AND    CHANGE  255 

doctrine  of  the  Eleatics  and  taught  that  all  is  subject  to 
change,  except  reason  (which  he  regarded  as  the  order  of 
the  world).  The  Sophists  took  an  extreme  opposing 
position ;  they  declared  that  we  have  naught  but  change. 
Empedocles,  Anaxagoras,  and  the  Atomists  held  that  all 
is  changeable  except  the  elements,  and  these  are  subject 
to  change  of  place.  Few,  if  any,  moderns  have  openly 
accepted  the  view  of  the  Eleatics;  but  many  thinkers 
have  unconsciously  regarded  the  world  as  static.  It  is 
easy  for  uncritical  thought  to  conceive  the  world  thus. 
Many  of  the  changes  in  nature  are  so  slow  as  to  escape  our 
attention,  and  much  of  the  world  seems  to  have  a  fixed 
form.  Reflective  thought  is  also  liable  at  times  to  adopt 
this  conception  of  the  world ;  it  is  specially  liable  to  treat 
an  object  of  study  as  static.  Whatever  we  study  must  be 
held  steadily  in  attention.  Hence  in  our  study  of  the 
world  or  some  phase  of  experience,  we  tend  to  fix  the  world 
or  halt  the  experience  while  we  examine  it.  Change  is, 
however,  generally  accepted  as  a  fact;  whatever  doubt 
is  raised,  is  as  to  the  actuality  of  permanence. 

§  113.  Is  Permanence  Actual .?  —  As  against  the  reality 
of  permanence,  it  is  said  that  we  never  have  experience  of 
an  unchanging  content.  That  is  true ;  but  it  is  also  true 
that  we  never  have  experience  of  mere  change.  Experi- 
ence of  change  is  always  of  change  of  what  persists.  In 
our  consciousness  of  self,  we  are  not  simply  conscious  of 
change  or  of  changing  states;  we  are  conscious  of  an 
identical  self  in  changing  states,  i.e.  of  self  as  the  persist- 
ing subject  of  changing  states.  We  have  experience  of 
change  through  relating  the  experience  of  some  moment 
with  that  of  some  preceding  moment.  For  apprehension 
of  change,  there  must  be  two  related  terms  which  have 
something  in  common.  There  must  be  something  com- 
mon to  this  house  in  ruins  and  the  beautiful  mansion 


256        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

that  once  stood  here,  if  we  may  truly  say  of  the  ruins, 
"  These  ruins  are  that  mansion."  That  somewhat  which 
is  common  to  them  has  persisted  through  the  changes ;  it 
is  a  permanent.  There  must  be  some  permanent  that 
abides  through  all  stages  of  change,  somewhat  that  identi- 
fies the  present  object  with  that  with  which  it  is  compared  ; 
or  we  would  not  be  justified  in  saying,  "  This  is  that." 
If  there  were  no  permanent,  we  would  not  have  a  case  of 
change,  it  would  be  an  instance  of  different  objects.  In 
addition  to  this,  we  know  that  the  difference  in  two  mo- 
ments of  consciousness  has  more  in  it  than  can  be  expressed 
by  "  then  "  and  "  now  "  ;  there  is  a  difference  of  make-up. 
But  despite  this  difference  of  make-up,  or  content,  there  is 
something  common  to  the  make-up]  of  those  moments, 
common  to  all  moments  of  our  experience.  According  to 
Hume,  experience  consists  of  discrete  momentary  impres- 
sions ;  in  his  Philosophy  there  was  no  persistent  self, 
and  our  successive  judgments  were  not  in  any  way  linked 
in  consciousness.  He  felt  the  need  of  some  principle 
which  would  "  unite  our  successive  judgments  in  our  .  .  . 
consciousness  " ;  and  he  acknowledged  that  his  system 
was  defective  for  want  of  it.  In  other  words,  Hume  saw 
that  an  adequate  construction  of  experience  requires  the 
recognition  of  permanence  as  actual.  There  can  be  no 
change  except  in  what  persists.  The  reality  of  change 
involves  the  reality  of  permanence. 

§114.  Change,  Permanence,  and  Reality.  —  Reality 
is  active  Being.  Since  it  is  in  the  nature  of  reality  to  be 
active,  what  is  real  will  be  in  constant  change.  Changing 
relations  and  consequent  adjustment  constitute  the  his- 
tory of  reality.  We  become  aware  of  change  in  objects  by 
comparing  different  stages  in  their  history.  These  stages 
are  in  fact  different  moments  in  a  continuous  process ;  they 
are  stages  in  an  unbroken  change,  stages  which  our  in- 


PERMANENCE   AND   CHANGE  257 

terest  leads  us  to  select  for  comparison.  These  stages 
are  different  expressions  of  the  essential  nature  of  the  one 
individual  real.  The  new  book  which  I  bought  some  years 
ago,  has  passed  through  changing  relations ;  and  these 
relations  have  —  according  to  the  teaching  of  the  pre- 
ceding chapter  —  conditioned,  and  therefore  modified, 
the  expression  of  its  reality.  It  now  appears  old  and 
worn.  The  barren  garden  of  the  winter  and  the  resplen- 
dent garden  of  the  season  of  flowers  are  the  same  garden 
in  different  relations,  with  continuously  changing  rela- 
tions and  consequent  readjustments  between  these  two 
stages.  It  is  the  same  real  in  different  stages  of  its 
history. 

The  essential  nature  of  any  reality  is  necessarily  un- 
changing; and  its  essential  nature  will,  of  course,  deter- 
mine the  law  of  its  changes.  For  example,  we  have  the 
law  of  gravitation  in  material  reality.  This  is  the  law,  or 
general  order,  of  change  in  objects  in  respect  of  mass  and 
distance.  What  the  change  shall  be  in  any  particular 
case,  depends  upon  this  law  and  the  relations  in  that  case. 
The  difference  in  any  two  or  more  instances  arises  from 
the  difference  in  the  relations.  The  law  of  change  in 
matter,  in  respect  of  mass  and  distance,  is  not  subject  to 
change.  This  law  is  an  expression  of  the  essential  nature  of 
material  reality.  Permanence  and  change  are  both  of 
them  expressions  of  the  nature  of  reality. 

§115.  Conclusions.  —  Experience  has  its  subjective 
origin  and  being  in  change  which  occurs  in  subject  reality. 
The  continuity  of  experience  comes  of  continuity  of  sub- 
jective change.  We  do  not  have  experience  of  mere 
change,  but  of  change  of  some  real  which  persists  through 
all  stages  of  change.  If  there  were  nothing  permanent, 
there  could  be  no  change.  In  such  case,  what  we  take 
to  be  change  in  any  object,  would  be  the  presentation  of  a 
s 


258        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

series  of  objects.  Such  a  series,  however,  could  not  be 
known  ;  for  cognition  of  the  series  would  require  that  there 
be  an  identical  subject  experiencing  the  terms  of  the  series. 
That  is,  there  must  be  a  permanent  subject.  The  essen- 
tial nature  of  any  real  and  its  law  of  change  are  unchange- 
able. Permanence  is  grounded  in  the  unchangeableness  of 
what  is  essential  to  reality.  Change  is  grounded  in  the 
nature  of  reality  as  active. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

INDIVIDUALITY 

We  can  only  give  a  partial  treatment  of  Individuality 
at  this  stage  of  our  study,  because  this  category  finds  its 
completion  in  Personality  and  we  are  not  yet  prepared  to 
take  up  the  consideration  of  Personality.  The  establish- 
ment of  certain  facts  respecting  individuality  will,  how- 
ever, be  of  great  assistance  in  our  study  of  categories  whose 
consideration  we  are  now  ready  to  undertake;  and  we 
think  it  best  to  avail  ourselves  of  such  assistance.  Per- 
sonality will  be  taken  up  later,  and  we  will  then  complete 
what  is  begun  in  this  chapter. 

§  ii6.  An  Individual  Object.  —  i.  Our  experience  comes 
of  intercourse  with  individual  objects  —  things,  persons, 
and  events.  Thus  far  in  this  Introduction,  we  have  spoken 
of  objects  when  thought  of  singly  as  particulars,  particular 
objects,  or  individual  objects.  We  have  refrained  from 
calling  them  "  individuals,"  because  custom  has  reserved 
the  term  "  individual  "  for  use  when  speaking  of  persons. 
If  it  were  not  for  this  limitation  set  by  custom,  "  individ- 
ual "  would  signify  any  single  object,  whether  it  were  a 
person  or  a  thing  or  a  happening.  We  shall  freely  use  the 
term  "  individuum  "  and  its  plural  "  individua  "  when 
speaking  in  a  general  way  of  individual  objects  of  any  kind 
whatever. 

2.  When  you  perceive  an  object,  —  say  a  dog,  —  you 
perceive  various  parts,  having  various  qualities  and  sus- 
taining various  relations.  That  is  not  all  you  apprehend ; 
but  you  do  apprehend  those  many  parts,  qualities,  and 

259 


26o        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

relations.  What  you  perceive  is  not  primarily  the  diversi- 
fied Many;  you  apprehend  the  Many  as  One.  Your 
individual  object,  the  dog,  is  a  complex  unit.  Further, 
the  dog  is  not  perceived  by  itself,  as  though  it  were  all  that 
is ;  it  is  perceived  in  a  surrounding,  or  context,  and  as 
distinguished  from  that  context.  An  individuum  may, 
therefore,  be  described  as  a  unitary  complex,  conceived  as 
distinct  from  all  else  that  is.  The  relatively  independent 
oneness  of  the  individuum  is  what  we  mean  by  individ- 
uality. Every  object  of  thought  is  an  individuum. 
Hence  individuality  is  a  fundamental  form  of  cog- 
nition. 

§  117.  Individuality  as  determined  by  the  Subject. — 
A  college  may  be,  and  often  is,  an  individual  object  for 
thought  and  speech.  So,  too,  may  any  particular  ele- 
ment or  combination  of  elements  of  collegiate  being  or 
activity  —  e.g.  the  faculty,  a  student,  or  an  examination 
—  be  treated  by  thought  as  an  individuum.  Whatever 
is  thus  regarded  is,  for  the  time,  conceived  as  having  a 
distinct,  if  not  an  independent,  being.  This  book  is  an 
individuum ;  so  likewise  is  any  leaf  or  page  or  smaller 
portion  to  which  I  may  give  attention.  This  last  gives 
us  the  key  to  the  subject's  relation  to  the  object,  as  an 
individuum.  It  is  found  in  the  expression,  "  to  which  I 
may  give  attention."  We  give  attention  to  that  which 
serves  the  interest  of  the  moment.  Our  object  is  a  selected 
portion  of  all  that  is  present.  For  the  surgeon,  it  may  be 
the  arm  or  the  hand  or  some  part  of  a  finger.  The  army 
as  a  whole  may  be  the  object  of  thought  of  the  general 
in  command  or  of  the  historian ;  or  it  may  be  a  small  de- 
tached force.  Whatever  acts  as  a  unit  from  the  subject's 
point  of  view,  whatever  thus  satisfies  his  interest  and 
serves  his  purpose,  is  for  him  an  individuum.  In  a  very 
true  sense,  the  subject  determines  what  shall  be  his  in- 


INDIVIDUALITY  261 

dividual  objects ;  he  gives  this  form  to  objects.  The 
fact  that  categories  have 'a  subjective  origin  would  lead 
us  to  expect  just  this. 

§118.  Individuality  as  determined  by  the  Object. — 
I.  From  the  common-sense  point  of  view,  that  is  an  in- 
dividuum  which  stands  apart  by  itself  and  has  an  appar- 
ently independent  existence.  If  the  Plain  Man  were  asked 
to  designate  an  individual  object,  he  would  probably 
choose  something  which  stands  out  obviously  separate 
from  other  things  —  e.g.  a  horse,  a  tree,  or  a  stone.  This 
agrees  with  what  we  found  to  be  one  characteristic  of  the 
subject's  determination  of  an  individuum ;  the  subject 
separates  the  individual  object  in  his  thought  from  its 
surroundings,  or  context.  So  regarded,  an  individuum  is 
an  object  conceived  as  distinct  from  other  objects  and  as 
having  a  relative  independence ;  and  the  more  marked 
its  independence,  the  greater  the  degree  of  individuality 
which  we  ascribe  to  it.  We  deem  that  man  most  distinctly 
individual,  who  is  least  determined  by  his  social  environ- 
ment. His  apparent  independence  of  his  time  and  as- 
sociations is  accounted  by  us  a  mark  of  individuality. 
The  arm  has  a  lower  degree  of  individuality  than  the  body, 
because  it  subsists  in  the  body  and  has,  therefore,  rela- 
tively less  independence.  Thus  we  find  ourselves  assign- 
ing degrees  of  individuality  to  objects  ;  and  the  measure  of 
their  apparent  independence  or  self-subsistence  is  for  us 
the  measure  of  their  individuality.  From  this  point  of 
view,  inorganic  objects  have  a  low  degree  of  Individuality ; 
and  individuality  increases  as  we  pass  upward  through 
plant  and  animal  life  to  man,  in  whom  we  find  the  highest 
finite  individuality.  Of  course,  nothing  finite  is  wholly 
self-subsistent ;  for  whatever  is  finite  is  a  part  of  a  system 
and  is  dependent  upon  the  system.  The  perfect  individual 
would   be   self-subsistent;    and   the   all-inclusive   system 


262         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

would  be  the  expression  of  the  activity  of  the  perfect  in- 
dividual reality. 

2.  Organic  objects  are  constituted  of  parts  which  are 
perceptibly  different  in  structure  and  which  serve  differ- 
ent ends.  The  root,  trunk,  branch,  leaf,  and  flower  of  an 
apple  tree  differ  in  structure  and  functions.  This  is  not- 
ably true  of  parts  of  the  human  body  —  as  the  eyes,  ears, 
and  arms.  Each  has  a  form  which  is  its  own,  and  it 
fulfils  an  office  in  relation  to  the  body,  which  no  other  can 
fill.  The  leaf  or  flower  of  an  apple  tree  cannot  be  replaced 
by  anything  else.  Neither  of  the  arms  or  hands  of  a  body 
is  identically  what  the  other  is,  in  respect  of  structure  or 
functional  relation.  This  distinctness  of  structure  and 
function  in  parts  of  a  highly  complex  organism  gives  a 
high  degree  of  individuality  to  such  parts.  The  quality 
of  irreplaceableness  has  its  fullest  exemplification  in  the 
self-conscious  individuum.  No  other  person's  conscious- 
ness can  replace  yours.  The  consciousness  of  each  of  us 
is  unique.     Uniqueness  is  a  characteristic  of  individuality. 

§  119.  Conclusions.  —  An  individuum  is  Many  in  One; 
the  Many  so  cohere  as  to  embody  one  idea.  It  is  com- 
prehensive, including  many;  it  is  coherent,  the  Many 
functioning  as  One.  As  determined  by  the  subject,  i.e. 
as  a  mode  of  rational  activity,  it  is  a  selected  portion  of 
what  is  objective,  the  selection  being  determined  by  the 
subject's  purpose.  The  individuum,  in  relation  to  the 
subject,  is  an  expression  of  the  activity  of  the  subject 
reality.  Individuality  is  also  a  mode  of  object  reality. 
Here  we  find  degrees  of  individuality,  the  measure  of  it 
being  determined  by  the  object's  approximation  to 
self-subsistence  and  uniqueness.  Self-subsistence  and 
uniqueness  are  marks  of  objective  individuality.  Self- 
consciousness  is  individual,  being  unique.  The  perfect 
individuum  would  be  the  wholly  self-subsistent,  self- 
conscious  individual. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

SUBSTANTIALITY 

§  120.  Origin  of  this  Category.  —  i.  We  have  experi- 
ence of  permanence  in  change.  The  clematis  which  you 
planted  by  the  arbor,  was  a  small  slip;  and  it  had  no 
flower  bud  on  it.  Now  it  covers  the  arbor  and  is  itself 
covered  with  flowers.  A  few  months  since,  it  was  bare 
of  leaf ;  now  it  is  clothed  with  foliage.  Year  by  year  there 
have  come  to  it  seasons  of  barrenness  and  seasons  in  which 
it  beautified  the  arbor  with  its  foliage  and  flowers.  You 
declare  it  to  be  the  same  plant  through  all  these  changes. 
A  framed  canVas  was  found  in  the  garret.  The  head 
of  the  house  recalled  having  taken  something  of  the  kind 
some  years  before  as  security  for  a  loan,  and  that  it  was 
said  to  be  a  painting  of  merit;  but  when  found  it  was 
impossible  for  the  eye  to  trace  a  painting.  In  the  hands  of 
an  expert  restorer,  it  proved  to  be  a  marine  view  which 
had  been  done  by  a  master.  It  was  the  same  painting 
through  all  the  changes.  The  persons  and  things  whose 
history,  or  a  part  of  whose  history,  is  known  to  us,  are  in 
constant  change;  but  they  are,  nevertheless,  identical 
with  themselves  all  through  their  history.  We  recognize 
them  as  the  same;  and  we  can  only  do  this,  if  in  every 
stage  of  our  acquaintance  with  them,  there  is  that  in  them 
which  was  in  them  in  all  our  previous  experience  of  them. 
We  recognize  a  house  as  our  former  home,  because  there 
is  that  in  it  which  gives  us  ground  for  assigning  to  it  ex- 
periences of  home  life  which  we  once  had.  It  has  greatly 
changed;    but  there  is  that  in  it  which  was  in  it  years 

263 


264        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

before.  All  experience  of  change  involves  the  notion  of 
a  permanent  persisting  through  change.  This  fact  is  so 
obvious  that  Heracleitus,  "the  philosopher  of  flux,"  rec- 
ognized an  underlying  principle  of  permanence.  We  have 
experience  of  self  persisting  through  change.  In  every 
present  experience  of  ours,  there  is  that  which  was  in  all 
our  past  experience.  We  can  each  of  us  say,  "  I  am  the 
self  that  had  certain  experiences  last  vacation."  The 
subject  of  those  past  experiences  and  the  subject  of  the 
present  experience  are  the  same.  Much  of  our  experience 
at  the  present  is  very  different  from  what  it  was  then; 
but  those  experiences  and  this  are  experiences  of  the  one 
self-conscious  self  who  has  persisted  through  all  the  inter- 
vening changes.  We  think  of  that  which  preserves  its 
identity  through  changes,  as  being  substantial.  Experi- 
ence of  permanence  in  change  gives  rise  to  the  notion  of 
substantiality. 

2.  You  would  bend  a  stick ;  but.  In  seeking  to  do  this, 
you  find  that  you  are  resisted.  So  also  when  you  under- 
take to  break  a  stick  or  a  nut,  these  objects  resist  the 
change  and  evince  persistence  in  retaining  shape  and  indi- 
vidual wholeness.  A  child  runs  against  a  chair,  but  the 
chair  does  not  move ;  you  strike  your  hand  against  the  wall, 
but  the  wall  persists  in  position.  The  notable  fact  for  us 
here  is  that  these  objects  persist  in  retaining  position  against 
our  efforts  to  move  them.  The  common  thought  connects 
such  experiences  of  persistence  with  the  substantiality 
of  the  object;  and  this  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  the 
substantiality  of  an  object  is  determined  for  us  by  the 
persistence  with  which  it  resists  changeful  tendencies. 
That  is  accounted  a  substantial  machine  or  building  which 
will  present  a  large  measure  of  resistance  to  incidents  which 
would  radically  change  its  structure.  That  is  a  substan- 
tial man  who  will  maintain  his  integrity  —  literally,  his 


SUBSTANTIALITY  265 

wholeness  —  despite  a  strongly  adverse  environment. 
We  likewise  think  of  that  which  acts  upon  us  as  sub- 
stantial. The  stone  which  falls  upon  the  foot  and  the 
branch  which  strikes  our  face  in  its  rebound,  are  thought 
of  as  substantial.  We  account  either  of  these  more  sub- 
stantial than  a  handful  of  loose  feathers ;  they  act  with 
greater  force.  The  notion  of  substantiality  arises  in 
our  experience  of  a  permanent  in  changing  objects,  also 
in  our  experience  of  the  opposing  activity  of  objects,  as 
they  effect  change  in  us  or  resist  activity  which  would 
effect  change  in  them. 

3.  This  category  is  present  in  our  thought  of  events; 
and  it  is  the  purpose  of  this  study  to  discover  its  relation 
to  reality.  It  is  usually  known  as  substance.  But  the 
term  substance  is  closely  associated  in  common  thought, 
and  in  certain  schools  of  Philosophy,  with  the  concep- 
tion of  an  unchanging  and  unknowable  substrate  of  states 
and  qualities ;  and  this  is  a  misconception  and  must 
be  given  up.  We  prefer  a  term  for  this  category  which 
is  free  from  such  association,  if  it  may  be  had.  Beside  this 
the  word  substance  has  to  most  minds  an  implication  of 
thinghood ;  and  we  think  it  well  to  avoid  such  an  impli- 
cation. We  will  designate  the  category  by  the  term  sub- 
stantiaHty.  It  does  not  suggest  substrate,  neither  does 
it  imply  thinghood  ;  and  the  form  of  the  word  is  congruous 
with  the  non-sensational  character  of  the  category.  Sub- 
stance is  that  element  In  our  conception  of  an  object  which 
leads  us  to  think  of  the  object  as  having  substantiality. 
Substance  is  for  us  the  objective  ground  of  substanti- 
ality. 

§  121.  Historical.  —  The  element  of  experience  which 
we  are  now  considering,  has  been  diversely  conceived  by 
leaders  in  philosophic  thought.  "  Substance "  is  the 
word   generally  used   to  designate  the  objective   reality 


266        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

of  that  to  which  it  is  related.  In  reading  Philosophy, 
one  meets  this  term,  or  its  equivalent,  in  the  writings  of 
almost  every  school  and  philosopher ;  but  the  significance 
of  the  term,  the  reality  which  it  is  intended  to  symbolize, 
varies  somewhat  with  the  age  and  the  school.  In  view 
of  the  importance  attached  to  this  notion  and  because  of 
the  diverse  conceptions  of  the  nature  of  the  objective 
reality  to  which  it  is  applied,  we  give  a  sketch  of  its  his- 
tory. This  historical  study  will  make  it  evident  that 
despite  the  diversity  of  views  respecting  substance,  there 
are  important  particulars  in  which  most  philosophers  have 
virtually  agreed  in  their  conception  of  it. 

I.  Previous  to  Aristotle.  —  The  earliest  Greek  philos- 
ophers questioned  as  to  what  the  world  is  made  of.  One 
suggested  that  the  world-stuff  is  water,  another  took  it  to 
be  air,  and  yet  another  took  it  to  be  the  Unlimited  or 
Undetermined.  All  of  them  regarded  it  as  a  single  change- 
ful substance.  The  Eleatics,  the  later  lonians,  and  the 
Atomists  differed  respecting  the  nature  and  kinds  of  the 
world-stuff.  They  queried  as  to  whether  the  world- 
substance  is  static  or  changeable,  and  whether  this  sub- 
stance is  one  kind  or  many  kinds.  The  Pre-Socratic 
thinkers  do  not  designate  the  world-stuff  by  a  term  which 
is  the  exact  equivalent  of  the  word  "  substance."  The 
word  which  they  used  means  elementary  principle,  or  first 
cause,  rather  than  substance ;  but  the  idea  of  substance  was 
involved  in  their  conception  of  the  relation  of  this  prin- 
ciple to  the  world.  Whatever  exists  is,  for  them,  some 
form  of  this  principle  or,  for  those  who  are  Pluralists, 
some  combination  of  the  many  principles.  Plato's 
"  ideas  "  had  a  place  in  his  philosophy  analogous  to  that 
of  the  "  elementary  principles  "  in  the  philosophy  of 
those  who  preceded  him.  The  "  principles  "  of  the  Pre- 
Socratics  and  the  "  ideas  "  of  Plato  were  conceived  to  be 


SUBSTANTIALITY  267 

permanent  existents,  which  are  the  ground  or  cause  of 
objects. 

2.  Aristotle.  —  Aristotle  was  the  first  teacher  who  gave 
definition  to  this  notion.  The  word  which  he  uses  when 
speaking  of  substance,  is  one  whose  root  relates  it  to 
"  being,"  and  consequently  to  "  essence."  His  doctrine 
accords  with  this  fact.  He  recognizes  two  substances : 
a  first  and  a  second.  A  concrete  individual  is  a  first  sub- 
stance ;  e.g.  "  Socrates,"  in  the  judgment,  "  Socrates  is 
a  man."  A  general  concrete  {i.e.  the  universal  in  a  class 
of  concrete  individua)  is  a  second  substance ;  e.g.  "  man," 
in  the  judgment,  "  Man  is  mortal."  Substance  in  the 
secondary  sense  is  that  which  is  common  and  essential  to 
all  the  members  of  a  class  or  genus.  In  a  first  substance, 
he  distinguishes  two  elements :  a  substrate,  Matter, 
which  is  of  itself  undetermined ;  and  a  principle.  Form, 
by  which  the  substrate  is  determined  and  comes  to  be 
an  object.  With  Aristotle,  the  matter  of  a  rose-bush  has 
of  itself  no  defined  characteristics ;  but,  in  its  union  with 
the  rose-bush  Form,  the  characteristics  of  a  rose-bush  are 
developed.  The  rose-bush  is  potential  in  Matter;  the 
rose-bush  in  the  garden  is  this  potentiality  made  actual 
by  means  of  the  Form.  For  him,  the  individual  rose- 
bush is  a  substance ;  and  its  substantiality  is  in  its 
essential  nature  when  thus  actualized.  The  concept 
"  rose-bush  "  was,  in  his  view,  a  substance  in  a  secondary 
sense ;  and  he  so  accounted  it,  because  it  is  the  ideational 
expression  of  the  essential  nature  of  all  rose-bushes. 

Aristotle  speaks  of  qualities  as  "  accidents,"  since  they 
only  exist  in  and  with  objects.  Thus,  the  existence  of 
"  rotundity  "  is  dependent  upon  the  existence  of  some 
Individual  object,  or  some  substance  which  Is  rotund. 
So  with  "  sonority,"  "  sweetness,"  and  all  other  qualities. 
An  existent  quality  is   an   accident  of  some  substance- 


268         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Some  qualities  of  an  object  may  be  non-essential;  for 
instance,  a  particular  tulip  or  man  may  have  qualities 
which  are  not  essential  to  the  being  of  a  man  or  a  tulip. 
Non-essential  qualities  are  not  included  in  substance  as 
conceived  by  Aristotle ;  they  are  not  regarded  by  him  as 
of  the  substance  of  the  object.  He  recognized  also  that 
some  of  the  accidents  of  an  individual  object,  or  substance, 
are  essential ;  and  he  included  essential  accidents  in  his 
conception  of  substance.  According  to  Aristotle,  an 
object  is  a  substance ;  so  also  is  a  concreted  universal ; 
and  the  substantiality  of  an  object  is  in  its  actualized 
essence  and  is  expressed  in  its  essential  qualities. 

3 .  Neo-Platonists  and  Scholastics.  —  With  the  Neo- 
Platonists,  a  substance  is  a  concrete  individuum,  and 
substance  is  actual  being.  Their  technical  term  for  sub- 
stance is  a  word  which  is  derived  from  a  verb  that  means 
to  stand  under;  it  is  the  exact  Greek  equivalent  of  the 
Latin  word  from  which  we  derive  our  English  word  "  sub- 
stance." This  helps  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  later 
conception  of  substance  as  a  substrate  of  phenomena. 
In  the  Scholastic  philosophy,  substance  is  conceived  as 
that  which  exists  by  itself.  It  is  used  of  the  individual 
object  as  a  whole,  and  is  contrasted  with  the  accidents  of 
the  object. 

4.  Review  and  Summary.  —  We  think  it  well  at  this 
point  to  note  what  the  historical  inquiry  has  thus  far  dis- 
covered to  us.  We  find  (i)  That  this  category  arises  in 
experience  of  change  and  permanence;  and  substance 
is  conceived  as  the  permanent  in  change.  We  find  (2) 
That  Aristotle  teaches  that  an  individual  concrete  is  a  sub- 
stance ;  and  this  substance  owes  its  being  to  the  activity 
of  its  Form,  the  Form  efi^ecting  an  objective  expres- 
sion of  itself  by  actualizing  the  potentiality  of  Matter. 
According  to  this,  a  substance  exists  through  its  own 


SUBSTANTIALITY  269 

immanent  activity;  and  a  substance  is  an  immanently 
active  individual.  We  find  (3)  That  substance  is  con- 
ceived to  be  the  essential  nature,  or  Form,  of  the  object, 
expressed  in  its  essential  qualities.  From  this  it  would 
follow  that  the  substantiality  of  an  object  is  grounded 
in  its  essential  nature.  We  find  (4)  That,  in  the  Neo- 
Platonic  philosophy,  substance  is  the  individuum  as  a 
whole ;  and  that  the  technical  term  for  substance  tends 
toward  the  identification  of  substance  with  substrate. 
We  find  (5)  That,  in  the  Scholastic  philosophy,  a  sub- 
stance is  an  individuum  which  has  independent  existence, 
as  distinguished  from  the  accidents  which  have  their 
existence  in  the  substance.  At  the  opening  of  the  Modern 
Age  of  Philosophy,  Substance  was  conceived  (i)  As  the 
permanent  in  change;  (2)  As  actual  being  which  exists 
by  itself;    (3)  As  causal  and,  hence,  active. 

5.  In  Modern  Philosophy.  —  Descartes  conceives  sub- 
stance as  independent  self-subsistent  being.  God  is  for 
him  the  only  true  substance.  He  regards  matter  and  mind, 
however,  as  relative  substances,  dependent  upon  the 
primary  substance.  He  speaks  of  them  as  "  created  sub- 
stances." Matter  is  extende(i  substance;  mind  is  con- 
scious substance.  The  substantiality  of  a  thing  is  in  the 
matter  of  which  it  is  composed.  Spinoza  defines  sub- 
stance as  that  which  exists  in  itself  and  is  conceived 
through  itself  alone ;  in  brief,  substance  is  self-subsistent 
and  unlimited.  Being  unlimited,  there  can  be  only  one 
substance;  and  God  is  that  substance.  In  Spinoza's 
view,  thought  and  extension  —  Cartesian  modes  of  mind 
and  matter  —  are  attributes  of  the  only  substance ; 
they  are  of  "the  essence  of  the  substance."  The  primary 
substance  of  Descartes  and  the  one  substance  of  Spinoza 
are  regarded  by  these  thinkers  as  the  ground  of  all  that 
is.  Substance  is,  for  them,  the  permanent  in  all  change ; 
and  it  is  individual  and  causal. 


270        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Leibniz  defines  substance  as  a  force  centre.  He  held 
that  the  universe  is  composed  of  an  infinite  number  of 
substances.  He  terms  these  substances  monads.  God  is 
the  supreme  Monad.  All  other  monads  are  dependent 
upon  the  supreme  Monad ;  but,  apart  from  this,  each  of 
the  monads  is  self-suflficient  and  independent.  All  changes 
are  within  the  monad  and  are  due  solely  to  the  immanent 
activity  of  the  monad  in  which  the  change  takes  place. 
The  monad  preserves  its  individuality  and  is,  therefore, 
permanent  in  change ;  and  it  is  active. 

Hobbes  was  a  materialist;  but  he  held  that  we  do  not 
know  what  the  substance  of  things  is,  and  that  we  are 
only  certain  that  it  is  different  from  our  knowledge  of 
things.  According  to  Locke,  "we  accustom  ourselves 
to  suppose  some  substratum  wherein  [the  qualities  of  an 
object]  do  subsist,  and  from  which  they  do  result,  which 
therefore  we  call  substance."  It  is  "  something  we  know 
not  what."  He  assumed  a  material  and  a  spiritual  sub- 
stance. Berkeley  denied  the  reality  of  material  substance ; 
and  Hume  necessarily  denied  the  reality  of  both  material 
and  spiritual  substance,  for  his  philosophy  has  no  place 
for  a  permanent.  The  notable  fact  for  us  is  Locke's 
definition  of  substance  as  the  unknown  substrate  of 
qualities  and  cause  of  their  coherence.  This  is  the  con- 
ception of  substance  generally  held  by  those  who  teach 
that  we  know  phenomena  only. 

Kant  defines  substance  as  the  permanent  in  change; 
and  he  also  describes  it  as  "  self-dependent  being."  He 
argues  that,  as  there  is  change,  there  must  be  a  permanent 
which  undergoes  the  change.  He  also  taught  that  the 
notion  of  substance  only  holds  for  material  objects,  and 
that  substance  has  no  reality  apart  from  its  accidents 
and  their  relation.  He  nowhere  clearly  defines  the  nature 
of  substance.     His  refusal  to  recognize  the  substantiality 


SUBSTANTIALITY  271 

of  the  Ego  is  involved  in  his  doctrine  that  the  self  we  know 
is  only  a  phenomenal  self,  not  the  real  self.  We  have  re- 
jected this  Phenomenalism;  and,  doing  so,  we  refuse  to 
agree  with  him  in  his  denial  of  the  substantiality  of  the 
Ego. 

6.  Conclusions.  —  Apart  from  Hume,  permanence  in 
change  is  accepted  as  a  fact;  and  Hume  confessed  dis- 
satisfaction with  his  own  system,  because  the  only  reality 
which  it  could  recognize  was  a  series  of  distinct  perceptions 
which  had  no  real  connection  with  each  other.  He  felt 
the  need  of  a  permanent.  We  find  also  that  substance  is 
thought  of  as  concrete  in  the  individual;  that  there  is 
general  agreement  in  identifying  it  with  the  essential 
nature  of  the  individual ;  that  many  have  regarded  it  as 
an  unknown  substrate  of  accidents ;  that  Phenomenal- 
ists  think  of  it  as  the  unknowable  substrate  of  phenomena  ; 
and  that  most  thinkers  have  conceived  it  as  causally 
related  to  objects  and  changes.  Of  these  conceptions, 
three  are  important  for  our  study :  (i)  That  substance 
is  the  permanent  in  change;  (2)  That  it  is  active  being; 
(3)  That  it  is  conceived  as  concrete  in  individual  objects. 
The  first  and  third  of  these  have  been  recognized  by  all 
schools  and  teachers;  and  the  second  is  involved  in  our 
experience  of  objects  as  effecting  change  in  us  and  resisting 
change  in  themselves. 

§  122.  Substance  and  Substrate.  —  Many  thinkers 
have  conceived  substance  as  a  substrate  in  which  qualities 
inhere,  or  as  the  unknown  reality  back  of  phenomena. 
This  substrate  is  undetermined  and  unknown.  Being 
undetermined,  —  i.e.  without  defined  character,  —  it  can- 
not change ;  for  change  involves  difference  of  characteris- 
tics. To  say  that  an  object  —  a  coat  or  a  boy  —  has 
changed,  is  to  say  that  its  present  characteristics  differ,  in 
some   particulars,   from   its    characteristics   in  the   past. 


272         INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

This  theory  would  ground  substantiality  in  an  undefined, 
unchangeable,  unknowable  somewhat.  To  this  there  are 
grave  objections. 

1.  The  doctrine  under  consideration  regards  our  world 
as  a  world  of  known  appearances  and  unknowable  reality. 
We  have  examined  the  dualism  which  separates  appearance 
from  reality  (chapters  XVIII  and  XIX,  and  §  87)  and 
have  concluded  that  it  is  neither  consistent  with  itself 
nor  accordant  with  experience;  and  our  constructive 
study  of  cognition  led  us  to  conclude  that  we  know  ob- 
jective reality.  We,  each  of  us,  know  our  self  to  be  identi- 
cal with  the  self  of  our  past  experiences.  The  self  we 
thus  know,  is  the  real  self ;  the  only  actual  self  is  the  self 
of  which  we  are  conscious.  This  means  that  we  know 
subjective  reality.  The  world  we  know,  then,  is  the  world 
of  reality;  and  it  is  known  in  and  with  the  cognition  of 
accidents  and  appearances.  The  assumed  unknowable 
substrate  is  a  myth. 

2.  This  assumed  substrate  has  no  reality.  The  pro- 
ponents of  the  theory  under  consideration  regard  substance 
as  being  of  itself  without  quality.  Actual  Being  is,  how- 
ever, being-of-some-sort.  Pure  Being,  being-of-no-sort, 
would  be  pure  Nothing.  Those  who  set  forth  this  con- 
ception, are  led  astray  through  failing  to  note  what  results 
from  their  process  of  abstraction.  They  begin  with 
a  substrate-with-inhering-qualities  or  a  substrate-with- 
phenomena.  This  is  a  complex  unit;  and  every  indi- 
vidual real  is  a  complex  unit.  No  element  of  a  unit  can 
exist  apart  and  by  itself;  but  those  who  hold  this  view 
abstract  the  substrate  and  conceive  it  as  self-dependent. 
There  is  no  substance  without  accident;  neither  is  there 
any  accident  apart  from  substance.  To  abstract  acci- 
dents or  phenomena,  is  to  leave  nothing;  for  it  leaves 
pure  Being.     It  is  impossible  that  Nothing  should  be  the 


SUBSTANTIALITY  273 

ground  of  our  experience  of  permanence  through  change 
and  of  resistance  to  change. 

§  123.  Substance  and  the  Primary  Qualities.  —  i. 
Some  identify  substance  with  the  so-called  primary  quali- 
ties of  an  object ;  and,  as  this  theory  is  proposed  with  par- 
ticular reference  to  the  substance  of  things,  the  primary 
qualities  of  the  object  are  the  primary  qualities  of  matter. 
The  distinction  between  primary  and  secondary  qualities 
appears  to  have  been  first  urged  by  Democritus.  It  was 
accepted  by  Descartes  and  Locke,  and  not  a  few  since  have 
undertaken  to  justify  it.  Locke  held  that  certain  qualities 
—  as  color,  sound,  flavor,  odor,  etc. — take  their  character 
from  sensibility;  he  argued  that  they  are  what  they  are, 
because  of  our  sentient  organism.  This  is  seen  in  the 
fact  that  the  same  object  may  have  for  different  persons 
a  different  color  or  taste.  If  one  of  my  hands  be  held 
for  a  time  in  very  cold  water,  and  the  other  in  very  warm 
water,  upon  laying  both  hands  upon  the  same  object  it  will 
seem  warm  to  the  one  hand  and  cold  to  the  other.  These 
secondary  qualities  are  said  not  to  represent  the  properties 
of  the  object,  but  to  owe  their  character  to  the  subject. 
In  other  words,  the  secondary  qualities  are  regarded 
as  subjective,  not  objective.  But  those  who  hold  for 
this  distinction,  insist  that  there  are  qualities  which  are 
solely  objective;  that  they  resemble  properties  of  the 
object.  These  latter  are  called  primary  qualities.  They 
are  listed  differently  by  different  teachers.  Descartes 
recognized  one  fundamental  quality,  viz.  extension;  but 
he  also  names  figure  and  shape.  Locke  designates  the 
following  as  primary  qualities :  extension,  figure,  motion, 
rest,  impenetrability  or  solidity,  and  number.  They  are 
In  general  those  qualities  with  which  Physics  deals.  Sub- 
stance Is  said  by  some  to  he  these  primary  qualities  and  to 
possess  the  secondary  qualities — weight,  color,  hardness,  etc. 


274        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

2.  This  distinction  is  a  convenience  for  Science ;  but 
it  is  untenable  from  the  point  of  view  of  Philosophy. 
The  object  possesses  the  primary  qualities  —  extension, 
figure,  motion,  etc.,  —  quite  as  much  as  it  does  the  second- 
ary qualities.  But  a  more  fundamental  objection  to 
this  theory  is  found  in  the  fact  that  ideas  of  extension, 
figure,  and  all  other  qualities  are  just  as  dependent  upon 
the  subject  as  sound,  smell,  taste,  and  the  other  secondary 
qualities.  All  perception  of  quality  requires  the  media- 
tion of  the  sentient  organism  and  the  mind  of  the  subject. 
Perception  of  figure,  motion,  and  rest  is  dependent  upon 
the  senses  and  the  interpreting  activity  of  the  percipient ; 
just  as  much  so  as  the  perception  of  sound,  color,  and  taste. 
In  addition  to  this,  it  is  a  mistake  to  identify  the  substance 
of  an  object  with  a  part,  or  with  all,  of  the  qualities  of 
the  object.  Reasons  for  this  statement  will  be  set  forth 
in  the  next  section.  The  substantiality  of  an  object  is 
not  grounded  in  its  primary  qualities. 

§  124.  Substance  and  the  Totality  of  Qualities.  — 
Another  view  of  substance  has  been  stated  thus :  Sub- 
stance is  "  the  synthesis  of  all  the  qualities  which  appear 
to  common  sense  as  the  qualities  of  a  thing  "  during  the 
whole  time  of  its  existence.  If  some  quality  "  remains 
relatively  unchanged  while  others  change,"  that  relatively 
unchanging  quality,  though  it  is  not  the  substance, 
"  would  come  to  be  considered  the  substance."  This 
theory  must  be  rejected. 

I.  It  conceives  an  object  —  and  substance  also  —  to 
be  a  mere  aggregation  of  qualities.  We  have  found  that 
reflective  thought  is  agreed  upon  one  point  —  that  actual 
substance  is  substance  of  an  individuum.  Now,  an  in- 
dividuum  is  not  an  aggregation;  it  is  not  One  consti- 
tuted through  the  conjunction  of  Many ;  it  is  not  a  syn- 
thesis of  independents.     It  is  a  diversified  unit.  Many  in 


SUBSTANTIALITY  275 

One.  An  aggregation  of  Independents  cannot  constitute 
a  unit.  A  unit  is  "  an  original  one,  not  a  total."  The 
theory  under  consideration  must  either  deny  the  sub- 
stantiality of  the  self,  or  constitute  the  self  through  the 
aggregation  of  states  of  consciousness.  Neither  of  these 
positions  can  be  sustained.  The  self  is  an  individual  real, 
it  is  a  permanent  through  change,  and  it  is  an  active  being : 
these  are  the  marks  of  substance.  To  assume  that  this 
substantial  self  is  an  aggregation  of  states  of  conscious- 
ness, is  to  misinterpret  experience.  The  distinguishable 
states  of  consciousness  do  not  constitute  experience ;  the 
states  are  themselves  constituted  in  experience.  The 
view  under  consideration  misconceives  individuality  and, 
consequently,  misconceives  substance. 

2.  An  object  is  Many  In  One ;  the  many  qualities  are 
in  the  one  object.  They  are  expressions,  to  a  subject,  of 
the  nature  of  the  object.  The  nature  and  relations  of  the 
object  determine  its  qualities.  The  qualities  of  a  peach 
and  of  a  piano  reveal  the  nature  of  these  objects;  they 
do  not  make  that  nature  to  be  what  it  Is.  A  substance  is 
immanently  active.  Its  qualities  are  the  result  of  its 
immanent  activity;  they  do  not  cause  it  to  be.  The 
qualities  are  grounded  in  the  substance;  they  are  not 
the  substance.  The  theory  we  are  examining  miscon- 
ceives the  relation  of  qualities  to  substance ;  and,  because 
of  this  and  the  fact  that  it  also  misconceives  Individuality, 
we  decline  to  accept  it. 

§  125.  Substantiality  and  Reality.  —  Substance  pre- 
sents three  characteristics :  it  is  active  being ;  it  is  actu- 
alized in  individual  reals ;  it  is  permanent  through  change. 

I.  The  first  of  these  marks  Identifies  substance  with 
reality  as  defined  by  us.  The  substance  of  an  object  is 
that  which  is  essential  to  its  being;  it  is  that  which,  in 
interrelation  with   its   environment,  makes   an   object  to 


276         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

be  what  it  is.  In  seeking  a  definition  of  substance,  we 
are  seeking  a  definition  of  reality.  It  is  a  notable  fact 
that  those  who  would  have  us  accept  knowledge  of  phe- 
nomena as  adequate  to  the  demands  of  reason,  either 
identify  substance  with  appearance  or  undertake  to  in- 
terpret experience  without  this  concept.  But  we  have 
found  that  reason  refuses  to  accept  that  the  world  with 
which  we  are  dealing  is  merely  a  world  of  appearances ; 
the  known  world,  the  world  with  which  we  have  inter- 
course, is  the  world  of  reality.  Neither  can  we  ignore  the 
notion  of  substantiality  and  be  true  to  experience.  It 
persists  in  the  thought  of  all  of  us  and  returns  to  confront 
the  philosopher  even  after  he  supposes  he  had  banished 
it.  Our  study  reveals  the  fact  that  substance  is  one  with 
reality,  and  that  is  why  it  persists.  The  substance  of  an 
object  is  its  essential  reality.  The  notion  of  substantiality 
arises  from  experience  of  reality. 

2.  An  individuum  is  Many  in  One  ;  the  Many  function 
as  One.  To  state  it  otherwise,  an  individuum  is  a  sys- 
tem. The  parts  of  a  true  system  inhere  in  the  system ; 
and  they  work  together  to  serve  the  purpose  of  the  system, 
i.e.  they  cohere  in  their  activity.  Reality  expresses  itself 
in  system.  This  is  true  of  the  universe  as  a  whole,  and 
of  the  individual  objects  of  the  universe.  The  individ- 
uality of  an  object  comes  of  the  coherent  activity  of  its 
reality.  Substance  is  individual  because  the  activity  of 
reality  is  a  systematizing  and,  therefore,  an  individuat- 
ing activity. 

3.  The  essential  nature  of  any  real  is  necessarily  un- 
changing. The  nature  of  an  object  is  expressed  in  its 
appearances ;  its  essential  nature,  in  its  essential  qualities. 
The  continuous  internal  adjustment  of  an  object  which 
is  consequent  upon  its  immanent  activity  and  changes  in 
its    environment,    will    result   in   change   of   appearance. 


SUBSTANTIALITY  277 

But  while  the  appearance  of  the  object  changes,  Its  essen- 
tial nature  is  necessarily  permanent.  The  appearance  of 
the  book  has  changed  through  much  use ;  but  all  that  is 
essential  to  its  being  a  book,  has  persisted  through  these 
changes.  The  permanent  essential  nature  will  express 
itself  in  a  corresponding  permanence  of  qualities.  The 
old  book  still  has  the  marks  of  a  book.  Experience 
develops  the  notion  of  substantiality,  as  permanence  in 
change,  because  the  qualities  which  reveal  the  essential 
significance  of  the  object  persist  through  all  changes; 
and  they  persist  because  the  essential  nature  of  a  real 
does  not  change. 

§  126.  Conclusions.  —  Substance  is  reality.  The  no- 
tion of  substantiality  is  present  in  our  thought  of  objects 
as  changing  and  as  resisting  and  causing  change.  Cogni- 
tion takes  this  form  because  experience  comes  of  commerce 
with  reality.  Reality  is  immanently  active  causal  being; 
because  of  this  it  yields  experience  of  change  and  of  re- 
sistance to  change.  Its  activity  is  coherent  and  system- 
atizing; as  a  consequence,  reality  is  individual,  and  the 
notion  of  substantiality  arises  in  our  thought  of  concrete 
individua.  A  real  is  an  expression  of  the  essential  nature 
of  its  reality;  and  the  essential  nature  of  a  real  neces- 
sarily persists  throughout  the  existence  of  the  real.  The 
permanence  of  the  essential  nature  of  a  real  expresses  it- 
self in  the  persistence  of  the  essential  qualities  of  the  real ; 
and  experience  of  essential  qualities  persisting  through 
changing  appearances  of  the  individual  object,  yields 
experience  of  permanence  in  change. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

QUALITY 

§  127.  Quality  and  Object.  —  i.  A  known  object  is  of  a 
kind ;  it  is  like  other  objects  in  one  or  more  particulars, 
and  different  from  them  in  others.  If  I  say,  "  Sit  on  the 
chair,  not  on  the  stool,"  the  chair  and  the  stool  are  de- 
fined by  sets  of  marks  which  distinguish  them  from  each 
other,  and  from  other  objects.  The  glass  of  milk  which 
you  rejected  because  it  was  sour,  was  known  by  you  as 
having  a  certain  characteristic.  If  I  say,  "This  is  the  thing 
I  mean,"  I  distinguish  a  certain  object  from  others  by  its 
proximity  and  by  the  qualifying  gesture  which  sets  it 
apart  for  thought.  For  the  occasion  of  this  judgment,  it 
is  known  by  its  proximity  and  the  qualifying  gesture.  It 
is  obvious  that  a  known  object  is  qualified,  or  defined, 
existence ;  it  is  known  through  marks  which  are  its  own. 
These  marks,  or  characteristics,  are  its  qualities. 

2.  There  is  no  bare  existence ;  there  is  no  Being  with- 
out quality.  Mere  existence  would  be  mere  nothing. 
Whatever  is,  is  of  some  kind;  and  that  kind  is  defined 
in  the  qualities  of  the  Being.  Not  only  is  there  no  reality 
without  quality;  but  quality  cannot  exist  apart  from 
a  real.  We  cannot  think  a  quality  as  having  existence  in 
itself.  Our  study  of  substantiality  made  it  evident  that 
quality  has  its  being  in  a  concrete  individuum,  and  never 
apart  from  what  is  actual ;  and  that  our  thought  of  quality 
is  always  cast  in  that  mould.  Experience  has  even 
embodied  this  fact  in  language.  Thought  of  actualized 
color,  sound,  taste,  or  other  quality  always  takes  some 

278 


QUALITY  279 

such  form  as  the  following :  "  This  rose  is  a  dark  red," 
"  The  piano's  tone  is  melodious,"  "  This  apple  is  sweet," 
*'  He  bows  gracefully."  The  color  is  thought  as  having 
its  reality  in  the  rose ;  the  melodious  tone,  in  the  piano ; 
the  taste  quality,  in  the  apple ;  and  the  gracefulness,  in  the 
act  of  bowing.  Reality  implicates  quality,  and  quality 
implicates  reality. 

§  128.  Characteristics  of  Quality.  —  i.  We  speak  of 
qualities  as  changing ;  and  this  form  of  statement  is  con- 
venient and  permissible,  but  it  is  not  exact.  A  quality 
does  not  of  itself  undergo  change.  "  Red  "  is  always 
"  red  " ;  it  cannot  become  "  blue  "  or  "  green  "  or  any 
other  color.  "  Sonority "  is  always  "  sonority,"  and 
"  acidity  "  cannot  become  "  sweetness  "  or  "  saltness  " 
or  "  bitterness."  The  red  cloth  may  take  on  another  color 
through  exposure  to  the  sun;  the  melodious  piano  may 
acquire  an  unpleasant  tone  through  neglect;  the  apple 
which  was  sour  when  it  was  unripe,  may  be  sweet  when 
it  has  ripened.  But  in  these  instances  the  substance  of 
the  cloth,  the  piano,  and  the  apple  has  undergone  change ; 
and  this  change  is  revealed  in  the  changed  quality  of  the 
objects.  Quality,  conceived  by  itself,  does  not  change; 
but  the  quality  of  an  object  may  change.  Change  occurs 
only  in  what  is  concrete ;  and  quality  conceived  apart  from 
substance,  is  abstract,  not  concrete;  hence  it  cannot 
change.  Quality  of  a  concrete  individuum  is  concrete, 
and  it  changes  with  the  changing  of  that  whose  quality 
it  is. 

2.  Qualities  have  a  subjective  and  an  objective  relation. 
A  color,  a  sound,  or  an  odor  is,  in  my  consciousness,  my 
sensation.  Similarly,  extension,  weight,  taste,  etc.,  are 
sensational  elements  of  consciousness ;  that  is,  they  are 
subjective.  They  arise  in  the  consciousness  of  a  sentient 
and  rational  subject;    and  they  cannot  be  conceived  as 


28o         INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

concrete  except  as  we  conceive  a  subject  who  senses  them. 
But  they  are  not  purely  subjective;  they  also  define 
objective  reality.  Extension  is  a  quality  of  the  box; 
weight,  of  the  piece  of  iron;  and  sonority,  of  the  guitar. 
When  you  think  of  the  box  as  extended,  of  the  iron  as 
having  weight,  and  of  the  guitar  as  sonorous,  you  are  not 
imposing  upon  these  objects  what  is  foreign  to  them. 
But  these  qualities  can  only  be  actualized  in  the  subject- 
object  relation.  An  object  is  not  complete  apart  from 
its  complementary  "  other,"  the  subject.  Quality  is 
developed  in  the  interrelated  activity  of  subject  reality 
and  object  reality. 

In  criticism  of  the  view  just  stated,  some  have  said, 
"  If  the  qualities  of  an  object  are  real  in  the  object,  but 
only  become  actualized  in  the  subject-object  relation, 
tell  us  what  the  object  is  apart  from  this  relation;  de- 
scribe the  object  by  itself,  unrelated  to  a  subject."  Those 
who  ask  a  description  of  an  object  out  of  relation  to  a 
subject,  make  appearance  impossible,  and  then  demand 
a  description  of  appearance.  They  cut  the  object  off 
from  intelligence  and  then  ask  to  be  told  what  intelligence 
has  to  say  of  the  object ;  they  make  knowledge  impossible 
and  then  demand  knowledge.  In  describing  an  object, 
you  necessarily  conceive  it  in  relation  to  a  subject.  If  one 
should  say,  "  An  object  conceived  apart  from  relation 
to  a  subject  is  potentially  what  it  is  actually  in  the  subject- 
object  relation,"  we  must  relate  the  object  to  a  subject 
in  order  to  give  meaning  to  this  description.  They  fail 
to  recognize  that  the  conditions  of  the  problem  contradict 
each  other.  We  are  asked  to  think  of  an  object  out  of 
relation  to  a  subject.  You  cannot  think  an  object  with- 
out relating  it  to  yourself  as  subject. 

3.  The  qualities  of  objects  change  as  the  relations  of 
objects  vary.     The  gown  which  is  lavender  in  sunlight 


QUALITY  281 

appears  gray  in  lamplight ;  from  some  points  a  round  disk 
will  appear  oval.  We  have  examined  such  experiences 
and  have  concluded  that  relations  modify  the  appearance 
of  objects  (§  ']i).  The  examples  just  cited  —  of  the 
lavender  gown  and  the  round  disk  —  are  instances  of 
temporary  changes  of  perceived  qualities.  In  a  much- 
used  book  and  a  faded  ribbon,  we  have  examples  of  changes 
that  are  permanent.  The  book  and  the  ribbon  have  been  so 
related  that  the  adjusting  activity  of  their  reality  has  re- 
sulted in  relatively  fixed  changes  of  quality.  The  bookj 
once  new  and  clean,  is  now  old  and  soiled ;  the  ribbon 
has  a  duller  hue,  and  some  of  the  threads  are  much  worn. 
The  violin  has  acquired  a  richer  and  mellower  tone.  One 
has  said  that  qualities  are  "  the  object's  special  way  of 
behaving " ;  and  we  may  add  that,  while  its  behavior 
will  always  be  relevant  to  its  nature,  it  will  differ  in  dif- 
ferent relations,  i.e.  it  will  also  be  relevant  to  its  environ- 
ment. 

§  129.  Quality  and  Reality.  —  The  reality  of  an  object 
presents  itself  to  a  subject  in  and  through  the  qualities 
and  relations  of  the  object.  The  qualities  of  an  object 
are  its  nature  expressed  to  a  subject.  To  sense-perception, 
it  presents  the  qualities  of  matter  and  material  objects  — 
extension,  motion,  color,  sound,  taste,  etc.  To  inner  per- 
ception, it  presents  the  fundamental  quality  of  conscious- 
ness, with  its  three  elementary  phases  —  intellection, 
feeling,  and  volition.  To  rationality  as  intellection, 
reality  presents  itself  as  intelligible,  as  having  meaning 
that  may  be  apprehended.  To  rationality  as  feeling,  it 
presents  itself  as  that  which  satisfies;  a  feehng  of  satis- 
faction attends  the  conviction  that  we  are  dealing  with 
reality.  To  rationality  as  will,  it  presents  itself  as  avail- 
able for  practical  activities ;  its  qualities  Indicate  how  it 
may  subserve  the  subject's  purposes.     The  value  of  an 


282        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

object  for  thought,  feeling,  and  action  is  revealed  in  its 
qualities.  The  manifold  and  variable  qualities  of  objects 
are  grounded  in  the  inexhaustible  richness  of  reality  and 
the  countless  relations  in  which  it  is  presented  to  us. 

§  130.  Conclusions.  —  The  qualities  of  an  object  are 
the  marks  by  which  we  distinguish  it  from  other  ob- 
jects. There  is  no  reality  without  quality,  and  no  quality 
apart  from  reality ;  reality  and  quality  are  co-implicates. 
Quality,  as  mere  quality,  does  not  change ;  but  the  quality 
of  an  object  may  change.  Change  in  the  qualities  of  an  ob- 
ject result  from  the  immanent  activity  of  the  object,  as  the 
reality  adjusts  itself  to  changing  conditions.  Quality  is 
dualistic;  it  has  a  subjective  and  an  objective  relation. 
It  has  its  origin  in  the  interrelated  activity  of  subject 
and  object.  The  qualities  of  an  object  are  its  expressed 
nature.  The  innumerable  qualities  of  objects  are  for 
us  the  expression  of  their  significance  for  life. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

QUANTITY 

§  131.  Introductory.  —  There  are  many  interesting 
and  important  questions  respecting  this  category  which 
the  Hmits  of  this  Introduction  to  Ontology  will  not  permit 
us  to  consider.  Two  facts,  however,  are  of  special  im- 
port, and  it  is  the  purpose  of  this  discussion  to  set  them  in 
evidence:  (i)  That  quantitative  thought  of  objects  is 
true  to  reality ;  (2)  That  reality  cannot  be  fully  expressed 
in  terms  of  quantity. 

1.  The  element  of  experience  which  we  are  about  to 
consider  comes  of  our  thinking  of  objects  as  one  or  more, 
and  of  an  object  as  being  so  much.  We  are  constantly 
asking,  "  How  many  ?  "  and  "  How  much  t  "  and  these 
are  questions  respecting  quantity.  In  the  first  of  these 
questions,  the  notion  of  Number  is  present ;  in  the  second, 
the  notion  of  Measure.  Number  and  measure  exhibit 
important  differences  ;  but  they  are  so  closely  related  that 
we  think  it  well  to  treat  them  under  the  one  category 
Quantity,  of  which  they  are  sub-forms. 

2.  Language  furnishes  evidence  that  number  is  a 
fundamental  form  of  thought.  The  most  ancient  lan- 
guages have  separate  singular  and  plural  forms  ;  and  many 
of  them  also  distinguish  the  dual.  The  most  primitive 
peoples  count.  Some  of  them,  to  be  sure,  can  go  no 
further  than  one,  two,  many  (more  than  two) ;  and,  if 
they  wish  to  be  more  definite  as  to  the  many,  they  com- 
pound thus :  two  one,  two  two,  two  two  one,  etc.  The 
cultured    races    have    a    more    extended    primary    series, 

283 


284        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

going  at  least  as  far  as  ten  before  they  begin  to  form  com- 
pounds. But  the  important  fact  for  us  is  that  thought 
distinguishes  one,  two,  and  more  than  two;  that  the  no- 
tion of  number  is  present  in  men's  thought  of  objects. 
It  is  sufficient  for  us  that  experience  takes  this  form. 

3.  All  peoples  have  standards  of  measure.  The  stand- 
ards of  primitive  peoples  —  e.g.  so  many  days'  journey, 
so  many  moons  —  are  indefinite  as  compared  with  those 
of  cultured  peoples  ;  but  they  are  measure  standards.  The 
fact  that  all  peoples  have  such  standards  is  evidence 
that  measure  is  a  fundamental  form  of  thought. 

§  132.  Characteristics  of  Number.  —  A  boy  finds  a 
small  bag  containing  marbles,  and  he  desires  to  know 
how  many  there  are.  He  takes  out  one  marble  and  then 
another  and  yet  another ;  and,  as  he  does  this,  he  counts, 
i.e.  he  thinks  the  terms  of  the  number  series ;  and  he  does 
this  until  all  have  been  counted.  The  number  which  he 
thinks,  does  not  indicate  the  kind  of  things  that  are  num- 
bered ;  it  merely  describes  quantitatively  the  group  that 
has  been  taken  out  of  the  bag.  No  two  of  the  marbles 
need  be  of  the  same  kind,  size,  color,  or  value.  The  num- 
ber modifies  the  meaning  of  the  collection ;  but  it  gives 
to  that  meaning  a  purely  quantitative  modification.  It 
says  nothing  as  to  the  quality  of  the  individual  marbles 
or  the  collection.  Quality  is  the  expression  of  the  nature 
of  an  individual  object;  number  indicates  nothing  re- 
specting the  nature  of  the  objects  to  which  it  is  applied. 
What  we  wish  to  emphasize  here  is  that  numbers  do  not 
express  quality.  A  number  merely  names  the  term  in 
the  number  series  at  which  we  stop  counting. 

2.  Suppose  that,  in  addition  to  the  marbles,  the  boy 
should  find  other  objects  in  the  bag;  and  that  there  are 
altogether  twenty  marbles,  three  pencils,  and  two  knives. 
From  this  account  of  what  is  in  the  bag,  it  will  be  seen  that 


QUANTITY  285 

the  different  classes  of  objects  —  marbles,  pencils,  and 
knives  —  are  counted  separately.  The  objects  of  any 
single  Instance  of  counting  may  differ  greatly  from  one 
another;  but  they  must  be  alike  In  this,  that  they  are  In 
the  same  class.  In  the  Illustration  just  used,  twenty  of 
the  objects  are  marbles,  three  of  them  are  pencils,  and 
two  of  them  are  knives.  But,  If  we  should  ask  how  many 
things  were  in  the  bag,  counting  would  show  that  there 
were  twenty-five,  for  all  these  objects  fall  into  the  class 
of  things.  In  any  Instance  of  counting,  or  numbering,  all 
the  objects  must  be  of  one  class,  i.e.  they  must  be  homo- 
geneous. The  purpose  of  the  person  counting  determines 
what  objects  shall  be  Included  in  the  count.  We  may  state 
this  characteristic  of  number  thus :  Objects  numbered 
must  be  homogeneous. 

§  133.  Characteristics  of  Measure.  —  i.  The  width  of 
this  room  is  equal  to  a  straight  line  perpendicular  to  the 
side  walls.  If  we  desired  to  find  the  width  of  the  room, 
such  a  line  would  be  the  object  to  be  measured.  This 
object  is  a  continuous  whole ;  and  In  this  It  differs  from 
the  whole  which  we  number.  The  whole  concerning 
which  we  ask,  "  How  many  are  there }  "  is  constituted  of 
discrete  objects  which  are  perceptibly  distinct  from  one 
another;  whereas  the  whole  which  we  measure  Is  con- 
tinuous within  its  limits.  Distance,  surface,  heat,  time, 
and  angles  are  measured  ;  and  they  are  continuous  wholes. 
In  weighing  an  object  or  a  group  of  objects,  we  are  meas- 
uring the  force  of  gravity  upon  a  defined  whole ;  and  this 
force  is  continuous,  not  discrete.  The  first  character- 
istic of  measure  which  we  note  is  that  the  whole  which  is 
measured  is  continuous  between  the  defined  limits. 

2.  In  measuring  the  width  or  length  of  this  room,  we 
use  a  rule  on  which  are  marked  multiples  of 'certain  ar- 
bitrary units  of  length  —  yards,  feet,  and  inches.     These 


286        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

units  are  in  common  use,  having  been  accepted  by  con- 
vention. The  rule  is  a  device  for  easy  and  exact  count- 
ing of  the  number  of  these  units  which  are  contained  in  a 
line.  If  we  seek  the  measure  of  the  surface  of  the  floor, 
we  measure  the  width  and  the  length  of  the  room,  and  by 
a  mathematical  calculation  —  which  is  a  convenient  way 
of  counting  —  we  determine  how  many  square  yards  or 
square  feet  there  are  in  the  room.  In  such  case,  our  ar- 
bitrary unit  is  a  square  yard  or  a  square  foot.  A  similar 
procedure  holds  in  the  measurement  of  time,  heat,  weight, 
angles,  etc. ;  similar  in  this,  that  an  arbitrary  unit  and 
counting  devices  are  employed.  Three  facts  are  to  be 
noted  in  this  connection,  (i)  In  measuring,  we  break  up 
the  continuous  defined  whole  and  treat  it  as  if  it  were 
constituted  of  discrete  parts.  (2)  In  numbering,  each 
of  the  individual  objects  counted  is  a  unit;  in  measuring, 
the  unit  is  arbitrary  and  generally  conventional.  (3)  The 
measure  obtained  is  not  absolute;  it  is  relative  to  the 
arbitrary  unit. 

§134.  Real  Number  and  Ideational  Number.  —  i. 
Number  has  its  origin  in  endeavor  to  determine  how  many 
individual  objects  of  a  certain  kind  there  are  in  a  given 
collection.  The  answer  to  the  inquiry  will  say  that  there 
are  so  many  units  of  that  kind;  that  is,  it  will  be  a  numeri- 
cal definition  of  objects,  not  a  mere  number.  A  real 
number,  then,  is  not  of  itself  an  individuum ;  it  is  an  ac- 
cident of  an  individual  collection  or  group.  An  acci- 
dent —  as  "  blue  "  or  "  smooth  "  or  "  four  "  —  has  no 
objective  reality  in  and  of  itself;  to  be  objectively  real 
it  must  be  related  to  an  object.  "  Four  "  in  the  expres- 
sion "four  horses"  is  a  real  number;  "four"  by  itself 
is  abstract  number.  A  number  thought  by  itself  is  ab- 
stract, not  concrete ;  unrelated  to  objects,  it  is  purely 
subjective  or  ideational,  not  real.     In  language,   a  real 


QUANTITY  287 

number  is  a  numeral  adjective  modifying  a  noun;  in 
thought,  it  is  a  term  in  our  number  series,  conceived  in 
relation  to  a  group  of  objects. 

2.  The  hypothenuse  of  a  right-angled  triangle  whose 
sides  are  equal,  is  a  definite  whole.  In  measuring  the 
hypothenuse,  we  are  seeking  to  discover  how  many  units 
of  a  certain  kind  —  say  feet  or  inches  —  there  are 
in  the  line.  Given  such  a  triangle  as  an  objective 
reality,  there  is  no  real  number  which  will  express  its 
measure.  If  its  equal  sides  are  each  five  feet  in  length, 
the  number  of  feet  in  the  hypothenuse  would  be  equal  to 
five  times  the  square  root  of  two;  but  there  is  no  such 
term  in  our  number  series.  The  symbol  5  v2  does  not  in- 
dicate a  definite  or  determinable  number  of  units;  it 
symbolizes  an  infinite  series.  But  a  real  number  is  a  def- 
inite, or  determined,  number  of  units;  and,  as  5v2  is 
indeterminate,  it  is  ideational  number,  not  real  number. 
We  cannot  express  the  measure  of  this  hypothenuse  in 
the  same  unit  with  that  of  the  equal  sides,  because  there 
is  no  unit  of  length  which  is  an  exact  divisor,  or  aliquot 
part,  of  all  three  sides.  In  fact,  the  objects  whose  measure 
can  be  stated  in  real  number,  are  few  compared  with  the 
many  for  the  quantifying  of  which  real  number  is  inade- 
quate. It  is  inadequate  because  measure  is  quantifi- 
cation of  what  is  continuous,  and  number  is  discrete.  In 
measuring  we  undertake  to  divide  a  continuous  whole 
into  equal  discrete  portions ;  having  done  this,  we  count 
the  equal  parts.  It  is  evidently  impossible  to  find  a  unit 
of  length  which  will  be  an  aliquot  part  of  every  line ;  but 
the  unit  which  will  give  determinate  measure  of  a  line, 
must  be  such  an  equal  part  of  the  line.  What  is  true 
in  this  respect  of  length,  is  true  of  weight  and  of  all  other 
forms  of  measure.  There  are  many  objective  realities 
which  real  number  cannot  quantify. 


288         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

§  135-  Quantity  and  Reality.  —  Reality  presents  Itself 
as  Many  and  Much;  hence  the  notion  of  quantity  is 
true  to  reality.  Quantitative  thought  of  reality  has  led 
to  important  conclusions ;  it  has  furnished  an  impressive 
and  valuable  interpretation  of  the  universe.  The  service 
which  higher  mathematics,  the  science  of  quantity,  has 
rendered  can  scarcely  be  overestimated.  Its  testimony 
to  the  unity  and  orderliness  of  the  universe  is  incontro- 
vertible. Through  its  quantitative  study  of  phenomena, 
it  has  been  able  to  make  predictions  which  future  occur- 
rences have  verified ;  e.g.,  eclipses,  the  return  of  comets, 
the  existence  of  hitherto  unknown  planets  and  elements, 
time  and  height  of  tides,  the  approach  of  storms.  The 
wonderful  accomplishments  of  this  science  have  led  many 
to  insist  that  all  that  is  may  be  expressed  in  quantitative 
terms.     But  we  take  exception  to  this  conclusion. 

Most  of  the  objects  with  which  it  deals  are  ideal  con- 
ceptions, not  objective  realities,  not  the  objects  with  which 
we  have  experience  in  our  intercourse  with  the  external 
world.  The  lever  of  mathematics  is  an  ideal  lever,  not 
the  real  lever  of  the  workman ;  it  is  assumed  to  be  without 
weight  and  to  have  a  stability  which  no  real  lever  has. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  beams  concerning  which  it  makes 
calculations  which  are  valuable  to  the  bridge-builder  and 
the  architect.  Its  conclusions  are  of  great  worth;  but 
they  are  not  an  exact  quantitative  representation  of  the 
world  of  reality.  But  the  impossibility  of  reducing  all 
reality  to  quantitative  terms  becomes  still  more  evident 
when  we  undertake  to  express  the  specifically  qualitative 
characteristics  of  objects  and  experiences  in  terms  of 
quantity.  Quality  is  an  expression  of  the  nature  of  ob- 
jects, and  quantity  is  indifferent  to  the  nature  of  the  ob- 
jects numbered.  The  hues  of  the  sunset  sky  and  the  taste 
of  an  orange  are  not  reducible  to  mere  quantitative  terms. 


QUANTITY  289 

Those  colors  and  that  taste  are  subjective  as  well  as  ob- 
jective; and,  whatever  may  be  thought  respecting  the 
objective  element,  the  subject's  consciousness  of  the  color 
and  the  taste  cannot  be  expressed  quantitatively.  It  Is 
not  a  mere  consciousness  of  many  or  much.  But  we  have 
already  seen  that  the  reality  of  the  object,  as  expressed 
in  quality,  is  not  realized  apart  from  the  consciousness  of 
a  subject  (§  128,  2) ;  hence  the  reduction  of  quality  to 
terms  of  quantity  would  require  the  reduction  also  of 
consciousness  to  such  terms.  Feeling  and  volitional 
phases  of  consciousness  are  assuredly  not  interpretable 
in  quantitative  terms.  Hopes,  fears,  joys,  sorrows,  and 
purposes  have  in  them  that  which  cannot  be  adequately 
stated  as  merely  so  many  or  so  much;  and  what  cannot 
be  so  thought.  Is  just  that  which  is  distinctive  of  these 
experiences.  Quantity  cannot  give  a  complete  statement 
of  subject  reality. 

§  136.  Conclusions.  —  Objects  to  which  a  number  is 
related  must  be  homogeneous ;  and  a  real  number  states 
definitely  how  many  such  objects  there  are  in  a  collection. 
A  real  number  Is  a  term  In  our  number  series,  set  in  relation 
to  a  certain  kind  of  objects.  The  whole  which  we  number 
is  a  whole  of  discrete  units ;  the  whole  which  we  measure 
is  a  continuous  whole.  In  measuring,  we  divide  the  whole 
into  discrete  homogeneous  units,  and  then  we  number  the 
units  thus  obtained.  Mathematical  calculations  in  meas- 
urement, and  rules,  scales,  etc.,  are  devices  for  effecting 
this  division  and  numbering.  If  the  objects  of  a  collec- 
tion are  not  homogeneous,  the  number  of  units  in  the 
whole  cannot  be  expressed  by  a  single  term  of  the  number 
series.  A  number  which  is  unrelated  to  objects,  Is  ide- 
ational, not  real.  The  unit  of  measure  is  an  arbitrary  unit, 
accepted  by  convention.  It  frequently  occurs  that  the  unit 
of  measure  is  not  an  aliquot  part  of  that  which  is  to  be 
u 


290         INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

measured ;  in  such  case,  the  number  by  which  we  express 
the  measure,  is  ideational. 

Our  experience  of  things  and  events  takes  this  form. 
Quantity  is  a  true  representation  of  reality,  for  reality 
presents  itself  as  Many  and  as  Much ;  but  there  are  reali- 
ties which  cannot  be  adequately  expressed  in  quantitative 
forms.  The  inadequacy  of  discrete  number  for  the  ex- 
pression of  many  quantitative  facts  sets  the  continuity 
and  structural  unity  of  individua  in  evidence.  There  are 
aspects  of  reality  which  cannot  be  expressed  in  quantita- 
tive terms ;  this  is  notably  true  of  phases  of  consciousness. 
We  have  discovered  that  a  real  is  Many  in  One ;  the  mani- 
fold is  discrete,  the  unity  is  continuous.  Subjectively 
regarded,  quantity  is  grounded  in  the  activity  of  subject 
reality,  in  our  seeking  to  know  the  external  world  in  res- 
pect of  number  and  measure.  Objectively  regarded,  it 
is  grounded  in  the  activity  of  object  reality  presenting 
itself  in  individual  reals,  each  of  which  is  Many  in  One. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

SPACE 

We  distinguish  Perceptual  space-experience  and  that 
which  is  purely  Ideational.  Their  essential  differences 
will  appear  in  the  course  of  this  discussion.  We  treat  per- 
ceptual space  first. 

§  137.  Characteristics  of  Perceptual  Space  Experience. 
—  I.  The  book,  inkstand,  and  pen  which  are  on  my  desk 
are  seen  to  be  distinct  objects ;  each  of  them  is  apart 
from,  or  "  out  of,"  the  others.  As  I  lay  my  hand  on  the 
door-knob  in  the  dark,  the  knob  is  felt  to  be  "  out  from  " 
the  surface  of  the  door.  Similarly  each  of  the  corners  of 
one  of  the  covers  of  the  book  is  perceived  to  be  apart  from 
the  other  corners.  In  like  manner  we  apprehend  that 
parts  of  other  material  objects  are  in  a  relation  of  "  out- 
ness "  to  one  another.  The  desk,  the  book,  and  other 
perceived  objects  on  the  desk  are  experienced  as  "  out 
from  "  me.  We  do  not  perceive  sensible  objects  other- 
wise than  in  a  relation  of  "  outness  "  to  one  another  and 
to  ourselves.  So  also  portions  of  the  cover  of  a  book 
or  of  a  patch  of  light  are  seen  to  be  "  out  from  "  one  an- 
other. In  a  word,  all  sensible  individua  are  perceived  to 
be  in  a  relation  of  "  outness  "  to  one  another  and  to  the 
perceiver.  In  perceiving  sensible  objects,  we  always  re- 
late them  in  respect  of  position ;  and  the  objective  reality 
which  yields  experience  of  mutual  "  outness,"  is  the  posi- 
tion-relation of  the  objects  perceived.     To  say  that  the 

291 


292         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

inkstand  and  the  pen  are  "  out  from  "  each  other,  Is  to 
say  that  they  are  in  distinct  positions,  and  that  we  have 
related  them  in  respect  of  those  positions. 

2.  When  we  look  at  a  patch  of  light,  the  cover  of  a 
book,  or  the  top  of  a  desk,  we  not  only  have  a  conscious- 
ness of  the  apartness  of  portions  of  the  whole,  but  we  also 
have  an  experience  of  "  spread-outness,"  or  extenslty. 
Taking  all  the  many  positions  on  the  surface  together, 
the  whole  appears  extended.  This  is  true  likewise  of  the 
perceptions  of  objects  which  are  not  In  contact  with  one 
another.  You  see  two  colored  spots  at  a  sensible  remove 
from  each  other.  The  whole  which  you  thus  perceive  Is 
two  spots  related  in  position,  and  it  has  an  aspect  of 
"  extendedness."  The  element  of  extenslty  In  your  ex- 
perience arises  In  your  perception  of  the  position-relation 
of  the  spots.  This  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  the  ex- 
tensity  of  the  whole  Is  dependent  upon  the  relative  posi- 
tions of  the  spots.  Suppose  these  spots  are  colored  coun- 
ters. If  you  give  them  positions  nearer  to  each  other, 
the  extenslty  is  lessened ;  if  you  move  them  farther  apart, 
the  extenslty  is  increased.  When  a  sheet  of  paper  is 
folded,  the  more  widely  separated  portions  are  brought 
nearer  to  one  another,  and  what  we  then  perceive  appears 
to  be  less  extended  than  the  unfolded  sheet.  In  a  word, 
the  aspect  of  extenslty  varies  with  the  variation  of  the 
position-relation  of  the  objects.  The  position-relation  of 
perceived  objects  Is  the  objective  reality  which  yields 
experience  of  extenslty. 

§  138.  What  Perceptual  Space  Is.  —  We  have  found 
that  perceptual  space-experience  comes  of  the  perception 
of  sensible  objects,  and  that  it  has  two  characteristics : 
the  mutual  "  outness  "  of  the  objects,  and  the  extenslty 
aspect  of  the  whole.  We  have  also  learned  that  It  is  the 
perceived  position-relation  of  objects  which  gives  us  ex- 


SPACE  293 

perlence  of  the  mutual  "  outness  "  of  objects  and  of  ex- 
tensity.  From  this  it  would  follow  that  perceptual  space 
is  essentially  the  perceived  position-relation  of  objects. 
This,  however,  differs  fundamentally  from  the  common 
conception  of  space,  which  is  that  space  is  extensity.  This 
common  conception  of  space  is  so  fixed  in  thought  that  we 
restate  considerations  already  presented.  Every  whole 
is  many  particulars  in  one.  The  surface  of  this  sheet  is 
for  perception  many  distinguishable  portions  of  a  whole ; 
and  it  is  because  we  relate  distinguishable  portions  to  one 
another  in  respect  of  their  positions,  that  the  sheet  appears 
to  be  extended.  When  I  have  experience  of  the  book, 
the  inkstand,  and  the  pen  in  one  perception,  it  is  the  posi- 
tion-relation of  these  objects  that  gives  the  aspect  of  ex- 
tensity  to  the  whole  which  I  perceive.  Spatial  experience 
is,  therefore,  not  primarily  experience  of  extensity;  it  is 
experience  of  the  position-relation  of  objects.  The  ob- 
jects whose  perception  yields  this  consciousness  are  nec- 
essarily presented  together  in  experience.  You  cannot 
relate  the  positions  of  three  colored  spots  unless  all  three 
are  present  in  your  thought  at  the  same  time.  Including 
this  fact  in  our  description  of  spatial  experience,  we  would 
say  that  it  is  primarily  experience  of  the  position-relation 
of  co-existent  objects.  Space,  as  a  category,  is  the  posi- 
tion-relation of  objects,  abstracted  from  the  objects. 
There  is,  of  course,  no  perceptual  experience  of  space  thus 
abstracted ;  for  space  does  not  exist  by  itself,  it  is  a  rela- 
tion. Neither  is  there  experience  of  extensity  by  itself; 
for  extensity  is  an  aspect  of  a  perceived  whole  in  which 
there  are  sensible  particulars,  —  as  the  book  and  the  pen, 
or  distinguishable  portions  of  a  surface,  —  and  it  does 
not  exist  apart  from  sensible  particulars.  We  conclude, 
then,  that  perceptual  space  is  the  perceived  position- 
relation  of  co-existent  sensible  objects,  the  perception  of 


294        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

this  relation  giving  an  aspect  of  extensity  to  the  whole  of 
what  is  perceived. 

§  139.  Direction.  —  You  reach  out  and  touch  a  wall, 
you  see  a  tree  toward  your  right,  you  hear  a  bell  sounding 
behind  you.  The  position  of  each  of  these  objects  is 
related  by  you  to  your  own  position;  and  you  express 
this  relation  in  the  terms,  "  before,"  "  to  the  right," 
"  behind."  Other  terms  definitive  of  like  spatial  ex- 
perience are  in  frequent  use  —  as  "  here,"  "  there," 
"  above,"  "  below,"  etc.  They  define  the  position  of 
objects  and  are  terms  of  direction.  Such  definition  of 
position-relation  is  present  in  all  developed  spatial  ex- 
perience. If  we  deal  efficiently  with  objects,  we  must 
apprehend  where  they  are  with  respect  to  ourselves. 
This  definition  of  space-perception  also  makes  experience 
available  for  intersubjective  intercourse.  If  I  should 
say,  "  The  book  is  on  the  upper  shelf  of  the  case  which  is  at 
the  left  of  the  door  as  you  enter  the  study,"  you  would 
understand  me  and  would  easily  locate  the  book.  The 
examples  given  show  that,  in  perceptual  space-experience, 
direction  is  determined  with  reference  to  the  position  of 
the  subject.  The  wall  is  before  you,  the  tree  is  at  your 
right,  the  bell  is  behind  you,  the  book-case  Is  at  your  left 
as  you  enter  the  room.  In  general,  in  perceptual  space, 
the  direction  is  determined  by  relating  the  position  of  the 
object  to  the  position  of  the  subject. 

§  140.  Conceptual  Space.  —  This  is  virtually  the  Plain 
Man's  conception  of  space ;  It  is  also  the  space  of  mathe- 
matics and,  therefore,  of  Science. 

I.  Our  discussion  has  led  us  to  conclude  that  perceptual 
space,  the  space  of  sense-experience.  Is  the  perceived  posi- 
tion-relation of  sensible  objects  and  the  resultant  extensity 
aspect  of  the  perceived  whole.  As  the  extension  element 
of  the  perception  is  an  aspect  of  what  Is  perceived,  it  cannot 


SPACE  295 

exist  by  itself.  We  cannot  image  extension  apart  from 
sensible  objects.  Conceptual  space  is  extension  abstracted 
from  objects ;  it  is  mere  extensity.  According  to  this 
conception,  space  is  whether  objects  are  or  not.  As  thus 
conceived,  space  has  a  sort  of  thinghood ;  it  is  treated  as 
an  entity  and  is  virtually  regarded  as  a  receptacle  for 
material  objects.  We  easily  think  of  space  as  an  infinite 
emptiness  within  which  is  all  that  is  material.  This 
mode  of  thought  has  even  found  a  place  in  Philosophy; 
we  often  say  that  all  sensible  objects  are  in  space.  But 
we  must  not  so  regard  the  objective  reality  corresponding 
to  our  perceptual  experience ;  for  our  perceptions  and 
our  images  have  a  spatial  character  because  of  the  per- 
ceived and  imaged  objects.  Conceptual  space  is  not  the 
same  with  perceptual  space.  Perceptual  space  is  a  re- 
lation and  a  resultant  aspect ;  conceptual  space  is  this 
aspect,  conceived  as  existing  by  itself.  It  is  a  product 
of  reflection;  and,  although  it  is  related  to  perceptual 
space,  it  differs  significantly  from  the  latter. 

2.  But,  if  conceptual  space,  the  space  of  mathematics, 
differs  so  greatly  from  the  space  of  sense-experience,  are 
the  conclusions  of  mathematics  valid  for  the  world  which 
we  know  through  sense-experience  ^  Are  they  valid  for 
the  real  external  world  .?  Although  mathematics  conceives 
space  as  extensity  abstracted  from  perceived  objects, 
nevertheless  it  sets  ideal  objects  in  this  extensity  when  it 
reasons  respecting  space.  The  ideal  objects  are  the 
mathematical  point,  line,  surface,  and  solid.  Having 
set  these  in  space,  it  discusses  position-relations.  The 
point,  being  without  extension,  is  pure  position.  It  takes 
the  place  of  the  subject  in  perceptual  space;  and  direc- 
tion and  distance  are  determined  from  the  point.  Its  line, 
surface,  and  solid  are  constituted  ideally  of  positions  which 
are  external  to  one  another.     The  science  of  geometry  is 


296        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  science  of  related  positions.  From  this  we  conclude 
(i)  that,  although  mathematics  conceives  space  as  ex- 
tensity  abstracted  from  objects,  it  is  wont  in  its  reasoning 
to  give  this  extensity  concreteness  by  setting  ideal  objects 
within  space ;  and  (2)  that  mathematical  reasonings  re- 
specting space  are  discussions  concerning  position-relations. 
In  both  these  particulars,  it  puts  itself  at  one  with  percep- 
tual space.  The  conclusions  logically  deduced  by  such 
reasoning  are  true  for  related  positions  and  are,  therefore, 
true  for  the  position-relations  of  objects.  By  so  much  as 
they  are  valid  for  spatial  relations  in  general,  they  are 
valid  for  the  spatial  relations  of  the  universe. 

§  141.  Is  Space  infinitely  Divisible  and  infinitely  Ex- 
tended? —  I.  It  is  frequently  said  that  space  is  infinitely 
divisible  and  infinitely  extended.  This  is  not  true  of 
perceptual  space.  The  extension  of  any  perceived  whole 
is  limited  by  the  related  positions  of  the  perceived  objects. 
To  be  sure,  I  can  change  the  relative  positions  of  my  book 
and  inkstand  and  pen  so  that  the  resultant  whole  would 
be  less  or  greater  in  extent  than  my  present  perception. 
But,  although  I  would  in  that  case  perceive  the  same  ob- 
jects, the  perceived  whole  would  not  be  the  same;  it 
would  differ  from  what  I  now  perceive  in  the  matter  of 
position-relation  and  extensity.  Perceptual  space  is 
necessarily  the  space  of  a  particular  perception,  and  its 
extensity  is  fixed  by  the  position-relations  of  the  objects 
perceived. 

2.  Conceptual  space  is  infinitely  divisible  and  extended. 
This  would  follow  from  the  fact  that  extensity  abstracted 
from  objects  —  and  that  is  what  conceptual  space  is  — 
is  necessarily  unlimited.  The  critical  question  for  us  at 
this  point  is  as  to  what  the  infinite  divisibility  and  exten- 
sion of  space  signify.  A  line  is  a  whole  whose  capacity 
for  division  cannot  be  exhausted ;   and  this  is  true  also  of 


SPACE  '        297 

a  surface  or  a  solid.  These  are  primary  concepts  of  con- 
ceptual space;  and  their  infinite  divisibility  simply  means 
that  their  capacity  for  division  can  never  be  exhausted. 
When  we  say  that  space  is  limitless  in  extent,  we  mean 
that  however  far  we  may  think  a  line  or  a  surface  extended, 
we  have  not  exhausted  the  possibility  of  extending  it. 
In  our  attempt  to  think  a  Hmit,  we  think  a  "  beyond." 
From  this  we  see  that  the  infinite  divisibility  and  exten- 
sion of  space  signify  that  thought  cannot  set  a  limit  to  the 
possible  position-relations,  size,  or  number  of  objects. 
It  does  not  mean  that  space  is  emptiness  which  is  infinitely 
extended,  or  limited  emptiness  which  may  be  infinitely 
divided. 

§  142.  Space  and  Reality.  —  i.  Perception  of  Material 
Objects  always  gives  Space-Experience.  —  All  material 
objects  are  known  through  sensory  experience,  and  they 
are  cognized  as  extended.  Matter  may,  therefore,  be 
described  as  reality  expressed  in  extension  and  known  in 
sense-experience.  Being  an  expression  of  reality,  it  is 
real.  Speaking  exactly.  It  Is  a  form  In  which  objective 
reality  expresses  Itself  to  a  subject;  It  Is  the  form  In  which 
it  expresses  itself  to  the  subject  as  sentient.  Acting 
after  this  mode,  objective  reality  expresses  Itself  In  objects 
which  have  parts  "  out  from  "  other  parts  —  as  the  parts 
of  a  pen  or  a  spot  of  color;  and  also  in  indlvidua  which 
are  perceptibly  discrete.  Science  assures  us  that  bodies 
which  present  an  appearance  of  continuity  are  really  con- 
stituted of  discrete  particles,  particles  which  are  apart 
from  one  another.  From  all  that  precedes,  it  would  ap- 
pear that  reality  has  an  externalizing  mode  of  activity, 
that  It  has  a  mode  of  being  in  which  parts  exist  "  out  of  " 
each  other.  To  deny  that  this  is  true  of  reality  would  be 
to  say  that  the  cognizing  mind  contributes  to  objects 
what  Is  alien  to  the  object ;   and  we  have  already  assigned 


298         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

reasons  for  rejecting  such  a  doctrine.  Objectively  re- 
garded, space  is  grounded  In  the  externalizing  activity  of 
objective  reality. 

2.  Whatever  is  known,  is  known  as  Many  in  One.  — 
My  knife,  my  pen,  and  my  paper-cutter  lie  before  me.  I 
perceive  all  of  them  in  one  act  of  perception.  In  knowing 
this  whole,  I  individualize  portions  of  the  whole  —  the 
knife,  the  pen,  and  the  paper-cutter.  I  see  the  surface  of 
the  sheet  upon  which  I  am  writing ;  and.  In  seeing  It,  I  dis- 
tinguish parts  of  the  surface  from  other  parts,  i.e.  I  indi- 
vidualize portions  of  the  surface.  This  individualizing 
activity  of  the  mind  is  the  synthetic-analytic  activity  of 
thought  to  which  we  have  previously  referred.  The  in- 
dividualizing activity  of  subject  reality  and  the  inter- 
related externalizing  activity  of  object  reality  yield  an  ex- 
perience of  related  "  outness  "  and  a  consequent  aspect  of 
extenslty.  The  subjective  ground  of  space  Is  the  synthetic- 
analytic  activity  of  mind;  subjectively  regarded,  space 
has  Its  origin  in  the  individualizing  activity  of  the  subject. 

§  143.  Non-spatial,  or  Trans-spatial,  Reality.  —  i.  You 
think  about  bulky  things ;  your  thoughts  do  not  have 
bulk.  You  feel  pleasure,  or  displeasure,  as  you  think  of 
a  happening  or  a  person ;  but  the  affective  tone  of  your 
experience  is  not  spatial.  You  may  purpose  undertakings 
which  will  affect  many  or  few  Interests ;  but  the  purpose 
does  not  fill  so  many  cubic  inches.  Our  thoughts,  feelings, 
and  purposes  do  not,  as  elements  of  consciousness,  have 
spatial  characteristics ;  they  are  not  related  to  each  other 
in  position.  Attention,  memory,  emotions,  and  Ideas 
are  not  in  position-relations  and  cannot  have  extension. 
They  are  expressions  of  subject  reality.  We  have  object 
reality  expressing  Itself  In  extension;  and,  over  against 
this,  we  have  subject  reality  whose  expressions  of  itself 
are  non-extended. 


SPACE  299 

2.  We  have  been  wont  to  speak  of  matter  as  extended 
or  spatial  reality,  and  of  mind  as  unextended  or  non- 
spatial.  But  there  is  grave  objection  to  taking  these 
negative  terms  —  unextended  and  non-spatial  —  as  final. 
They  do  not  proffer  any  content  to  thought;  whereas 
our  experience  of  self,  our  self-consciousness,  has  content ; 
and  the  mind  gains  this  positive  content  by  being  related 
to  extended  reality.  But,  to  speak  of  objective  reality 
as  spatial  and  of  subject  reality  as  non-spatial  is  to  make 
them  antithetical  to  each  other.  If  it  were  possible  that 
there  should  be  two  realities,  each  of  them  in  nature  and 
idea  exclusive  of  the  other,  could  they  be  interrelated  ? 
But,  granting  the  possibility  of  their  existence  and  their 
being  interrelated,  neither  of  them  could  possibly  have 
content  for  the  other.  We  know,  however,  that  material 
and  mental  reality  are,  and  that  they  are  actually  related, 
and  that  mental  reality  obtains  content  from  material  real- 
ity. We  have  also  learned  that  they  are  complementary 
to  each  other,  not  antithetical ;  and  that  material  reality 
exists  for  mental  reality  and  finds  its  significance  in  it. 
These  considerations  lead  us  to  use  the  term  "  trans- 
spatial  "  in  preference  to  the  term  "  non-spatial."  The 
self  is  trans-spatial  reality,  i.e.  reality  which  is  free  from 
spatial  limitations,  that  reality  in  which  spatial  reality 
becomes  significant  and  for  which  it  exists. 

§  144.  Conclusions.  —  Perceptual  space  is  the  space 
of  particular  perceptions.  It  is  essentially  the  perceived 
position-relations  of  objects,  with  the  resultant  aspect 
of  extensity.  As  a  category,  it  is  the  extensity  of  a  per- 
ception, abstracted  from  the  objects  perceived ;  this  is 
the  same  with  abstracting  the  position-relations  from 
the  perceived  whole.  Conceptual  space  is  mere  extensity, 
extensity  abstracted  from  objects.  Perceptual  space  is 
fundamentally  a  relation;   conceptual  space  is  treated  as 


300        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

an  entity.  Perceptual  space  is  an  aspect  of  a  percep- 
tion, and  is  a  concrete  accident;  conceptual  space  is  this 
aspect  conceptualized  and  then  regarded  as  a  substance, 
not  an  accident.  In  perceptual  space,  direction  is  deter- 
mined from  the  position  of  the  subject;  in  conceptual 
space,  it  is  determined  with  respect  to  a  conceived  point. 
Although  the  space  of  mathematics  is  conceptual  space, 
the  discussions  of  that  science  are  related  to  perceptual 
space.  This  is  done  by  setting  ideal  objects  —  the  point, 
the  line,  the  surface,  and  the  solid  —  within  its  conceived 
extensity  and  in  actual  position-relation  to  each  other; 
and  its  discussions  are  arguments  concerning  the  position- 
relations  of  these  objects.  Since  its  conclusions  are  valid 
for  spatial  relations  in  general,  they  are  valid  for  the 
external  world  viewed  spatially.  The  extensity  of  per- 
ceptual space  is  limited  by  the  position-relations  of  the 
perceived  objects ;  conceptual  space  is  limitless,  i.e.  there 
is  no  limit  to  the  possible  position-relations,  the  size,  or 
the  number  of  objects.  Matter  is  real;  it  is  reality  ex- 
pressed in  extension;  it  is  the  form  in  which  objective 
reality  expresses  itself  to  the  subject  as  sentient.  Mind 
is  unextended  and  trans-spatial  reality ;  it  and  matter 
are  complementary,  not  antithetical.  Subject  reality  — 
i.e.  the  self  —  is  trans-spatial  reality  ;  it  is  free  from  spatial 
limitations,  and  spatial  reality  exists  for  it  and  only  comes 
to  completion  and  significance  as  it  is  appropriated  by  a 
self.  Space  is  grounded  in  the  interrelated  externalizing 
activity  of  object  reality  and  the  individualizing  activity 
of  subject  reality. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 

TIME 

In  considering  this  category,  it  is  necessary  to  distin- 
guish between  the  time-element  of  sense-perception  and 
conceptual  time.  They  are  closely  related,  but  they 
differ  in  their  conception  of  time ;  and  the  ignoring  of 
this  difference  had  led  to  confusion. 

§145.  Characteristics  of  Perceptual  Time.  —  i.  Ex- 
perience is  a  continuous  process  (§  59,  3) ;  being  a  con- 
tinuous process,  it  is  in  constant  change.  Our  interest, 
however,  leads  us  to  individualize  portions  of  our  experi- 
ence. In  the  experience  of  this  morning,  I  distinguish  a 
stage  in  which  I  was  reading  and  this  present  stage  in 
which  I  am  writing.  The  important  fact  for  our  present 
study  is,  not  that  I  apprehend  these  stages  as  differing 
from  each  other  in  general  content,  but  that  I  apprehend 
one  of  them  as  coming  after  the  other.  These  stages  are 
cognized  by  me  as  related  in  respect  of  sequence.  This  is 
true  of  all  our  experience  of  the  external  world ;  the  in- 
dividual stages  are  cognized  as  terms  in  a  succession.  We 
experience  this  relation  of  sequence  in  and  with  our  ap- 
prehension of  the  stages.  Thus,  in  taking  up  the  fact  of 
my  reading  and  of  my  writing  into  one  thought,  I  there- 
with have  experience  of  the  sequence  of  the  writing  upon 
the  reading.  This  cognition  of  the  sequence  is  not  through 
reflection ;  in  knowing  these  stages,  I  know  them  as  in 
sequence-relation.  The  time-element  of  my  present  ex- 
perience is  my  perception  of  one  of  these  stages  as  sequent 
to  the  other.     The   objective   time-element   is   the   rela- 

301 


302        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  of  succession.  Perceptual  space-experience  arises 
in  the  perception  of  position-relation;  perceptual  time- 
experience  arises  in  the  apprehension  of  sequence-relations. 
2.  Because  of  the  spatial  element  of  experience,  lan- 
guage —  which  is  a  product  of  experience  —  has  such 
words  as  "  here  "  and  "  there  " ;  because  of  the  temporal 
element,  we  have  the  words  "  now "  and  "  then.'* 
"  Then  "  may  signify  that  the  stage  of  experience  to  which 
it  is  applied  is  one  through  which  we  have  passed,  or  a 
stage  thought  of,  but  not  yet  realized.  There  are  ex- 
periences which  may  be  expressed  thus :  "  I  spoke  of  it 
then  " ;  or  "  I  will  be  there  to-morrow  and  will  speak  of 
it  then."  "  Then  "  is  either  before  or  after  "  now  " ; 
and,  in  perceptual  time,  "  now  "  —  or  the  present  —  is 
the  term  of  the  succession  to  which  all  stages  of  experience 
are  related.  "  Now  "  in  time  corresponds  to  "  here  " 
in  space.  This  present,  this  "  now,"  is  often  regarded  as 
an  instant  which  ceases  in  its  becoming,  which  dies  as  it 
is  born ;  it  is  thought  by  most  persons  to  be  a  mere  time- 
point.  James  has  trenchantly  said,  "  The  present  is  not 
a  knife-edge,  it  is  a  saddle-back  " ;  and  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult, if  not  impossible,  to  find  a  psychologist  who  questions 
this  statement.  The  perceptual  present  is  an  enduring 
present.  It  Is  not  a  mere  time-point,  separating  past 
sequence  from  future  sequence ;  it  is  a  time-line.  In  the 
briefest  time-consciousness,  there  is  awareness  of  two  or 
more  sequent  phases  of  experience,  distinguished  from 
each  other.  We  do  not  have  these  phases  of  experience 
first  and  then  come  to  know  them  as  sequent  by  reflection ; 
they  are  together  in  experience  as  successive.  Time-experi- 
ence arises  in  our  perception  of  sequence,  of  "  that  "  as 
coming  before  "  this,"  or  of  "  this  "  and  "  this  "  again  and 
"  this  "  again,  and  so  on.  The  perceptual  present  is 
frequently  spoken  of  as   "  the   specious  present  " ;    but 


TIME  303 

this  term  is  unfortunate,  for  it  implies  that  the  enduring 
present  of  perception  is  not  a  real  present.  It  is  the  real 
present  of  experience.  We  conclude,  then,  that  the  per- 
ceptual present  has  duration.  Perceptual  time  is  a  per- 
ceived sequence-relation  and  the  resultant  aspect  of 
duration.  The  perceptual  time-unit  is  Many  in  One ;  in 
respect  of  duration,  it  is  one;  in  respect  of  succession, 
it  is  many. 

3.  From  the  above,  it  appears  that  awareness  of  se- 
quence is  fundamental  to  time-experience,  and  that  the 
awareness  of  sequence  gives  an  aspect  of  duration  to  the 
whole  which  is  cognized.  "  A  year  ago  to-day,  I  was  in  the 
rush  and  din  of  New  York ;  now  I  am  tenting  beside  a  quiet 
lake  which  is  hidden  in  the  Maine  woods."  Here  is  a  cog- 
nized whole  of  experience ;  and,  in  this  whole,  two  stages 
of  experience  are  distinguished.  In  the  one  stage,  the  sub- 
ject is  having  experience  of  New  York  city ;  in  the  other,  he 
has  experience  of  the  quiet  Maine  woods.  In  thinking 
about  these  stages,  the  subject  relates  them  in  respect  of  se- 
quence ;  and  he  fixes  the  order  of  sequence  by  relating  the 
New  York  stage  to  his  present.  In  thus  relating  them  he 
apprehends  them  as  widely  separated  ;  and,  in  his  cognizing 
them  as  apart  from  each  other,  the  whole  has  an  aspect  of 
duration.  He  assigns  a  measure  to  this  duration;  he 
speaks  of  it  as  a  year.  Perceptual  time  is  the  sequence- 
relation  of  distinguished  stages  of  experience  and  the 
aspect  of  duration  which  arises  in  the  perception  of  this 
relation.  The  sequence  is  determined  with  reference  to 
the  present  of  the  subject.  If  we  abstract  sequence  and 
the  duration  from  the  cognized  stages,  we  have  perceptual 
time  as  a  category.  It  is  the  form  in  which  we  cognize 
stages  of  experience,  the  form,  therefore,  in  which  we 
cognize  change. 

§  146.    Conceptual   Time.  —  Conceptual   time   bears   a 


304        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

relation  to  perceptual  time  analogous  to  the  relation  of 
conceptual  space  to  perceptual  space. 

1.  In  conceptual  time,  the  aspect  of  duration  is  ab- 
stracted from  actual  experience  and  is  conceived  as  exist- 
ing by  itself ;  briefly,  conceptual  time  is  abstract  duration. 
An  aspect  is  a  characteristic  of  an  objective  whole,  as 
that  whole  is  perceived  by  the  subject.  The  extensity  of 
a  surface  or  the  length  of  an  address  is  an  aspect  of  the 
surface  or  the  address,  as  experienced  by  one  who  sees 
the  surface  or  hears  the  address.  An  aspect  exists  only 
in  a  particular  cognition;  but  conceptual  time  regards 
abstract  duration  as  an  individual  real.  It  is  conceived 
as  an  extended  whole  in  which  events  and  our  experience 
of  events  and  persons  and  things  come  to  be.  This  ab- 
stract is  the  time  of  the  Plain  Man  and  the  Scientist. 
It  is  not,  however,  treated  as  an  abstract,  or  a  concept ; 
on  the  contrary,  a  sort  of  thinghood  is  accorded  it. 
Teachers  of  Philosophy  not  infrequently  speak  of  events 
and  experiences  as  being  in  time.  This  is  allowable  if 
we  are  speaking  of  abstract,  or  conceptual,  time;  but 
from  the  point  of  view  of  real  time,  the  time  of  perceptual 
experience,  experience  is  not  in  time,  for  time  has  its 
origin  and  being  in  experience.  If  we  would  keep  in 
touch  with  concrete  reality,  and  would  speak  with  exact- 
ness, we  may  not  say  that  objects  are  cognized  in  time; 
for  time  is  in  cognition.  Hence  when  we  speak  of  ex- 
perience as  being  in  time,  our  statement  is  only  true  of 
conceptual  time,  time  conceived  as  a  condition  of  change. 

2.  That  the  present  of  perception  is  an  enduring  pres- 
ent, is  undisputed.  The  present  of  conceptual  time  is  a 
mere  time-point ;  it  has  no  duration ;  quantitatively  it  is 
zero.  It  is  the  point  of  transition  between  duration  which 
precedes   and   that  which   follows. 

3.  The  conceptual  notion  of  time  has  value  for  Science 


TIME  '  305 

and  for  practical  life.  It  enables  us  to  relate  events  to 
any  moment  of  the  past  or  future.  Perceptual  time 
can  only  relate  them  to  the  present  of  the  subject,  to  our 
personal  "  now."  For  example,  in  our  calendar,  events 
are  related  to  the  birth  of  Christ  —  so  long  before  or  after 
that  moment  of  human  experience.  That  is,  conceptual 
time  expresses  time-relations  in  universal  terms,  terms 
which  have  like  temporal  significance  to  all  subjects. 
Although  time  is  generally  thought  of  as  mere  duration, 
we  give  it  concreteness  in  scientific  thought  and  every-day 
intercourse ;  and  we  must  if  it  shall  have  value.  We  give 
it  this  concreteness  by  relating  actual  events  in  re- 
spect of  sequence.  "  Columbus  discovered  America  a.d. 
1492  " ;  "  The  Jamestown  colonists  came  to  the  Western 
world  thirteen  years  before  the  Plymouth  Pilgrims." 
These  examples  go  to  show  that  the  time  of  actual  experi- 
ence is  an  apprehended  sequence-relation  and  an  attend- 
ant aspect  of  duration ;   it  is  not  mere  duration. 

§  147.  Is  Time  infinitely  Divisible  and  Extended?  — 
It  is  frequently  said  that  time  is  infinitely  divisible  and 
infinite  in  duration.     This  statement  is  open  to  criticism. 

I.  Perceptual  time  —  and  that  is  real  time  —  is  ob- 
viously not  infinitely  extended ;  for  we  cannot  have  per- 
ceptual experience  of  infinite  duration.  Neither  is  it 
infinitely  divisible.  Perceptual  time  arises  in  awareness 
of  succession ;  this  awareness  is  an  element  of  perceptual 
experience.  This  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  the  "  now  "  of 
perceptual  experience  has  duration.  In  the  experience 
of  any  moment,  there  is  awareness  of  two  or  more  sequent 
phases  of  experience.  If  the  moment  be  that  of  hearing 
a  quick  tap,  in  that  instant  we  are  aware  of  the  relative 
silence  before  the  tap  and  after  the  tap.  The  "  present  " 
experience  is  an  experience  of  Many  in  One  (§  145,  2). 
Experimental  psychology  furnishes  facts  which  are  im- 


3o6         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

portant  in  this  connection.  If  there  are  more  than  twenty 
changes  to  the  second,  vision  cannot  distinguish  the  in- 
dividual changes.  More  than  forty  changes  to  the  second 
are  not  distinguishable  by  touch ;  and  more  than  lOO  taps 
to  the  second  are  heard  as  one  tap.  Although  persons 
differ  in  their  ability  to  distinguish  rapidly  repeated  sen- 
sations, there  is  for  every  one  a  limit;  repeated  changes 
of  briefer  duration  than  this  minimum  are  continuous 
for  perception.  In  such  case,  we  cannot  perceive  a  se- 
quence-relation. 

2.  Conceptual  time  is  infinitely  divisible  and  infinite 
in  duration.  Since  it  is  mere  duration,  it  is  conceived 
apart  from  perceived  sequence-relation  and,  therefore,  is 
not  subject  to  the  limitations  of  sense-experience.  These 
characteristics  of  conceptual  time  signify  that  thought 
cannot  set  a  limit  to  the  beginning  or  the  end  of  change, 
or  to  the  number  or  duration  of  changes  in  the  cosmos. 

§  148.  Time  and  Reality.  —  The  time-element  of  ex- 
perience has  its  origin  in  our  perception  of  changes  in 
objective  reality.  Our  personal  interest  leads  us  to  in- 
dividualize stages  of  change  in  objects ;  and  we  thus  dis- 
tinguish parts  of  the  change  from  one  another.  Objective 
reality  is,  in  consequence,  expressed  in  sequent  revelations 
of  itself.  These  distinguishable  sequences  in  objective 
changes  are  the  objective  ground  of  time-experience. 
The  same  interest  which  leads  us  to  individualize  stages 
of  objective  change  leads  us  also  to  individualize  corre- 
sponding phases  of  experience.  By  reason  of  the  in- 
dividualizing activity  of  the  mind,  objective  change  is 
perceived  in  sequent  stages,  and  our  experience  has  for  us 
corresponding  sequent  stages.  It  is  of  the  nature  of  mind 
to  relate  its  objects ;  it  does  this  in  order  that  it  may  dis- 
cover their  import  (§§  104,  105).  In  relating  the  stages 
of  change,  both  subjective  and  objective,  there  arises  the 


TIME  307 

aspect  of  duration.  From  this  it  follows  that  the  subjec- 
tive ground  of  time  is  the  activity  of  the  mind  in  relating 
changes  in  respect  of  their  sequence.  Time  is  an  ex- 
pression of  subject  reality  as  revealed  in  its  experience  of 
objective  reality. 

§  149.  The  Non-temporal  or  Trans-temporal.  —  i. 
The  Objective  Ground  of  Time  is  Change.  —  Physical  laws 
are  unchangeable.  Given  certain  events,  we  have  a 
telephone  system ;  given  a  certain  relating  of  yourself, 
another  person,  and  the  system,  you  hold  a  conversation 
with  the  other  person  even  though  he  be  some  miles  dis- 
tant. The  physical  laws  involved  in  these  changes  do 
not  change.  One  may  change  the  distance  between  two 
material  objects;  but  that  will  not  affect  the  law  of  at- 
traction as  related  to  those  objects.  The  fundamental 
order  of  change  in  the  physical  universe  is  unchangeable. 
The  relations  between  persons  are  subject  to  change; 
but  the  ethical  principle  which  determines  the  duty  of 
each  of  us  with  respect  to  others  abides  the  same  always. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  the  law  of  identity  in  logic  and 
principle  of  harmony  in  aesthetics  ;  they  and  physical  and 
ethical  laws  are  unchanging  orders.  These  unchangeable 
laws  and  principles  give  order  to  the  universe;  but  for 
them  it  would  be  a  chaos  instead  of  a  cosmos.  The  nature 
of  reality  is  necessarily  unchangeable ;  and  its  nature  just 
as  necessarily  determines  its  laws  of  change;  as  a  con- 
sequence, orderly  change  has  its  ground  in  the  unchanging 
nature  of  reality.  In  other  words,  what  is  not  temporal 
is  the  ground  of  time-experience. 

These  unchanging  principles  have  been  commonly 
spoken  of  as  non-temporal  or  timeless ;  but  these  terms 
are  not  satisfactory.  They  are  negative.  They  put  the 
so-called  non-temporal  and  the  temporal  out  of  relation 
to  each  other,  whereas  we  have  found  that  they  are  in- 


308        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

timately  related.  They  set  these  unchanging  principles 
in  fundamental  antithesis  to  the  world  of  change;  but 
these  principles  and  the  changes  which  they  order  are 
expressions  of  the  nature  of  reality,  and  reality  is  surely  not 
divided  against  itself.  We  prefer  the  term  trans-temporal ; 
the  trans-temporal  determines  the  order  of  the  temporal. 

2.  Is  a  Trans -temp  oral  Subject  Conceivable?  —  Our 
"  present  "  is  limited.  Much  of  our  experience  is  "  past  " 
and  has  to  be  recalled  if  we  would  realize  it  now ;  there  are 
sequences  in  this  instant  which  we  cannot  distinguish; 
and  there  is  an  undefined  future  of  experience  before  each 
of  us,  and  this  future  cannot  come  into  our  present  con- 
sciousness. Our  "  present  "  experience  is  incomplete ; 
it  is  rendered  incomplete  by  our  limitations.  We  cannot 
call  up  all  of  the  past  at  any  instant ;  we  cannot  distin- 
guish very  rapid  sequences,  and  we  cannot  realize  the 
future.  This  incompleteness  of  experience  makes  it  im- 
possible for  us  to  understand  the  full  significance  of 
"  present "  experience.  Every  stage  of  the  rational 
life  of  each  of  us  is  an  organic  part  of  the  whole  of  ex- 
perience;  no  stage  can  be  fully  understood  except  it  be 
read  in  the  light  of  the  whole  life.  The  student  experi- 
ence has  explanation  for  the  years  after  college ;  and 
future  experience  was  for  the  student  an  ideal  which  largely 
determined  the  experience  of  the  student  years.  There 
is  that  in  the  future  experience  of  the  child  which  reveals 
the  significance  of  the  present  experience  of  the  parents. 
The  experience  of  the  citizen  finds  explanation  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  state,  in  incidents  of  this  history  which  are 
unknown  to  the  citizen. 

Now,  it  would  be  of  the  nature  of  an  Absolute  subject, 
a  subject  who  is  himself  the  source  of  all  being  and  activity, 
to  have  a  complete  experience;  for  all  that  exists  would 
have  its  being  from  him.     The  incompleteness  of  our  ex- 


TIME  309 

perience  is  not  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  constituted  of 
sequent  moments.  It  comes  of  our  limitations.  The 
Absolute  subject  would  conceivably  cognize  all  the  suc- 
cessive changes  of  the  world  as  we  cognize  our  "  present  "  ; 
that  is,  he  would  have  all  sequences  in  a  "  present  "  con- 
sciousness. This  would  not  preclude  their  appearing  in 
succession ;  for  succession  is  in  our  "  now,"  so  all  suc- 
cession would  be  in  the  enduring  "  now  "  of  the  Absolute 
subject.  The  full  significance  of  the  experience  of  all  of 
us  would  be  revealed  in  the  experience  of  this  subject; 
for  his  experience,  being  complete,  would  include  all  that 
is.  We  believe  that  the  ground  reality  of  the  universe 
is  the  Absolute  subject.  Being  Absolute  subject,  he  is 
trans-temporal ;  and  all  that  is  temporal  finds  its  ulti- 
mate explanation  in  him. 

§  150.  Conclusions.  —  Perceptual  time  is  the  time  of 
particular  perceptions.  It  is  the  perceived  sequence- 
relation  of  individualized  stages  of  change  and  the  at- 
tendant aspect  of  duration.  Perceptual  time,  as  a  form 
of  cognition,  —  i.e.  as  a  category,  —  is  the  sequence- 
relation  and  the  duration,  abstracted  from  the  distin- 
guished stages  of  change.  Conceptual  time  is  mere 
duration.  Perceptual  time  is  fundamentally  a  relation 
and  does  not  exist  apart  from  distinguished  moments  of 
perception ;  conceptual  time  is  regarded  as  having  exist- 
ence by  itself.  Perceptual  time  is  also  an  aspect  of  a 
perceived  whole,  an  aspect  having  its  being  in  a  perceived 
sequence-relation.  Conceptual  time  is  this  aspect  con- 
ceptualized and  then  thought  of  as  a  substance,  not  an 
accident.  In  perceptual  time,  sequent  stages  of  change 
are  related  to  the  "  present "  of  the  subject.  This  "  pres- 
ent "  is  not  a  time-point,  it  is  a  time-line ;  it  has  duration. 
In  conceptual  time,  events  may  be  related  in  respect  of 
sequence  to  any  moment  of  individual  or  universal  history. 


3IO        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

The  "  present  "  of  conceptual  time  is  a  time-point.  Al- 
though time  is  commonly  regarded  as  mere  duration,  in 
applying  this  conception  to  actual  experience  it  ceases  to 
be  abstract  and  becomes  a  concrete  aspect  of  related  se- 
quent stages  of  experience.  Perceptual  time  is  not  in- 
finite ;  we  cannot  perceive  infinite  duration.  It  is  not  in- 
finitely divisible;  sequences  may  follow  each  other  so 
rapidly  that  we  cannot  distinguish  them.  The  infinite 
divisibility  and  duration  of  conceptual  time  signify  that 
thought  cannot  set  a  point  for  the  beginning  or  cessation 
of  change,  neither  can  it  limit  the  number  of  possible 
changes  or  the  duration  of  the  universe.  Objectively,  time 
is  grounded  in  the  fact  that  reality,  both  subjective  and 
objective,  expresses  itself  in  change;  and  particulars  of 
change  are  necessarily  successive.  Subjectively,  it  is 
grounded  in  the  individualizing  and  relating  activity  of 
the  mind.  Changes  are  orderly;  and  they  are  orderly 
because  the  principles  which  determine,  and  therefore 
condition,  changes  are  themselves  not  subject  to  change. 
They  are  trans-temporal.  These  trans-temporal  prin- 
ciples are  an  expression  of  the  essential  nature  of  reality; 
and  this  signifies  that  the  activity  of  reality  is  by  necessity 
orderly.  Reality  is  in  its  essential  nature  trans-temporal 
and,  therefore,  unchangeable;  but  it  is  also  active  and 
expresses  itself  in  change,  in  what  gives  time-experience. 
We  have  experience  of  what  is  trans-temporal ;  but  our 
experience  is  temporal  and  incomplete.  Its  incomplete- 
ness and  temporality  do  not  come  of  the  fact  that  ob- 
jective reality  is  expressed  in  succession ;  it  is  due  to  our 
limited  "  present "  ;  and  our  "  present "  is  limited  because 
we  are  not  self-subsistent,  but  are  in  a  dependent  relation 
to  all  that  is.  An  Absolute  subject,  being  self-subsistent, 
would  be  trans-temporal ;  all  succession  would  be  compre- 
hended in  his  "present"  ;  his  experience  would  be  complete. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 

ACTIVITY,    REST,    AND   MOTION 

§  151.  Activity.  —  i.  We  know  ourselves  as  thinking, 
purposing,  speaking,  and  doing.  Your  least  knowledge  of 
yourself  is  not  that  you  are,  but  that  you  are  and  are  active. 
The  being  and  being  active  are  inseparable  elements  of  this 
least  knowledge.  We  may  separate  them  in  thought,  by 
giving  emphasis  now  to  the  being  and  again  to  the  being 
active;  but  both  are  always  present  in  our  knowledge  of 
self.  In  other  words,  one  never  merely  knows  that  he  is ; 
he  knows  himself  as  active.  Thinking  and  purposing 
activity  is  obviously  internal  to  the  self;  it  is  immanent 
activity.  Our  speaking  and  working  activity  results  in 
change  which  is  external  to  the  self;  but  the  activity  is 
within  and  of  the  self.  This  notion  of  activity  is  not  a 
product  of  reflection ;  it  is  present  in  a  subject's  cognition 
of  himself.  That  is,  subject  reality  is  known  after  the 
form,  or  under  the  category,  of  activity. 

2.  "  I  wave  my  hand  "  and  "  I  lift  the  book  "  express 
typical  experiences  in  which  I  know  myself  as  active.  The 
notable  fact  for  us  is  that,  in  these  experiences,  I  refer  the 
activity  primarily  to  myself.  The  activity  which  results 
in  the  movement  of  the  hand  and  the  lifting  of  the  book  is 
thought  of  as  within  the  subject.  The  spatial  changes  — 
the  waving  of  the  hand  and  the  moving  of  the  book  — 
are  thought  of  as  the  token  and  result  of  the  subject's 
immanent  activity.  The  changes  which  are  apparent  are 
the  tokens  of  changes  which  are  internal.  This  is  true 
of  the  movements  of  animals  and  the  changes  which  take 

3" 


312         INTRODUCTION   TO  PHILOSOPHY 

place  in  the  growth  of  animals  and  plants.  The  shying  of 
the  horse,  the  flying  of  the  bird,  the  barking  of  the  dog, 
the  leafing  of  the  trees  in  spring  are  outer  tokens  and  re- 
sults of  immanent  activity  and  change.  The  astounding 
transformations  which  are  effected  in  the  chemist's 
laboratory  are  tokens  and  results  of  internal  changes  in 
the  substances  with  which  he  deals.  This  holds  also  for 
the  integrating  and  disintegrating  changes  in  nature.  All 
change  comes  of  activity,  and  all  activity  is  fundamentally 
immanent. 

§  152.  Transeunt  Activity.  —  So  far  we  have  repre- 
sented activity  as  essentially  immanent,  as  immediately 
related  to  internal  changes  in  reality.  There  are  experi- 
ences, however,  which  seem  to  indicate  that  activity  passes 
beyond  the  particular  real.  For  example,  a  boy  throws 
a  ball.  The  "  common-sense  "  interpretation  of  such  an 
event  is  that  something  passes  from  the  boy  to  the  ball 
and  imparts  motion  to  the  latter.  Because  the  activity 
of  the  boy  apparently  goes  beyond  him  to  the  ball,  his 
activity  in  this  instance  is  said  to  be  transitive,  or  transeunt 
—  occasionally  transient.  The  usual  explanation  is  that 
energy  —  or  active  power  —  is  transmitted  to  the  ball. 
But  activity  does  not  exist  by  itself;  and  it  cannot,  for 
activity  is  an  attribute,  not  a  thing.  The  same  is  true  of 
energy.  It  is  simply  impossible  that  an  attribute  pass 
over,  or  be  transmitted,  from  one  object  to  another. 
Hence  this  interpretation  must  be  rejected.  Nevertheless 
it  is  obvious  that  the  activity  of  the  boy  is  intimately 
related  to  the  change  which  takes  place  in  the  ball.  There 
was  energy  in  the  boy  and  the  ball  before  the  boy  threw 
the  ball.  The  difference  is  that  when  the  boy  and  the 
ball  are  related  as  they  are  in  the  act  of  throwing,  the  energy 
of  the  ball  is  expressed  in  the  motion  of  the  ball.  A  new 
relation  is  set  up  by  the  change  in  the  activity  of  the  boy 


ACTIVITY,  REST,  AND  MOTION         313 

in  throwing,  and  there  follows  such  an  adjustment  of  the 
ball  to  the  new  relation  as  is  necessary  to  preserve  the  har- 
mony of  the  system  of  which  the  boy  and  the  ball  are  parts. 
The  adjusting  immanent  activity  of  the  ball  is  expressed, 
at  least  in  part,  in  the  movement  of  the  ball.  When  a 
change  is  effected  in  the  relation  of  objects,  there  is  an  ad- 
justing change  in  the  activity  of  the  objects;  and  this 
change  frequently  becomes  apparent.  Transeunt  activity 
is  not  activity  in  which  energy  passes  over  from  one  object 
to  another.  When  we  say  that  an  object  is  transeuntly 
active,  we  mean  that  its  activity  is  perceptibly  related 
to  changes  in  another  object. 

§  153.  Rest.  —  We  think  of  an  object  as  at  rest  when, 
so  far  as  we  know,  it  is  not  changing  its  spatial  relations. 
Such  an  object  is  commonly  thought  to  be  inactive ;  but 
this  conception  confounds  activity  and  movement.  Move- 
ment is  not  activity ;  it  is  one  result,  but  not  the  only  result, 
of  activity.  All  reality  is  active;  hence  the  mere  fact 
that  an  object  is  not  changing  its  position-relations  does 
not  warrant  us  in  speaking  of  it,  or  thinking  of  it,  as  in- 
active. Perceptible  change  in  an  object  is  an  indication 
of  internal  change.  Sometimes  immanent  activity  ex- 
presses itself  in  changes  which  are  unaccompanied  by 
perceptible  spatial  change  —  as  in  the  ripening  of  fruit, 
or  in  the  case  of  cool  water  becoming  warm  by  standing 
in  a  heated  room.  We  judge  an  object  to  be  at  rest  when 
its  activity  is  not  expressed  in  known  spatial  change. 

The  important  question  for  us  is,  What  determines  that 
an  object  shall  be  at  rest?  What  determines  that  the 
mellowing  apple  on  my  desk  shall  be  at  rest,  and  that  the 
hand  with  which  I  am  writing  shall  be  moving .?  We  have 
seen  that  movement  is  a  token  of  internal  change,  and 
that  sometimes  it  accompanies  change  and  at  other  times 
it  does  not.     It  follows,  then,  that  the  internal  changes 


314        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

of  an  object  determine  whether  it  shall  appear  to  be  at 
rest  or  not  at  rest.  Every  object  is  a  part  of  the  world 
system  and  is,  at  the  same  time,  subject  to  change.  It  is 
evident  that  the  preservation  of  the  system  requires  a  con- 
stant process  of  readjustment  in  the  changing  parts  of 
the  system  (§§  no,  114).  This  readjustment  is  effected 
by  the  immanent  activity  of  objects.  In  some  instances 
this  systematizing  activity  is  apparent  in  movement,  and 
sometimes  it  takes  place  without  apparent  change  of 
spatial  relations.  Whether  an  object  shall  be  at  rest  is 
determined  by  the  systematizing  activity  of  the  reality 
of  which  the  object  is  an  expression. 

§  154.  Motion.  —  We  have  experience  of  objects  in  the 
process  of  changing  their  position-relations.  So  much  of 
experience  takes  this  form  that  most,  if  not  all,  of  us 
accept  the  reality  of  motion  without  question.  But  the 
Eleatics  doubted  its  reality ;  and  there  have  been  teachers 
since  who  have  held  that  motion  is  irrational.  We  will 
consider  the  principal  objections  which  have  been  urged 
against  holding  that  motion  is  real. 

I.  Zeno  argued  that  a  body,  in  moving  from  one  point 
to  another,  must  pass  through  an  infinite  number  of  spaces ; 
but  it  would  require  infinite  time  to  pass  through  an  in- 
finite number  of  positions,  hence  motion  is  impossible. 
Others  have  conceived  the  line  passed  over  to  be  divided 
in  half;  then  the  half  farthest  from  the  starting  point 
is  divided  in  half ;  then  the  farther  quarter  is  thus  divided  ; 
and  so  on.  This  converts  the  line  into  a  series  which  has 
no  last  term ;  and  it  is  argued  that,  as  there  is  no  defin- 
able last  point  in  the  line,  the  end  of  the  line  can  never 
be  reached.  Again,  a  like  division  of  the  first  half  is  con- 
ceived, and  of  the  first  quarter,  and  the  first  eighth,  and 
so  on.  From  this  it  is  argued  that  there  is  no  definable 
first  point  after  the  point  of  beginning;    hence  motion 


ACTIVITY,   REST,  AND  MOTION  315 

cannot   begin.     The    Inference   from    such   objections    is 
that  motion  is  irrational. 

But  these  objections  misconceive  both  space  and  time. 
It  is  assumed  that  the  extensity  between  two  points  is  an 
aggregate  of  an  infinite  number  of  infinitesimal  spaces ; 
that  is,  this  perceived  space  is  thought  of  as  a  totality. 
These  objectors  would  constitute  space  of  an  infinite  num- 
ber of  discrete  particulars.  This  is  a  serious  misconcep- 
tion ;  the  line  passed  over  and  the  time  taken  to  pass  over 
it  are  both  of  them  continuous.  It  may  be  convenient 
to  think  them  broken  up  into  discrete  parts ;  but,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  they  are  not  the  total  of  discrete  particu- 
lars. Extensity  is  a  flux,  not  a  series  of  discrete  terms; 
so  also  is  duration.  They  increase  from  within  ;  and  thus 
differ  radically  from  the  total  of  a  series,  for  the  series  in- 
creases from  without.  The  extensity  between  any  two 
positions  is  a  unit ;  so  also  is  the  duration  of  an  experience 
and  a  sequent  experience.  A  unit  "  is  an  original  one, 
not  a  totality."  These  objections  will  not  stand ;  they 
misconceive  space  and  time. 

2.  Zeno  presented  another  argument  which  ran  thus : 
A  body  which  is  at  rest  is  in  one  place.  "  An  arrow  in  its 
flight  is,  at  each  successive  moment,  in  one  place ;  there- 
fore it  is  at  rest."  In  this  we  have  the  same  misconcep- 
tion of  space  and  time  as  that  in  the  objections  already 
discussed ;  and  we  might  dismiss  it  with  this  criticism, 
but  we  wish  to  call  attention  to  another  defect  in  this 
reasoning.  Motion  is  continuous  change  of  place;  it  is, 
therefore,  not  true  that  the  flying  arrow  "  is  at  each  suc- 
cessive moment  in  one  place."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
arrow  is  at  each  successive  moment  passing  through  some 
place.  To  be  in  is  apparently  consonant  with  rest;  but 
to  be  passing  through  is  only  consonant  with  motion.  This 
objection  falls,  because  it  is  based  upon  misrepresentation 
of  an  essential  fact. 


3i6        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

3.  One  other  objection  remains  to  be  noticed.  It  is 
this :  The  fleet-footed  Achilles  cannot  overtake  the  slow 
tortoise;  because,  when  Achilles  arrives  at  the  place 
occupied  by  the  tortoise  when  he  set  out,  the  tortoise  will 
have  moved  forward ;  and  this  will  necessarily  continue 
to  infinity.  Here  we  have  the  same  misconception  of 
space  and  time  that  was  the  basis  of  the  objections  first 
considered.  They  are  transformed  from  unities  into  to- 
talities and  are  treated  as  though  they  were  aggregations 
of  discrete  particulars.  All  these  objections  have  their 
origin  in  failure  to  recognize  the  radical  difference  be- 
tween a  continuous  whole  and  a  sum  of  discrete  terms.  A 
continuous  whole  and  a  total  of  distinct  terms  may  be 
equal  in  measure ;  but,  when  we  argue  as  though  the  con- 
tinuous were  the  same  as  a  total,  we  are  in  danger  of  draw- 
ing unwarranted  conclusions. 

§  155.  Conclusions.  —  It  is  of  the  nature  of  reality  to 
be  active.  Perceptible  change  in  an  object  is  an  expres- 
sion of  internal  change.  Some  perceptible  changes  are 
changes  in  spatial  relations ;  changes  in  position-relations 
are  the  expression  to  sense  of  internal  changes  and  are, 
in  consequence,  manifestations  of  internal  changes. 
Whether  an  object  shall  appear  to  be  at  rest  or  in  motion 
is  determined  by  the  immanent  activity  of  the  object; 
and  the  form  of  its  immanent  activity  is  determined  by 
the  relation  of  the  object  to  the  system  of  which  it  is  a  part. 
Transeunt  activity  is  not  activity  in  which  an  attribute 
or  a  state  of  one  object  is  transmitted  to  another  object. 
All  activity  is  immanent;  and,  inasmuch  as  the  activity 
of  an  object  is  sometimes  perceptibly  related  to  changes  in 
another  object,  this  experience  has  led  to  the  conception 
of  transmitted  activity ;  the  term  transeunt  activity  arose 
from  this  conception.  The  changes  in  the  object  to  which 
the  activity  appears  to  pass  over  are  due  to  the  adjusting 


ACTIVITY,   REST,  AND   MOTION  317 

immanent  activity  of  this  same  object.  Its  relations  have 
been  changed,  and  this  change  forces  a  new  adjustment  of 
the  object  to  all  that  is.  This  adjusting  activity  frequently 
expresses  itself  in  perceptible  spatial  changes ;  and  known 
objects  are  perceived  to  be  in  motion.  Motion  is  real; 
it  is  grounded  in  the  systematizing  activity  of  reality. 
The  reasons  assigned  for  holding  that  motion  is  unreal  and 
that  our  perceptions  of  motion  are  illusions  are  based  upon 
a  misconception  of  space  and  time.  The  objections  prof- 
fered conceive  a  particular  extensity  or  duration  to  be  a 
total  of  discrete  particulars,  whereas  it  is  a  continuous 
whole. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 

CAUSALITY 

§  156.  Origin  of  the  Idea  of  Cause.  —  i.  We  have 
experience  of  ourselves  as  acting  and  of  our  activity  as 
leading  to  changes  In  the  external  world.  The  child  soon 
learns  that  crying  will  secure  attention.  How  little  or  how 
much  thought  the  child  gives  to  this  we  may  not  safely 
undertake  to  say ;  but  we  are  assuredly  justified  In  saying 
that  the  earliest  self-consciousness  has  In  It  experience  of 
the  self  affecting  the  objective  world.  Doubtless  this 
element  of  experience  Is  not  consciously  distinguished  at 
first ;  but  it  is  a  part  of  experience,  and  early  In  our  con- 
scious life  we  conclude  that  our  doing  brings  events  to 
pass  outside  the  mere  self.  We  have  no  doubt  but  that 
we  open  and  close  the  door,  that  we  determine  the  arrange- 
ment of  articles  in  the  room.  The  matter  of  interest  for 
us  here  is  that  we  believe  we  effect  changes  in  the  province 
of  the  not-self.  From  this  point  of  view,  our  life  is  an  ex- 
tension of  the  self  into  the  objective  world;  and  in  so 
projecting  ourselves  into  the  external  world,  we  conclude 
that  we  effect  changes  there.  "  I  tore  down  the  wall," 
"I  built  the  house,"  —  in  these  and  similar  statements, 
we  assert  that  we  influence  the  course  of  events.  We 
are  certain  that  we  do  not  merely  act,  but  that  our  activity 
is  a  factor  in  bringing  changes  to  pass  in  objective  reality. 

2.  We  also  have  experience  of  being  limited  in  our 
doing  by  what  is  not  self.  We  find  that  the  nature  of 
objects,  their  way  of  behaving,  limits  our  determination 
of  changes.     A  potter  learns  that  clays  differ   and  that 

318 


CAUSALITY  319 

his  treatment  of  clay  must  be  adapted  to  the  peculiarities 
of  that  which  he  is  handling.  If  you  would  bend  a  glass 
rod  and  not  break  it,  you  must  heat  it.  We  often  find 
ourselves  restrained  when  we  endeavor  to  shape  the  course 
of  events ;  and  sometimes  we  are  coerced  —  as  when  the 
struggling  boatman  is  swept  over  the  falls.  Our  doing  is 
conditioned  by  physical  laws  and  by  other  selves.  The 
inventor  of  the  telephone  determined  the  ideal  coordina- 
tion of  objects  for  this  form  of  distance-speaking; 
the  maker  of  the  instrument  and  the  person  who  installs 
the  system  determine  the  actual  coordination ;  and  those 
who  use  the  instrument  determine  the  messages.  But 
the  inventor,  the  maker  of  the  instrument,  and  the  man 
who  Installs  the  system  are  conditioned  by  physical  laws ; 
their  activities  must  be  adapted  to  these  laws.  The 
activity  of  one  who  would  use  the  instrument  is  conditioned 
by  those  who  serve  in  the  central  exchange,  not  to  speak 
of  others.  Our  doing  is  conditioned  by  those  with  whom 
we  are  related  in  our  endeavor  to  carry  out  our  purposes. 
3.  The  uncritical  interpretation  of  these  experiences  — 
experiences  in  which  we  determine  changes  and  are  con- 
ditioned in  our  activity  —  involves  the  notion  of  causality. 
This  naive  interpretation  may  be  erroneous ;  but  whether 
correct  or  incorrect  it  Is  an  element  of  experience  and  is, 
therefore,  subject-matter  for  our  study.  We  apparently 
interfere  in  the  movements  of  the  objective  world  ;  and  we 
seem  to  make  changes  to  suit  our  purposes.  We  move 
things  from  where  they  were  to  where  we  would  have 
them  be ;  and,  in  lifting  them  about,  we  overcome  their 
persistent  pull  toward  the  earth.  Our  practical  life 
is  made  up  of  such  apparent  interferences  in  nature  and 
resistance  of  its  tendencies.  In  all  this,  we  think  of  our- 
selves as  acting  upon  the  objects  with  which  we  deal  and 
causing  changes  in  them ;  and  we  also  think  of  the  objects 


320        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

as  acting  upon  us  and  causing  changes .  in  our  feelings. 
When  you  lift  the  window,  you  think  of  yourself  as  causing 
the  change  in  its  position ;  when  it  falls  upon  your  hand, 
you  think  of  the  window  as  causing  your  discomfort.  Men 
naturally  and  inevitably  apply  this  interpretation  to 
changes  In  the  external  world  of  which  they  are  percipients, 
but  to  which  they  are  not  more  directly  related.  We  see 
a  stone  fall  upon  a  toy,  and  the  toy  is  broken.  We  pro- 
ject our  experience,  as  we  Interpret  it,  into  the  objective 
world  and  apply  It  in  explanation  of  what  has  taken  place ; 
and  we  think  of  the  stone  as  acting  upon  the  toy  and  caus- 
ing the  change  In  it. 

4.  A  certain  characteristic  of  Intelligence  insures  the 
development  of  the  notion  of  causality  :  this  characteristic 
Is  the  mind's  Insistent  demand  for  a  sufficient  reason  why 
an  occurrence  takes  place.  It  is  a  principle  of  rationality 
that  nothing  occurs  but  that  "  there  Is  a  sufficient  reason 
why  it  should  occur  rather  than  not."  The  mind  begins 
In  the  early  stages  of  Its  development  to  ask  for  a  sufficient 
reason  for  occurrences.  The  child  asks,  "  Why  does  It 
thunder  .?  "  or  "  What  makes  thorns  grow  on  rose-bushes  ? " 
and  Innumerable  other  questions  quite  as  puzzling.  These 
are  inquiries  for  cause.  The  myths  of  primitive  peoples 
are  the  outcome  of  endeavor  to  set  forth  a  reason  for  the 
common  and  the  unusual  occurrences  in  nature ;  this 
endeavor  has  resulted  In  these  fanciful  answers  to  ques- 
tions of  cause  respecting  the  origin  of  the  world  and  man, 
and  the  varied  natural  phenomena.  We  are  constantly 
framing  causal  judgments ;  and  these  judgments  are  for 
us  satisfactory  answers  to  the  rational  demand  for  a 
sufficient  reason  why  events  should  take  place.  The  ac- 
tivity of  scientists  in  their  search  for  natural  laws  and  their 
formulation  of  these  laws  Is  an  endeavor  to  respond  to  this 
insistent  request  of  Intelligence.     The  law  of  causation  is, 


CAUSALITY  321 

as  Bosanquet  has  said,  a  "  subform  "  of  the  law  of  Suffi- 
cient Reason. 

§  157.  Conceptions  of  Cause.  —  i.  Causality  presents 
one  of  the  most  complex  of  philosophical  problems.  Much 
of  the  difficulty  which  attends  its  consideration  arises  from 
the  ambiguity  which  attaches  to  the  term  "  cause."  All 
of  us  connect  events  causally  in  our  thought.  We  insist 
that  the  stroke  of  the  broom-handle  knocked  the  vase  off 
the  mantel ;  and,  when  we  do  not  know  the  cause  of  a 
phenomenon,  —  as  the  Northern  Lights,  —  we  still  believe 
that  it  is  caused.  But  what  do  we  mean  by  "  cause  "  ? 
In  the  course  of  thought  upon  this  subject  differing  con- 
ceptions of  cause  have  developed. 

(i)  The  boy  says  he  is  crying  because  his  foot  hurts,  and 
that  his  foot  hurts  because  a  stone  fell  on  it.  He  is  con- 
necting changes  causally;  he  says  that  the  falling  of  the 
stone  has  injured  his  foot,  and  that  the  change  in  the  foot 
is  causing  him  pain.  The  cause  is,  for  him,  the  antecedent 
occurrence ;  the  falling  of  the  stone  is  the  antecedent 
event  of  which  the  injured  foot  and  the  pain  are  conse- 
quents. The  electric  button  was  pressed,  and  the  dyna- 
mite which  the  miners  had  placed  in  the  rocks  exploded. 
The  pressing  of  the  button  was  the  antedecent  occurrence, 
or  cause  ;  the  torn  rocks  are  the  consequent  event,  or  effect. 
The  scientist  would  describe  what  took  place  in  greater 
detail;  but  his  description  would  agree  in  principle  with 
this.  For  him  the  cause  is  an  antecedent  event,  and  the 
effect  is  an  event  consequent  upon  the  antecedent.  This 
conception  of  cause  is  variously  named.  It  is  known  as 
the  scientific,  mechanical,  physical,  empirical,  or  phenom- 
enal conception  of  cause ;  or  more  briefly  as  scientific, 
empirical,  or  phenomenal  cause. 

(2)  But  it  is  evident  that  the  empirical  cause  of  an  event 
is  not  a  final  explanation  of  why  it  occurs.     Why  did  the 

Y 


322        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

stone  fall  ?  How  did  the  stone  come  to  be  ?  These 
questions  obviously  lead  us  back  toward  the  source  of  all 
that  is  not  self-existent.  In  seeking  a  sufficient  reason 
why  anything  is  or  why  an  event  occurs,  we  are  seeking 
the  ground  of  all  being  and  change.  To  distinguish  this 
conception  of  cause  from  that  described  above,  it  has  been 
called  the  metaphysical  cause,  the  ultimate  cause,  the 
ultimate  ground,  or  simply  the  Ground.  In  keeping  with 
this  last  term,  Theists  are  wont  to  speak  of  God  as  the 
Ground  of  Being  and  Activity.  They  hold  that  the  com- 
plete explanation  of  being  and  occurrences  is  to  be  found 
in  God. 

(3)  There  is  another  view  of  cause,  which  we  shall  call 
the  naive  metaphysical  doctrine  of  cause.  It  will  be  more 
particularly  described  later  in  this  chapter. 

2.  We  have  not  given  a  full  definition  of  these  concep- 
tions in  what  is  said  above;  we  have  merely  indicated 
their  distinguishing  marks.  Although  these  conceptions 
differ,  there  is  that  which  they  have  in  common  —  viz., 
that  an  event  occurs  because  of  somewhat  else  than  the 
event  itself.  This  notion  is  the  category  of  cause;  it 
is  present  in  our  thought  of  things  as  coming  to  be  and  in 
our  thought  of  events. 

§  158.  Phenomenal  Cause.  —  i.  You  see  a  portion  of 
a  limb  fall  from  a  tree  upon  a  telephone  wire,  and  the  wire 
is  broken.  As  you  perceive  this  occurrence,  you  have 
experience  of  a  falling  limb  and  of  the  wire  being  broken. 
In  your  perception  of  this  event,  you  regard  the  falling 
limb  as  the  cause,  and  the  broken  wire  as  the  effect.  You 
might  speak  of  the  limb  as  the  cause ;  but  a  more  critical 
consideration  shows  that  what  you  take  to  be  the  cause  is 
not  the  limb,  but  the  limb's  falling.  That  is,  the  im- 
mediate cause  is  an  event,  not  a  thing  or  a  person.  My 
pen  is  not  itself  the  cause  of  this  writing ;   it  is  the  event 


CAUSALITY  323 

of  my  using  the  pen.  The  Immediate  effect  is  a  change 
in  the  appearance  of  this  sheet;  that  is  also  an  event. 
In  both  these  instances,  we  perceive  two  intimately  re- 
lated occurrences.  In  our  thought  of  these  occurrences, 
that  which  is  first  in  time  is  regarded  as  a  cause,  and  the 
second  as  effect.  In  other  words,  we  relate  them  causally. 
The  fact  that  the  effect  is  perceived  as  consequent  upon 
the  cause  has  led  to  our  calling  the  first  of  two  causally 
related  occurrences,  the  antecedent;  and  the  second,  the 
consequent.  In  phenomenal  cause,  antecedent  and  con- 
sequent are  equivalent  respectively  to  cause  and  effect. 
Those  who  hold  this  conception  of  cause  often  apply  the 
term  cause  to  a  person  or  thing;  e.g.  the  limb  and  the 
pen  would  be  spoken  of  as  cause,  and  I  would  be  taken  to 
be  the  cause  of  my  pen's  movements.  This  is  permissible, 
perhaps ;  but  it  is  certainly  inexact,  for  the  antecedent 
and  consequent  are  events  or  changes,  not  persons  or 
things. 

2.  From  the  above,  it  might  seem  that  we  are  wont  to 
think  that  all  perceived  sequence  Is  causal ;  that,  if  one 
event  is  perceived  to  be  immediately  consequent  upon 
another,  they  are  thought  to  be  causally  related.  Not 
so,  however.  Day  follows  upon  night ;  yet  no  one  thinks 
that  the  occurring  of  night  is  the  cause  of  day.  The  shin- 
ing of  the  sun  upon  any  portion  of  the  earth's  surface  is 
the  antecedent  of  day;  and  the  Intervening  of  the  body 
of  the  earth  between  any  portion  of  its  surface  and  the 
sun  is  the  antecedent,  or  cause,  of  night.  Night  and  day 
are  distinct  consequents,  or  effects  ;  each  has  Its  own  cause. 
Given  the  sun  shining  upon  any  part  of  the  earth,  it  must 
be  day  at  that  part ;  given  the  earth  intervening  between 
any  place  and  the  sun,  it  must  be  night  at  that  place. 
From  this  we  conclude  that  the  cause  of  any  event  is  that 
antecedent  event  which  Is  necessary  to  the  occurrence  of 


324        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  consequent.  To  put  it  otherwise :  of  two  causally 
related  events,  that  much  of  the  antecedent  event  is 
cause  or  part  of  the  cause,  whose  non-recurrence  would 
mean  the  non-recurrence  of  the  consequent  event.  Mill 
speaks  of  the  cause  as  "  the  unconditional  invariable 
antecedent  " ;  and  Bain  explains  this  as  meaning  that 
the  cause  is  "  the  sole  sufficing  circumstance  whose  pres- 
ence makes  the  effect,  and  whose  absence  arrests  it." 

3.  What  we  have  said  thus  far  would  seem  to  indicate 
that,  for  the  Phenomenal  conception  of  cause,  a  cause  is 
a  simple  event.  In  actual  experience  this  is  seldom,  if 
ever,  the  case.  Take,  for  example,  the  Instance  of  a  boy 
throwing  a  ball  through  a  window  and  breaking  a  pane  of 
glass.  To  duplicate  this  occurrence,  so  much  at  least  as 
the  following  would  be  required :  the  boy  must  be  in  ex- 
actly the  same  position-relation  to  the  glass,  he  must 
give  the  stone  exactly  the  same  initial  momentum,  and 
the  stone  must  hit  the  glass  with  the  same  portion  of  its 
irregular  surface.  All  these  particulars  are  elements  of  the 
antecedent  and  enter  into  the  determination  of  the  con- 
sequent. It  is  evident  that  the  cause  is  not  the  simple 
fact  of  a  stone's  hitting  a  pane  of  glass ;  It  is  a  complex  of 
antecedents  or,  as  one  has  put  it,  "  a  concurrence  of  an- 
tecedents." 

4.  Phenomenal,  or  empirical,  cause  does  not  know  of 
any  objective  causal  bond  uniting  events  which  are 
thought  to  be  causally  related.  It  deals  only  with  what  Is 
perceived,  and  we  do  not  perceive  any  causal  bond.  You 
see  apples  falling  from  a  tree  which  a  man  is  shaking. 
What  you  perceive  is  a  man  shaking  the  tree  and  the  apples 
falling.  But  in  perceiving  these  two  occurrences,  you 
judge  that  the  apples  fall  because  of  what  the  man  is 
doing.  You  perceive  the  events ;  and,  in  the  act  of  per- 
ceiving, you  think  the  causal  relation.     This  Is  true  in 


CAUSALITY  325 

all  cognition  of  relations  (§  104,  3).  In  space-experience, 
we  perceive  material  objects  ;  and,  in  perceiving  them,  we 
think  their  position-relation  —  before,  behind,  above, 
below,  etc.  Similarly  in  causal  experience,  when  I  see 
the  stone  strike  the  glass  and  the  glass  break,  I  perceive 
the  throwing,  the  stone  flying,  and  the  glass  breaking; 
and  I  think  the  thrown  stone  to  be  the  cause  of  the  glass 
breaking.  We  do  not  perceive  a  causal  bond ;  we  per- 
ceive events  and  we  relate  them  causally,  because  we  think 
that  one  of  them,  the  consequent,  comes  to  be  because  of 
the  other,  the  antecedent.  According  to  this  conception 
of  causality,  antecedent  and  consequent  are  subjectively, 
not  objectively,  united. 

5.  It  is  essential  to  phenomenal  cause  that  the  ante- 
cedent and  the  consequent  shall  be  regarded  as  distinct 
occurrences,  as  events  which  are  not  objectively  connected. 
They  are  conceived  to  be  connected  in  our  thought,  but 
not  in  the  external  world.  This  conception  of  causality 
is  based  upon  the  doctrine  that  we  are  not  to  affirm  any- 
thing respecting  an  experience  which  is  not  present  to 
sense-perception.  The  causal  event  and  the  caused 
event  are  perceived  as  distinct  phenomena;  and,  ac- 
cording to  this  doctrine,  we  are  to  regard  them  as  separate 
events,  not  merely  distinguishable  occurrences.  For 
sense-experience,  the  pushing  of  the  button  and  the 
shining  of  the  electric  lamp  are  independent  events. 
Those  who  hold  this  conception  of  causality  insist  that 
these  occurrences  are  really  separate  occurrences.  We 
think  of  them  as  connected ;  but  those  who  hold  the  view 
we  are  considering  declare  that  the  notion  that  events  are 
objectively  linked  by  a  causal  bond  is  simply  a  developed 
mental  habit.  It  would  be  foreign  to  our  present  purpose 
to  set  forth  in  detail  the  arguments  by  which  it  is  sought 
to  sustain  this  contention.     The  important  fact  for  us  is, 


326        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

that  cause  and  effect  are  regarded  as  wholly  external  to 
each  other,  as  distinct  and  independent. 

§  159.  Is  Phenomenal  Cause  Adequate?  —  Is  the  con- 
ception of  cause  which  we  have  considered  in  the  preceding 
section  adequate?  Is  it  an  adequate  statement  of  ex- 
perience as  it  is  expressed  in  causal  judgments  ?  We  do 
not  ask  whether  it  can  answer  all  questions  which  may  be 
raised  in  this  connection.  What  we  wish  to  know  is 
whether  it  is  true  to  thought  and  to  objective  reality. 

I.  This  conception  of  causality  meets  the  requirements 
of  practical  life.  Men  put  capital  and  labor  into  the 
construction  of  telephone  instruments  and  the  connecting 
of  them  in  a  system.  They  do  this  because  they  believe 
that  by  relating  the  parts  of  the  instrument  in  a  certain 
way  and  by  connecting  the  instruments  according  to 
certain  principles,  desired  results  will  be  obtained :  per- 
sons will  be  able  to  converse  at  a  distance.  Whether 
there  is  any  causal  bond  linking  the  speaking  into  one 
instrument  with  the  hearing  at  another  instrument,  is 
not  a  matter  of  practical  consequence  to  those  who  con- 
struct the  system,  or  to  the  man  of  business  who  uses  it. 
They  probably  believe  that  there  is  such  a  bond ;  but, 
apart  from  this,  it  is  sufficient  for  them  that  the  antici- 
pated consequent  follows  upon  the  antecedent.  So  in  all 
the  every-day  activities  of  men.  When  they  discover 
that  a  certain  effect  follows  upon  a  certain  known  ante- 
cedent, they  conclude  that,  given  the  same  complex  of 
antecedents,  they  will  have  the  same  result.  The  matter 
of  absorbing  interest  to  them  is  the  sequence  of  the  effect 
upon  the  antecedent ;  what  makes  it  follow  is  of  passing 
interest  to  a  few  —  a  matter  of  curiosity,  rather  than  a 
fact  of  practical  value. 

The  Scientist  is  satisfied  with  this  conception  of  caus- 
ality.    He  deals  with  the  orderly  succession  of  changes; 


CAUSALITY  327 

and  he  seeks  an  accurate  and  detailed  description  of 
changes  in  consciousness  and  the  external  world.  When 
he  concludes  that  an  occurrence  is  the  invariable  and  nec- 
essary antecedent  of  another  occurrence,  he  regards  the 
antecedent  event  as  the  cause  of  the  consequent  event. 
He  does  not  undertake  to  discover  the  nature  of  the  causal 
bond,  whether  it  is  objective  or  subjective ;  he  is  content 
to  know  that  the  antecedent  is  the  invariable  and  neces- 
sary prius  of  the  consequent.  Cause  is  for  him  the  orderly 
connection  of  phenomena.  It  is  his  aim  to  trace  this  con- 
nection, to  discover  the  essential  elements  of  the  connec- 
tion, and  to  state  the  order  in  a  formula  which  will  hold 
for  all  events  of  a  defined  class.  These  general  statements 
are  our  scientific  laws  —  e.g.  the  law  of  gravitation  in 
physics  and  the  law  of  association  in  psychology.  Further 
than  this  the  scientist  does  not  need  to  go ;  hence  phe- 
nomenal cause  is  for  him  an  adequate  conception  of 
causality. 

2.  But  is  it  an  adequate  conception  for  Philosophy? 
That  is  the  important  question  for  us ;  and  we  think  it 
must  be  answered  in  the  negative.  Take  the  following 
example :  I  push  a  button  and  the  electric  lamp  glows. 
According  to  phenomenal  cause,  we  have  two  occurrences, 
and  the  causal  relation  consists  simply  in  this,  that  the 
pushing  of  the  button  is  the  invariable  and  necessary  an- 
tecedent of  the  lighting  of  the  lamp.  For  it,  the  pushing 
of  the  button  is  a  complete  fact,  and  the  shining  of  the 
lamp  is  another  complete  fact.  But  if  we  regard  the 
pushing  of  the  button  a  complete  fact,  we  have  no  right 
to  speak  of  it  as  the  cause  of  anything.  In  conceiving  it 
to  be  the  cause  of  another  event,  that  other  event  is  taken 
to  be  significant  for  the  pushing  of  the  button;  it  is  es- 
sential to  a  complete  statement  of  what  the  pushing  of 
the  button  signifies  in  the  external  world.     When  we  say 


328        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

that  it  is  the  cause  of  the  lamp*s  being  lighted,  we  so  con- 
nect it  with  the  lighted  lamp  that  it  Is  in  our  thought 
incomplete  apart  from  the  change  in  the  lamp. 

When  we  think  of  the  antecedent  event  in  the  above 
illustration  as  the  cause  of  the  consequent  event,  we  think 
of  them  as  causally  related  ;  the  two  events  are  then  known 
to  us  as  the  interdependent  terms  of  a  relation.  The  unit 
of  thought  includes  both  occurrences  :  the  pushing  of  the 
button  and  the  lighting  of  the  lamp.  If  we  separate 
these  occurrences  and  regard  them  as  discrete  and  sever- 
ally complete,  we  have  destroyed  the  relation  (§  104,  1,2). 
For  thought,  cause  and  effect  are  necessarily  In  a  whole 
which  includes  both.  This  whole  is  a  thought-unit; 
and,  being  such,  it  is  more  than  the  succession  of  its  parts. 
Mere  succession,  even  though  it  be  invariable  and  nec- 
essary succession,  cannot  constitute  the  "  oneness  " 
which  is  an  essential  characteristic  of  a  relation.  Phe- 
nomenal cause  is  philosophically  inadequate,  for  it  is 
untrue  to  the  nature  of  a  whole ;  it  conceives  a  whole  to 
be  a  totahty  instead  of  a  "  one." 

3.  The  preceding  discussion  makes  it  evident  that  phe- 
nomenal cause  is  an  inadequate  conception  of  the  subjective 
factor  in  causal  experience.  It  also  fails  to  give  a  satis- 
factory account  of  the  objective  factor.  Change  is  con- 
tinuous ;  it  is  not  constituted  of  discrete  terms.  The 
pushing  of  the  button  and  the  shining  of  the  lamp  "  are 
earlier  and  later  stages  in  a  process  which  Is  continuous." 
Leading  physicists  and  philosophers  are  agreed  as  to  this. 
It  is  a  characteristic  of  continuity  that.  If  any  two  portions 
of  it  lie  wholly  outside  each  other,  what  lies  between  these 
mutually  exclusive  parts  is  Itself  part  of  the  continuity. 
All  that  comes  between  the  putting  forth  of  my  hand  and 
the  lighting  of  the  lamp  is  an  unbroken  process  which  goes 
continuously  forward  from  the  reaching  forth  of  my  hand 


CAUSALITY  329 

to  the  lighting  of  the  room.  We  may  not  truly  say  of  any 
stage  of  it,  "  Here  the  antecedent  is  complete,"  or  "  Here 
the  consequent  begins  " ;  cause  and  effect  are  in  every 
moment  of  it.  We  individuate  stages  of  the  process;, 
and  we  do  this  the  more  readily  because  some  moments 
of  it  are  recognized  by  sense-perception.  Our  individuat- 
ing activity  gives  an  aspect  of  discontinuity  to  what  is 
really  continuous.  For  much  of  thought  and  practical 
life,  no  difficulty  will  arise  from  our  regarding  it  as  dis- 
continuous, from  our  thinking  of  the  whole  as  constituted 
of  separate  events  ;  but  such  a  conception  of  the  objective 
reality  is  inexact  and  will  not  satisfy  the  requirements  of 
Philosophy. 

4.  Those  who  hold  that  phenomenal  cause  Is  an  ade- 
quate conception  of  causality  admit  that  cause  and  effect 
are  sometimes  simultaneous.  The  formation  of  water 
by  the  union  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen  in  the  proportion  of 
two  to  one,  is  an  example.  Since  it  is  essential  to  this 
conception  of  causality  that  the  antecedent  and  consequent 
shall  be  regarded  as  independent  events,  the  formation  of 
water  and  the  combining  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen  in  the 
proportion  stated  are  to  be  taken  as  separate  occurrences. 
But  this  is  obviously  untrue  to  the  fact.  We  have  one 
event :  from  one  point  of  view.  It  is  the  combining  of  hy- 
drogen and  oxygen ;  from  another,  it  is  the  formation  of 
water.  The  cause  and  the  effect  are  not  distinct  events. 
If  we  accept  that  the  union  of  the  hydrogen  and  the 
oxygen  is  the  cause,  the  cause  and  the  effect  are  simply 
distinguishable  elements  of  one  event.  This  agrees  with 
what  we  found  above  in  our  discussion  of  causally  related 
occurrences  In  which  the  phenomenal  cause  and  effect  are 
perceived  in  succession.  In  that  casey  cause  and  effect 
are  distinguishable  elements  of  one  occurrence.  By  so 
much,  then,  as  the  phenomenal  conception  of  causality 


330         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

regards  cause  and  effect  as  distinct  events,  it  is  philosophi- 
cally inadequate. 

§  1 60.  The  Naive  Metaphysical  Conception  of  Caus- 
ality. —  We  will  approach  the  study  of  this  view  of  caus- 
ality by  comparing  it  with  phenomenal  cause. 

1.  The  tendency  of  this  conception  of  causality  is  to 
regard  the  cause  as  a  person  or  thing;  whereas  phenom- 
enal cause  finds  it  in  an  event.  The  uncritical  view  is 
evidenced  in  such  statements  as  the  following :  "  He 
caused  the  disturbance  " ;  "  The  wreck  was  caused  by 
a  defective  rail."  If  one  should  ask,  What  causes  the 
engine  to  move .?  many,  if  not  most,  persons  would  say, 
"  Steam."  Thus  conceived,  a  cause  is  a  person  or  a 
thing.  Sitting  down  at  your  desk  to  write,  you  find  it 
necessary  to  clear  a  space,  and  you  push  a  dictionary 
aside.  For  the  phenomenal  view  of  causality,  the  cause 
is  the  moving  of  your  hand ;  for  the  naive  view  the  cause 
is  either  your  hand  or  you.  Those  who  hold  these  differing 
views  do  not  always  preserve  this  distinction.  Mill, 
one  of  the  clearest  exponents  of  scientific  cause,  sometimes 
speaks  of  an  object  as  a  cause ;  and  those  who  prefer  the 
view  discussed  in  this  section  would  not  object  to  the 
statement,  "  The  bursting  of  the  gun  caused  his  death." 
Despite  their  apparent  agreement,  these  views  of  causality 
differ  at  this  point;  and  the  difference  is  fundamental. 
For  the  phenomenal  conception  of  causality,  the  cause  is 
essentially  an  event ;  for  the  naive  conception,  the  cause 
is  a  person  or  thing  in  process  of  change. 

2.  These  views  differ  also  as  to  the  objective  reality 
of  the  causal  bond.  According  to  phenomenal  cause,  the 
cause  in  any  instance  Is  merely  a  relation  between  ideas, 
not  an  objective  linking  of  objects  and  events  ;  objectively, 
it  is  simply  the  invariable  temporal  conjunction  of  a  cer- 
tain   necessary    antecedent    and    its    consequent.      But 


CAUSALITY  331 

the  uncritical  believe  that,  in  seeking  the  cause  of  an 
occurrence,  they  are  seeking  something  more  than  a  fixed 
order  of  events.  When  they  find  what  they  believe  to 
be  the  cause,  they  are  certain  that  they  have  discovered 
what  has  actual  objective  connection  with  the  affected 
object;  they  are  certain  that  they  have  found  what  pro- 
duces the  effect.  This  conception  of  cause  is  so  fixed  in 
the  thought  of  men  that  thinkers  who  insist  that  phe- 
nomenal cause  is  an  adequate  conception  write  in  terms  of 
the  uncritical  view.  Hume  says  in  one  place,  "  The  ob- 
servation of  this  resemblance  produces  a  new  impression 
upon  the  mind."  The  term  "  produces  "  implies  more 
than  that  "  the  impression  "  is  invariably  consequent  upon 
"  the  observation."  Bain,  also  a  phenomenalist,  speaks 
of  the  causal  antecedent  as  that  circumstance  "  whose 
presence  makes  the  effect."  The  important  fact  for  us 
is  that  the  naive  metaphysical  view  accords  with  that 
conception  of  cause  which  seems  to  be  established  in  the 
thought  of  men,  viz.  the  notion  that  the  cause  makes  the 
effect.  We  do  not  say  that  this  notion  is  philosophically 
acceptable;    we  are  merely  reporting  a  fact. 

3.  Another  characteristic  of  this  view  remains  to  be 
stated.  A  billiard  ball  is  struck  by  a  cue  and  set  in  motion ; 
it  impinges  upon  another  ball,  and  the  second  ball  moves. 
According  to  the  naive  view,  the  motion  or  the  momentum 
or  an  undefined  somewhat  which  was  in  the  first  ball  is 
communicated  to  the  second  ball.  To  state  it  in  general 
terms :  something  which  is  in  the  causal  object  passes 
over  to  the  affected  object  and  produces  the  change  in  the 
latter.  The  transition  of  the  force  or  motion  or  of  some 
quality  of  the  thrown  stone  is  thought  to  constitute  the 
stone  a  cause  and  to  produce  the  change  in  the  glass  which 
was  broken.  The  important  fact  for  us  is  that  this  view 
tries  to  find  an  actual  objective  ground  for  the  objective 


332         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

change.  It  finds  this  ground  in  the  transition  of  some 
quality  of  the  causal  object  to  the  object  which  is  affected. 
§  i6i.  Is  the  Naive  Metaphysical  View  of  Causality 
Adequate  ^  —  Does  it  meet  the  requirements  of  critical 
thought  ?     We  think  not. 

1.  It  is  Incomplete  for  Single  Events.  — This  view  con- 
ceives one  object  —  the  cause  —  as  active  and  another 
object  as  acted  upon.  These  objects  are  thought  to  be 
causally  related  in  only  one  direction,  from  the  cause  to 
the  object  in  which  the  perceived  effect  takes  place.  This 
is  an  incomplete  representation  of  what  occurs.  When  a 
billiard  ball  in  motion  strikes  another  ball,  change  occurs 
in  the  striking  ball  as  well  as  in  that  which  is  struck ;  as  a 
result  of  the  contact,  the  momentum  of  the  striking  ball 
Is  lessened  and  its  direction  is  frequently  altered.  If  it 
be  true  that  the  rain  has  some  effect  upon  the  earth,  it  is 
quite  as  true  that  the  earth  has  some  effect  upon  the  water 
which  falls.  The  sunlight  warms  the  stone ;  and  the  physi- 
cist insists  that  this  process  eifects  a  change  In  the  energy 
of  the  sunlight.  If  the  billiard  ball  and  the  rain  and  the 
sunlight  are  active,  so  also  are  the  second  ball,  the  earth 
and  the  stone.  This  agrees  with  what  we  found  in  our 
study  of  the  phenomenal  conception  of  causality:  cause 
and  effect  are  both  of  them  elements  of  every  moment  of 
an  occurrence ;  they  are  Inseparable.  The  causal  relation 
is  reciprocal ;  of  two  objects  thus  related,  both  are  causes, 
and  effects  take  place  In  both. 

2.  The  Naive  View  errs  in  its  Conception  of  the  Causal 
Bond.  —  It  conceives  the  bond  between  cause  and  effect 
to  be  the  transition  of  some  attribute,  quality,  or  state  of 
the  causal  object  to  the  object  in  which  the  effect  takes 
place.  What  was  said  in  our  discussion  of  motion  (§  152) 
Is  pertinent  to  the  matter  ija  hand.  It  is  impossible  that 
an  attribute,  quality,  or  state  of  one  object  shall  be  trans- 


CAUSALITY  333 

mitted  to  another.  The  accidents  of  an  object  are  an 
expression  of  its  reality;  they  are  that  object's  own,  and 
they  exist  in  it  and  only  in  it ;  they  are  not  transmissible. 
The  objective  causal  bond  of  the  naive  view  has  no  exist- 
ence. The  objects  in  connection  with  which  any  event 
takes  place  are  parts  of  the  one  world-system.  If  any  part 
of  a  system  be  essentially  changed,  such  change  will  ne- 
cessitate a  related  adjusting  change  in  other  parts.  If  the 
size  of  a  wheel  of  a  watch  or  the  number  of  teeth  In  it  were 
altered,  it  would  be  necessary  to  effect  adjusting  altera- 
tions in  other  parts  of  the  train ;  otherwise  our  collection 
of  wheels  and  springs  would  cease  to  be  a  time-keeping 
system.  Causally  related  changes  in  the  universe  are 
adjusting  changes  in  the  world-system.  In  any  instance 
selected  by  us,  what  we  regard  as  the  eifect  is  an  element 
of  the  change  to  which  we  give  emphasized  attention.  The 
effect  is  not  due  to  transmitted  motion,  force,  or  quality, 
but  to  the  adjusting  immanent  activity  of  the  object  in 
which  the  effect  is  exhibited. 

§162.  The  Complete  Ground.  —  We  have  concluded 
that  the  phenomenal  and  naive  conceptions  of  causality 
are  inadequate.  We  now  take  up  the  third  conception, 
i.e.  the  conception  of  cause  as  the  complete  Ground  of 
all  that  is. 

I.  There  is  a  particular,  not  yet  considered  by  us,  in 
which  both  the  phenomenal  and  naive  conceptions  are 
philosophically  Inadequate ;  and  our  study  will  be  fur- 
thered if  we  shall  now  attend  to  this  particular.  If  an 
event  takes  place  because  of  a  previous  event,  it  is  obvious 
that  this  previous  event  owes  its  having  occurred  to  some 
event  which  is  its  antecedent.  From  this  it  follows  that 
our  search  for  a  sufficient  reason  for  any  occurrence  takes 
us  endlessly  backward ;  for,  go  so  far  back  as  we  may,  we 
must  ask  respecting  the  last  causal  event,  "  What  is  the 


334        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

reason  for  its  occurrence  ?  '*  To  put  it  briefly,  our  search 
leads  us  back  through  endless  regression.  This  is  true 
also  of  persons  or  things  regarded  as  causes.  The  be- 
ginning of  an  object  is  an  event ;  and,  in  seeking  a  suffi- 
cient reason  for  this  event,  the  naive  conception  can  do 
no  better  than  name  another  object  whose  beginning  was 
also  an  event.  This  commits  us  to  an  endless  regression. 
The  root  of  the  difficulty  is  in  the  conception  of  cause 
common  to  both  these  views.  They  seek  the  explanation 
of  everything  in  something  else  than  the  thing  itself. 
This  sets  us  upon  a  regression  which  this  method  cannot 
arrest.  The  regression  could  only  be  arrested  if  we  could 
arrive  at  that  which  is  itself  the  explanation  of  all  that  is ; 
but  we  cannot  do  that,  for  the  cause  is  in  each  instance  a 
particular  of  the  universe  and  cannot  possibly  be  inclusive 
of  the  whole. 

Instead  of  seeking  the  ground  of  particular  events  or 
objects,  —  a  ground  which  is  incomplete,  for  it  is  not  self- 
explanatory,  —  we  do  better  to  begin  with  the  Ground  of 
the  universe.  The  Ground-Reality  of  the  universe  is 
necessarily  self-subsistent ;  and,  being  self-subsistent,  it 
is  self-explanatory.  Our  experience  has  taught  us  that 
this  Reality's  expression  of  itself  is  coherent  and  orderly 
—  i.e.  self-consistent  and  systematic.  Such  a  Ground 
would  have  in  it  the  full  explanation  of  the  universe. 
The  Ground-Reality  of  the  cosmos,  the  Ground  of  all 
Being  and  Change,  is  the  only  adequate  answer  to  the 
demand  of  intelligence  for  a  sufficient  reason  for  all  that 
is.  This  Ground  is  not  a  particular  temporal  reality;  it 
is  necessarily  the  Absolute  Trans-temporal  Reality. 

2.  What  are  the  attributes  of  the  Ground.?  (i)  It 
must  be  Being  which,  in  being,  is  active.  It  cannot  be  an 
event;  for  there  cannot  be  an  event  apart  from  Being. 
Hence  it  must  be  concrete  Being.     Activity  is  of  the  nature 


CAUSALITY  335 

of  reality,  or  concrete  Being;  given  concrete  reality,  it 
acts'(§  8 1,  2).  In  other  words,  it  is  self-subsistently  dy- 
namic. The  sufficient  reason  for  the  being  and  activity  of 
the  Ground-Reality  is  the  Ground  itself.  Since  the  source 
of  the  activity  of  the  Ground  is  in  the  Ground,  it  must  be 
self-determined;  and  change  has  its  origin  in  the  self- 
determination  of  the  Ground.  The  law  of  causation 
objectively  regarded  is  the  orderly  and  efficient  adjust- 
ment of  the  particulars  of  the  universe  to  changes.  This 
adjustment  —  i.e.  the  law  of  causation  —  is  an  expression 
of  the  activity,  hence  also  of  the  nature,  of  the  Ultimate 
Reality. 

(2)  It  must  be  Individual.  In  our  discussion  of  In- 
dividuality, we  concluded  (§118,  i)  that  whatever  has 
distinct  being,  is  individual;  that  is  most  markedly  in- 
dividual which  is  least  determined  by  "  the  other."  The 
stone  appears  to  be  determined  wholly  from  outside  itself ; 
in  the  plant,  there  is  something  of  inner  directivity;  in 
the  animal,  still  more.  The  animal  has  a  greater  degree 
of  individuality  than  the  plant;  and  the  plant  is  more 
individual  than  the  stone.  Man  is  self-determined,  even 
though  his  activity  is  conditioned  by  the  nature  of  that 
with  which  he  deals ;  and  we  accord  to  man  more  indi- 
viduality than  to  animal,  plant,  or  stone.  The  more 
evident  any  man's  self-directivity,  the  greater  his  relative 
independence  of  his  age,  or  of  his  family  and  racial  in- 
heritance, the  more  pronounced  is  his  individuality.  The 
individual  which  is  not  dependent  upon  anything  apart 
from  itself  for  its  activity  or  its  being,  is  the  perfect  in- 
dividual. The  Complete  Reality,  the  Ground  of  all 
Being  and  Activity,  being  self-subsistent  and  self-deter- 
mined, is  the  Absolute  Individual. 

§  163.  Conclusions.  —  i.  The  idea  of  cause  is  grounded 
subjectively  in  our  belief  (i)   that  we  effect  changes  in 


336        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  external  world,  (2)  that  our  activity  and  our  feelings 
are  conditioned  by  the  external  world;  and  (3)  in  the  de- 
mand of  intelligence  for  a  sufficient  reason  why  any  event 
occurs  rather  than  not.  It  is  grounded  objectively  in  the 
adjusting  activity  of  objects.  If  an  essential  change 
takes  place  in  any  object,  adjustment  of  other  objects 
becomes  necessary;  only  thus  can  the  system  in  which 
these  objects  have  their  reality  be  preserved. 

2.  The  phenomenal  conception  of  cause  relates  events 
to  events.  It  defines  cause  as  the  invariable  necessary 
antecedent  of  the  effect,  or  consequent.  This  view  does 
not  recognize  any  objective  causal  bond  connecting  an- 
tecedent and  consequent.  Causality  is  purely  subjective ; 
its  only  ground  is  the  developed  habit  of  accounting  that 
such  an  antecedent  produces  the  effect.  The  antecedent 
and  consequent  are  regarded  as  distinct  occurrences.  This 
conception  answers  the  requirements  of  Science  and  of 
our  workday  relations  with  the  objective  world ;  but  we 
deem  it  philosophically  inadequate,  because 

(i)  It  is  untrue  to  the  subject-aspect  of  the  causal 
relation.  Viewed  thus,  cause  and  effect  are  in  a  whole; 
that  is,  they  are  two  in  one.  But  phenomenal  cause  regards 
the  whole  as  the  aggregation  of  the  two ;  and,  in  thinking 
thus,  it  makes  the  unit  of  thought  a  "  totality  "  instead 
of  a  unit. 

(2)  It  is  untrue  to  the  objective  reality.  It  thinks  of 
cause  and  effect  as  external  to  each  other,  as  distinct 
events;  whereas  they  are  inseparable  elements  of  one 
occurrence.  The  occurrence  is  a  process,  and  cause  and 
effect  are  in  every  moment  of  the  process. 

3.  The  naive  view  of  causality  relates  a  causal  object  to 
another  object,  one  in  which  the  causal  object  effects  a 
change.  It  holds  that  the  change  is  produced  by  the 
transition  of  some  accident  of  the  causal  object  to  the 


CAUSALITY  337 

affected  object.  This  conception  recognizes  an  objective 
linking  of  the  cause  to  the  affected  object.  This  view 
is   not  satisfactory,   because 

(i)  It  fails  to  recognize  that  the  causal  relation  is  re- 
ciprocal ;  that  when  two  objects  are  causally  related,  both 
are  causes,  and  effects  take  place  in  both. 

(2)  Its  assumed  causal  bond  does  not  exist;  an  acci- 
dent cannot  pass  from  one  object  to  another.  The  change 
which  occurs  in  the  affected  object  is  the  effect  of  the  im- 
manent activity  of  this  same  object,  adjusting  itself  to  the 
change  which  has  taken  place  in  the  causal  object.  Such 
related  adjustment  follows  necessarily,  for  the  two  objects 
are  parts  of  one  system. 

4.  We  decline  to  accept  either  of  the  above  views  for 
another  reason :  they  can  never  lead  us  to  a  final  reason 
why  an  event  occurs  rather  than  not.  The  reason  which 
they  may  assign  for  an  effect  calls  for  explanation  by  some- 
thing other  than  itself;  and  so  on  endlessly.  The  com- 
pletely sufficient  reason  will  be  self-explanatory  and  will 
comprehend  within  itself  the  sufficient  reason  for  all  that 
is.  This  ultimate  reason  must  be  the  Ground  of  the  whole. 
This  Ground-Reality  is  self-subsistent,  self-determined, 
active  Being.  It  is  the  Absolute  Individual,  the  Ground 
of  all  Being  and  Activity. 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

FINALITY 

§  164.  Finality  in  Individual  Experience.  —  You  sit  at 
your  desk  intent  upon  study.  Having  reached  a  resting 
point,  you  notice  confused  sounds  which  appear  to  be 
caused  by  a  crowd  on  the  street.  You  go  to  the  window 
and  perceive  a  street-piano  playing  and  a  bevy  of  children 
laughing  and  dancing.  In  going  to  the  window,  you 
directed  your  activity  to  an  end  —  the  discovery  of  the 
cause  of  the  noise.  You  were  also  directing  your  mental 
activity  in  the  study  that  preceded  your  rising  from  the 
desk;  you  were  endeavoring  to  secure  a  certain  desired 
result.  All  our  thought-activity  is  purposive.  We  may 
be  giving  such  concentrated  attention  to  an  object  that 
we  are  for  the  time  not  fully  aware  of  the  purpose  of  our 
attention ;  but  in  such  case  we  are  obviously  trying  to 
satisfy  ourselves  respecting  the  object.  The  pleasure 
or  displeasure  tone  of  our  experience  has  its  origin  in  the 
fact  that  our  activity  is  directed  toward  an  end.  The  boy 
who  scores  a  point  in  a  game  is  pleased  because  the  gaining 
of  the  point  makes  for  the  attainment  of  his  purpose. 
This  is  the  source  of  the  pleasure  of  the  mathematician 
who  advances  a  step  in  the  solution  of  a  difficult  problem, 
and  of  the  pleasure  of  the  inventor  whose  device  gives 
evidence  of  working  as  he  desires.  An  experience  of  dis- 
comfort comes  with  losing  a  point  in  a  game  or  finding 
ourselves  halted  by  some  unforeseen  difficulty.  Whatever 
aids  in  the  attainment  of  a  present  purpose  yields  an 
experience  of  pleasure ;  whatever  hinders,  yields  an  experi- 

338 


FINALITY  339 

ence  of  displeasure.  In  other  words,  we  have  pleasure- 
pain  experiences  because  we  are  constantly  valuing  the 
persons  and  things  with  which  we  have  to  do  and  the  in- 
cidents to  which  we  are  consciously  related ;  and  we  de- 
termine their  value  in  view  of  their  helping  or  hindering 
the  attainment  of  our  purposes.  We  may  not  always  be 
aware  of  the  end  toward  which  our  activity  is 
directed ;  we  may,  indeed,  only  become  aware  of  it 
when  our  endeavor  to  reach  it  is  thwarted ;  neverthe- 
less we  always  think  and  act  and  feel  with  respect 
to  an  end.  We  conclude,  then,  that  subjective  reality 
relates  its  activity  to  ends.  The  category  of  Finality 
is  the  principle  of  experience  illustrated  above.  This 
principle  may  be  stated  thus :  activity  is  always  deter- 
mined by  an  end  and  finds  its  significance  in  the  end. 

§  165.  Finality  in  Historical  Sources. — The  interpre- 
tation of  historical  sources  requires  the  recognition  of  this 
category.  We  construct  the  history  of  primitive  races 
and  of  civilizations  which  have  passed  away  without 
leaving  literary  records,  from  remains  which  give  us  a  clue 
to  their  activities.  The  sharpened  flints  and  the  rude 
carving  on  bone  of  the  earliest  inhabitants  of  Britain,  the 
barrows  and  smooth-stone  implements  of  the  Iberians, 
the  mounds  built  by  the  race  that  once  occupied  portions 
of  this  continent,  have  historical  worth ;  but  that  historical 
value  comes  of  the  fact  that  they  are  products  of  activity 
which  was  directed  toward  ends.  In  the  study  of  such 
remains,  we  always  ask.  What  purpose  did  this  thing  fulfill } 
Why  was  it  made .?  We  must  answer  this  question  if  we 
would  know  the  meaning  of  the  object  to  the  person  who 
wrought  it ;  and  we  must  know  the  meaning  of  these  re- 
mains to  those  who  made  them  or  used  them  if  we  would 
utilize  them  in  the  construction  of  history. 

What  is  true  of  instances  like  the  above  is  emphatically 


340        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

true  of  historical  phenomena  of  later  periods.  The  ends 
sought  by  leaders,  as  De  Montfort  in  calling  the  parliament 
of  1625 ;  by  whole  peoples,  as  the  barbarian  hordes  when 
they  invaded  the  Roman  Empire ;  by  portions  of  a  people, 
as  the  American  colonies  in  their  protests  antecedent  to 
their  declaring  themselves  independent  —  these  must  be 
known  if  we  would  understand  history.  But  this  is  con- 
ceiving history  teleologically,  that  is,  by  the  application 
of  the  principle  of  finality. 

§  166.  Finality  in  the  Development  of  Science.  —  In 
his  earliest  dealing  with  nature,  man  sought  to  subject 
objects  to  manipulation.  He  wanted  to  make  objects 
serve  him  in  his  struggle  to  support  life,  or  in  the  effecting 
of  what  we  call  practical  ends.  To  accomplish  this,  he 
was  obliged  to  observe  them  with  some  care ;  and  his 
thought,  such  as  it  was,  was  directed  to  ends  which  he 
might  attain  by  means  of  the  objects.  Later,  men  began 
to  seek  intellectual  mastery  of  the  modes  of  nature's  op- 
erations. From  these  earlier  and  later  endeavors,  the 
sciences  have  developed  —  agriculture,  horticulture,  bot- 
any, geology,  chemistry,  mechanics,  etc.  They  are  prod- 
ucts of  the  mental  and  manual  activity  of  men,  directed 
to  the  attainment  of  ends. 

§  167.  Finality  in  Ethical  and  JEsthetical  Relations.  — 
In  critical  situations  we  are  wont  to  ask,  "  What  ought  I  to 
do  ^  "  In  asking  this  question  one  recognizes  that  he 
may  not  act  merely  with  a  view  to  securing  a  certain 
result,  —  as  the  obtaining  of  a  situation  or  the  getting 
of  money,  —  but  that  his  activity  should  conform  to  an 
ideal  standard,  the  standard  of  right.  When  the  word 
"  ought  "  is  used  in  its  fuller  meaning,  it  signifies  that  one 
is  under  obligation  so  to  act  as  to  maintain  harmony  with 
the  moral  order.  That  is,  one  end  of  activity  should  be 
the  realization  of  the  idea  of  right,  the  actualization  of 


FINALITY  341 

the  moral  ideal  In  our  thinking  and  doing,  and  in  our  at- 
titude toward  other  persons  and  the  course 'of  events. 
Ethical  terms  find  their  significance  in  the  relating  of 
thought  and  feeling  and  doing  to  ends  and  to  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  moral  ideal.  Motive,  desire,  choice,  and  pur- 
pose derive  their  import  from  the  principle  of  finality 
which  is  implied  In  them.  Works  of  art  —  musical  com- 
positions, paintings,  statues,  dramas,  finished  style  in 
literature  —  derive  their  aesthetic  character  from  a  desire 
to  give  expression  to  the  beautiful.  Those  who  create  our 
works  of  art  seek  more  or  less  consciously  to  give  that  char- 
acter to  their  work.  They  purpose  to  embody  their  con- 
ceptions of  beauty.  Esthetics,  the  science  of  the  beauti- 
ful, and  Ethics,  the  science  of  the  true,  have  their  ground 
in  this  category. 

§  168.  Directivity. — We  have  found  that  the  succes- 
sive stages  of  subject  activity  are  teleologically  related. 
Beginning  in  this  section  with  subject  activity,  we  shall 
pass  to  the  consideration  of  changes  in  objective  reality; 
and  we  shall  study  these  changes  with  a  view  to  deter- 
mining whether  objective  changes  are  teleologically  related. 

I.  Self-conscious  Individua.  —  In  rising  from  my  desk 
and  going  to  the  window  and  closing  it  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  the  rain  from  beating  in,  I  direct  my  activity 
to  a  selected  end.  Not  a  little  of  the  life  of  each  of  us  is 
made  up  of  such  consciously  directed  activity.  Much  of 
our  life,  however,  is  constituted  of  activities  which  are 
not  consciously  self-directed.  We  have  acquired  habitual 
physical  movements  —  as  In  walking  and  writing.  These 
habitual  movements  have  become  quasi-automatic,  and 
we  are  not  under  the  necessity  of  consciously  directing 
them.  There  are  also  Instinctive  movements  —  as  the 
shrinking  of  the  bashful  boy  when  forced  to  enter  a  room 
where  there  are  many  strangers ;  likewise  reflex  and  auto- 


342         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

matic  movements  —  as  the  sucking  movements  of  an 
infant's  lips  when  touched,  and  the  life-sustaining  activi- 
ties of  respiration  and  digestion.  We  call  attention  to  two 
facts  respecting  those  activities  which  are  not  consciously 
directed  by  the  subject:  — 

(i)  They  are  related  to  ends,  even  though  the  subject 
does  not  consciously  direct  them  to  the  end  to  which  they 
are  related.  The  reflex  and  automatic  movements  get 
their  significance  from  the  fact  that  they  serve  in  the  sus- 
taining of  life.  No  description  of  them  is  complete  unless 
it  passes  beyond  them  to  the  end  which  they  help  to  se- 
cure. The  shrinking  of  the  boy  expresses  what  he  would 
do  if  he  were  free  to  act  as  he  would  prefer ;  he  would  go 
almost  anywhere  else  than  into  that  room.  The  shrinking 
is  related  to  an  end  which  he  is  prevented  from  attaining. 
In  our  first  efforts  to  walk  and  write,  we  consciously  direct 
our  movements  to  the  walking  and  writing ;  the  acquired 
physical  habit  frees  us  from  the  necessity  of  exercising 
conscious  direction  of  our  specific  movements ;  neverthe- 
less the  walking  and  the  writing  are  now  directed  to  the 
accomplishment  of  a  purpose. 

(2)  Our  automatic,  reflex,  instinctive,  and  habitual 
movements  are  directed  from  within  us  and  by  us,  al- 
though they  are  not  consciously  directed.  Respiration  and 
digestion  are  directed  by  the  organism ;  the  organism 
utilizes  them  for  the  conservation  of  life  and  upbuilding 
of  the  body. 

2.  Other  Living  Individua;  Selective  Activity.  —  We 
find  directivity  in  other  living  individua ;  but,  in  these 
cases,  we  have  no  ground  for  regarding  any  of  it  as  directed 
with  conscious  choice  of  the  end  and  of  the  mode  by  which 
the  end  is  attained.  Animals  select  foods.  Of  two  birds 
in  the  same  garden  one  may  take  only  fruit  and  the  other 
only  insects.     The  life  activities  of  one  animal  will  so 


FINALITY  343 

direct  the  selected  material  as  to  build  up  the  organism  of 
a  quadruped  ;  in  another,  that  of  a  biped  ;  in  yet  another, 
that  of  a  fish.  Different  plants  will  utilize  different  con- 
stituents of  the  soil,  and  will  appropriate  the  same  ma- 
terial in  different  proportions.  Some  plants  will  secrete 
essential  organic  compounds  —  as  indigo,  mint,  opium, 
etc.  In  all  cases  of  selective  activity,  the  activity  is 
directed  toward  an  immediate  or  remote  end.  Life  ac- 
tivities as  a  whole  are  directed  from  within  the  organism 
toward  upbuilding  (or  anabolic)  ends,  and  against  breaking 
down  (or  katabolic)  tendencies.  Thus,  all  the  activities 
in  a  living  plant  or  animal  tend  to  building  up  and  con- 
serving the  organism.  This  is  true  even  of  the  throwing 
off  of  effete  material ;  for  the  presence  of  effete  material 
would  make  against  the  conservation  of  the  life  of  the 
animal  or  plant.  The  facts  just  presented  establish  the 
teleological  character  of  organic  activities. 

§  169.  Non-living  Individua.  —  There  are  processes  in 
non-living  individua  which  tend  toward  the  breaking  up 
of  the  individuum.  Are  such  processes  teleologically 
related  to  world  changes .? 

I.  Living  individua  conserve  life  and  build  up  the  or- 
ganism (i)  by  adapting  themselves  to  their  environment, 
and  (2)  by  adapting  their  environment  to  themselves. 
The  adaptation  to  environment  and  the  adaptation  of 
environment  are  not  separate  processes ;  they  are  two 
aspects  of  one  life-process.  The  first  process  —  the  adap- 
tation of  the  organism  to  its  environment  —  is  recognized 
by  all  biologists.  A  fish  cast  upon  the  land  cannot  long 
adapt  itself  to  its  environment  and,  because  of  its  want  of 
adaptability,  it  dies ;  whereas  a  frog  can  adapt  itself  to 
both  an  atmospheric  and  a  water  environment.  The 
second  aspect  —  the  organism's  adaptation  of  the  environ- 
ment to  itself  —  has  been  too  often  overlooked.     Organ- 


9 

344        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY         ^^^ 

isms  utilize  what  is  in  their  environment  —  air,  water, 
elements  of  the  soil,  fruits,  etc. ;  and,  in  doing  this,  they 
build  up  the  organism  and  sustain  life.  Since  organisms 
and  their  non-living  environment  are  thus  adaptable,  it 
is  evident  that  they  are  complementary  parts  of  a  systeni, 
this  far  at  least,  that  the  non-living  is  the  necessary  com- 
plement of  the  living.  The  living  have  too  often  been 
thought  to  constitute  a  realm  apart  from  and  independent 
of  the  non-living.  The  conditions  of  life  show  that  this 
is  a  misconception.  If  the  living  and  non-living  were 
wholly  external  to  each  other,  if  there  were  nothing  com- 
mon to  both,  the  non-living  could  not  have  any  value  for 
the  living;  in  such  case,  there  would  not  be  anything  in 
it  which  could  be  utilized  by  the  living.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  however,  organisms  not  only  utilize  the  non-living, 
but  they  are  absolutely  dependent  upon  what  they  can 
thus  utilize.  The  living  and  the  non-living  are  comple- 
mentary parts  of  a  system. 

2.  The  breaking-down  processes  in  the  non-living  should 
be  studied  in  their  relation  to  the  living.  The  lower 
forms  of  the  living  furnish  needful  sustenance  to  the  higher 
forms ;  animals  find  much  of  the  material  for  their  up- 
building and  conserving  activity  in  plants ;  they  go  to 
plants  for  food  rather  than  to  inorganic  compounds. 
Plants  find  their  food  in  the  inorganic.  From  this  it 
appears  that  the  breaking-down  process  in  the  living  is 
not  an  end  in  itself ;  the  product  of  this  process  is  prepared 
for  the  plant ;  and  in  the  plant  it  is  prepared  for  the  ani- 
mal. We  conclude  that  the  breaking-down  and  up-build- 
ing processes  in  nature  are  teleologically  related. 

3.  The  world  is  a  systematic  whole;  every  part  of  the 
system  functions  for  the  whole.  In  a  whole  of  this  char- 
acter, that  which  is  a  more  limited  expression  of  reality 
subserves  the  higher ;   its  significance  comes  to  expression 


FINALITY  345 

in  the  higher.  The  significance  of  oxygen  and  of  hydrogen 
has  a  very  limited  expression  in  these  elements  when  each 
is  taken  by  itself.  It  comes  to  fuller  expression  when 
they  unite  to  form  water ;  and  to  yet  fuller,  in  the  various 
compounds  into  which  they  enter.  No  one  of  these  com- 
pounds —  starch,  for  example  —  is  self-explanatory.  The 
significance  of  water  is  much  more  fully  expressed  when  it 
is  utilized  by  plants  and  animals  than  it  is  when  regarded 
apart  and  by  itself.  So  of  the  enlarging  expressions  of 
reality  from  the  non-living  up  to  the  living,  and  from  the 
lower  organisms  up  to  man  and  rationality.  Each  of  the 
more  limited  expressions  of  reality  is  teleologically  related 
to  the  higher. 

§  170.  Self-determination  the  Highest  Form  of  Ac- 
tivity. —  I.  We  have  mechanical,  chemical,  instinctive, 
and  rational  activity.  In  mechanical  and  chemical  ac- 
tivity, change  is  toward  an  end,  but  the  end  is  not  an  idea 
of  the  individuum.  This  is  obviously  true  of  inorganic 
bodies ;  e.g.  the  rolling  of  a  stone  down  hill,  the  gathering 
of  rust  on  iron,  or  the  burning  of  wood.  It  is  true  also  of 
the  mechanical  and  chemical  changes  in  plants,  and  of  the 
beating  of  the  heart  and  the  chemical  changes  which  take 
place  in  digestion.  So  likewise  as  to  instinctive  activity, 
e.g.  the  sucking  of  the  newly  born  child.  In  none  of  these 
is  the  end  an  idea  of  the  individuum  in  which  the  pro- 
cess occurs.  But  in  the  instance  of  the  carpenter  making 
a  box,  the  end  is  an  idea  of  the  workman ;  he  makes  con- 
scious choice  of  it  and  of  each  step  in  the  process.  In 
rational  activity  we  have  intelligence  determining  the  end 
and  the  course  which  the  subject  will  take  to  secure  the 
purposed  result.  This  is  the  highest  form  of  activity  of 
which  we  have  experience;  other  forms  are  truly  teleo- 
logical,  but  they  are  relatively  limited  and  incom- 
plete. 


346        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

2.  Teleological  activity  is  not  exclusive  of,  or  opposed 
to,  mechanical  and  chemical.  The  mechanical  and 
chemical  are  present  in  man;  we  have  capillarity  in  the 
circulation  of  the  blood  and  chemical  changes  in  digestion, 
seeing,  and  smelling.  Instinctive  mental  and  physical 
activities  are  manifested  in  fear,  anger,  and  imitativeness, 
and  their  attendant  reactions.  These  changes  are  es- 
sential ;  they  are,  that  we  may  be  and  that  we  may  fulfil 
our  functions.  The  high  function  of  the  individual  man 
is  to  bring  to  pass  what  is  peculiarly  his,  because  he  himself 
has  made  it  the  end  of  his  activity.  The  significance 
of  the  mechanical,  chemical,  and  instinctive  activities 
of  our  organism  has  only  a  limited  revelation  in  these  ac- 
tivities themselves ;  it  is  most  fully  manifested  in  what 
we  are  as  rational  beings,  as  intelligent  conative  beings; 
it  is  to  be  seen  in  the  part  we  have  in  the  thought  of  the 
world  and  the  course  of  events.  The  lower  activities  are 
teleologically  related  to  our  rational  functioning. 

§  171.  Finality  and  Reality.  —  i.  In  respect  of  subject 
reality,  we  find  that  all  stages  of  rational  activity  are  teleo- 
logically related.  Each  earlier  stage  finds  its  significance 
and  completion  in  a  later  stage.  Each  step  in  the  solution 
of  a  problem  looks  to  a  complete  solution  and  is  taken 
with  respect  to  that  end.  It  has  its  being,  not  merely  for 
itself,  but  for  the  solution  which  is  the  ideal  set  by  the 
student.  No  account  of  any  stage  of  the  process  is  com- 
plete which  does  not  include  the  conclusion  of  the  process. 
In  man,  the  conclusion  of  the  process  is  consciously  ac- 
cepted as  the  ideal  whose  actualization  the  subject  will 
endeavor  to  secure.  Thought  moves  forward  by  trying 
to  realize  an  ideal  which  it  has  set  for  itself ;  the  thought 
process  is  determined  with  respect  to  an  ideal.  It  is  of 
the  nature  of  intelligence  to  determine  its  activity  thus. 
When  one  is  trying  to  recall  an  incident  or  a  quotation, 


FINALITY  347 

he  is  endeavoring  to  actualize  an  ideal.     Subjective  ac- 
tivity is  teleological. 

2.  Our  discussion  has  also  shown  that  the  particulars 
of  the  objective  world  are  teleologically  related.  So  far 
as  any  object  or  event  gives  embodiment  to  an  ideal,  that 
object  or  event  is  teleologically  related  to  the  objects  and 
changes  involved  in  it  and  leading  up  to  it.  Elements 
do  not  exist  merely  for  themselves,  but  for  the  compounds 
of  which  they  are  elements ;  and  these  compounds  are 
embodiments  of  the  meaning  of  the  elements.  We  have 
given  an  illustration  of  this  in  the  instance  of  oxygen  and 
hydrogen.  The  significance  of  sodium  and  chlorine  is 
expressed  in  common  salt  and  the  utilities  which  it  serves. 
The  leaf-bud,  the  flower,  and  fruit  of  a  plant  express  the 
meaning  of  the  biological  processes  of  which  they  are  the 
product.  The  higher  reality  is  a  fuller  and  a  more  ex- 
pressive embodiment  of  the  lower.  Conscious  determina- 
tion of  an  end  and  direction  of  activity  toward  the 
attainment  of  the  chosen  end  are  characteristic  of  the  tele- 
ological relation  in  full  rational  activity ;  but  they  are  not 
the  essence  of  the  teleological  relation.  The  essence  of 
the  teleological  relation  is  that  every  stage  or  particular 
of  an  object  has  value  for  the  whole  object,  for  the  com- 
pletely developed  object  and  for  the  whole  of  its  history. 

3.  FinaUty  is  grounded  in  the  nature  of  reality  as  de- 
velopmentally  active.  Each  successive  stage  of  an  ob- 
ject which  is  perceptibly  changing  is  significant  for  the 
process  as  well  as  for  the  object.  It  sets  forth  the  import 
of  the  preceding  changes ;  that  is,  each  successive  change 
is  end  for  the  antecedent  stages.  In  other  words,  an  object 
regarded  in  respect  of  its  changes  is  a  system;  and  the 
parts  of  a  system  are  teleologically  related.  The  universe 
is  a  system;  and  the  whole  is  a  continuity.  This  con- 
tinuity is  not  continuity  upon  the  same  level  of  signifi- 


348        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

cance  and  value ;  it  is  graduated  in  value  for  thought,  and 
in  fullness  of  expression  of  reality  from  the  inorganic  up 
to  man.  The  teleological  relatedness  of  the  particulars 
of  the  universe  is  manifest  in  this  graduated  continuity; 
and  it  is  grounded  in  the  systematizing  nature  of  ac- 
tivity. 

§  172.  Conclusions.  —  Activity  is  always  related  to  an 
end.  This  "  end  "  is  not  a  terminus,  a  point  at  which 
activity  shall  cease;  it  is  a  result  which  is  itself  a  point 
of  beginning  from  which  another  end  shall  be  attained. 
The  carpenter  in  making  a  box  prepares  the  necessary 
pieces ;  each  of  these  is,  for  the  time,  the  present  "  end  " 
of  his  thinking  and  doing.  For  his  further  thought  and 
work,  these  pieces  are  means  for  effecting  a  more  remote 
result,  viz.  the  box.  The  box  itself  is  merely  a  stage  in 
his  effort  to  attain  a  still  more  remote  result,  —  it  may  be 
the  getting  of  a  living  or  making  a  present  for  a  friend. 
In  any  case,  the  box  is  not  a  terminus.  It  is  made  that  it 
may  be  utilized ;  and  the  use  to  be  made  of  it  determines 
the  design  of  the  box.  The  "  end  "  expresses,  not  the 
terminus  of  activity,  but  its  import,  its  value  for  the  sys- 
tem. We  have  found  that  changes  in  the  objective  world 
are  teleologically  related,  that  the  katabolic  processes  of 
nature  are  teleologically  related  to  the  anabolic  processes. 
In  rational  activity,  the  highest  form  of  which  we  have  ex- 
perience, there  is  conscious  choice  of  end  and  of  means  for 
attaining  the  end  ;  but  in  the  lower  realms  of  being,  in  the 
more  limited  realities  —  as  plants  and  animals  ^directivity 
is  present,  although  the  directing  of  activity  is  not  con- 
sciously determined  by  the  individuum.  The  changes  in 
the  most  limited  expressions  of  reality  reveal  the  import  of 
those  realities  and  of  the  antecedent  stages  of  the  objects. 
The  stages  of  individual  thought  and  of  manual  activity  are 
teleologically  related.     General  history,  the  development 


FINALITY  349 

of  science,  and  ethical  and  sesthetlcal  consciousness 
can  only  be  understood  if  we  shall  recognize  the  teleo- 
logical  relatedness  of  the  particulars  of  the  life  of  man. 
Activity  is  systematic;  and,  being  systematic,  it  is 
teleological. 


(i 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 

INDIVIDUALITY   AND    PERSONALITY 

§  173.  Individuality  and  Personality.  —  In  the  opening 
of  the  chapter  on  Individuality,  we  said  that  the  study  of 
that  category  would  not  be  completed  until  later.  We 
now  resume  its  consideration. 

-  I.  In  our  previous  study,  we  learned  that  an  individuum 
subjectively  regarded  is  constituted  by  the  selective  ac- 
tivity of  the  subject.  A  block,  a  single  building,  a  suite 
of  offices,  one  of  the  rooms  of  a  suite,  or  a  single  piece  of 
furniture  in  one  of  the  rooms  may  be  an  individuum. 
The  subject  determines  what  shall  constitute  his  unit 
object,  and  he  determines  it  in  keeping  with  the  interest 
of  the  moment.  We  also  concluded  that  individuality 
is  a  mode  of  object  reality,  that  what  the  subject  regards 
as  an  individuum  Is  also  an  objective  individual,  and  that 
there  is  significant  import  in  the  "  common-sense  "  con- 
ception of  individuality,  as  to  distinctness,  wholeness,  and 
independence  of  being.  We  likewise  concluded  that  the 
individual  Is  Many  in  One,  that  the  Many  are  constituted 
In  the  One  and  function  as  one.  We  found  further  that 
there  are  degrees  of  individuality,  and  that  marked  dis- 
tinctness of  structure  and  function  denote  a  high  degree 
of  individuality.  Lastly,  we  discovered  that  increasing 
comprehensiveness  and  closer  approximation  to  self- 
subsistence  denote  approach  toward  perfect  individuality. 
In  the  present  discussion,  we  will  argue  that  the  perfect 
individual  is  the  Absolute  Person. 

2.   Two  marbles  may  be  perceptibly  distinct  only  be- 

350 


INDIVIDUALITY  AND  PERSONALITY     351 

cause  they  occupy  different  positions;  they  may  appear 
in  all  other  respects  to  be  the  same.  Two  musical  notes 
may  only  differ  in  the  fact  that  one  follows  another,  as 
when  a  note  is  repeated.  In  such  cases,  the  individuality 
of  the  objects  is  indicated  in  their  being  in  different  space 
and  time  relations.  The  individuality  of  most  objects 
is  expressed  in  the  marks  by  which  they  differ  from  one 
another.  The  individuality  of  each  of  a  student's  books 
is  indicated  in  the  marks  by  which  it  differs  from  all  other 
books.  But  the  individuality  of  an  object  is  not  in  the 
marks  and  relations  in  which  it  is  perceived  to  differ 
from  other  objects.  Difference  of  quality  and  relation  are 
tokens  of  individuality;  they  are  not  the  individuality 
itself,  nor  the  source  of  the  individuality.  Perceptible 
differences  are  not  the  ultimate  "  principle  of  individua- 
tion " ;  the  principle  of  individuation  is  immanent  in  the 
object,  not  external  to  it.  Individuality  is  uniqueness. 
The  individual  is  unique  in  that  it  alone  is,  or  can  be, 
itself ;  no  other  is  it  or  can  be  it.  It  is  irreplaceable.  In- 
dividuality is  Immanent  uniqueness. 

3.  We  are  conscious  of  great  diversity  in  our  experi- 
ences ;  no  two  incidents  of  our  life  are  in  all  particulars 
quite  the  same.  Nevertheless  these  innumerable  diverse 
experiences  are  constituted  in  a  continuous  life  experience. 
This  continuous  experience  is  essentially  one,  and  it  is 
comprehensive  of  all  our  life.  These  diverse  experiences 
have  their  being  in  one  self-same  self.  Our  experience  as 
a  whole  is  a  diversified  unity.  Each  particular  of  it  func- 
tions for  all  the  others ;  it  has  its  being  in  and  with  all  the 
others  and  modifies  them.  This  is  true,  whether  we  speak 
of  the  distinct  experiences  which  we  have  through  relation 
with  the  many  objects  with  which  we  have  to  do,  or 
whether  we  have  in  mind  the  elemental  phases  of  experi- 
ence, as  thinking,  feeling,  and  doing.     Consciousness  is 


352         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

emphatically  Many  in  One.  We  also  have  consciousness 
of  the  self  as  a  unit  distinct  from  the  world  of  not-self,  a 
consciousness  of  the  "  otherness  "  of  things,  other  persons, 
and  events.  In  a  word,  self  is  known  In  consciousness  as 
having  the  comprehensive  wholeness,  the  distinctness, 
the  diversified  unity  which  characterizes  individuality. 
No  other  reality  of  which  we  have  experience  possesses 
these  characteristics  in  so  high  a  degree  as  the  human 
individual. 

4.  In  respect  of  consciousness,  each  of  us  Is  set  apart 
from  other  personal  Indivldua,  is  peculiarly  himself,  by  a 
content  which  is  his  "  private  property."  You  are  the 
only  possible  subject  of  your  experience.  If  we  should 
go  so  far  as  to  assume  that  another  person  could  have 
experience  qualitatively  identical  with  yours,  that  would 
not  make  him  the  subject  of  your  experience.  You  and  he 
may  rejoice  over  the  same  occurrence ;  but  his  joy  is  his, 
and  yours  is  yours.  The  consciousness  of  every  human 
individual  Is  unique.  Consciousness  of  self-sameness 
gives  to  human  Individuality  a  higher  rank  than  can  be 
found  in  any  other  finite  individuum.  The  brute  lives 
only  in  the  present  moment,  with  no  rational  recall  of  the 
past  nor  forecast  of  the  future;  man  possesses  his  past 
and  purposes  his  future.  The  activity  of  the  human  in- 
dividual is  consciously  self-directed.  In  this,  we  have 
self-assertive  activity,  asserting  its  apartness  from,  and 
relative  independence  of,  other  persons,  asserting  also  that 
it  itself  originates  its  thought  and  determines  its  activities. 
The  human  Individual  likewise  holds  that  his  attitude 
toward  all  without  is  determined  within  and  by  himself, 
that  he  is  in  possession  of  a  province  within  which  he  rules 
and  into  which  no  other  may  press.  This  claim  to  origi- 
nation and  rulership  is  an  assertion  of  uniqueness.  We 
recognize  the  element  of  uniqueness  in  our  estimate  of  the 


INDIVIDUALITY  AND   PERSONALITY     353 

more  noted  individuals  who  have  made  themselves  a  part 
of  organized  history.  They  cannot  be  merged  into  the 
mass  of  humanity.  Their  uniqueness  is  expressed  in  our 
judgment  that  they  had,  each  of  them,  a  distinguishing 
individuality.  The  highest  finite  individuality  is  in  the 
consciously  purposive  and  self-determined  individuum. 
Of  all  that  is  finite  only  man  is  truly  individual. 

5.  The  universal  is  expressed  in  the  difi'erences  as  well 
as  the  likenesses  of  particulars  (§  47,  3).  The  universal 
"  oak  "  is  the  ground  of  the  differences  and  the  likenesses 
of  particular  "  oaks."  We  have  found  (§  80)  that  ex- 
perience is  never  experience  of  a  mere  particular ;  and  we 
have  concluded  (§§  94,  95)  that  a  known  object  is  not  a 
mere  particular,  but  is  always  a  particularized  universal. 
Every  "  horse  "  or  "  man  "  is  the  universal  "  horse  "  or 
"  man  "  particularized  ;  and  it  is  only  in  such  an  individual 
that  the  universal  has  actuality.  The  individual  is  the 
unity  of  the  universal  and  the  particular.  A  particular 
"  horse  "  is  distinguished  from  other  "  horses  "  through 
the  characteristics  in  which  he  differs  from  them.  These 
differences  set  him  apart  from  other  "  horses  " ;  and  be- 
cause differences  distinguish  particulars,  they  are  often 
regarded  as  the  sole  and  sufficient  token  of  uniqueness. 
But  to  conclude  thus  is  to  misconceive  the  nature  of 
uniqueness  and  individuality.  The  modern  man  of  cul- 
ture has  more  individuality  than  a  savage  has.  His  differ- 
encing characteristics  are  more  numerous  and  more  dis- 
tinct than  those  of  the  savage ;  and  he  is  a  more  compre- 
hensive expression  of  the  universal  "  man."  That  which 
gives  the  more  comprehensive  expression  of  the  universal 
manifests  the  higher  degree  of  individuality.  Compre- 
hensiveness and  distinctness  of  characteristics  are  tokens 
of  individuality ;  they  are  elements  of  uniqueness.  The 
many-sided  man  is  distinctly  individual. 

2A 


354        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

6.  Since  reality  is  individual,  the  Ground-Reality  of  the 
universe  must  be  individual.  This  Universal  is  all-com- 
prehensive; for  the  universe  is  the  manifestation  of  the 
activity,  and  the  expression  of  the  meaning,  of  the  Ul- 
timate Reality.  This  individual  is  wholly  self-subsistent 
and  is,  therefore,  rightly  denominated  the  Absolute.  Self- 
consciousness  and  self-determination,  characteristics  of 
Personality,  are  also  characteristics  of  the  highest  indi- 
viduality of  which  we  have  experience.  The  perfect 
unitary  reality,  that  reality  which  is  the  most  compre- 
hensively diverse  and  the  most  distinct,  is  to  be  found  in 
Personality.  The  wholly  self-subsistent  individual,  the 
reality  which  is  unitary  with  an  all-comprehensive  di- 
versity of  activities,  the  Ground-Reality  of  the  universe,  is 
the  Absolute  Person. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 
sociality;    summary  of  conclusions 

§  174.  The  Solitary  Self  and  the  Social  Self.  —  Hitherto 
we  have  regarded  consciousness  as  the  consciousness  of  a 
solitary,  purely  individual  self;  this  is,  however,  an  in- 
complete view  of  consciousness.  We  are  in  intimate  re- 
lation with  other  selves ;  and  the  consciousness  of  each 
of  us  has  content  and  significance  because  of  our  relation 
to  others.  So  much  as  this  was  said  earlier  in  our  study ; 
but  more  remains  to  be  said.  Our  consciousness  of 
self-rulership,  with  its  attendant  assertion  of  personal 
rights,  seems  to  set  us  apart  in  a  province  which  is  all  our 
own;  and  we  tend  to  think  of  our  relation  to  others  as 
wholly  external.  This  appears  also  to  follow  from  the 
uniqueness  of  the  individual.  Each  of  us  is  just  himself ; 
and  he  is  all  there  is  of  himself.  From  this  point  of  view, 
society  is  an  aggregate  of  individuals ;  and  each  of  these 
individuals  is  complete  in  himself.  The  self  thus  con- 
ceived is  purely  individual ;  and  this  solitary,  self-centered 
self  is  assumed  to  be  the  real  self. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  self  who  knows  and  plans  and 
hopes  and  strives  is  not  this  solitary  self.  Consciousness 
is  not  purely  Individual,  it  is  also  social ;  with  conscious- 
ness of  self  it  includes  consciousness  of  another  or  others. 
The  recognition  of  this  fact  has  given  rise  to  the  term  "  so- 
cial consciousness,"  a  term  for  which  no  satisfactory,  con- 
cise definition  is  at  hand.  The  derivation  of  the  word 
"  social  "  furnishes  a  point  of  beginning  for  the  study  of 
the  social  phase  of  consciousness.     The  word  "  socius," 

3SS 


3S6        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

from  which  social  and  its  cognates  are  derived,  signifies 
fellow,  partner,  companion.  "  Social  consciousness  "  is 
virtually  the  same  with  "  associating  consciousness."  In 
saying  that  consciousness  is  social,  we  assert  (i)  that 
self-consciousness  Is  consciousness  of  an  "  other  "  or  of 
"  others,"  as  well  as  consciousness  of  self;  (2)  that  other 
persons  are  regarded  as  of  our  kind,  and  as  fellows  —  or 
associates  —  in  experience.  Consciousness  is  social  in 
that  it  relates  itself  to  others  as  their  socius,  or  fellow,  and 
the  "  other  "  to  self  as  the  socius  of  the  self.  The  self 
whom  each  of  us  knows  as  "  my  self,"  the  self  to  whom  we 
assign  our  feelings,  thought,  and  purposes,  is  a  social  self. 
Sociality,  as  a  category,  Is  that  characteristic  of  conscious- 
ness which  arises  from  our  recognizing  that  others  are  of 
our  kind  and  are  fellow-participants  with  us  In  experience. 

§  175.  The  Social  Self  is  the  Real  Self.  —  If  It  be  true 
that  the  real  self  is  the  self  In  whose  experience  there  is 
consciousness  of  the  other  as  his  "  fellow,"  evidence  of  It 
should  be  abundant.  In  such  case,  the  social  conscious- 
ness should  be  in  all  our  experience;  It  should  be  mani- 
fest In  the  attitudes  and  activities  of  life. 

I.  We  are  not  first  self-conscious  and  then  conscious 
of  the  world.  Self-consciousness  arises  in  our  distinguish- 
ing self  from  the  objects  of  the  external  world.  But  defi- 
nite self-consciousness  does  not  simply  set  one  apart 
from  the  other  realities  of  the  world.  In  my  self-con- 
sciousness, I  know  myself  as  knowing  and  feeling  and  do- 
ing ;  I  am  for  myself  a  knowing,  feeling,  and  doing  reality. 
That  Is  the  judgment  of  every  one  respecting  himself.  It 
may  not  be  stated  definitely,  but  It  Is  involved  In  all  our 
thought  of  ourselves.  At  first  the  child  assigns  feeling 
and  thinking  to  things ;  he  takes  them  to  be  of  his  kind ; 
he  would  beat  the  stick  or  the  chair  that  hurts  him.  In 
other  words,  his  consciousness  Is  from  the  first  a  social 


SOCIALITY;   SUMMARY  OF  CONCLUSIONS      357 

consciousness;  he  and  all  objects  are  fellows.  Later,  he 
distinguishes  things  from  persons,  and  he  ceases  to  regard 
things  as  of  a  kind  with  himself;  but,  by  so  much  as  his 
consciousness  is  normal,  he  continues  to  account  himself 
a  "  socius  "  of  persons.  From  this  It  appears  that  con- 
sciousness Is  social  from  the  beginning,  and  that  sociality 
gets  definition  and  limitation  In  enlarging  experience. 

2.  Language  testifies  to  the  reality  of  the  social  self. 
Language  is  a  product  of  the  inter-related  activity  of 
men  and  has  Its  origin  in  the  endeavor  to  exchange  ex- 
perience. When  the  master  gives  an  order  to  his  servant, 
he  is  seeking  to  arouse  In  the  servant  an  experience  which 
shall  be  identical  in  certain  particulars  with  his  own. 
Commerce  in  experience  has  brought  language  to  its  pres- 
ent stage  of  development.  To  effect  exchange  of  experi- 
ence is  the  function  of  language.  When  you  enter  upon 
conversation  with  another,  you  assume  that  the  other  Is 
of  your  kind,  is  rational  as  you  are  rational.  You  also 
assume  that  the  other  has  had  an  experience  in  some  re- 
spects the  same  with  yours.  The  listener  hears  sounds; 
he  assigns  import  to  these  sounds,  and  this  Import  Is  for 
him  the  thought  of  the  speaker.  If  he  shall  understand 
what  is  said.  It  is  not  only  necessary  that  he  shall  be  able 
to  hear  and  to  think  —  i.e.  that  he  shall  be  sentient  and 
rational ;  but  it  is  likewise  necessary  that  he  shall  have  had 
experience  which  is  in  some  particulars  the  same  with 
that  of  the  speaker.  If  the  listener's  experience  were 
not  the  same  in  any  particular,  he  could  not  discover  the 
speaker's  thought,  but  would  be  llabk  to  assign  a  different 
meaning  to  words  and  phrases  from  that  which  was  In 
the  mind  of  the  speaker.  We  recognize  that  things  are 
not  sentient  and  cannot  hear,  and  that  animals  are 
not  rational  and  have  had,  no  experience  which  will  fit 
them  to  interpret  reasoned  discourse.     As  a  consequence. 


358         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

we  never  make  a  serious  attempt  to  converse  with  things ; 
and,  if  we  make  pretence  of  conversation  with  the  more 
gifted  domestic  animals,  we  for  the  time  play  that  they 
are  of  our  kind.  The  teacher  can  only  accomplish  his 
undertaking  because  he  and  the  student  have  an  associ- 
ated experience.  The  consciousness  of  the  individual 
self  is  not  a  solitary,  purely  individual  consciousness. 
A  purely  individual  and  isolating  consciousness  would 
not  initiate  inter-subjective  intercourse;  it  could  not 
have  part  in  rational  intercourse.  The  real  self  is  at  once 
individual  and  social ;  the  individuality  and  sociality  of 
consciousness  are  inseparable. 

3.  A  consideration  of  our  outlook  upon  life  and  of  the 
interests  upon  which  we  set  high  value,  makes  it  evident 
that  the  social  self  is  at  the  centre  of  all  our  experience. 
We  do  not  say  that  the  social  element  of  consciousness 
is  distinctly  recognized  by  each  of  us  in  every  moment  of 
our  experience;  but  we  do  say  that  the  social  self  is 
the  self  of  the  interests  which  we  deem  vital.  The  child's 
earliest  definite  awareness  centres  about  the  person  who 
cares  for  him.  The  mother  or  nurse,  what  she  can  do 
for  him  and  what  he  expects  her  to  do  —  these  are  for  him 
the  matters  of  chief  importance.  This  is,  of  course,  not 
a  completely  defined  social  self,  but  it  is  the  germ  of  the 
socius ;  it  is  a  social  consciousness  in  its  beginning. 
Later,  there  comes  a  period  of  interest  in  toys  and  games ; 
and  then  the  normally  developing  child  desires  companion- 
ship in  his  pleasures  and  triumphs,  and  sympathy  when 
he  fails.  He  regularly  prefers  games  in  which  others 
partake  with  him ;  and,  when  child  companions  are  want- 
ing, he  will  ask  that  father  and  mother  take  part  with 
him.  The  vital  interests  of  the  parent,  of  the  citizen,  of 
every  one  whatever  his  line  of  activity  may  be,  are  not 
the  interests  of  a  self  who  stands  apart  from  others ;  they 


SOCIALITY;   SUMMARY  OF  CONCLUSIONS      359 

are  the  interests  of  a  self  in  whose  experience  other  selves 
have  a  large  place.  He  is  not  normal  of  whom  this  may 
not  be  said. 

§  176.  Social  Reciprocity  and  the  Development  of  the 
Individual.  —  i.  The  social  consciousness  has  its  source 
in  our  recognition  of  the  fact  that  we  are  socially  related  to 
others.  Our  attitude  toward  others,  our  thought  of  them 
and  our  activity  as  it  may  affect  them  are  necessarily  de- 
termined with  respect  to  the  value  we  assign  to  this  re- 
lation. But  the  social  relation  is  reciprocal  in  nature; 
every  person  who  is  normal  regards  himself  as  the  socius 
of  all  others.  This  being  true,  it  follows  that  social 
attitudes  and  activities  should  be  reciprocal.  We  look 
for  social  reciprocity :  we  treat  others  as  though  they  were 
of  our  kind,  and  we  expect  that  they  shall  treat  us  simi- 
larly. To  be  ignored,  to  be  treated  as  though  we  were 
of  no  account,  would  be  an  afflictive  experience.  We 
long  to  be  recognized  by  others  as  one  with  them;  and 
we  are  disturbed  when  such  recognition  is  not  extended 
us.  As  we  know  that  others  enter  into,  and  help  make  up, 
our  experience,  so  would  we  have  others  give  us  a  vital 
place  in  their  interests,  a  place  in  their  social  self.  This 
it  is  which  gives  such  keenness  and  intensity  to  the  effort 
which  some  make  to  gain  entrance  to  what  is  in  common 
parlance  called  "  society."  It  is  seen  also  in  the  large 
number  of  associations  of  various  kinds  and  the  eagerness 
with  which  men  seek  membership  in  them.  The  normal 
developing  self  demands  social  reciprocity ;  and  this  de- 
mand is  a  call  for  what  is  essential  to  the  development  of 
the  individual. 

2.  Our  incomplete  and  disconnected  experience  finds 
its  completeness  in  social  reciprocity.  The  social  conscious- 
ness binds  all  together.  It  is  our  "  other  "  who  answers 
our   questions,    resolves   our   doubts,   writes   our   books, 


36o        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

provides  for  our  amusement,  and  furnishes  us  the  many 
necessities  and  comforts  which  we  of  ourselves  could  never 
obtain  alone.  These  "  others "  awaken  in  us  thoughts 
which  had  otherwise  never  been  ours ;  they  live  lives 
which  inspire  us ;  and  they  unite  with  us  in  carrying  out 
undertakings  which  we  could  not  eifect  alone.  In  all  this 
they  have  part  in  developing  our  real  self. 

3.  We  speak  of  rights,  privileges,  and  obligations.  We 
believe  that  the  ideas  which  these  words  express  should  be 
clearly  defined  in  our  thought,  that  they  should  represent 
to  us  what  is  of  highest  value,  and  that  they  should  find 
embodiment  in  conduct.  These  ideas  have  their  origin 
in  the  social  consciousness.  We  insist  that  a  man  has 
rights  equal  to  those  accorded  others;  and  we  consent 
that  he  has  rights  equal  with  ours.  The  ground  of  this 
insistence  and  consent  is  that  he  is  of  a  kind  with  others 
and  with  us,  at  least  in  the  sphere  within  which  these  rights 
are  claimed.  When  we  refuse  another  equal  rights  with 
us,  it  is  because  we  believe  that  in  that  sphere  he  is  not  of 
our  kind.  The  criminal  is  restricted  in  his  liberty,  because 
he  has  shown  that  he  is  not  of  the  kind  of  the  true  citizen. 
This  is  further  exemplified  in  the  exclusiveness  of  social 
circles,  fraternal  organizations,  and  clubs.  The  unad- 
mitted are  held  to  be,  in  these  relations,  not  of  a  kind 
with  those  who  make  up  these  circles  and  associations. 
We  believe  also  that  those  who  are  of  our  kind  have  the 
same  privileges  and  obligations  that  we  have.  These 
ideas  have  their  development  and  definition  within  social 
relations  and  through  social  reciprocity ;  and  their  de- 
velopment in  the  individual  is  essential  to  his  completeness. 
The  moral  sense  is  developed  within  social  relations,  and 
only  there. 

§  177.  Conclusions.  —  The  normal  consciousness  is 
both  individual  and  social :   it  testifies  to  the  individual's 


SOCIALITY;   SUMMARY  OF  CONCLUSIONS      361 

distinctness  from  others  and  his  incompleteness  apart  from 
others.  As  a  social  self,  the  individual  recognizes  that  the 
other  is  of  his  kind  and  is  a  co-participant  in  experience. 
Such  recognition  is  essential  to  his  own  development. 
Sociality  is  the  proximate  ground  of  society  and  of  the 
orderly  development  of  the  individual.  Hence  the  in- 
dividual is  not  an  ultimate ;  he  is  not  an  independent 
centre  of  experience  and  therefore  cannot  be  an  inde- 
pendent centre  of  being.  Society  is  not  an  aggregate  of 
independent  individuals.  We  do  not  say  that  it  is  a  mere 
organism ;  but  we  are  forced  to  conclude  that  its  individual 
components  are  so  inter-related  that  no  term  that  impli- 
cates less  intimacy  of  relation  than  the  term  "  organic  " 
can  adequately  express  the  relation  of  individuals  to  one 
another.  Each  functions  for  all  the  others.  The  ulti- 
mate ground  of  society  is  the  Absolute  Individual  who  is 
the  ground  of  the  being  and  the  experience  of  finite  indi- 
viduals. Society,  in  the  principles  of  its  coherence,  is  an 
expression  of  the  nature  of  the  Absolute  Individual. 

§  178.  Conclusions  from  our  Study  of  the  Categories. 
—  The  categories  are  fundamental  forms  in  which  reality, 
both  subjective  and  objective,  expresses  itself.  Our 
study  of  these  forms  justifies  our  assumption  that  reality 
is  active  being.  All  realities  are  of  interest  to  us  ;  but  of 
finite  realities,  man  is  of  prime  interest.  A  man  is  a  true 
individual,  but  he  is  not  the  complete  individual;  he  is 
not  the  perfect  individual,  for  his  being  and  his  activity 
do  not  have  their  source  within  himself.  He  can  only  be 
conscious  when  he  is  related  as  subject  to  some  object.  He 
is  in  the  world  system  and  dependent  upon  it.  Reality 
expresses  itself  in  him,  but  he  is  a  limited  expression  of 
reality.  He  is  in  some  particulars  trans-spatial';  but 
for  much  of  his  activity  he  is  subject  to  spatial  limitations. 
He  can  conceive  the  trans-temporal  and  can  in  idea  scan 


362        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  ages ;  but  his  possession  of  the  actual  is  circumscribed 
by  temporal  limitations.  He  can  rule  over  and  utilize 
much  of  the  objective  world  ;  but  he  is  forced  to  recognize 
that  his  authority  here  is  a  conditioned  authority.  To 
deal  effectively  with  the  not-self  he  must  subject  himself 
to  the  conditions  imposed  by  its  constitution;  but,  if 
he  shall  observe  these  conditions,  he  becomes  ruler  in  an 
extended  realm.  ^A  man  is  an  individual  with  rulership 
and  rights  which  are  his  own  as  against  all  other  finite 
individuals ;  but  he  is  not  an  independent  centre  of  ex- 
perience or  reality.  He  is  organically  related  to  all  others 
of  his  kind,  and  he  is  dependent  upon  this  relation  for  the 
experience  in  which  he  develops  true  selfhood. 

The  Absolute  Reality  is  the  Absolute  Individual.  As 
the  highest  individuality  of  which  we  have  experience  is 
constituted  in  personality,  we  are  forced  to  conclude  that 
the  Absolute  Individual  is  a  person,  is  at  least  self- 
conscious  and  self-determined.  The  Absolute  is  self- 
subsistent,  and  is  the  ground  of  being  and  activity;  the 
world  system  is  of  him  and  dependent  upon  him.  This 
Absolute  determines  the  conditioning  of  the  universe; 
and  it  would  be  a  reversal  of  the  fundamental  order  to 
speak  of  the  universe  as  conditioning  its  ground.  The 
Absolute  Reality  is  trans-temporal  and  trans-spatial. 
The  Absolute  Individual  is  the  ultimate  ground  of  society ; 
the  social  consciousness,  being  grounded  in  the  Absolute, 
is  an  expression,  however  limited,  of  the  Absolute  con- 
sciousness. Because  the  world-process  is  teleological, 
we  conclude  that  it  is  determined  toward  an  end.  This 
end  is  a  purpose,  not  a  conclusion ;  and  it  must  be  a  pur- 
pose that  is  consonant  with  the  nature  of  the  Perfect 
Person. 


PART  IV 

HUMAN    FREEDOM    AND    EXISTENCE  OF 

GOD 

CHAPTER  XXXVHI 

HUMAN    FREEDOM 

§  179.  The  Problem.  — The  problem  of  Human  Freedom 
has  given  rise  to  much  controversy ;  and  the  attempt  to 
solve  it  has  resulted  in  conflicting  theories.  The  subject 
is  confessedly  difficult,  and  the  difficulty  has  been  aug- 
mented by  lack  of  agreement  concerning  the  significance 
of  the  terms  usually  employed  in  the  discussion.  In 
view  of  this,  we  shall  endeavor  to  assign  such  meanings 
to  the  terms  used  as  will  secure  that  our  discussion  and  our 
conclusions  shall  be  true  to  experience. 

I.  Origin  of  the  Idea  of  Human  Freedom.  —  We  think 
and  speak  of  ourselves  as  free.  We  claim  some  acts  as 
our  own,  and  hold  that  these  acts  are  ours  because  we 
purposed  them  and  took  part  in  them  of  our  own  choice 
and  not  by  compulsion.  In  other  words,  we  insist  that 
we  have  related  ourselves  freely  to  tjiese  acts,  and  we  base 
our  assertion  of  freedom  upon  our  consciousness  that  we 
are  self-ruled  and  self-directed  in  the  decision  to  act. 
The  idea  of  freedom,  then,  has  its  origin  in  our  conscious- 
ness of  a  certain  subjective  relation  to  events  in  which 
we  have  part.  My  consciousness  of  freedom  in  any  partic- 
ular instance  is  grounded  in  my  consciousness  that  I 
purposed  my  part  in  what  took  place;    that  the  decision 

363 


364        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

to  act  with  reference  to  a  certain  end  and  the  initiating 
and  directing  of  my  course  of  action  are  my  own  decision, 
initiation,  and  direction. 

2.  The  Problem  Stated.  —  The  preceding  paragraph  dis- 
covers the  point  in  controversy :  Are  we  free  in  the  act  of 
deciding?  This  question  is  usually  confined  to  ethical 
decisions.  It  might  be  stated  thus  :  Is  one  free  when  he 
chooses,  or  refuses,  to  do  what  he  believes  to  be  right  ^ 
But  the  question  of  human  freedom  extends  to  decisions 
which  are  not  purely  ethical.  Are  we  intellectually  and 
aesthetically  free  t  Are  you  free  in  conducting  a  course 
of  reasoning }  Do  you  determine  the  reasoning  t  Am  I 
free  in  judging  as  to  the  beauty  of  a  landscape  t  In  short, 
is  one  in  the  critical  moment  of  rational  activity  determined, 
or  does  he  determine  t  Are  our  intellective,  aesthetic, 
and  ethical  judgments  determined  by  us  or  through  us  .? 

§  180.  Kinds  of  Freedom.  —  The  term  "  freedom " 
has  three  references,  and  these  differ  so  widely  in  their 
connotations  that  it  is  well  to  distinguish  them. 

1 .  Psychical  Freedom.  —  Choosing  is  a  psychical  process ; 
hence  the  question  as  to  whether  a  man  is  freely  active 
in  this  process,  has  a  distinctly  psychical  reference.  If  we 
beHeve  that  one  is  free  in  deciding  between  alternatives, 
—  e.g.  as  to  whether  he  will  attend  to  correspondence  or 
go  for  a  walk,  —  we  hold  a  doctrine  of  psychical  freedom. 
This  form  of  freedom  appears  to  present  the  best  approach 
to  the  main  question  under  consideration ;  and  we  shall 
have  this  form  of  freedom  in  mind,  except  it  be  distinctly 
stated  that  we  are  speaking  of  one-  of  the  other  forms. 

2.  Metaphysical  Freedom.  —  The  Epicureans  give  the 
term  "  freedom "  a  metaphysical  reference.  Epicurus 
held  that  the  atoms  have  a  power  of  self-determination, 
and  that  this  determination  is  free  in  that  it  is  causeless 
and  wholly  of  chance.     In  this  he  assumes  that  reality 


HUMAN   FREEDOM  365 

is  In  its  nature  free ;  he  gives  freedom  a  metaphysical 
reference.  The  Stoics  declared  that  all  changes  in  the 
universe  take  place  under  a  law  of  natural  necessity  to 
which  there  are  no  exceptions.  According  to  them,  there 
is  no  metaphysical  freedom.  Those  systems  which  con- 
ceive of  the  ultimate  reality  as  a  person  regard  freedom  as 
an  attribute  of  the  highest  reality.  In  so  doing  they 
give  freedom  a  metaphysical  reference.  The  question  of 
freedom  is  thus  involved  in  the  nature  of  the  ultimate 
reality.  The  mediaeval  theologians  and  the  Substantial- 
ists  give  freedom  a  similar  reference  in  their  discussion  of 
the  Divine  will,  and  this  reference  occurs  naturally  in  all 
systems  that  conceive  of  the  ultimate  as  a  person.  It  is 
present  also  when  we  raise  the  question  as  to  whether 
man  is  by  nature  free. 

3.  Ethical  Freedom.  — The  question  of  ethical  freedom 
takes  two  forms.  Plato  inferred  freedom  from  man's 
sense  of  responsibility.  We  hold  ourselves  responsible 
for  certain  acts.  Plato  would  argue  that  a  person  cannot 
rationally  be  made  responsible  for  an  act  that  is  repre- 
hensible, unless  it  were  possible  for  him  not  to  have  done 
what  he  did ;  neither  can  one  be  rightly  praised  for  doing 
what  he  could  not  avoid  doing.  Aristotle  agreed  with 
him  in  this ;  so  likewise  almost  all  who  have  contended 
for  freedom  of  choice.  This  gives  one  form  to  the  question 
of  ethical  freedom.  The  other  form  arises  from  a  question 
which  Plato  discussed  and  which  nas  had  prominence 
given  it  in  ethical  studies.  The  following  query  presents 
it  with  sufficient  exactness  for  our  purpose:  Is  the  man 
who  chooses  what  is  unreasonable  and  evil,  free } 

4.  Inter-relation  of  these  Forms.  —  These  forms,  or  kinds, 
of  freedom  are  at  root  one ;  the  difference  in  connation 
comes  of  considering  freedom  in  different  relations. 

Is    human    freedom    possible    in    this    universe }     Our 


366        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

metaphysical  ultimate  determines  our  answer  to  this 
question.  The  cosmos  is  an  expression  of  the  ultimate 
reality.  Hence,  if  there  is  no  free  activity  in  the  ultimate 
reality,  there  cannot  be  freedom  in  the  universe;  and,  if 
the  ultimate  is  freely  active,  there  is  freedom  in  the  uni- 
verse. Whether  or  not  man  is  free,  is  a  fact  to  be  other- 
wise determined. 

Is  freedom  present  in  psychical  activity  ?  The  answer 
to  this  inquiry  determines  the  question  of  the  actuality 
of  psychical  freedom.  What  testimony,  if  any,  does  our 
ethical  consciousness  give  respecting  human  freedom  ^ 
It  is  argued  by  many  that  our  sense  of  responsibility  goes 
to  prove  that  we  are  psychically  free.  Others  reverse  the 
argument;  they  say  that  our  sense  of  responsibility  has 
its  origin  in  our  certainty  that  we  are  volitionally  free. 
In  either  case,  it  is  evident  that  psychical  and  ethical 
freedom  are  inter-related. 

The  question.  Is  the  man  who  chooses  the  unreasonable 
and  evil,  free .?  comes  of  regarding  freedom  as  the  ideal 
relation  of  the  subject  to  the  ethical  order.  This  ideal 
is  the  subject's  inner  harmony  with  the  ethical  order,  his 
perfect  ethical  rationality,  his  habitual  preference  for  the 
rationally  right,  his  prompt  and  invariable  decision  in 
favor  of  the  right.  If  one  should  attain  this  ideal,  he  would 
think  and  act  without  any  sense  of  restriction ;  he  would 
be  wholly  free.  This,  the  second  form  of  ethical  freedom, 
connects  with  the  metaphysical  ultimate,  the  Ground- 
Reality  of  the  universe.  Has  the  system  of  which  the 
subject  is  an  individual  part,  an  ethical  order.?  If  the 
metaphysical  ultimate  has  no  ethical  characteristic,  the 
system  which  is  an  expression  of  this  ultimate  will  be  non- 
ethical  ;  if  this  ultimate  is  ethical  in  nature,  we  will  expect 
the  system  to  present  an  ethical  order.  Hence  the  ques- 
tion asked  at  the  beginning  of  this  paragraph  takes  us  to 


HUMAN   FREEDOM  367 

the  Ground-Reality  of  the  universe,  and  our  answer  will 
depend  upon  our  conception  of  this  Ground,  as  to  whether 
it  is,  or  is  not,  ethical. 

§  181.  Theories  Stated.  —  It  is  generally  assumed  that 
there  are  two  theories  of  volitional  activity  —  Deter- 
minism and  Indeterminism.  The  former  used  to  be  called 
Necessitarianism ;  but  many  Determinists  seriously  ob- 
ject to  that  designation.  Indeterminists  are  sometimes 
spoken  of  as  Libertarians ;  but  some  Libertarians  are  un- 
willing to  be  classified  as  Indeterminists.  There  are  De- 
terminists who  hold  what  is  virtually  a  fatalistic  doctrine ; 
while^  others  who  propound  what  they  call  Determinism 
just  as  distinctly  insist  that  man  is  free  in  volition.  Where 
there  is  such  disagreement,  it  will  be  well  to  distinguish 
a  third  theory  and  to  indicate  the  meaning  which  this 
study  will  assign  to  these  terms. 

1.  Pure  Determinism,  —  This  will  be  known  as  De- 
terminism. It  is  the  doctrine  that  every  choice  is  deter- 
mined by  the  physical  and  psychical  conditions  of  the 
subject;  the  self,  the  conditions,  and  the  choice  are  con- 
ceived, as  mechanically  related,  as  discrete.  The  decision 
in  favor  of  one  alternative  and  against  others  is  a  term  in 
a  mechanical  series  and  is  external  to  the  preceding  states 
of  the  self.  All  successive  states  of  the  subject  are  causally 
united ;  they  are  links  in  a  chain  of  antecedents  and  con- 
sequents, quite  as  much  so  as  the  ebjD  and  flow  of  the  tides. 
Our  decisions  are  mechanical  products. 

2.  Pure  Indeterminism.  —  This  will  be  known  as  Inde- 
terminism. It  is  the  doctrine  that  decision  is  not  deter- 
mined in  any  way,  not  even  by  an  estimate  of  the  relative 
value  of  what  we  choose  and  what  we  reject.  In  the  in- 
stant of  choice,  the  will  acts  wholly  independent  of  external 
and  internal  influences;  it  is  independent  of  our  native 
and  acquired  character ;  it  Is  unmotived  by  our  estimates 


368         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  worth  of  objects  and  actions.  In  this  theory,  the  will 
is  conceived  as  a  faculty  fulfilling  an  independent  function ; 
and  it  is  regarded  as  externally  related  to  the  self  con- 
sidered in  respect  of  character. 

3.  Self-determinism,  —  This  is  the  doctrine  that  choice 
is  determined  by  the  subject's  conception  of  value.  This 
conception  of  value  is  an  expression  of  the  self  as  rationally 
active  in  estimating  the  worth  of  an  object.  The  subject 
decides  in  favor  of  the  object  or  course  of  conduct  which 
he  judges  to  be  most  desirable,  to  have  highest  value  for 
him.  The  judgment  of  value  and  the  choice  are  the 
subject's  own.  According  to  this  doctrine,  it  is  always 
possible  for  one  to  choose  what  he  judges  to  be  right; 
on  the  other  hand,  he  may  put  a  higher  value  on  the  satis- 
fying of  evil  passion  than  on  doing  the  right,  so  that  he  may 
decide  to  follow  his  vicious  desires  instead  of  taking  the 
course  which  he  deems  right. 

4.  Determinism  and  Indeterminism  contrasted  with  Self- 
determinism.  —  Determinism  is  fatalistic ;  every  choice 
is  a  moment  in  a  cosmic  process  in  which  there  is  no 
place  for  freedom.  Our  sense  of  freedom  in  deciding  and 
the  decision  follow  upon  their  antecedents  with  the 
fixedness  of  changes  in  a  gravitation  series.  Conscious- 
ness of  freedom  is  an  illusion;  a  feather  whirled  about 
by  the  wind  determines  its  movements  just  as  much  as  we 
determine  our  choices.  Determinism  insists  that  our 
choices  are  determined  for  us.  Self-determinism  contends 
that  our  choices  are  determined  hy  us.  Indeterminism 
avers  that  they  are  not  determined  at  all. 

Determinism  and  Indeterminism  set  the  subject's  mo- 
tives, character,  and  will  in  an  external  relation  to  the  self. 
They  are  thought  of  as  though  they  were  apart  from  the  self 
and  acted  upon  the  self.  Self-determinism  holds  that  they 
are  organically  related,  and  have  no  existence  except  in 


HUMAN  FREEDOM  369 

and  with  one  another.  It  insists  that  the  will  and  char- 
acter are  not  other  than  the  self,  and  that  motives  are  an 
expression  of  the  self.  The  relation  of  the  subject  to  his 
desires,  motives,  and  decisions  is  immanent  and  develop- 
mental, not  external  and  mechanical. 

§182.  Historical.  —  i.  Determinism. — The  Atomists 
held  that  the  atoms  —  their  metaphysical  ultlmates  — 
were  subject  to  natural  necessity ;  there  was  no  place  for 
freedom  in  the  universe  as  conceived  by  them.  The  Stoics 
also  held  a  metaphysical  doctrine  of  determination.  This 
would  shut  out  the  possibility  of  freedom ;  nevertheless, 
they  had  so  profound  a  sense  of  ethical  responsibility 
that  they  Insisted  that  man  is  free  to  obey  or  disobey 
reason.  They  tried  to  reconcile  this  doctrine  of  freedom 
with  the  doctrine  that  every  event  is  determined  by  natural 
necessity.  Pantheism  and  Cosmic  Mechanism  (the  theory 
that  the  universe  and  all  Its  changes  are  explicable  by  the 
laws  of  matter  in  motion)  are  deterministic.  Their  de- 
terminism is  illustrated  in  Bruno,  Spinoza,  and  most  of  the 
Mystics,  in  Hobbes,  in  the  writings  of  Laplace,  and  in  the 
philosophical  excursions  of  many  able  scientists. 

2.  Indeterminism.  —  This  Is  exemplified  In  the  teach- 
ings of  Epicurus,  Carneades,  and  others  of  the  Epicurean 
and  Eclectic  schools.  Augustine  was  theoretically  an 
indetermlnist ;  but  he  also  held  that  the  will  is  practically 
determined  by  reason  of  man's  sinfulness :  being  sinful, 
men  cannot  choose  the  good.  Duns  Scotus  and  William 
of  Ockham  were  pronounced  Indetermlnists.  Voluntarists 
generally  tend  to  Indeterminism.  This  comes  of  their 
subordinating  intellective  activity  to  volitional.  William 
James  illustrates  this  theory.  ' 

3.  Selj -determinism. — Aristotle  seems  to  belong  here; 
he  teaches  that  choice  is  consequent  upon  consideration 
of   ends.     Despite   their   metaphysical   determinism,  the 

2B 


370         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Stoics  sought  to  sustain  a  doctrine  of  self-determinism. 
Thomas  of  Aquino  says  that  the  will  is  determined  by 
knowledge,  and  he  concedes  that  the  will  at  times  in- 
fluences judgment.  This  teaching  would  place  him  with 
self-determinists.  Jonathan  Edwards  leaves  us  uncer- 
tain as  to  whether  he  should  be  accounted  a  self-determinist 
or  a  determinist ;  and  the  same  may  be  said  of  not  a  few 
who  accept  a  deterministic  theory.  Many  intellectualists 
are  self-determinists.  Among  these  we  name  Locke, 
Kant,  and  Hegel. 

§  183.  Phases  of  Consciousness  immediately  related 
to  Volition.  —  It  has  been  indicated  (§§  179;  180,  i) 
that  the  reality  of  human  freedom  turns  upon  the  fact 
of  the  subject's  freedom  in  choosing  between  alternatives 
and  in  deciding  to  seek  a  selected  end.  The  solution  of 
our  problem,  then,  calls  for  a  study  of  phases  of  conscious- 
ness which  are  immediately  related  to  such  choice  and 
decision. 

I.  Impulse.  —  We  are  said  to  act  from  impulse  when 
we  act  without  deliberation.  Much  of  our  activity  is 
from  impulse,  and  thus  without  consciously  organized 
deliberation ;  nevertheless,  impulsive  acts  are  not  always 
non-voluntary.  The  same  may  be  said  of  instinctive  acts, 
such  as  calling  out  in  sudden  fear  or  shrinking  from  an 
object  which  we  fear  or  loathe,  for  they  are  impulsive 
acts.  Habitual  reactions — e.g.  walking — are  consciously 
organized  ;  but  having  been  organized  they  are  performed 
without  distinct  awareness  of  conscious  determination  of 
them.  Impulsive  and  habitual  acts  may  acquire  a  volun- 
tary character.  I  write  a  letter;  in  doing  this,  many  of 
the  mental  and  motor  acts  required  are  not  distinctly 
purposed,  but  they  are  necessary  that  I  may  carry  out  the 
purpose  to  write.  When  a  single  voluntary  act  Includes 
impulsive  and  habitual  acts,  the  impulsive  and  habitual 


HUMAN   FREEDOM  371 

reactions  are  purposed  In  the  inclusive  purpose.  But 
the  question  of  freedom  does  not  arise  in  connection  with 
purely  impulsive  acts,  —  if  we  ever  perform  such ;  for  no 
alternative  is  present  to  mere  impulse. 

2.  Desire.  —  Desire  is,  at  root,  a  longing  for  satis- 
faction. It  arises  when  one  contrasts  his  actual  state 
with  an  ideal  state  which  he  accounts  preferable  to  the 
actual.  The  hungry  boy  desires  food ;  and,  in  desiring 
it,  he  necessarily  contrasts  his  present  state  of  dissatis- 
faction with  the  satisfaction  which  would  be  his  if  he  had 
food.  This  is  desire  regarded  subjectively.  We  tend, 
however,  to  identify  this  subjective  desire  with  some  con- 
crete object ;  in  doing  this,  we  objectify  our  desire.  Thus, 
the  boy  of  whom  we  have  spoken  identifies  his  desire  with 
food,  or  possibly  some  specific  kind  of  food,  as  bread  or 
an  apple.  The  object  may  be  general,  as  pleasure  or 
honor ;  or  it  may  be  particular,  as  a  book  or  a  trip.  From 
the  endeavor  to  identify  our  desire  with  some  object,  there 
arises  what  is  often  called  a  conflict  of  desires.  Two  or 
more  objects  are  compared ;  and  the  subject  deliberates 
as  to  which  of  these  will  most  assuredly  give  the  longed- 
for  satisfaction.  With  which  shall  the  self  identify  his 
subjective  desire  }  Before  distinctively  rational  objective 
action  takes  place,  there  must  be  deliberation  and  choice, 
and  purpose  to  attain  the  object  chosen.  The  subject 
must  give  the  various  objects  a  relative  valuation ;  and  he 
must  purpose  to  secure  that  to  which  he  assigns  the  highest 
value.  It  is  the  self  who  determines  the  value-  and  pur- 
pose-judgments. 

3.  Motive. — The  term  "motive"  has  a  deservedly 
prominent  place  in  discussions  respecting  human  freedom ; 
and  we  cannot  hope  to  reach  valid  conclusions  if  we  do 
not  get  a  correct  and  definite  conception  of  this  element  of 
experience.     Whatever  incites  to  action  is  a  motive.     This 


372        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

conception  of  motive  is  accepted  without  question,  and  it  is 
apparently  as  definite  as  one  would  desire.  But  despite 
the  simplicity  and  apparent  definiteness  of  this  definition, 
those  who  have  discussed  human  freedom,  have  not  agreed 
in  the  application  of  motive  to  experience;  and  confusion 
has  resulted.  Some  of  this  confusion  has  arisen  from  not 
recognizing  the  fact  that  the  term  "  motive  "  has  two 
possible  references,  a  subjective  and  an  objective  reference ; 
and  that  these  references  should  be  carefully  distinguished. 

(i)  Motive  has  a  subjective  reference.  The  boy's 
hunger  and  the  student's  dissatisfaction  with  his  present 
knowledge  of  a  subject  stir  them  to  thought  as  to  what 
would  satisfy  them.  Thus  aroused  they  deliberate,  trying 
to  determine  what  would  satisfy  them  and  how  that  which 
would  satisfy  may  be  obtained.  Each  of  them  concludes 
his  deliberation  by  deciding  what  he  will  do,  and  he  acts 
in  keeping  with  his  latest  decision.  In  all  this  mental 
activity,  the  desire  of  the  boy  and  of  the  student  to  secure 
satisfaction  is  the  motive  which  incites  them  to  delibera- 
tion, to  assignment  of  relative  values  to  different  objects 
and  courses  of  action,  and  to  a  conclusive  purpose.  The 
desire  for  satisfaction  moves  each  of  them  to  identify 
his  desire  with  some  concrete  object  which  may  possibly 
be  obtained  —  say  fruit  or  bread  for  the  boy,  and  a  certain 
book  or  course  of  instruction  for  the  student.  The  motive 
to  rational  activity  is  in  each  instance  one  with  the  desire 
for  satisfaction.  They  are  two  aspects  of  the  one  sub- 
jective state. 

(2)  By  "  motive  "  we  also  mean  that  which  one  seeks 
to  accomplish,  that  end  toward  which  one  directs  his  ac- 
tivity. In  keeping  with  this,  we  say  that  the  motive  of 
one  man  is  the  accumulation  of  wealth ;  of  another,  the 
winning  of  political  power.  When  the  boy  concludes  that 
some  fruit  will  quiet  his  hunger,  he  proceeds  to  determine 


HUMAN  FREEDOM  373 

how  he  may  obtain  it.  The  getting  of  the  fruit  is  his  ob- 
jective motive.  Similarly,  the  completed  course  of  study 
is  the  dominant  motive  of  the  student's  activity;  it  in- 
cites him  to  devise  means  and  to  determine  intermediate 
courses  of  action.  The  purposed  end  is  the  objective 
motive;  and  the  subject  determines  what  it  shall  be. 
Motive  has  its  origin  in  subjective  activity ;  and  our  ob- 
jective motives  are  determined  by  us,  not  for  us.  It  is 
in  deliberating,  choosing,  and  purposing  that  we  determine 
our  objective  motives. 

§  184.  The  Conditions  of  Psychical  Freedom.  —  From 
the  foregoing  it  follows  that  the  question  of  psychical 
freedom  may  be  stated  thus :  Are  we  free  in  deliberating, 
in  assigning  relative  values  to  objects  and  to  courses  of 
activity,  and  in  purposing  t  Freedom  in  these  activities 
requires :  — 

I.  That  the  deliberating,  valuing,  choosing,  and  pur- 
posing acts  shall  be  determined  by  the  subject,  not  by 
what  is  other  than  the   subject. 

In  our  study  of  causality  (§  156)  we  recognized  that  our 
activities  are  limited  by  persons  and  things.  If  we  would 
utilize  an  object,  we  must  note  its  way  of  behaving  and 
we  must  so  determine  our  treatment  of  it  that  it  will 
react  in  furtherance  of  our  purpose.  Thus,  gypsum  is 
under  certain  conditions  a  powder;  under  other  condi- 
tions it  is  plastic ;  under  yet  other  conditions  it  is  rigid. 
He  who  would  utilize  gypsum  must  accept  its  ways  of 
behaving  as  conditioning  his  treatment  of  it.  The  nature 
of  an  object  (which  is  expressed  by  its  way  of  behaving) 
conditions  our  use  of  it.  So,  too,  the  attitude  of  a  person 
with  whom  we  have  to  deal,  his  interest  or  want  of  interest 
in  the  matter  in  hand,  conditions  our  intercourse  with  him. 
To  sum  it  up,  the  nature  of  the  things  we  handle  and  the 
character  of  persons  with  whom  we  have  dealings  condi- 


374        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  our  external  activities ;  and,  so  far  as  they  are 
known  to  us,  they  condition  our  deliberating,  valuing, 
and  purposing  activity  in  relation  to  them.  This  will 
scarcely  be  questioned,  except  possibly  by  indeterminists. 
The  conditioning  is  from  without ;  it  is  imposed  upon  the 
subject.     Looked  at  thus,  we  would  appear  not  to  be  free. 

But  what  has  just  been  said  is  not  a  complete  statement 
of  the  case.  How  about  the  determination  of  our  thought 
activity  and  our  objective  activity?  It  is  held  by  many 
that,  although  we  are  externally  conditioned,  we  are 
nevertheless  free  in  that  each  of  us  initiates,  guides,  and 
concludes  his  own  deliberative  activity;  that  we  deter- 
mine from  within  ourselves  what  value  things,  events,  and 
persons  have  for  us  and  for  the  fulfilment  of  our  desires ; 
that  we  form  our  purposes  and  decide  upon  our  course  of 
action ;  and  that  we  do  all  this  in  view  of  these  conditions. 
The  subject  is  free  if  he  utilizes  these  conditions  in  deter- 
mining his  activity.  We  are  free  as  we  relate  conditions, 
things,  events,  and  persons  to  the  fulfilment  of  our  desires. 

What  has  just  been  said  raises  another  question.  We 
have  recognized  the  fact  that  the  character  of  persons, 
their  attitude  toward  life  and  life's  problems,  determines 
their  activity.  As  a  consequence,  human  freedom  re- 
quires :  — 

2.  That  the  subject's  character  shall  not  be  determined 
by  what  is  other  than  the  subject,  but  shall  be  essentially 
the  resultant  of  the  subject's  self-determination. 

That  we  may  be  psychically  free,  it  is  not  sufficient  that 
our  volitions  shall  be  self-determined,  but  our  character 
must  likewise  be  essentially  self-determined.  My  judg- 
ments of  fact  and  value  and  purpose,  in  respect  of  their 
being  determined  by  me,  are  what  they  are  because  of 
what  I  am  in  the  moment  of  my  judging.  Hence,  if  my 
character  is  not  essentially  self-determined,  if  my  char- 


HUMAN   FREEDOM  375 

acter  is  determined  by  what  is  other  than  myself,  my  judg- 
ments are  in  reality  determined  by  what  is  other  than 
myself,  not  by  me. 

§  185.  Character.  —  Does  each  of  us  determine  his 
own  character.^  We  recognize  that  race,  family,  time, 
specific  incidents,  and  the  manifold  circumstances  of  life 
have  to  do  with  the  formation  of  character;  but  for  us 
the  crucial  question  is  as  to  whether  any  or  all  of  these  fix 
our  character  for  us,  or  whether  each  of  us  determines 
his  own  character. 

1.  Character  Defined.  —  Character  has  been  defined  as 
habitude  of  will ;  but  this  obviously  falls  short  of  including 
all  that  we  have  in  mind  when  we  use  this  term.  When  we 
speak  of  a  person's  character,  we  mean  his  personal  quali- 
ties taken  as  a  whole  —  his  disposition  or  temperament, 
his  general  and  relatively  persistent  attitude  toward  per- 
sons and  things  and  the  course  of  events.  As  thus  de- 
scribed, character  is  emotional,  as  well  as  volitional,  habi- 
tude. But  we  may  not  rest  here,  for  this  is  a  defective 
conception  of  character ;  it  is  untrue  to  the  organic  unity 
of  the  self.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  acquire  intellectual 
qualities  in  and  with  our  acquisition  of  emotional  and 
volitional  qualities ;  and  these  should  be  included  in  our 
conception  of  character.  Stout  says,  "  Character  is  just 
the  constitution  of  the  Self  as  a  whole."  We  can  accept 
this  statement  if  we  add,  "  considered  with  respect  to  the 
qualities  which  distinguish  a  particular  self."  Hence 
character  is  rational  habitude ;  it  is  an  individual's  mode 
of  relating  himself  to  the  objects  of  which  he  has  experi- 
ence; it  is  expressed  in  the  manifold  qualities  of  the  in- 
dividual. 

2.  Personality  and  Character  Distinguished.  —  Person- 
ality and  character  are  used  to  denote  the  same  reality  — 
the  self;    and  they  are  sometimes  regarded  as  freely  in- 


376        INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

terchangeable.  It  is  well,  however,  to  distinguish  them, 
even  though  the  particular  in  which  they  differ  is  gener- 
ally negligible.  In  the  term  "  personality  "  we  emphasize 
the  essential  qualities,  or  the  attributes,  of  a  person  —  as 
self-consciousness  and  self-determination;  in  the  term 
"  character  "  we  emphasize  those  qualities  which  are  in  a 
peculiar  sense  the  individual's  own,  as  evidenced  in  his 
usual  attitude  toward  other  persons  and  their  interests, 
and  in  the  standard  by  which  he  values  the  objects  and 
incidents  of  life.  In  respect  of  essential  qualities,  all  men 
are  alike ;  In  respect  of  qualities  emphasized  in  the  term 
"  character,"  probably  no  two  are  wholly  alike ;  for  it  is 
scarcely  possible  that  any  two  persons  shall  have  the  same 
emotional,  volitional,  and  intellectual  habitude. 

3.  Personality  is  Subject  to  Development. — To  be  a 
person  is  to  be  self-conscious  and  self-determined ;  for 
self-consciousness  and  self-determination  are  essential 
qualities  of  personality.  But  an  individual  is  not  self- 
conscious  at  birth  and  is,  therefore,  not  consciously  self- 
determined  ;  he  is  not  an  actual  person.  It  is  certain, 
however,  that  the  normal  child,  if  he  shall  live,  will  in  time 
become  conscious  of  self  and  will  begin  consciously  to 
direct  some  of  his  own  activities.  The  attributes  of  per- 
sonality are  obviously  implicit  in  the  child ;  they  become 
explicit  as  the  result  of  his  experience.  Man,  therefore, 
is  at  birth  only  a  potential  person ;  it  is  through  the  ex- 
perience of  the  individual  that  this  potential  personality 
becomes  actualized.  It  is  not,  however,  fully  realized  in 
any  of  us.  Complete  self-control,  perfect  mastery  of  our 
abilities,  facile  and  effective  application  of  our  mental 
furnishing  to  the  life  problems  which  we  are  called  upon 
to  solve,  does  not  come  to  us  by  inheritance.  Self-mastery 
is  attained  only  through  extended  experience ;  and  we  have 
reason  to  believe  that  it  is  still  incomplete,  even  in  those 


HUMAN   FREEDOM  377 

who  are  most  highly  developed.  Personality  is  a  matter 
of  degrees.  It  is  subject  to  the  law  of  development;  it 
is  not  static,  but  is  changing  every  moment. 

4.  Character  is  a  System.  —  The  concept  "  character  " 
originates  through  our  regarding  the  qualities  of  an  in- 
dividual as  aspects  of  what  is  itself  unitary.  When  we 
think  of  the  characteristic  qualities  of  one  whom  we  know, 
—  e.g.  his  kindliness  and  forcefulness,  —  these  qualities 
are  thought  of  as  distinguished  phases  of  what  is  in  itself 
an  indivisible  whole.  That  character  is  conceived  to  be 
a  unit,  is  also  indicated  in  the  fact  that  we  do  not  speak 
seriously  of  a  man's  characters,  as  if  he  had  more  than  one, 
even  though  he  reveals  qualities  of  self-hood  which  appear 
to  us  to  be  irreconcilable.  If  a  person  is  violent  in  address, 
but  patient  under  severe  provocation,  we  take  these  in- 
harmonious qualities  to  be  expressions  of  the  one  charac- 
ter. The  many  qualities  of  any  one  character  are  thought 
of  as  cohering,  although  particular  qualities  may  appear 
to  be  incoherent ;  and  the  concept  "  character  "  itself 
involves  the  idea  that  the  qualities  of  the  perfect  character 
are  perfectly  coherent.  All  the  instincts,  appetencies, 
impulses,  attitudes,  and  judgments  of  truth  and  value 
and  purpose  of  such  a  character  would  be  perfectly  con- 
cordant. That  could  only  be  if  they  were  all  perfectly 
subjected  to  a  single  principle,  or  law.  In  speaking  of  a 
man's  character,  we  assume  that  his  affections  and  all  his 
subjective  activities  may  be  truly  conceived  as  coor- 
dinated, or  organically  related,  parts  of  a  whole.  The 
objective  activities  of  an  individual  are  expressions  of  his 
subjective  organization. 

5.  The  Organization  of  Character.  —  Has  man  a  char- 
acter at  birth }  We  recognize  that  the  essential  qualities 
of  personality  are  implicit  in  the  babe,  and  that  these  at- 
tributes are  certain  to  become  explicit  through  experience. 


378         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Is  the  future  character  of  the  babe  similarly  determined 
at  birth  ?  Has  the  babe  at  birth  a  determined  implicit 
habitude,  so  that  the  whole  of  individual  qualities  which  is 
his  later,  i.e.  the  rational  habitude  which  he  develops,  is 
at  birth  potentially  determined  for  him  ?  We  may  accept 
it  as  assured  that  every  individual  is  born  with  a  racial 
and  family  inheritance  of  "  dispositions."  It  is  certain 
that  a  child  begins  early  to  exhibit  a  "  temperament." 
He  would  be  a  bold  man  who  would  undertake  to  describe 
these  "  dispositions  "  or  this  "  temperament  "  more  par- 
ticularly; but  the  fact  of  such  an  inheritance  is  hardly 
open  to  question.  It  is,  however,  a  serious  mistake  to 
regard  this  inherited  "  temperament "  as  constituting 
character.  Character  is  not  temperament  or  disposition ; 
it  is  all  the  elements  of  our  rationality  organized  into  a  habi- 
tude. Our  impulses,  instincts,  affections,  and  attitudes 
are  "  raw  material  "  from  which  character  is  constituted. 
They  enter  into  character  only  as  they  are  ordered  into  a 
system.  Personality  is  self-organizing.  It  differs  from 
the  plant  in  this :  the  plant's  type  and  environment  de- 
termine the  organism ;  the  environment  and  material 
condition  the  organizing  activity  of  the  self,  but  do  not 
determine  it.  The  self  chooses  the  principle  to  which  all 
its  impulses,  instincts,  dispositions,  and  activities  are  sub- 
jected. It  coordinates  these  phases  of  consciousness, 
subordinating  some  to  others  and  subordinating  all  to 
the  ruling  principle.  Our  choices  and  purposes  are  ob- 
viously determining  factors  in  the  organizing  of  character. 
The  constituting  of  character  is  a  continuous  process ;  it 
may  seem  to  be  fixed  in  some,  but  it  is  in  reality  always  in 
the  making.  All  experience  is  educative ;  every  judgment 
of  value  and  purpose  works  for  the  development  of  char- 
acter. Man  is  not  born  with  a  determined  germinal  char- 
acter ;   character  is  always  determining,  never  determined. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX 

HUMAN    FREEDOM    (continued) 

§  i86.  Indeterminism  Criticised.  —  Indetermlnlsm  holds 
that  when  we  will  we  are  uninfluenced  by  judgments  of 
fact ;  it  insists  that  our  purposes  are  not  determined  by  our 
estimate  of  value  of  an  object  or  a  course  of  action.  It 
declares  that  volition  is  so  far  from  being  determined  in 
view  of  fact-j.udgments  and  value-judgments  that  the  will 
itself  determines  such  judgments.  According  to  the  In- 
determinist,  character  does  not  determine  choice.  In 
holding  the  theory  stated  above,  Indeterminism  is  untrue 
to  the  nature  of  rationality.  Man  is  always  a  willing-feel- 
ing-thinking being;  there  is  no  instant  of  consciousness 
in  which  any  one  of  these  elements  is  unmodified  or  un- 
influenced by  the  others.  In  asserting  that  choice  is  not 
determined  by  the  character  of  the  subject,  the  Indeter- 
minist  assumes  a  self,  which  is  mere  will,  apart  from  the 
self  of  organized  character.  We  know  of  no  self  other  than 
the  self  of  experience ;  and  that  self  is  not  without  char- 
acter. In  fact,  character  is  that  self's  constitution;  and 
the  self  cannot  possibly  act  independent  of  its  constitution. 

This  theory  also  avers  that  volition  and  the  psychical 
processes  which  precede  it  —  as  impulse,  desire,  delibera- 
tion —  are  unrelated,  except  in  time.  It  would  follow 
from  this  that  volition  springs  from  nothing,  that  there  Is 
at  least  no  relation  between  the  impulse  to  choose  and  the 
choice  itself,  except  that  one  comes  after  the  other.  This 
doctrine  does  not  stop  with  declaring  that  the  causal 
explanation  of  choice  is  Inadequate;    we  could  agree  to 

379 


38o         INTRODUCTION   TO   PHILOSOPHY 

that.  But  it  denies  that  there  is  any  relation  between 
choice  and  what  was  antecedent  in  the  experience  of  the 
subject;  and  to  that  we  must  object.  That  would  make 
volitional  activity  and  the  directing  of  our  objective  ac- 
tivities irrational.  According  to  this  teaching,  one  is 
lawless  in  his  willing,  not  free.  Since  this  doctrine  gives 
the  primacy  to  will  and  regards  will  as  not  subject  to  law, 
it  follows  also  that  we  are  not  under  law.  As  a  conse- 
quence, there  cannot  be  any  ethical  order  for  man ;  for 
ethics  implicates  an  order  to  which  we  should  conform; 
that  is,  it  would  subject  the  will  to  law.  The  logical  issue 
of  this  doctrine  is  not  liberty,  but  the  anarchy  which  must 
ensue  when  caprice  or  chance  rules. 

§  187.  In  Favor  of  Determinism.  —  Determinism  is 
supported  by  a  strong  cumulative  argument.  The  fol- 
lowing statement  of  the  case  for  this  theory  is  unavoidably 
brief. 

I.  From  Reflex,  Impulsive,  and  Habitual  Reactions.  — 
Digestion  is  an  unconsciously  directed  activity;  so  also 
is  the  closing  of  the  infant's  hand  when  the  palm  is  touched. 
The  hysterical  laugh,  the  trembling  and  cowering  of  one 
who  fears,  the  hesitant  shying  of  the  bashful  child,  and 
the  impulsive  grasp  for  something  when  we  are  suddenly 
tripped  are  reactions  of  which  the  subjects  are  in  some 
measure  conscious,  but  which  are  not  under  the  control 
of  the  subjects.  We  are  conscious  sometimes  of  winking 
and  of  breathing,  and  we  may  partially  control  these  re- 
actions. Now,  it  is  impossible  to  draw  the  line  between 
our  unconsciously  directed  activities,  such  as  digestion, 
and  our  conscious  uncontrolled  reactions,  such  as  the  hys- 
terical laugh ;  neither  can  we  point  out  the  boundary 
between  our  uncontrolled  conscious  reactions  and  reactions 
which  are  subject  to  partial  control,  such  as  respiration 
and  winking.     Further,  who  can  state  with  precision  when 


HUMAN   FREEDOM  381 

we  pass  the  line  which  separates  these  partially  controlled 
activities  and  our  habitual  reactions,  such  as  acquired 
automatic  balancing  in  walking  and  quasi-automatic 
guidance  of  the  pen  when  writing?  These  habitual  re- 
actions were  consciously  originated,  but  they  do  not  re- 
quire conscious  direction  now  that  they  are  established. 
Who  will  undertake  to  say  just  when  we  pass  the  boundary 
between  the  realm  of  unconsciously  directed  activities 
and  activities  which  we  assume  to  be  determined  by  the 
subject,  if  any  are  so  determined  ?  Many  believe  that  re- 
flex and  impulsive  acts  are  due  to  external  determination, 
that  they  are  purely  mechanical  reactions  to  external 
stimulus.  That  is  the  scientific  explanation  of  them. 
Then,  why  not  preserve  unity  in  the  explanatory  principle, 
and  say  that  volitional  activity  is  externally  determined  ^ 
2.  Thinking  which  is  not  Self-determined.  —  It  is  gen- 
erally thought  that  we  control  our  thinking,  that  a  course 
of  reasoning  is  freely  determined  from  within  the  subject 
and  by  the  subject.  We  are  no  more  certain  that  we  form 
our  own  purposes  than  we  are  that  we  direct  our  thought, 
e.g.  In  the  solving  of  a  problem.  We  believe  that  we 
determine  the  successive  steps.  But  is  this  conviction 
well  founded }  All  of  us  have  had  thoughts  thrust  ifpon 
us.  Sometimes  in  the  consideration  of  a  difficult  subject, 
an  idea  has  come  to  us  which  was  not,  so  far  as  we  could  see, 
logically  connected  with  anything  which  we  had  previously 
thought.  At  other  times,  thoughts  which  were  quite 
foreign  to  the  subject  in  hand  would  occupy  our  attention 
and  we  could  not  free  ourselves  from  them  ;  they  annoyed 
us  by  their  persistent  interference.  How  can  such  expe- 
riences be  shown  to  consist  with  psychical  freedom  1  If 
we  are  self-determined,  if  our  rational  activity  is  ours  in 
the  sense  that  it  is  determined  from  within  us  and  by  us, 
what  shall  we  say  of  these  experiences  .?     The  Determinist 


382         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

insists  that  they  can  only  be  explained  if  we  shall  accept 
his  theory,  that  rational  activity  is  externally  determined. 

3.  The  Asserted  Universality  of  Causal,  or  External, 
Determination.  —  It  is  an  accepted  principle  of  science  that 
the  universe  is  subject  to  the  law  of  external  determination. 
Science  proceeds  upon  this  assumption  ;  and  its  conclusions 
are  verified  by  the  course  of  events.  There  is  no  reason 
for  believing  that  this  assumption  will  ever  lead  to  erro- 
neous scientific  conclusions.  In  our  commerce  with  things, 
we  assume  that  objects  are  changed  by  action  upon  them 
from  without,  so  that  what  they  shall  do  or  become  is 
determined  by  external  influences,  and  this  assumption 
does  not  lead  to  confusing  consequences.  This  law  cer- 
tainly holds  true  for  descriptions  and  forecasts  of  all 
processes,  except  those  in  which  will  is  present.  Why 
make  the  volitional  process  an  exception  t  Why  exempt  it 
from  the  law  of  external  determination  t 

4.  Character.  —  Character  is  to  be  reckoned  with  in  our 
study  of  choice.  We  have  a  special  liking  for  certain  ob- 
jects and  situations ;  we  think  of  them  as  having  peculiar 
value.  There  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  we  are  influenced 
by  these  objects  and  situations.  One  has  a  love  for  study ; 
another  dislikes  study,  but  is  happy  in  conducting  business 
undertakings.  One  loves  pure  and  uplifting  associations ; 
another  finds  such  associations  unbearable.  Some  men 
give  so  great  value  to  selfish  projects  and  vicious  relations 
that  it  is  extremely  difficult  for  them  to  choose  against 
their  selfish  tendencies  and  the  gratification  of  low  pas- 
sions. Many  assert,  with  show  of  truth,  that  they  can- 
not, in  these  things,  choose  other  than  as  they  do.  Others 
give  greater  value  to  virtuous  relations  and  to  a  life  of 
helpfulness ;  and  they  could  scarcely  bring  themselves 
to  make  choice  of  degrading  associations  or  to  withhold 
help  from  the  needy.     Is  it  not  evident  that,  our  charac- 


HUMAN   FREEDOM  383 

ter  being  what  it  is,  we  are  determined  in  our  choices  by- 
accordant  objects  and  situations  ?  This  much  is  certain, 
character  determines  choice. 

This  agrees  with  the  fact  that  we  explain  the  conduct 
of  others  by  referring  it  causally  to  their  character  and 
circumstances.  If  any  particular  act  of  one  whom  we 
know  well  cannot  be  adequately  explained  thus,  if  it  is 
not  of  a  kind  with  the  past  of  that  individual's  life,  we 
explain  it  by  saying :  "  He  was  not  himself,"  or  "  There  was 
something  in  the  circumstances  which  is  not  known  to  us," 
or  "  He  has  changed."  Each  of  these  explanations  is 
based  upon  the  assumption  that  character  and  circum- 
stances  determine   conduct. 

5.  Conclusions.  —  From  facts  like  those  presented 
above,  important  deterministic  conclusions  are  drawn. 

(i)  Some  conclude  that  all  our  activities  are  deter- 
mined mechanically.  This  was  the  view  of  the  older 
associational  Psychology.  Associationism  has  been  gen- 
erally discarded,  but  traces  of  it  appear  in  relatively  re- 
cent writings.  That  school  held  that  our  consciousness  of 
freedom  in  willing  and  with  it  all  other  complex  ideas  are 
the  result  of  a  purely  mechanical  self-combining  of  ele- 
mental ideas ;  and  that  these  elemental  ideas  are  the 
product  of  physical  stimuli  acting  upon  our  sense-organs. 
These  elemental  ideas  are  given  to  us,  we  do  not  in  any 
way  determine  them ;  and,  when  they  become  ours,  they 
combine  by  fixed  laws  into  thinking,  feeling,  and  purposing 
elements  of  consciousness.  All  our  rational  processes 
are  wrought  for  us,  not  by  us.  Our  judgments  of  fact,  of 
value,  and  of  purpose  are  terms  in  a  fixed  mechanical 
series ;  and  there  is  no  place  for  freedom  in  that  series. 
According  to  this  doctrine,  we  no  more  determine  our 
thoughts  and  purposes  than  the  thistle-down  floating  in 
the  air  determines  its  course. 


384         INTRODUCTION  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

(2)  Others  conclude  that  volition  is  determined  by  the 
strongest  motive,  and  that  this  motive  is  itself  determined 
by  the  subject's  birth-character  and  the  circumstances 
within  which  his  life  has  been  lived  up  to  the  moment  of 
any  choice.  It  is  urged  that  we  have  no  choice  as  to  our 
birth-character,  and  none  as  to  the  circumstances  of  life 
preceding  self-consciousness,  and  little  choice  for  some  time 
after.  But  these  initial  factors  —  the  birth-character 
and  the  earliest  circumstances  of  life  —  determine  our 
volitions  ever  after,  for  they  determine  the  nature  of  the 
motives  which  shall  have  most  power  over  us.  These 
factors  exclude  freedom  during  the  earliest  stages  of  the 
development  of  character,  and  there  is  no  door  left  for 
freedom  to  enter  afterward. 

§188.  Determinism  Criticised. —  i.  General. — The 
argument  for  Determinism  is  cumulative,  and  it  would 
be  unfair  to  reject  this  theory  because  it  could  be  shown 
that  each  separate  averment  is  insufficient  to  establish 
the  doctrine.  This  could  be  done.  For  example,  the 
fact  that  thought  appears  at  times  to  be  determined  for 
the  self,  not  by  the  self,  is  readily  explained  as  mental 
activity  which  is  not  wholly  normal.  We  deem  such  ex- 
periences exceptional.  In  these  exceptional  experiences, 
we  are  usually  conscious  of  an  inner  struggle,  accompanied 
by  a  feeling  that  we  owe  it  to  ourselves  to  retain  mastery 
of  our  thought ;  and  sometimes  we  succeed  in  reestab- 
lishing such  control.  These  facts  accord  with  the  view 
that  such  experiences  are  not  to  be  accounted  truly  nor- 
mal. Upon  what  ground  should  we  permit  experience 
which  is  not  normal  to  determine  our  interpretation  of 
normal  experience  t  But  we  will  not  deal  with  the  sepa- 
rate counts  in  the  argument  for  Determinism;  for  this 
theory  must  stand  or  fall  by  reason  of  the  validity  or  in- 
validity of  its  fundamental  conception.     For  it,  the  dis- 


HUMAN   FREEDOM  385 

tingulshed  elements  of  experience  —  as  desire  and  motive 
—  are  distinct  from  each  other ;  motive  Is  treated  as 
though  It  were  distinct  from  the  self;  and  all  processes 
are  thought  of  as  purely  mechanical  and  are  regarded  as 
due  to  phenomenal  cause.  The  pertinence  of  this  crit- 
icism will  appear  In  what  follows ;  but  we  call  attention 
at  this  point  to  the  fact  that  phenomenal  cause  Is  not  an 
adequate  philosophical  conception,  and  to  the  further 
fact  that  the  phases  of  mental  activity  are  not  externally 
related.  The  phases  of  rationality  are  organically  related ; 
to  treat  them  as  terms  in  mechanical  relation  Is  to  open 
the  way  to  grave  error. 

2.  Is  our  Sense  of  Freedom  an  Illusion?  —  Determin- 
ists  acknowledge  that  we  think  we  are  free  in  volition; 
but  they  deem  this  an  Illusion.  According  to  this  theory, 
the  order  of  the  universe  imposes  this  illusion  upon  all 
men  ;  and,  In  doing  this,  it  contradicts  itself,  for  It  imposes 
upon  me  belief  that  I  am  free  and,  at  the  same  time,  forces 
me  to  infer  from  other  particulars  that  I  am  not  free.  If 
this  were  true,  it  would  follow  that  the  fundamental  order 
of  the  universe  is  untrustworthy  ;  and  universal  scepticism 
is  the  only  consistent  conclusion.  But  the  inference  that 
the  consciousness  of  freedom  is  an  illusion  is  more  open 
to  doubt  than  the  consciousness  itself.  In  knowing 
myself  as  purposing,  I  know  myself  as  free.  Doubt  of  the 
validity  of  this  cognition  of  self  Is  an  inference,  and  it  is 
based  upon  the  assumption  that  all  processes  are  solely 
mechanical.  This  hypothesis,  that  all  changes  are  solely 
mechanical,  does  not  have  general  acceptance  among 
philosophers.  Determinism  asks  us  to  give  greater  weight 
to  an  inference  based  upon  a  disputed  hypothesis  than  we 
give  to  a  primary  cognition.     We  decline  to  do  so. 

3.  Determination  misconceives  the  Process  in  the  Con- 
stitution of  Character.  —  It   declares  (i)  that  we  have  a 

2C 


386         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

birth-character;  (2)  that  subsequent  to  birth,  character 
is  determined  by  environment.  Our  congenital  tempera- 
ment is  not  character ;  it  is  material  which  the  self  utilizes 
in  organizing  character.  As  to  our  being  determined  by 
circumstances,  we  must  never  forget  that  the  subject  is 
not  a  mere  passive  recipient  of  influences  from  environ- 
ment. We  are  not  simply  acted  upon  by  the  outer  world 
and  its  occurrences ;  we  utilize  the  external  world,  its 
objects  and  incidents.  The  self  coordinates  its  impulses, 
dispositions,  desires,  and  cognitions;  and  it  relates  cir- 
cumstances, opportunities,  hindrances,  and  all  other 
environing  particulars  to  itself.  We  determine  the  value 
for  ourselves  of  objects  and  circumstances.  In  this  co- 
ordinating, relating,  and  valuing  activity,  we  organize 
our  character;  and  the  organizing  activity  is  the  activity 
of  a  person,  i.e.  of  a  self-determining  individuum.  The 
theory  under  consideration  misconceives  character. 

4.  Determinism  misconceives  the  Relation  of  Character 
and  the  Self  to  Desires  and  Motives.  —  It  speaks  of  the 
self  as  "  having  desires  "  and  as  "  impelled  by  motives  " ; 
and  Determinists  are  wont  to  say  that  "  the  will  is  deter- 
mined by  the  strongest  motive,"  as  though  desires  and 
motives  existed  apart  from  and  independent  of  the  self 
and  could  have  mastery  over  the  self.  Desire  is  the 
self's  longing  for  satisfaction  —  e.g.  the  student's  longing 
for  mental  satisfaction ;  motive  is  the  self's  longing, 
thought  of  as  stirring  one  to  discover  means  for  attaining 
satisfaction.  Subjectively  regarded,  desire  and  motive 
have  their  being  in  the  self.  An  objective  desire  or  motive 
is  constituted  such  by  the  subject.  He  identifies  the  de- 
sired object  with  his  longing  for  satisfaction  ;  for  example, 
the  hungry  boy  concludes  that  a  bag  of  peanuts  will  give 
him  satisfaction.  The  possession  of  the  desired  object  is 
thus  constituted  a  motive.     The  young  man  makes  the 


HUMAN  FREEDOM  387 

attainment  of  an  education  his  motive.  An  objective 
motive  can  only  become  such,  because  the  subject  con- 
stitutes it  the  end  of  his  endeavor.  Desires  and  motives 
are  what  they  are  because  the  character  of  the  subject  is 
what  it  is.  They  become  desires  and  motives  because 
of  the  activity  of  the  self,  and  they  are  expressions  of  the 
activity  of  the  subject.  Determinism  represents  them  as 
controlling  the  subject;  the  truth  is  that  the  self  deter- 
mines them,  both  as  to  being  and  characteristics. 

5.  Determinism  leaves  Activity  without  Ethical  Quality. 
—  If  a  man's  volitions  are  determined  by  what  is  external 
to  him,  his  choices  and  conduct  are  not  his  in  the  sense 
which  Ethics  demands.  They  are  imposed  upon  him,  and 
he  is  powerless  to  resist  or  to  make  them  other  than  they 
are.  In  that  case,  the  words  "  ought  "  and  "  moral  " 
have  their  origin  in  illusion.  We  are  not  even  permitted 
to  say  that  these  words  should  be  eliminated  from  speech, 
and  the  corresponding  ideas  from  thought;  because 
"  ought  "   is   implied   in   "  should." 

§  189.  Self-determinism.  —  From  the  preceding  dis- 
cussion, we  conclude  that  our  psychical  life  is  a  developing 
system.  The  systematizing  principle  is  our  own  self- 
directivity  seeking  the  realization  of  ends.  The  activity 
and  the  direction  of  it  have  their  origin  in  the  self;  its 
systematic  and  coherent  character  show  it  to  be  deter- 
mined. 

I.  Self -determinism  agrees  with  the  Volitional  Conscious- 
ness. —  In  deliberation,  our  self-awareness  is  of  the  self 
as  conducting  the  deliberation  and  closing  it  off.  We  know 
ourselves  as  framing  the  purpose-judgment  with  which 
deliberation  is  cut  off.  I  am  determining  how  I  shall 
spend  my  vacation.  A  friend  suggests  a  European  trip; 
I  had  thought  of  a  quiet  time  in  the  mountains.  The 
deliberative  process  in  which  I  balance  the  values  for  me 


388         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  trip  and  the  restful  quiet  is  mine ;  and  the  judg- 
ment with  which  I  close  the  deliberation  is  mine,  whether 
that  judgment  is  to  put  off  the  decision,  or  to  go  to  Europe, 
or  to  rest  in  the  mountains.  The  concluding  judgment 
is  ours.  This  holds  even  though  the  judgment  be  to  ac- 
cede to  the  request,  advice,  or  demand  of  another ;  for 
in  that  case  we  know  ourselves  as  making  the  decision  to 
accede.  In  all  the  process,  the  subject  knows  himself 
as  a  self-determining  Ego. 

2.  Self-determinism  agrees  with  our  Sense  of  Respon- 
sibility for  our  Deliberative  Acts.  —  It  is  often  argued  that 
we  are  not  responsible,  that  we  are  not  to  be  praised  or 
blamed,  if  our  acts  are  externally  determined.  That  is 
not  what  is  here  urged ;  it  seems  better  to  follow  the  order 
of  the  development  of  the  sense  of  responsibility.  This 
much  is  certain :  we  deem  ourselves  responsible  for  cer- 
tain acts,  and  we  hold  others  responsible  for  acts  to  which 
they  are  similarly  related,  and  we  adjudge  the  fact  and 
the  degree  of  responsibility  by  the  fact  and  the  degree  of 
self-determination.  Responsibility  always  goes  with  de- 
liberative acts,  and  is  based  upon  the  consciousness  that 
such  acts  have  their  origin  in  us.  If  we  judge  that  a  man 
has  become  a  slave  of  passion  or  habit,  this  may  mitigate 
the  severity  of  our  adverse  judgment  in  the  instance  of 
some  present  act  of  his ;  but  we  hold  him  responsible  for 
his  present  character  so  far,  at  least,  as  we  believe  it  would 
have  been  possible  for  him  to  have  developed  a  different 
character.  Our  sense  of  responsibility  has  its  origin  in 
our  sense  of  self-determination. 

3.  Self-determinism  agrees  with  the  General  Affirmation 
of  Volitional  Freedom.  —  This  much  is  certain  :  men  have 
generally  believed  that  they  were  free,  that  their  decisions 
were  freely  determined  by  themselves.  They  have  praised 
or  blamed  others,  and  have  justified  themselves  for  doing 


HUMAN   FREEDOM  389 

so  upon  the  ground  that  those  whom  they  praised  or 
blamed  might  have  chosen  to  act  otherwise  than  as  they 
did.  Self-determlnism  agrees  with  this.  It  holds  that 
each  of  us  determines  his  thinking  and  judging ;  and  that 
we  do  so  by  determining  the  relation  to  ourselves  of  what 
Is  external  to  us.  What  the  outer  world  shall  be  for  my 
conduct  of  life  Is  fixed  by  me.  The  objects  of  the  world 
condition  my  treatment  of  them;  If  I  use  them,  I  must 
have  regard  to  their  qualities.  But,  by  taking  advantage 
of  their  ways  of  behaving,  I  adapt  them  to  my  purposes. 
Their  fixed  modes  of  behavior  make  my  free  activity  ef- 
fective. We  have  also  concluded  that  the  character  of 
an  Individual  Is  organized  by  the  Individual  himself. 
These  conclusions  —  that  each  of  us  determines  the  re- 
lations of  the  objects  of  the  outer  world  to  his  thinking 
and  his  purposing  and  to  much  of  his  objective  activity, 
and  that  we  organize  our  own  characters  —  agree  with  the 
consciousness  of  volitional  freedom. 

4.  Self-determinism  does  not  ignore  the  Law  of  Mechani- 
cal Causality.  —  The  action  of  the  will  is  purposive ;  It 
has  respect  to  ends ;  and  it  would  be  ineffectual  If  there 
were  no  fixed,  or  determined,  order.  We  secure  our  ends 
by  relating  the  fixed  order  of  the  external  world  to  our 
purposes.  (See  §§  156,  2;  184,  i.)  It  is  also  true  that 
our  activity  becomes  extended  and  eff"ectual  in  the  degree 
to  which  we  establish  an  order  of  physical  and  psychical 
reactions  in  our  organism.  Such  established  order  gives 
expertness  to  the  type-writer;  and  it  is  the  source  of  the 
genius  of  the  musician,  artist,  public  speaker,  and  author. 
This  order  is  always  In  the  making;  its  Ideal  is  the  com- 
plete systematization  of  our  activities.  The  more  nearly 
one  approaches  this  Ideal,  the  more  uniform  is  his  con- 
duct. Viewed  from  without,  the  conduct  of  others  ap- 
pears to  be  determined ;  we  are  surprised  if  one  whom  we 


390         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

know  takes  a  course  which  seems  to  differ  from  what  has 
been  habitual  with  him.  Two  things  contribute  to  give 
conduct  this  fixed  mechanical  aspect:  (i)  We  see  the  life 
of  another  from  outside  it,  and  it  appears  in  stages  which 
seem  to  be  external  to  each  other;  and  (2)  Character 
develops  through  the  systematizing  of  our  activities, 
and  this  makes  for  a  regularity  in  conduct  which  comports 
with  mechanical  determination. 

5.  An  Objection.  —  "  According  to  Self-determinism, 
the  self  that  chooses  has  developed  a  character,  he  has 
developed  a  certain  mode  of  relating  himself  to  objects. 
One's  choice  in  any  instance  is,  therefore,  determined  by 
the  character  which  he  has  acquired.  In  other  words,  a 
man  is  the  bondman  of  his  past." 

(i)  This  objection  errs  in  its  conception  of  character; 
it  thinks  of  character  as  static  in  the  instant  of  valuing 
and  purposing.  You  have  to  arrive  at  a  decision,  pos- 
sibly one  of  great  import  to  you.  The  person  who  ad- 
vances this  objection  thinks  of  you  as  coming  to  the  time 
of  decision  with  a  character  already  developed ;  and  he 
conceives  your  decision  to  be  determined  by  a  character 
acquired  previous  to  the  time  of  deliberation  and  decision. 
This  is  a  serious  misconception.  Character  is  not  static 
even  for  an  instant ;  it  is  "  in  the  making  "  in  the  instant 
and  act  of  valuing  and  purposing.  New  situations  are 
constantly  in  presentation,  and  the  subject  organizes  char- 
acter in  his  relating  these  new  situations  to  himself.  Every 
moment  of  life  has  in  it  new  situations  and  outlooks  and  a 
developing  character.  Character  determines  choices 
while  it  is  developing;  and  it  develops  in  the  choosing. 
The  character  which  determines  the  choice  of  an  instant 
is  the  forming  character  of  the  instant.  In  that  develop- 
ing character,  we  have  a  past  character  and  the  self- 
determining  self  in  a  new  situation  with  new  outlooks. 


HUMAN   FREEDOM  391 

Doubtless  we  tend  to  maintain  the  general  characteristics 
of  our  present  rational  habitude.  Stability  of  character 
is  generally  thought  to  be  a  token  of  maturity;  and  we 
are  surprised  if  the  generous  person  becomes  penurious, 
or  the  haughty  humble.  But  character  is  always  forming, 
never  formed ;  and  this,  together  with  the  fact  that  it  is 
self-determined,  makes  it  so  that  the  subject  is  not  in  any 
instant  the  mere  bondman  of  his  past. 

(2)  It  occurs  not  seldom  that  the  conduct  of  persons  in 
particular  cases  does  not  accord  with  their  past;  and  in 
many  instances  a  transformation  of  character  takes  place. 
Miserly,  pitiless  men  have  been  known,  in  exceptional 
cases,  to  be  generous ;  and  persons  who  were  regarded  as 
kind  have  said  and  done  what  was  inexcusably  cruel. 
There  are  instances  of  lapses  from  virtuous  life,  even  In 
vigorous  maturity;  and  cases  of  conversion  and  reform 
are  indubitable.  These  facts  make  against  the  objection; 
but  self-determinism  finds  a  place  and  a  possible  explana- 
tion for  such  facts. 

It  is  possible  that  there  was  in  the  character  of  one 
who  has  thus  changed,  some  element  which  had  not  been 
previously  so  organized  into  his  character  as  to  affect 
conscious  activity  sufficiently  to  become  manifest  in  con- 
duct; and,  in  relating  some  new  situation  to  himself,  he 
brings  this  quality  to  the  fore.  He  may,  or  may  not,  give 
this  element  permanent  importance.  It  is  also  possible 
that,  in  his  new  view  of  objects  and  courses  of  conduct, 
he  may  temporarily  or  permanently  assign  a  different 
relative  value  to  objects  and  ideals  from  that  which  he 
had  previously  given  them.  These  explanations  are 
possible  because  character  is  never  made,  but  is  always 
"  In  the  making." 

§190.  Perfect  Freedom.  —  i.  Psychical  Freedom. — 
The  process  In  the  formation  of  character  is  a  process  of 


392         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

coordinating  impulses  and  desires.  The  perfectly  free 
person  would  be  the  person  who  had  completed  this  co- 
ordination, and  who  had  organized  all  his  activities  into  a 
perfectly  cohering  system  in  accordance  with  the  ground 
principle  of  personality.  That  person  would  experience 
no  subjective  limitations.  Since  his  activities  would  be 
perfectly  systematized,  they  would  be  harmonious ;  as 
the  system  is  determined  by  the  ground  principle  of  per- 
sonality, he  would  be  free ;  for  freedom  is  an  attribute  of 
personality.  Psychical  Freedom  is  implicit  in  us  at  birth ; 
normally  it  develops  toward  complete  systematization  of 
our  activities. 

2.  Ethical  Freedom.  —  Is  the  man  who  chooses  what  is 
unreasonable  and  evil,  free  .^  Psychical  Freedom  requires 
that  the  psychical  activities  shall  be  in  perfect  harmony 
with  the  ground  principle  of  Personality.  Ethical  Free- 
dom demands  that  the  Individual's  system  of  rational 
activities  shall  agree  with  the  system  of  the  universe, 
that  its  principle  shall  be  the  same  with  the  fundamental 
order  of  the  cosmos.  For  us,  this  order  is  the  expression 
of  the  perfect  Personality ;  it  is  rational  and  good.  Man, 
therefore,  attains  freedom  to  the  degree  in  which  his 
estimates  of  value  accord  with  the  cosmic  gradation  of 
values,  with  the  actual  relative  values  of  objects  and  ideals. 
If  he  shall  determine  his  conduct  by  these  values,  he  does 
not  come  into  permanent  confusion.  He  becomes  free  to 
the  extent  to  which  he  is  at  one  with  the  fundamental 
order  of  the  universe ;  for  to  that  extent  this  order  ceases 
to  limit  him.  This  fundamental  order  is  the  expression 
of  the  perfect  Reality ;  hence,  man  becomes  free  as  he 
comes  to  be  at  one  with  the  perfect  Reality.  As  that 
Reality  is  reasonable  and  good,  the  man  who  chooses  the 
unreasonable  and  evil  is  not  free. 


CHAPTER  XL 

THE    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD 

§  191.  Introductory.  —  Early  in  our  study  we  said  that 
three  great  topics  had  occupied  the  attention  of  phi- 
losophers :  The  Object  —  i.e.  the  world  of  persons,  things, 
and  events ;  The  Subject,  who  is  conscious  of  the  objects 
and  of  self;  and  The  Religious  Consciousness.  We  have 
confined  our  study  to  the  first  two  of  these  topics.  A  sys- 
tematic consideration  of  the  religious  consciousness  would 
yield  a  Philosophy  of  Religion.  In  the  limits  assigned  us, 
we  cannot  do  more  than  give  an  introduction  to  one  of 
the  many  questions  which  are  discussed  in  constructing  a 
Philosophy  of  the  religious  consciousness,  viz.,  the  ques- 
tion of  the  existence  of  God.  Even  in  the  study  of  this 
one  question  we  are  forced  to  recognize  limitations,  and 
thus  to  forego  the  advantage  of  a  historical  sketch  setting 
forth  the  various  arguments  by  which  thinkers  have  under- 
taken to  justify  their  affirmation  of  the  reality  of  God. 
A  consideration  of  these  arguments  and  of  the  criticisms 
to  which  they  have  been  subjected  would  be  both  inter- 
esting and  valuable.  But  for  this  we  must  refer  the  stu- 
dent to  works  which  treat  the  subject  more  at  large.  A 
few  of  these  are  named  in  our  list  of  references. 

It  Is  not  the  purpose  of  the  present  chapter  to  originate 
faith  in  God.  In  fact,  it  is  not  the  duty  of  Philosophy  to 
originate  faith;  it  is  its  province  to  examine  beliefs  in 
order  to  discover  whether  they  stand  justified  in  the  court 
of  reason.  Belief  in  God  is  here ;  it  develops  in  the  devel- 
opment of  the  religious   consciousness,   and   it  persists. 

393 


394         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

The  nature  of  this  belief  is  such  that,  if  true,  it  is  of  the 
highest  importance.  Attempts  have  been  made  to  oust 
it ;  but  reason  has  always  demanded  a  substitute,  and  no 
substitute  has  been  able  to  satisfy  all  the  facts  of  experi- 
ence. This  is  a  case  In  which  doubt  should  be  required 
not  merely  to  set  forth  reasons  for  its  scepticism,  but  also 
to  do  full  justice  to  the  religious  consciousness  and  to 
experience  in  general. 

The  question  to  which  we  give  an  introductory  answer 
in  this  chapter  is  this  :  What  are  some  of  the  experiential 
facts  which  justify  us  in  retaining  belief  in  the  existence 
of  God  ?  It  will  be  noted  that  we  only  set  forth  some  of 
these  facts.  We  cannot  note  all ;  for,  if  God  is,  it  follows 
of  necessity  that  the  whole  process  of  the  world  and  his- 
tory, and  all  the  particulars  of  experience  rightly  read, 
reveal  Him.  By  God  we  mean  the  perfect  spiritual 
Being,  the  self-subsistent  One,  the  Ground  of  being  and 
activity.  Since  He  is  conceived  as  the  self-subsistent  One, 
we  speak  of  Him  as  the  Absolute ;  and  we  wish  the  term 
Absolute  when  used  in  this  work  to  have  this  meaning 
assigned  to  it. 

§  192.  The  Religious  Consciousness. —  i.  The  Fact  of 
the  Religious  Consciousness  is  Indisputable.  —  This  ele- 
ment of  experience  has  been  potent  in  the  history  and 
development  of  man.  The  having  a  religious  conscious- 
ness is  not  simply  a  characteristic  of  individuals;  it  is 
a  racial  characteristic.  If  exceptions  appear,  the  excep- 
tional individuals  or  peoples  are  to  be  accounted  as  lack- 
ing a  characteristic  essential  to  fully  developed  human  self- 
hood. A  person  who  does  not  respond  to  music  or  the 
figures  and  rhythm  of  poetry  is  without  a  phase  of  ex- 
perience which  Is  essential  to  the  full  life  of  man.  By 
the  general  consent  of  mankind,  the  lack  of  a  religious 
consciousness  would  be  a  still  greater  defect. 


THE   EXISTENCE   OF  GOD  395 

2.  A  Marked  Characteristic  of  this  Experience  is  a  Sense 
of  Dependence.  —  We  feel  that  we  do  not  have  the  full 
control  of  our  own  affairs.  Men  believe  that  all  events 
do  not  occur  by  mere  chance,  that  they  are  made  to  occur 
often  by  some  other  than  ourselves ;  and  this  is  true  of 
matters  in  which  we  are  immediately  Interested.  As  thus 
described,  this  consciousness  of  dependence  is  not  distinctly 
religious.  But  it  is  not  found  by  itself;  it  is  accompanied 
by  a  behef  in  the  presence  and  activity  of  an  invisible 
power  or  powers.  Men  have  felt  that  they  were  living 
in  a  world  where  "  higher  powers  "  have  to  do  with  the 
management  of  human^ffairs.  This  feeling  of  dependence 
on  a  "  higher  power  "  has  developed  a  desire  to  stand  right 
with  this  power;  and  this  desire  expresses  itself  in  wor- 
ship. The  object  or  objects  of  worship  are  always  thought 
of  as  superior  in  some  respect  to  the  things  of  sense,  and 
of  a  higher  nature  than  man.  This  feeling,  with  its  im- 
pulsion to  worship,  is  not  regarded  by  man  as  a  by- 
product of  life,  a  negligible  accompaniment  of  experience. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  thought  to  be  of  chief  importance ; 
and,  being  thus  regarded,  it  has  had  great  impelling  force. 
The  religious  consciousness,  of  which  this  sense  of  de- 
pendence upon  the  super-human  is  the  heart,  has  deter- 
mined the  ethical  principles  and  social  organization  of 
peoples ;  it  has  given  the  highest  ideals  to  literature  and 
has  influenced  law  and  governmental  forms  and  national 
activities. 

3.  The  Religious  Consciousness  Demands  an  Object  of 
Faith. —  By  this  we  mean  that  the  religiously  revered 
object  must  be  thought  of  as  a  known  reality.  Mystery 
always  attends  man's  thought  of  the  object  of  religious 
veneration.  There  Is  a  tacit  or  open  acknowledgment 
that  the  higher  nature  of  what  Is  worshipped  makes  it 
impossible  for  us  to  attain  complete  knowledge  of  it ;  but 


396         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  object  of  worship  cannot  be  wholly  undefined.  Only 
that  can  be  real  for  us  of  which  we  have,  or  believe  we  have, 
some  knowledge.  Religious  consciousness  is  not  a  matter 
merely  of  the  feelings,  nor  of  the  will,  nor  of  both  feeling 
and  will ;  it  is  of  the  whole  self.  To  eliminate  intellec- 
tion from  it,  is  to  make  it  the  consciousness  of  a  partial 
self ;  and  a  partial  self  is  in  fact  no  self  at  all.  We  repeat 
here  what  we  have  previously  insisted  upon :  man  is  a 
thinking-feeling-willing  being.  Man  must  have  some 
idea  of  the  object  of  his  worship.  One  cannot  worship 
"  a  mental  vacuum  " ;  one  cannot  relate  the  conduct  of 
life  to  that  of  which  he  has  no  knowledge.  An  object  of 
faith,  of  which  something  is  believed  to  be  known,  is  es- 
sential to  the  religious  consciousness.  The  Greek  gods 
did  not  become  objects  of  really  definite  belief;  and,  as  a 
result,  the  religious  consciousness  of  the  Greeks  was  rela- 
tively weak,  and  it  had  little  influence  over  life.  When  this 
phase  of  consciousness  is  well  developed,  it  assigns  to  the 
revered  object  a  much  higher  degree  of  reality  than  to 
any  object  of  sense;  and  it  thinks  of  that  object  in  de- 
scriptive terms,  for  man  can  only  think  thus. 

4.  The  Religious  Consciousness  seeks  a  Unifying  Real- 
ity. —  Our  experiences  in  dealing  with  the  world  of  nature 
are  many  and  greatly  varied ;  and  the  world  realities  are 
many.  The  scientist  groups  the  many  changes  and  ob- 
jects which  he  studies.  He  collects  objects  into  classes,  and 
so  unifies  them  ;  and  he  unifies  changes  and  expresses  their 
unity  in  statements  of  natural  law.  He  carries  this  uni- 
fication as  far  as  he  can.  The  first  groups  —  as  species  — 
are  unified  into  a  more  inclusive  group  —  as  genus ;  and 
this  larger  group  into  a  yet  more  comprehensive  group  — 
as  family;  and  so  on.  There  is  a  tendency,  rather  a 
distinct  effort,  to  effect  a  similar  unification  of  changes. 
Thus,  evolution  is  taken  as  including  a  number  of  orders 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF   GOD  397 

of  change  —  selection,  heredity,  etc.  It  is  also  accepted 
that  the  different  sciences  have  a  unity  which  demands 
recognition ;  and  scientists  recognize  the  structural  unity 
of  all  sciences.  In  this  more  comprehensive  view,  exact 
scientific  thought  conceives  the  myriad  objects  and  changes 
which  it  studies  to  be  realities  and  changes  of  a  unity. 
Even  the  Plain  Man  has  a  notion,  vague  to  be  sure,  that 
all  these  things  with  which  he  has  to  do,  belong  together. 

The  religious  consciousness  evinces  the  same  tendency. 
In  the  lowest  forms  of  religion,  there  are  many  objects 
of  reverence;  and  each  of  these  objects  stands  for  the 
relating  of  many  experiences.  The  experiences  connected 
with  war  are  related,  in  respect  of  their  religious  aspect, 
to  the  god  of  war ;  experiences  in  connection  with  sowing 
and  reaping,  to  the  god  of  the  harvest.  In  each  of  these 
objects  of  religious  reverence,  the  religious  consciousness 
has  unified  many  experiences.  Thus,  the  religious  con- 
ceptions represented  in  the  many  gods  of  Egypt  became 
unified  in  Ra,  the  god  of  light.  This  movement  toward 
unity  in  and  through  the  religious  consciousness  finds  its 
completest  expression  in  monotheism.  The  religious 
consciousness,  judged  by  its  highest  stage  of  development, 
would  relate  all  its  experiences  to  one  Supreme  Being.  It 
believes  that  its  hopes  are  forwarded,  its  successes  secured, 
its  assurances  sustained,  its  fears  quieted,  its  failures  re- 
paired, and  its  doubts  resolved,  only  when  the  subject  of 
these  experiences  is  in  right  relation  with  the  Supreme, 
in  real  accord  with  the  activity  of  God. 

5.  This  Consciousness  demands  a  Personal  Object  of 
Faith.  —  The  object  of  worship  must  be  one  with  whom  the 
worshipper  may  have  communication.  Worship  finds  its 
incentive  and  meaning  in  the  desire  for  communion  with 
the  super-human ;  and  it  seeks  such  communion  with  a 
view  to  securing  rest  of  heart  and  support  in  life.     This  is 


398         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

obviously  true  of  the  more  distinctly  spiritual  worship ; 
that  is,  worship  in  which  there  is  the  least  of  fixed  ritual. 
But  it  holds  also  for  worship  which  is  ritualistic,  for  that 
centres  about  the  idea  of  sacrifice  and  the  kindred  idea  of 
sacrament.  The  element  of  sacrifice  is  significant  of  the 
thought  of  the  worshipper,  alike  in  the  worship  of  primitive 
peoples  and  of  those  ivho  are  most  highly  cultured.  Sac- 
rifice is  off"ered  in  order  that  communion  with  God  may  be 
made  possible;  and  in  the  sacrificial  meal,  the  worshipper 
partakes  with  the  divine,  or  of  the  divine.  In  the  sacra- 
mental idea,  there  is  at  least  the  conception  of  the  binding 
of  the  worshipper  to  God  through  covenant.  The  per- 
fect religion,  that  which  would  fulfil  the  highest  aspira- 
tions of  the  religious  consciousness,  would  Involve  im- 
mediate fellowship  with  the  "  higher  power  " ;  It  would 
find  its  life  and  its  satisfaction  in  conscious  communion 
with  the  object  of  religious  reverence. 

It  is  this  which  gives  religion  so  great  power  in  the  life 
of  the  genuine  worshipper;  he  believes  that  he  has  en- 
tered into  fellowhip  with  God.  "  Spiritual  growth  Is 
brought  about  by  the  Impact  of  nobler  souls  on  ours." 
It  is  not  only  true  that  he  who  lives  in  communion  with 
those  whose  life  is  higher  than  his  own  rises  with  them ; 
but  it  is  also  true  that  he  would  who  rise,  seeks  such  com- 
panionship. The  religious  instinct  follows  this  order  and 
will  not  be  turned  aside.  Definite  religious  experience  Is 
always  attributed,  by  those  who  have  It,  to  their  having 
come  into  intimate  relation  with  a  higher  reality.  This 
requires  that  the  object  of  religious  reverence  shall  be 
personal ;  for  we  cannot  have  real  fellowship  with  what 
lacks  the  attributes  of  personality.  Primitive  peoples 
worship  natural  objects  and  powers;  and  the  Posltivlsts 
worship  Humanity;  but  the  primitive  peoples  assign 
quasi-personality  to  those  natural  objects   and   powers. 


THE  EXISTENCE   OF  GOD  399 

and  the  Positivists  do  quite  the  same  with  Humanity. 
The  religious  consciousness  seeks  communion  with  the 
object  of  worship ;  in  this  it  conceives  the  Supreme  as 
personal. 

§193.  The  Religious  Consciousness  Evaluated.  —  i. 
What  does  it  signify  that  the  religious  consciousness 
demands  a  knowable  concrete  reality  as  an  object  of  faith, 
one  reality  in  which  all  experiences  are  unified,  a  personal 
object  so  that  the  worshipper  may  commune  with  the 
object  worshipped,  a  Supreme  Being  in  order  that  the 
dependent  worshipper  may  be  assured  of  efficient  aid  ? 
Is  this  consciousness  the  expression  of  a  mere  individual 
desire,  or  is  it  a  mode  of  reality  and  therefore  at  one  with 
the  Ground  Reality  of  the  universe  ?  We  believe  that  it 
is  a  mode  of  subject-reality,  and  that  it  also  expresses 
what  is  significant  of  the  world  of  nature  and  of  racial 
and  individual  history.  So  far  as  it  expresses  the  signifi- 
cance of  our  relation  to  nature  and  history,  objectively 
regarded,  it  is  a  mode  of  object-reality.  If  this  concep- 
tion be  true,  the  religious  consciousness  has  equal  author- 
ity with  cognitive  consciousness. 

2.  The  religious  consciousness  is  implicit  in  man.  This 
phase  of  consciousness  cannot  be  alien  to  the  nature  of  man. 
It  is  not  found  in  merely  individual  experiences ;  it  is 
characteristic  of  the  race.  Individual  exceptions  may  be 
discovered.  There  are  some  persons  in  whom  it  seems 
never  to  have  been  developed ;  and  there  are  others  who 
have  confessedly  repressed  it  or  neglected  to  foster  it  until 
its  presence  in  consciousness  can  be  scarcely,  if  at  all, 
recognized.  But  such  persons  fail,  in  this  particular,  to 
represent  the  normal  consciousness;  just  as  the  blind 
and  the  deaf  do  not  represent  normal  sentient  conscious- 
ness. The  religious  consciousness  is  a  characteristic  of 
humanity.     It  is  not  a  mere  datum  of  our  social  environ- 


400         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

ment.  We  never  take  "  raw  "  material  of  experience  into 
our  consciousness ;  we  always  make  over  the  material 
which  we  appropriate,  and  we  assimilate  it  to  our  mental 
constitution.  Some  one  is  speaking.  Air  waves  stimu- 
late our  auditory  sense-organs  ;  but,  for  our  consciousness, 
those  air  waves  are  ideas.  The  "  raw  "  material  proffered 
to  sense  becomes,  in  our  appropriation  and  assimilation 
of  it,  something  quite  other  than  that  which  stimulated 
our  sense-organs.  It  has  been  assimilated  to  our  rational 
nature.  It  is  thus  with  all  that  becomes  constituent  of 
consciousness.  The  religious  consciousness  cannot  be 
an  exception ;  it  is  developed  in  our  appropriating  and 
assimilating  what  comes  to  us  in  our  experience  of  the 
external  world.  In  man's  experience  of  the  world  of  per- 
sons, things,  and  events,  he  has  developed  this  phase  of 
consciousness ;  in  assimilating  the  material  of  experience, 
he  has  given  it  this  quality.  We  must  conclude,  then, 
that  it  is  of  the  nature  of  man  to  be  religious,  since  his 
experiences  have  a  religious  aspect.  To  put  it  otherwise, 
the  being  religious  is  implicit  in  man ;  and,  in  his  appro- 
priation of  the  material  of  experience,  what  was  implicit 
in  him  becomes  explicit.  It  follows  that  the  religious  con- 
sciousness is  a  mode  in  which  subjective  reality  expresses 
itself;  it  is  a  mode  of  its  being.  The  requirements  of 
the  religious  consciousness  are,  therefore,  the  require- 
ments of  rationality. 

3.  Consciousness  of  God  is  implicit.  This  conscious- 
ness has  not  been  communicated  to  man  from  without. 
Man  does  not  first  hear  of  God  and  then  become  religious. 
Consciousness  of  the  super-human  is  a  primal  and  persistent 
element  of  the  religious  consciousness.  If  the  conscious- 
ness of  God,  or  of  what  is  regarded  as  God,  becomes  dulled, 
the  force  of  religious  aspiration  and  impulse  is  lessened,  and 
religion  loses  its  supreme  place  in  life  and  its  influence  over 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD  401 

life.  For  reasons  similar  to  those  advanced  In  the  last 
paragraph,  we  hold  that  consciousness  of  God  is  implicit 
in  man.  Whatever  aids  the  development  of  this  con- 
sciousness is  in  harmony  with  the  nature  of  man ;  it  aids 
in  bringing  subjective  reality  to  effective  development. 
The  requirements  of  this  consciousness  are  the  require- 
ments of  rationality. 

4.  The  religious  characteristic  of  consciousness  accords 
with  the  significance  of  objective  reality.  We  have  in- 
sisted that  man  gives  a  religious  quality  to  the  "  raw  " 
material  of  experience.  A  question  naturally  follows : 
Is  this  religious  significance  foreign  to  the  objective  world  ? 
We  do  not  ask  as  to  whether  the  world  of  nature  and  his- 
tory, racial  and  individual,  is  distinctly  religious.  What 
we  wish  to  know  may  be  stated  thus :  Is  the  religious 
consciousness  in  its  nature  alien  to  the  significance  of 
the  world  ? 

We  have  given  reasons  for  holding  that  the  mind  does 
not  contribute  to  the  known  object  what  is  alien  to  that 
object  (§  98,  2  (2)).  It  is  true  that  we  may  err  in  par- 
ticular instances;  and  a  whole  age  may  err  respecting 
an  object  of  thought.  But  even  in  these  instances  there 
is  some  knowledge  of  reality.  The  point  which  we  made 
in  §  98  was  that  the  cognitive  act  as  such  does  not  contrib- 
ute to  knowledge  what  is  alien  to  the  object.  One  as- 
sumption underlies  all  our  consideration  of  experience  and 
must  precede  all  reflective  thought;  viz.,  that  the  world 
and  life  are  intelligible.  We  do  not  assume  that  any  one 
person  or  age  will  have  complete  knowledge  of  the  world 
and  life;  but  that  the  world  and  life  are  intelligible  and 
may  be  known.  Thought  cannot  begin  without  this  as- 
sumption. That  the  world  of  nature  and  history  may  be 
intelligible,  it  is  necessary  that  objective  reality  shall 
express  itself  in  modes  which  are  not  alien  to  the  modes 


402         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

in  which  the  mind  acts.  The  world  in  relation  with  which 
man  has  experience  and  develops  consciousness  comes  to 
expression  in  consciousness.  The  consciousness  which 
is  thus  developed  has  a  religious  quality;  for  it,  life  in 
this  world  has  a  religious  significance.  It  must  be,  then, 
that  at  least  some  of  the  situations  and  relations  in  which 
objective  reality  expresses  itself  have  a  religious  signifi- 
cance. The  religious  phase  of  consciousness  is  not  alien 
to  the  significance  of  the  world  of  history  and  na- 
ture. 

5.  When  we  compare  the  requirements  of  the  religious 
consciousness  with  the  conclusions  to  which  we  were  led 
by  our  study  of  the  categories,  it  becomes  manifest  that 
the  objective  world  is  at  ground  in  harmony  with  the 
religious  consciousness.  The  categories  are  the  forms  of 
reality,  the  forms  of  its  being  and  its  activity;  they  are 
at  once  the  forms  in  which  we  experience  the  world  and 
the  forms  in  which  reality  expresses  itself.  The  religious 
consciousness  requires  for  its  satisfaction  the  unification 
of  experiences;  and  the  highest  development  of  this 
consciousness  finds  the  ground  of  harmonious,  restful  ex- 
perience in  a  Personal  God,  of  whom  and  in  whom  the 
universe  is.  Our  study  of  the  categories  led  us  to  conclude 
that  there  is  one  ultimate  reality;  that  the  ultimate 
reality  is  the  Absolute  Individual,  the  Perfect  Person ; 
that  the  myriad  objects  and  changes  of  the  world,  and  the 
varied  experiences  of  individuals  find  their  unity  in  Him ; 
that  society  is  grounded  in  Him  —  in  a  word,  that  He  is 
the  unification  and  explanation  of  all  experience.  The 
religious  consciousness  demands  a  God  in  whom  all  ex- 
periences are  unified.  Our  study  of  reality  concludes 
that  all  modes  of  being  and  activity,  all  modes  of  ex- 
perience, are  thus  unified.  According  to  this,  the  religious 
consciousness  is  not  a  purely  subjective  longing;   it  is  one 


THE   EXISTENCE  OF  GOD  403 

of  the  modes  of  reality,  and  its  requirements  have  the 
value  for  reason  that  reality  has. 

6.  Men  have  given  a  specific  religious  significance  to 
certain  experiences.  We  aspire  to  rise  to  a  nobler  estate 
of  self-hood;  we  strive  and  are  often  forced  to  confess 
failure.  At  the  best,  we  acknowledge  that  the  task  — 
felt  to  be  a  worthy  one  —  has  not  yet  been  completed. 
We  are  convinced  that  the  true,  the  highest  interpretation 
of  life  is  that  there  is  something  better  for  us  than  the 
struggle  for  objects  of  sense,  or  mere  intellectual  attain- 
ment, or  position  of  power.  Above  all  these,  there  is 
something  of  infinitely  greater  moment  for  us.  Our 
conception  of  this  better  object  of  thought  and  endeavor 
may  be  vague,  and  our  definition  of  it  unsatisfactory  even 
to  us ;  but  in  our  best  moments  we  have  no  doubt  of  its 
reality.  The  vanity  of  things  of  sense,  the  incapacity  of 
mere  knowledge  to  fit  one  to  enjoy  others  and  to  be 
gladdened  by  their  gain  —  such  experiences  as  these  and 
those  just  named  above  lead  our  thoughts  above  the  world 
in  which  and  for  which  much  of  our  life  is  lived.  When 
we  are  at  our  best,  we  are  convinced  that,  if  we  and  all 
others  should  get  a  vision  of  the  true  end  of  life  and 
should  be  obedient  to  that  vision,  the  very  struggle  to 
actualize  that  ideal  would  be  better  than  to  be  content 
with  seeking  what  most  of  us  too  easily  make  the  end  of 
life.  These  are  not  mere  illusions,  pure  vaporings; 
they  are  man's  interpretation  of  the  meaning  of  his  being 
in  the  universe,  his  interpretation  of  the  significance  of 
his  experience  of  the  world  of  persons,  things,  and  events ; 
and  they  are  not  alien  to  that  world. 

These  experiences  go  to  sustain  our  contention  that  the 
religious  consciousness  is  at  one  with  the  order  of  the  uni- 
verse. Consciousness  of  the  need  of  an  aim  that  is  worthy 
the  self  has  in  it  a  religious  element ;  and  men  have  turned 


404         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

to  religion  to  learn  how  they  may  surely  attain  the  true 
end  of  life.  They  have  sought  fellowship  with  God,  as 
One  who  knew  them  and  the  world.  And  the  most  deeply 
religious  declare  that  in  this  fellowship  they  have  been 
lifted  above  their  lower  selves  and  have  been  inspired  to 
attain  a  higher  self-hood.  They  attest  that  they  have  been 
joined  to  an  ideal  which,  although  never  perfectly  realized 
by  them,  has  been  of  inestimable  value.  They  testify 
that  in  this  fellowship  they  have  been  aroused  to  seek  the 
best  and  have  been  aided  in  the  search;  and  they  have 
found  peace.  Since  these  experiences  tend  to  incite  man 
to  seek  what  he  believes  to  be  highest  and  best,  they  are 
obviously  at  one  with  the  law  of  development.  The  in- 
dividual may  err  in  judging  what  is  highest.  But  to  be 
responsive  to  what  one  deems  to  be  the  highest  is  the  true 
test  of  self-hood ;  and  the  religious  consciousness  makes 
for  that.  If  the  end  of  experience  is  the  development  in 
man  of  the  highest  expression  of  finite  personality,  and  we 
believe  that  it  is,  then  the  religious  consciousness  must  be 
regarded  as  being  in  the  order  of  the  universe.  We  con- 
clude, therefore,  that  it  has  the  same  value  for  reflective 
thought  that  the  order  of  the  universe  has. 

§  194.  Conclusion.  —  We  have  found  that  the  require- 
ments of  the  religious  consciousness  in  general  and  of  the 
consciousness  of  God  in  particular  are  requirements  of 
rationality.  We  have  also  found  that  the  religious  con- 
sciousness is  one  of  the  modes  of  reality,  both  subjectively 
and  objectively  expressed,  and  that  its  requirements  have 
the  value  for  reason  that  any  other  expression  of  reality  has. 
We  have  likewise  learned  that  the  religious  consciousness  is 
at  one  with  the  order  of  the  universe,  and  that  definite, 
constructive,  religious  experience  is  in  the  order  of  the 
universe.  We  conclude,  therefore,  that  religious  experi- 
ence has  the  value  for  reflective  thought  that  the  order 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD  405 

of  the  universe  has.  The  acceptance  of  the  reality  of  the 
one  God,  personal  and  supreme,  a  God  with  whom  man 
may  have  communion,  is  a  demand  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness. Hence,  we  retain,  as  an  article  of  philosophic 
faith,  our  belief  that  God,  the  Perfect  Personality,  the 
Absolute  Individual,  is,  and  is  the  Ground  of  being  and 
activity.  "  In  Him  we  live  and  move  and  have  our 
being." 


REFERENCES 

Those  who  desire  fuller  bibliographies  will  do  well  to  consult  Baldwin's 
"Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology,"  Vol.  Ill,  and  the  bibli- 
ographies given  with  articles  on  philosophical  subjects  in  "The  Ency- 
clopaedia Britannica,"  nth  edition.  An  excellent  bibliography  for 
Modern  Philosophy  is  to  be  found  in  Calkins 's  "Persistent  Problems  of 
Philosophy,"  id  ed.,  pp.  457-564.  Baldwin's  Dictionary  referred  to 
above  is  especially  helpful  in  the  matter  of  definition  and  in  its  condensed 
statements  of  philosophical  problems  and  controversies. 

ABBREVIATIONS 

The  following  abbreviations  will  be  used  in  the  Instance  of  works 

more  frequently  referred  to:  — 

BosANQUET,  Logic  =  Bosanquct's  Logic,  2d  ed. 

BosANQUET,  Individuality  =  Bosanquet's  Principle  of  Individuality  and 
Value,  Gifford  Lectures  for  191 1. 

BowNE,  Metaphysics  =  Bowne's  Metaphysics,  rev.  ed. 

Bradley,  Appearance  =  Bradley's  Appearance  and  Reality,  2d  ed. 

Caird,  Kant  =  Caird's  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant,  2d  ed. 

Calkins,  Persistent  Problems  =  Calkins's  Persistent  Problems  of  Phi- 
losophy, 2d  ed. 

Creighton,  Logic  =  Creigh ton's  Introductory  Logic,  3d  ed. 

Enc.  Brit.  =  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  nth  ed. 

Ladd,  Reality  =  Ladd's  Theory  of  Reality. 

New  Int.  Enc.  =  The  New  International  Encyclopaedia. 

Ormond,  Foundations  =  Ormond's  Foundations  of  Knowledge. 

Phil.  Rev.  =  The  Philosophical  Review. 

Taylor,  Metaphysics  =  Taylor's  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  2d  ed. 

Watson,  Outline  =  Watson's  Outline  of  Philosophy,  3d  ed. 

CHAPTER  I 

Calkins,  Persistent  Problems^  pp.  3-6. 
RoYCE,  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy,  3d  ed.,  pp.  I-3. 
Ward,  Enc.  Brit.,  Vol.  XXII,  p.  550. 
Watson,  Outline,  pp.  1-3. 

WiNDELBAND,  History  of  Philosophy,  2d  ed.,  §  i. 

406 


REFERENCES  407 

CHAPTERS  II-XII 

We  suggest  the  following  for  persons  beginning  the  study  of  Philosophy : 
CusHMAN,  A  Beginner's  History  of  Philosophy,  2  vols. 
Rogers,  Student's  History  of  Philosophy. 
Turner,   History  of  Philosophy,  —  especially  valuable  for    Mediaeval 

Philosophy. 
Weber,  History  of  Philosophy. 
WiNDELBAND,  History  of  Philosophy,  2d  ed. 

Modern  Philosophy. 
HoFFDiNG,  Brief  History  of  Modern  Philosophy. 
Calkins,  Persistent  Problems. 

CHAPTER  XHI 

Muirhead,  Enc.  Brit.,  Vol.  XIV,  pp.  285  f. 
Rogers,  Student's  History  of  Philosophy,  pp.  505  ff. 
Seth,  English  Philosophers  and  Schools  of  Philosophy,  pp.  358  ff. 
EucKEN,  Main  Currents  of  Modern  Thought,  4thed.,  pp.  70-82;  103-115; 
230-239. 

CHAPTER  XIV 

Ladd,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  pp.  6-27. 
Pringle-Pattison,  Enc.  Brit.,  Vol.  XXI,  pp.  440  ff. 
Watson,  Outline,  pp.  13-20. 
Watson,  Philosophy  of  Kant  Explained,  pp.  1-3. 

CHAPTER  XV 

Cairo,  Kant,  Vol.  II,  pp.  90-92. 
Ormond,  Foundations,  pp.  30-51;    iii  f. 
RoYCE,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  pp.  165-171. 
Ward,  Enc.  Brit.,  Vol.  XXII,  pp.  550,  552,  564. 

CHAPTER  XVI 

HiBBEN,  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment,  pp.  85-108. 
Hicks,  Stoic  and  Epicurean,  pp.  312-352;   371-399. 
New  Int.  Enc,  Vol.  X,  pp.  757  ff. 
Pringle-Pattison,  Enc.  Brit.,  Vol.  XXIV,  pp.  306  f. 


4o8         INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER  XVII 

Calkins,  Persistent  Problems,  pp.  404  ff. 

Pearson,  The  Grammar  of  Science,  2d  ed.,  pp.  60-63. 

New  Int.  Enc,  Vol.  X,  pp.  764  f. 

WiNDELBAND,  History  of  Philosophy,  2d  ed.,  pp.  471,  675. 

CHAPTERS  XVIII  and  XIX 

Calkins,  Persistent  Problems,  pp.  149  ff. 

Ladd,  Reality,  pp.  49-56. 

Watson,  Outline,  pp.  32-42. 

New  Int.  Enc,  Vol.  X,  pp.  758  ff. 

Bradley,  Appearance,  Bk.  I. 

Pringle-Pattison,  Man^s  Place  in  the  Cosmos,  etc.,  pp.  137-192. 

Bosanquet,  Logic,  Vol.  I,  pp.  25-28;  Vol.  II,  p.  210. 

Creighton,  Logic,  pp.  343-352. 

CHAPTER  XX 

I 
Baillie,  Idealistic  Construction  of  Experience,  pp.  146-175. 
BowNE,  Metaphysics,  pp.  17-26. 
Bradley,  Appearance,  pp.  359-382. 
Ladd,  i?^fl/tiy,  pp.  81  f.;   130-132. 
Leighton,  Phil.  Rev.,  Vol.  XIX,  pp.  1-17. 
Watson,  Outline,  pp.  38-41. 

CHAPTER  XXI 

Spencer,  First  Principles,  6th  ed.,  pp.  61-97. 
MuiRHEAD,  Enc.  Brit.,  Vol.  XIV,  p.  281. 

ScHURMAN,  Phil.  Rev.,  Vol.  II,  pp.  133  ff.;  Vol.  VII,  pp.  235  ff. 
Jones,  Phil.  Rev.,  Vol.  XX,  pp.  405-421. 
Watson,  Outline,  pp.  431-439. 

Eraser,  Locke,  in  Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics,  pp.  122-147. 
Wallace,  Kant,  in  Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics,  pp.  156-178. 
Pringle-Pattison,  Scottish  Philosophy,  in    Blackwood's   Philosophical 
Classics,  pp.  1-32;   77-91. 


REFERENCES  409 

CHAPTER  XXII 

Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  sth  ed.,  pp.  130-173. 
Cunningham,  Thought  and  Reality  in  Hegel's  System,  pp.  17-20. 
Creighton,  Logic,  pp.  322-342. 
Creighton,  Phil.  Rev.,  Vol.  XV,  pp.  482-489. 

CHAPTER  XXIII 

BosANQUET,  Logic,  Vol.  I,  pp.  29-51 ;  90-95. 

Creighton,  Logic,  pp.  322-342. 

Creighton,  Phil.  Rev.,  Vol.  XXI,  pp.  303-321. 

EucKEN,  Main  Currents  of  Modern  Thought,  4th  ed.,  pp.  64-98. 

Ward,  Enc.  Brit.,  Vol.  XXII,  p.  564. 

CHAPTER  XXIV 

Adamson  ;  X,  Enc,  Brit.,  Vol.  V,  pp.  511  f. 

Ladd,  Reality,  pp.  84-110. 

Ormond,  Foundations,  pp.  111-117. 

New  Int.  Enc,  Vol,  IV,  pp.  211  f. 

Wallace,  Logic  of  Hegel,  2d  ed.,  pp.  387-391. 

Watson,  The  Philosophy  of  Kant  Explained,  pp.  157-168. 

CHAPTER  XXV 

Bradley,  Appearance,  pp.  572-584. 
Ladd,  Reality,  pp.  160-177. 
Taylor,  Metaphysics,  pp.  140-153. 

CHAPTER  XXVI 

BowNE,  Metaphysics,  pp.  44-67. 
Taylor,  Metaphysics,  pp.  158-164. 

CHAPTER  XXVII 

Ormond,  Foundations,  pp.  272-279. 
Taylor,  Metaphysics,  pp.  123-128. 


4IO         INTRODUCTION   TO   PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

Ormond,  Foundations,  pp.  176-193. 
Taylor,  Metaphysics,  pp.  128-140. 

CHAPTER  XXIX 

BosANQUET,  Logic,  Vol.  I,  pp.  104-140;   154-160;  204-207. 
BowNE,  Metaphysics,  pp.  31-38. 
Bradley,  Appearance,  pp.  572-584. 
Ormond,  Foundations,  pp.  151-160. 
Taylor,  Metaphysics,  pp.  128-140. 

CHAPTER  XXX 

BosANQUET,  Logic,  Vol.  I,  pp.  144-161 ;  166-169;  I93~I9S' 
Ormond,  Foundations,  pp.  147-15 1. 

CHAPTER  XXXI 

BosANQUET,  Logic,  Vol.  I,  pp.  112-115;  174-189. 
New  Int.  Enc,  Vol.  XVI,  pp.  19  f. 
Ormond,  Foundations,  pp.  1 18-146. 
Sturt,  Enc.  Brit.,  Vol.  XXV,  pp.  525  f. 
Taylor,  Metaphysics,  pp.  243-264. 

CHAPTER  XXXII 

BosANQUET,  Logic,  Vol.  I,  pp.  112-115;  169-174;  186-189;  258  f. 
Ormond,  Sturt,  and  Taylor,  same  as  for  Chapter  XXXI. 

CHAPTER  XXXIII 

BowNE,  Metaphysics,  pp.  74-79;  205-227. 

McIntyre,  Cyclopedia  of  Religion  and  Ethics,  Vol.  I,  p.  80. 

Ward,  Enc.  Brit.,  Vol.  XXII,  p.  597. 

CHAPTER  XXXIV 

Mill,  Logic,  8th  ed.,  pp.  234-266. 

Bain,  Logic,  rev.  ed.,  pp.  245-253  ;   267  f. 

BosANQUET,  Logic,  Vol.  I,  pp.  250-267;  Vol.  II,  p.  215. 


REFERENCES  411 

Ormond,  Foundations,  pp.  161-175;   205-216. 

Taylor,  Metaphysics,  pp.  164-190. 

Watson,  Om^/xW,  pp.  15-19;  27-29;  89-100;  385-387- 

CHAPTER  XXXV 

BosANQUET,  Individuality,  pp.  123-154. 

Caird,  Kant,  Vol.  II,  pp.  442-521,  especially  pp.  481,  489-497. 

Ormond,  Foundations,  pp.  464-468;  521. 

Pfleiderer,  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  259-264. 

Watson,  The  Philosophy  of  Kant  Explained,  pp.  399-402. 

CHAPTER  XXXVI 

Bosanquet,  Individuality,  pp.  68-77. 

Cunningham,  Thought  and  Reality  in  HegeVs  System,  pp.  79-113. 

Illingworth,  Personality  Human  and  Divine,  pp.  6-80;   240  f. 

Ormond,  Foundations,  pp.  254-268. 

RoYCE,  The  World  and  the  Individual.     See  Index  under  Individual. 

CHAPTER  XXXVII 

Ormond,  Foundations,  pp.  268-271 ;  283-300. 

RoYCE,  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Vol.  II,  pp.  168-174. 

Angell,  Psychology,  4th  ed.,  pp.  445  f. 

Calkins,  A  First  Book  in  Psychology,  pp.  245-259. 

Stout,  Manual  of  Psychology,  pp.  509-516;  520-527. 

CHAPTERS  XXXVIII  and  XXXIX 

Bosanquet,  Individuality,  pp.  318-357. 

Caird,  Kant,  Vol.  II,  pp.  223-255. 

James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  II,  pp.  569-579. 

LoTZE,  Outlines  of  Practical  Philosophy,  pp.  35-50. 

Mackenzie,  Manual  of  Ethics,  pp.  90-100. 

MuiRHEAD,  Elements  of  Ethics,  pp.  45-54. 

Sidgwick,  The  Methods  of  Ethics,  7th  ed.,  pp.  57-76;  511-516. 

RoYCE,  The  World  and  the  Individual.     See  Index  under  Freedom. 

Taylor,  Metaphysics,  pp.  358-380. 

Watson,  Outline,  pp.  235-248;  460-483. 

Eucken,  Main  Currents  of  Modern  Thought,  4th  ed.,  pp.  409-444. 


412  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER  XL 

Cairo,  The  Evolution  of  Religion,  4th  ed.  See  Index  under  God,  also  pp. 
82-84.  Caird  cogently  insists  that  God  is  "the  ultimate  presup- 
position of  our  consciousness." 

BowNE,  Metaphysics,  pp.  94-120. 

Calkins,  Persistent  Problems.     See  Index  under  God. 

Cunningham,  Thought  and  Reality  in  Hegel's  System,  pp.  138-157. 

Illingworth,  Personality  Human  and  Divine,  pp.  81-112;    138-191. 

Pfleiderer,  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  237-290. 

RoYCE,  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Vol.  II,  pp.  418-425. 


INDEX 


Abelard:  54  f. 

Absolute,  the :  394  f .,  405 ;  Fichte's 
Universal  Ego,  97  f.,  102 ;  Schel- 
ling's  idea  of,  99  f.,  102 ;  Hegel's 
idea  of,  loi  flf. ;  as  Person,  102, 
354,  361  f .,  402,  405 ;  as  true  uni- 
versal, 102  f, ;  subject,  308  f., 
310;  individual,  335,  337,  354, 
361,  402,  405;   reality,  362. 

Accidents:   55,  70,  267  ff.,  271. 

Activity:  187,  311  ff. ;  and  cognition, 
66  f.,  207-214,  232  f. ;  combining 
or  synthetic,  85,  88,  93;  rational, 
loi  f. ;  cognitive,  tri-phasal  char- 
acter of,  207-214;  organic,  225- 
228;  selective,  342  f . ;  transeunt, 
312  f.,  316  ;  immanent  (see 
organic),  187,  311  f.,  313  ;  self- 
determination,  highest  form  of, 
345 ;  teleological  and  mechanical, 
346,  338-349. 

Acts:  instinctive,  habitual,  341  f., 
370,  380  f. 

Esthetics:   127,  340  f. 

Affection:  and  experience,  134,  207- 
209,  211-213. 

Affectivism:  defined,  46,  59,  207-209. 

Agnosticism :  see  Scepticism. 

Agnostics:  39,  40  f. 

Albert,  the  Great:  doctrines,  57,  58; 
scientist,  59;   intellectualist,  208. 

Anaxagoras:  doctrines,  18  f.,  255; 
teleology,  33. 

Anaximander:   16. 

Anaximenes:   16. 

Anselm:   54. 

Antecedent:  322-330. 

Antiochus:  41. 

Appearance:  illusory,  161  ff. ;  real- 
ity expressed,  171  f . ;  and  reality, 
157-178;  and  reality  mutually 
exclusive,  159-161,  174;  and  real- 
ity correlatives  in  cognition,  171  f. ; 


and  perception,  174  f. ;  and  expe- 
rience, 175-178;  a  construct  of  the 
subject,  173-178,  194  f . ;  Kant's 
doctrine,  203-205 ;  see  Phenom- 
enalism, Reklity. 

Apperception:   136  f. 

Aquinas,  Thomas:  58  f.,  208,  370. 

Arabians :  influence,  56  f. ;  relation 
to  science,  122. 

Archimedes:  39. 

Aristarchus:  39. 

Aristotle:  21,  22,  29;  a  monist  in 
purpose,  30,  36;  scientist,  35;  cf. 
with  Plato,  31  f. ;  attitude  toward 
dualism,  34,  37;  doctrine  of  uni- 
versal, 32,  52,  102  f . ;  of  develop- 
ment, 32  ff. ;  of  man,  36 ;  of  form 
and  matter,  33,  38,  58,  267;  on 
mechanism,  34 ;  on  teleology,  ss  f., 
37  f . ;  logical  doctrine,  34  f . ;  con- 
ception of  God,  38 ;  an  idealist,  83 ; 
on  judgment,  35  f.,  212  ;  categories, 
235  f. ;  on  substance,  267  f. ;  on 
freedom,  365 ;  a  self-determinist, 
369  f. 

Associationism :   113-115,  383. 

Atomists:  doctrines,  16,  18,  20  f., 
255,  266;   determinists,  369. 

Atoms:   17 ;  properties  of,  30  f. 

Augustine :  method  and  doctrine,  50, 
369 ;  a  voluntarist,  208 ;  on  cate- 
gories, 236;  an  indeterminist, 
369. 

Averroes:  57,  59,  208. 

Avicebron:   208. 

Bacon,  Francis :  76,122. 

Bacon,  Roger:  57,  58,  59,  122. 

Bain:   115;  on  causation,  324,  331. 

Being:  in  Pre-Socratic  thought,  17; 
and  reality,  82,  loo  f. ;  pure,  102, 
272;   active,  def.,  187,  311  f. 

Berkeley:  77,79,83,270. 


4ii 


414 


INDEX 


de  Biran :   208. 
Boehme,  Jacob :  62. 
Bradley:    162-166, 
Brahe,  Tycho:   61. 
Bruno:  61. 

Campanella:  61. 

Carneades:   369. 

Categories:  234-362;  general  view, 
234-242 ;  def.,  235  f .,  242  ;  Kant- 
ian and  Hegelian  view,  103  f., 
236-238;  historical,  235  £f. ;  and 
subjective  reality,  238  f. ;  and 
objective  reality,  239  f . ;  and  con- 
tent for  thought,  240  f. ;  unity  of, 
241  f. ;  general  conclusions,  242, 
361  f. 

Causality:  318-337;  and  change, 
319  f.,  326-329;  and  conditioning, 
318  f. ;  naive  conception,  319  f., 
330-333;  conceptions  of,  321  f . ; 
metaphysical  doctrine,  330-333 ; 
phenomenal,  322-333  ;  is  phenom- 
enal cause  adequate?  326  ff. ; 
complete  ground,  333-335»  337- 

Cause:  in  Pre-Socratic  Philosophy, 
18;  origin  of  idea,  318-321;  con- 
ceptions of,  321  f. 

Change:  and  permanence,  16,  254- 
258 ;  Leibniz  on,  75  ;  Spinoza,  74  f. ; 
historical,  254  f . ;  and  reality, 
256-258;  see  Permanence . 

Character:  def.,  375;  and  person- 
ality distinguished,  375  f . ;  sub- 
ject to  development,  376;  a  sys- 
tem, 377;   organization  of,  377  f. 

Choice:  and  freedom,  373  ff. ;  and 
character,  382  f. 

Christian  Dogma  and  Philosophy: 
48,  51-61,  62  f. 

Cognition:  31,  40,  58,  60,  65  f.,  78, 
84  f.,  140-178,  190-233;  super- 
ordinary,  44 ;  involves  feeling  and 
will,  211-213  ;  a  thought-process, 
213  f.;  conclusions,  228-233;  see 
Knowledge. 

Common-sense  Philosophy :   no  ff. 

Concept:  23  ff.,  26  f.,  28,  40,  53, 
218-222;  def.,  218;  relation  to 
thought,  219-222;  ground  of, 
221  f. ;  see  Ideas,  Plato,  Universal. 


Conceptualism :   52  f.,  54,  57. 

Condillac:  115. 

Confucius:  12. 

Consciousness :  of  self-sameness, 
134-136,  170,  94,  254,  25s;  of 
self,  169  f.,  189,  363  f. ;  state  of, 
not  primary  object  in  cognition, 
197-203;     and   feeling    and    will, 

133  f.,  207-209,  387-389 ;  unitary, 

134  f.,  209-211;  many  in  one, 
351  f. ;  social,  3S5-361;  see  Ex- 
perience,    Religious     Conscious- 


Copernicus:  61. 
Cosmology:   16. 

Criteria  of  truth:  Stoic  and  Epi- 
curean, 40  f . ;  Descartes,  73  f. 

Democritus:    20  f.,   30  f.,   66,   73, 

273. 
Descartes:    an  extreme  rationalist, 

70;    doctrines,    71-74,    122,    269, 

273- 
Determinism:    def.,  367;  historical, 

369;      argument     for,     380-384; 

criticism  of,  384-387. 
Directivity:  341  ff. 
Diversity :  see  Identity. 
Dogma :  see  Christian  Dogma,  Reli- 
gious Consciousness  in  Mediaeval 

Philosophy. 
Doubt:      140-149;     see    Agnostics, 

Hume,  Scepticism. 
Dualism:   def.,  17,  46;   epistemolog- 

ical,  29;   ontological,  29;   Plato's, 

28,  30,  31 ;  Aristotle's,  34;  Kant's, 

92  f. 
Duration :  see  Time. 

Eckhart:  60. 

Eclectics:  39,41;  and  indetermin- 
ism,  369. 

Edwards,  Jonathan:  370. 

Ego:  Kantian  and  Fichtean  con- 
ceptions, 87-89,  96-98;  and  the 
external  world,  Pearson's  concep- 
tion, 152  f.,  154  f- 

Eleatics:  16,  17,  19,  25,  162  f.,  255, 
266,  314. 

Empedocles:   16,  18,  255. 

Empiricism:    66-69,  76  f.,  113-115, 


INDEX 


41S 


IIS  f.,  192  £f. ;  def.,  66 ;  early  mod- 
ern, 76  f . ;  later  modern,  113  f. ; 
and  knowledge,  78,  114,  116  f., 
193  {. ;   and  reality,  79  f.,  117. 

Environment :  and  organisms, 
343  ff.;  and  self,  318  f.,  373  f-, 
385  f- 

Epicureans:   39,  40,  41,  42,  46,   58, 

364,  369- 

Epistemology:  128-233;  def.,  21; 
of  Sophists,  19  f.;  Kant,  84-87, 
89  f.,  92-94;  Fichte,  96  f. ;  Schel- 
ling,  100;  Hegel,  104-106;  Reid, 
Hamilton,  et  al.,  109-113;  Mill, 
Spencer,  etal.,  113-117  ;  5ee  Knowl- 
edge. 

Erigena:   51. 

Error  in  perception :  sources  of,  175- 
178. 

Ethics:  a  normative  science,  127; 
of  Stoics  and  Epicureans,  41  f. ; 
of  Socrates,  22-24;  Kant's  moral 
imperative,  90  f. ;  in  Fichte's 
system,  95,  97,  98,  100. 

Euclid:   39. 

Existence  of  God:  3Q3-40S;  st'i 
God. 

Experience:  128-139;  def.,  4,  131; 
source,  i ;  and  knowledge,  2  ;  as 
viewed  by  Philosophy,  3  f.,  130- 
132;  dual  aspect,  4,  132-134; 
conative,  4  f.,  133;  is  philosophic 
material,  8-10;  a  development, 
136  f . ;  a  continuous  whole,  139; 
characteristics,  82,  139,  216  f . ; 
is  unitary,  170;  judgment  and, 
142,  175-178;  universal  in,  181- 
186,  216-218;  cognitive  expe- 
rience, 190-206 ;  three  phases,  4  f ., 
207-214;    organic,  225-228. 

Faith :  in  Patristic  Philosophy,  48  f . ; 
and  reason,  49,  56-60 ;  and  knowl- 
edge in  Kant's  system,  90  f .,  92  f., 
203-205  ;   and  Philosophy,  393. 

Fathers,  the :   48. 

Feeling:  def.,  134,  210;  with  Stoics, 
Eclectics,  Epicureans,  42  f . ;  in 
psychological  theory,  208  f. 

Fichte :  motive,  95  f. ;  epistemology, 

^  96  f . ;   doctrine  of  ego,  97  f . ;  tele- 


ology, r  S ;  idealism,  98 ;  a  volun- 
tarist,  208. 

Finality:  338-349;  in  individual 
experience,  338  f. ;  in  historical 
sources,  339  f . ;  in  development  of 
science,  340;  in  ethical  and 
aesthetical  relations,  340  f . ;  and 
reality,  346  £[. ;  and  activity, 
347  ff. 

Freedom:  psychical,  364-367, 
391  f. ;  ethical,  365-367.  392; 
metaphysical,  364-367;  see  Hu- 
man Freedom. 

Fries :   209. 

Galileo:   61. 

Gerbert:   51. 

God:  Aristotle's  idea,  38;  Neo- 
Platonic,  43,  44  f . ;  Patristic,  49  f . ; 
with  Plotinus,  44  f . ;  Origen,  49  f. ; 
Augustine,  50;  Erigena,  51; 
Nicholas  of  Cusa,  60;  Bruno,  61; 
Boehme,  62;  Descartes,  71  f.,  72; 
Spinoza,  72;  Leibniz,  73,  270; 
Kant,  88  f. ;  Schelling,  99  f . ;  as 
ground  of  being  and  activity,  322  ; 
reality  of  universe,  333  ff.,  399; 
attributes,  334;  the  perfect  Per- 
sonality, 362,  402,  405;  see  Exist- 
ence of  God. 

Gorgias:   20,  140. 

Ground,  complete:  242,  252,  253, 
322,  354,  361,  362;  see  Causality. 

Hamilton:   1 10-113. 

Hedonism:   42. 

Hegel:  100-108,  122;  nature  of 
reality,  100  f . ;  ultimate  reality, 
loi  f. ;  cf.  Fichte  and  Schelling, 
102 ;  the  Absolute,  101-103 ;  the 
universal,  102  f . ;  the  categories, 
103,  238;  knowledge  and  reality, 
104;  limitation  of  knowledge,  105 ; 
identity  of  subject  and  object, 
105  f. ;  the  self,  106  f. ;  general, 
107  f. 

Heracleitus:    16,  17,  254,  264. 

Hesiod:   13. 

Hobbes:   76,  270. 

Homer:   13. 

Human  Freedom:     363-392;    his- 


4i6 


INDEX 


torical,  369  f. ;  theories  of :  de- 
terminism, 367,  368,  380-387; 
indeterminism,  367  f.,  368  f., 
,  379  f . ;  self-determinism,  368  f., 
387-391;  conditions  of,  373  f . ; 
and  character,  390  f. ;  perfect 
freedom,  391  f. 
Hume:  on  knowledge,  77,  78,  114, 
148;  on  substance,  80,  270;  on 
perceptions,  137;  on  reason,  144, 
148;   his  scepticism,  141. 

Idea:  Platonic,  26-30;  universal,  of 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  32  f.;  innate 
ideas,  40,  77  f. ;  objects  embodi- 
ments of,  81 ;  Kantian  regulative, 
87-89 ;  relation  of,  to  subject  and 
object,  197-202;   def.,  201. 

IdeaUsm:  def.,  46,  81  f.,  109;  his- 
torical, 82  f . ;  absolute,  108;  and 
realism  compared,  109  f.,  120;  per- 
sonal, 120. 

Identity:  of  subject  and  object, 
105  f. ;  in  difference,  162,  163  fif., 
222-225. 

Illumination:  44,  62. 

Illusions:   177. 

Impressions:  Hume's  doctrine,  78, 
80. 

Impulse:   370. 

Indeterminism:  367  ff. ;  criticised, 
379  f- 

Individual:  and  particular,  353; 
perfect,  262;  is  a  system,  276,  351 ; 
solitary  and  social,  355-360;  finite, 
not  an  ultimate,  361 ;  see  Indi- 
viduality, Individuum,  Person. 

Individuality:  259-262,  3SO-3S4; 
an  individual  object,  259  f. ;  as 
determined  by  the  subject,  260  f. ; 
by  the  object,  261  f. ;  and  per- 
sonality, see  Personality. 

Individuum:  259. 

lonians:  earlj^  15,  see  Milesian; 
later,  15,  16,  17,  266. 

Jacobi :   209. 

Jamblichus:   45. 

James:   209,  369. 

Jewish  Philosophy :  44,  57,  208. 

Judgment:    174  f.,  219;    Aristotle's 


doctrine,   34   ff. ;     Kant's,    85   f. ; 
Hegel's,  107  f. ;   Raid's,  112. 
Justinian:    45. 

Kant :  philosophical  motive,  83  f . ; 
compared  with  Fichte,  Schelling, 
Hegel,  95-98,  100,  103-108;  his 
philosophy,  83-94;  on  faith,  91; 
cognition,  84-87,  104,  194-197 ; 
objectivity  of  what  is  known, 
86  f . ;  regulative  ideas,  87  f . ; 
phenomena  and  noumena,  89-91 ; 
knowledge  and  reality,  89,  104  f., 
245  f. ;  knowledge  and  faith,  91, 
204  f . ;  the  self,  87-91,  270  f . ; 
mechanism  and  teleology,  91  f . ; 
dualism,  92  f. ;  judgment,  85  f., 
212;  limitation  of  knowledge,  105, 
203-205;  substance,  270  f . ;  cate- 
gories, 103,  112,  236-239,  240,  242; 
summary  of  doctrines,  93  f . ; 
an  intellectualist,  208,  370;  a  self- 
determinist,  370. 

Kepler:   61. 

Knowledge:  not  complete,  2,  116; 
143,  147  f.,  230-232;  validity  of. 
see  Validity;  immediate  object 
67  f.,  197-203,  216  ff.,  218-222 
see  Object;  Sophists'  doctrine 
19  f . ;  Democritus,  20,  30;  Soc 
rates,  22  ff. ;  Plato,  28,  30  f. 
Aristotle,  31,  34-36;  Stoics  and 
Epicureans,  40 ;  Neo-Platonic, 
43  f . ;  Augustine,  50 ;  Albertus 
Magnus  and  Aquinas,  57  f . ;  Duns 
Scotus  and  William  of  Ockham, 
60;  Campanella,  61;  Descartes, 
Spinoza,  and  Leibniz,  73  f . ;  Locke 
and  Hume,  77  f.;  Fichte,  96  f . ; 
Schelling,  100,  104  f. ;  Reid,  inf.; 
Hamilton,  112  f . ;  Mill  and 
Spencer,  116  f.;  see  Empiricism, 
Hegel,  Hume,  Kant,  Leibniz, 
Validity. 

Leibniz:  method,  71;  on  substance, 

72,  270;  monads,  72-74,  75,  270; 
mind  and  matter,  73  ;  knowledge, 
73  f.,  19  .  J  mechanism  and  tele- 
ology, 74;  pre-established  har- 
mony, 75. 


INDEX 


417 


Locke:  innate  ideas,  77  f . ;  cogni- 
tion, 78,  193;  reality,  79;  pri- 
mary and  secondary  qualities,  79, 
273;  substance,  270;  a  self- 
determinist,  370. 

Logic:   34  fif.,  127. 

Lotze:   208. 

Maimoriides:   57. 

Many  and  One:  and  reality,  17  f., 
25,  60,  290;  and  relation,  248, 
252;  and  individuality,  262,  274  f., 
276,  290,  305,  350,  351  f. ;  and 
perception,  298,  303,  305. 

Materialism:  40,  46. 

Matter:  16  f.,  44,  45,  49,  72,  269  f., 
299;    scientific  conception,  158. 

Measure:   see  Quantity. 

Mechanism:  18,225-228,369;  and 
teleology,  18  f.,  45;  with  Aris- 
totle, 34;  Epicurus,  40;  Kant, 
91  f.,  204  f. ;  Substantialists,  74; 
cosmic,  def .,  369 ;  see  Teleology. 

Mediaeval  Philosophy:  see  Re- 
ligious Consciousness ;  Philos- 
ophy: Patristic,  Scholastic,  Tran- 
sition. 

Metaphysics:   def.,  21. 

Milesian:  school,  15,  16,  17. 

Mill,  J.  S.:  on  mind,  IIS  f,;  knowl- 
edge, 116;  objective  reality,  117 ; 
consciousness,  137;  cause,  324, 
330. 

Mind:  and  matter,  19,  40,  49;  Des- 
cartes, 71  f.,  73;  Spinoza,  73; 
Locke,  79 ;  Hume,  80 ;  Fichte,  99 ; 
Schelling,  99,  102;  Hegel,  loi  f. ; 
and  object,  229-233;  and  experi- 
ence, 188  f.,  231  ff. 

Modern  Philosophy:  see  Empiri- 
cism, Idealistic  Rationalism,  Phi- 
losophy, Realistic  Rationalism, 
Substantialists. 

Monad:  Bruno's,  61 ;  Leibniz',  72  f., 
75,  270. 

Monism:  def.,  17,  45,  46,  119. 

Monotheism:  38,  397. 

Motion:  314-317. 

Motive:  371  ff. 

Mysticism:   def.,  44,  60,  62,  209. 

Mystics:   60,  209. 

2E 


Necessity:    and  Freedom,   93,   95; 

see  Human  Freedom. 
Neo-Platonists :    general   view,   43 ; 

anti-Christian,    44;     Jewish,    44; 

doctrines,  44-46,  208  f.,  268. 
New  Realism:   no. 
Nicholas  of  Cusa:  60,  209. 
Nominalism:  52  ff. 
Noumena:   89-91,  92  f.;  seeK&at, 
Nous:   19,  36,  44. 
Number :  see  Quantity. 

Object:  primary,  19  f.,  58,  60,  61, 
67  f.,  74,  78,  no.  III  f.,  116,  150- 
156,  197-203  ;  see  Knowledge,  im- 
mediate object;  in  Kantian  sys- 
tem, 84-87,  89,  90  f.,  92,  203  f. ; 
Hegel's,  104,  105  f . ;  subject  and, 
105  f.,  188  f.,  229-233  ;  and  individ- 
uality, 259  f.,  261  f. ;  see  Subject. 

Objectivity:   5  f.,  86  f.,  97. 

Ockham,  William  of:  60,  no,  208, 
369- 

One,  the,  and  the  Many :  see  Many 
and  One. 

Ontology:  def.,  21,  234-362. 

Organic  relation :   225-228. 

Origen:  49. 

Pantheism:  51,  54. 

Parallelism :   74  f . 

Parmenides:   17,  19. 

Particular:  Plato's  doctrine,  27  f. ; 
Aristotle's,  32-34;  in  Mediaeval 
Philosophy,  51-55,  57,  63  ;  Hegel's 
doctrine,  102  f . ;  and  individual, 
353 ;  see  Universal. 

Patristic  Philosophy  v  see  Philosophy, 
schools. 

Pearson,  Professor  Karl:   152-155. 

Perception:  Sophists  on,  19-21; 
Plato,  27-29;  D'emocritus,  30  f.; 
Stoics  and  Epicureans,  40  f. ; 
Locke,  78;  Berkeley,  83;  Kant, 
84-86,  93 ;  Hegel,  108 ;  and  ap- 
pearance, 173-178;  and  qualities, 
188,  274;  and  relation,  244;  see 
Cognition,  Concept,  Knowledge. 

Permanence:  and  change,  16;  his- 
torical, 254  f. ;  actual,  255  f. ; 
and  reality,  256-258;  see  Change. 


4i8 


INDEX 


Person:  Absolute  is  Person,  loi  f. ; 
Perfect  Individual,  350,  354;  Per- 
fect, 361  f.,  402,  405  ;  see  Absolute, 
Individual,  Personality. 

Personality:  106  f.,  232,  350  £f. ;  a 
development,  232,  376;  and  char- 
acter, 375  f. ;  is  self-organizing, 
377  f. ;  essential  qualities,  376, 
377;  5ee  Individuality. 

Phenomena :  see  Appearance, 
Noumena. 

Phenomenalism:  def.,  141,  150- 
170,  215  f.,  246,  270  f. 

Pherecydes:   13. 

Philo:   44. 

Philosophy:  def.,  4;  material,  8-10; 
problem,  6-8,  21,  44,  51  f.,  118  flf., 
191  f . ;  province,  122-127;  and 
theology,  see  Jewish,  Patristic, 
Scholastic,  Transition;  and  psy- 
chology, 3,  no  f.,  1 13-115,  128- 
131;  and  science,  124-126;  of  the 
unconditioned,  113;  present-day, 
1 18-12 1 ;  principal  divisions,  12  f., 
14,  47  f.,  69;  poetic  period,  13; 
Schools,  14  f. ;  Oriental,  12  f. ; 
Greek,  13,  14-46;  Jewish,  44, 
57;  Patristic,  47-51;  Scholastic, 
47,51-60;  Arabian,  56  f. ;  Tran- 
sition, 61  f . ;   Modern,  68-127. 

Plato:  relation  to  other  phil- 
osophers, 25,  54  f. ;  estimate  of, 
26,  29;  doctrine  of  ideas,  14  f., 
82  f.,  266;  of  reality,  27  f . ;  dual- 
ism, 28  f.,  30  f. ;  a  pluralist?  29; 
teleology,  29,  33,  38 ;  universal 
and  particular,  27  f.,  32  f.,  52; 
an  idealist,  83 ;  on  freedom,  365. 

Plotinus:  44  f.,  236. 

Pluralism:   def.,  17,  40,  46. 

Pol3rtheists :  45. 

Positivists :   398  f . 

Pragmatism:    120,  208,  209. 

Pre-established  Harmony :   75. 

Protagoras:   21,  23,  140. 

Psychology:  and  Philosophy,  3  f., 
77,  III,  113  f.,  128-130,  190-192; 
Associational,  114,  383;  faculty, 
204,  209;  and  Afifectionism,  208  f. 

Purpose :  and  the  cognitive  process, 
211  f. 


Pyrrho:   140,  143  f. 
Pythagoreans:   17. 

Quality:  278-282;  primary  and 
secondary,  61,  79,  157  f.,  273  f . ; 
reality  of,  179 ;  and  object,  278  f. ; 
and  subject,  188,  279  f. ;  and  rela- 
tions, 281 ;  and  reality,  186,  279, 
281  f. ;  see  Substance. 

Quantity:  283-290;  number,  283  t. ; 
characteristics  of  number,  284  f . ; 
of  measure,  285  f. ;  real  and  idea- 
tional number,  286  f. ;  and  reality, 
288-290. 

Rationalism:  def.,  31,  67,  68  f.,  70; 
idealistic,  see  Idealism,  Kant, 
Fichte,  Schelling;  realistic,  see 
Realism,  Reid,  Hamilton. 

Rationality:  tri-phasal,  loi  f.,  207- 
214;  and  experience,  189,  232  f. 

Realism:  def.,  109;  in  Scholastic 
Philosophy,  52-54;  in  the  Tran- 
sition Period,  63  f.;  moderate 
Realism,  57,  63  f . ;  in  Modern 
Philosophy,  65,  109-113,  118,  120; 
and  idealism,  120. 

Reality:  17  f.,  21,  25,  179-189; 
def.,  81  f.,  186-188;  Plato's  doc- 
trine, 27  f . ;  Aristotle's,  32,  33  f., 
37,38;  in  Graeco-Roman  Schools, 
39  f. ;  in  Patristic  Philosophy,  49, 
50;  Kant  on,  89-91;  Fichte  on, 
96  f . ;  Schelling,  98-100;  Hegel, 
100-102,  104;  appearance  and, 
217  f.,  157-178;  this  concept 
essential,  166-169;  cognition  and, 
215-233,  see  Cognition,  Knowl- 
edge; kinds,  179;  degrees,  180  f.; 
the  universal  in  experience,  181- 
186,  216  ff. ;  nature  of,  186-188; 
as  object,  188,  232  f . ;  as  subject, 
189;  immaterial,  19,  26,  49;  and 
concepts,  218,  222;  categories 
and,  238-241 ;  relation  and,  245  f. ; 
change,  permanence  and,  256  f . ; 
substantiality  and,  275-277;  qual- 
ity and,  281  f. ;  quantity  and, 
288  flf.;  space  and,  297-300; 
trans-spatial,  298  f . ;  time  and, 
306,  310;    trans-temporal,  308  f., 


INDEX 


419 


310,  334;  finality  and,  346  ff. ; 
see  Appearance. 

Reason :  1 8  f . ;  see  Anaxagoras ;  and 
knowledge,  29;  authority  of, 
doubted,  43 ;  and  faith,  48  f.,  50, 
55,  56,  57  i;  5Q,  60,  62;  Kant's 
doctrine,  87-91. 

Reid:   110-112. 

Relation:  relations  in  general,  243- 
253;  subject-object,  171  f.,  188  f., 
200-202,  232  f . ;  mechanical  and 
organic,  225-228;  characteristics, 
243  f. ;  mediates  thought,  244  f . ; 
and  reality,  245  f . ;  internality  of, 
247-249;  modifies  objects,  249  f., 
ground,  252;   conclusions,  252  f. 

Relativity  of  Knowledge:  Hamil- 
ton's doctrine,  112  f . ;  Spencer's, 
116  f. 

Religion:  see  Oriental  Philosophy, 
Greek,  Neo-Platonic,  Patristic, 
Scholastic. 

Religious  Consciousness:  12  f.,  14; 
in  Mediaeval  Philosophy,  47-49, 
51,  56-58,  59,  63;  characteristics, 
394-399;   evaluated,  399-405. 

Representationism :  Reid's  criti- 
cism, 112,  118. 

Rest:  313  f- 

Revelation:  43  f.,  48,  49,  56. 

Roscellin:   54. 

Scepticism:  140-149;  20,  40  f. ; 
Hume,  78,  80,  144,  148;  grounds 
of  doubt,  141-144;  examined, 
144-149. 

Schelling:  problem,  98  f. ;  matter 
and  mind,  99 ;  Absolute,  99  f .,  102  ; 
knowledge  and  reality,  100;  ideal- 
ism, 100. 

Scholastic  Philosophy:  51  ff. ;  see 
Philosophy. 

Schools :  see  Philosophy. 

Science:  historical,  47,  51,  57,  59, 
61,  122;  province,  123-126; 
classification,  126  f. ;  conception 
of  reality,  187. 

Scottish  Philosophy :   110-115. 

Self:  and  the  world,  1-6;  solitary 
and  social,  see  Sociality;  super- 
conscious,    see    Kant's    doctrine ; 


empirical,  see  Kant's  doctrine; 
not  phenomenal,  169  f. ;  unitary, 
170,  204,  207-214;  Kant's  doc- 
trine, 86  f.,  90  f.,  92,  97,  203  f. ; 
Fichte's,  95-98;  Hegel's,  106  f . ; 
and  reality,  169  f.,  180;  and 
experience,  227  f. 

Self-consciousness:  90,  93,  96  f., 
106  f. ;  and  experience,  227  f. 

Self-determinism:  352  f.,  368  £., 
369  f.,  387-391 ;  highest  form  of 
activity,  345  f. 

Sensation:  65  ff.,  190  f. ;  and  knowl- 
edge: Sophists'  view,  19  f. ; 
Stoic  and  Epicurean,  40;  Em- 
pirical, 78,  114,  IIS  f-;  Kantian, 
84  f.,  203. 

Sensationalism:  def.,  19,  31,  46,  118. 

Sensibility:   85,  87. 

Separation,  Period  of:  59;  see 
Scholastic  Philosophy. 

Sociality:  355-362;  the  social  self, 
355  f. ;  is  real,  356-358;  and 
development  of  the  individual, 
359  f.;  ultimate  ground  of  society, 
361. 

Socrates:  purpose,  22;  contrasted 
with  Sophists,  22  f. ;  method, 
23  f. ;  and  the  concept,  24  f., 
26  f. ;   teleology,  37  f. 

Socratic  Philosophy:  and  knowing, 
46,  42;  philosophers,  46;  on 
cognition,  65-67 ;  see  Aristotle, 
Plato,  Socrates. 

Solipsism:  150-156;      doctrine, 

150  f . ;  Pearson's  view,  152  f . ; 
arguments  examined,  153  ff . ; 
conclusions,  155  f.,  215. 

Sophists:  15,  16,  19  f.,  22  f.,  140, 
181. 

Soul:  36,  44,  91,  93. 

Space:  291-300;  Kant's  view,  85, 
236  f. ;  perceptual,  291-293  ;  con- 
ceptual, 294-296 ;  conceptual  and 
perceptual  compared,  299  f. ; 
is  space  infinite?  296  f . ;  and 
reality,  297  f. ;  non-spatial,  or 
trans-spatial,  reality,  298  f. 

Spencer:  115;  on  mind,  115  f. ; 
knowledge,  116  f. ;  objective 
reality,  117. 


420 


INDEX 


Spinoza:  71,  74  f. ;  method,  71; 
mind  and  matter,  72,  73,  74  f., 
269;  knowledge,  74;  necessity 
and  freedom,  95 ;  parellelism, 
74  f . ;  substance,  77;  an  idealist, 
83. 

Stoics:  39,  40-42,  46,  58,  236,  365, 
369,  370. 

Subject:  4,  12,  15,  19,  42,  65;  sub- 
jective, 5  f.,  15,42  ;  and  object,  84, 
86  f.,  los  f.,  171  f.,  188  f.,  198-202, 
203  f.,  229  f. ;  and  experience, 
134-136,  137  f.,  184-186;  see 
Object,  Self. 

Subjectivism:  118,  150-156,  197  f., 
198,  203  f.,  215;  criticised,  154- 
156,  94. 

Substance:  16-18,  70,  71-73,  79; 
historical  review,  265-271;  and 
substrate,  79,  271-273;  and  qual- 
ity, 273-275. 

Substantialists :   70-75,  208,  365. 

Substantiality:  263-277;  origin, 
263-265;  and  reality,  275-277; 
see  Substance. 

Syllogism :  Aristotle's  doctrine,  34  flf . 

Teleology:  def.,  37;  in  Pre-Socratic 
Philosophy,  18  f.;  of  Plato,  29  f . ; 
Anaxagoras,  33 ;  Aristotle,  33 ; 
Socratic  Period,  37  f. ;  Stoics, 
41;  Leibniz,  74;  Kant,  91  f. ; 
Fichte,  98;  Hegel,  108;  see 
Finality. 

Thales:   16. 

Theology :  see  Religious  Conscious- 
ness in  Mediaeval  Philosophy. 

Thought:  loi  f.,  165  f.,  209-214; 
and  concepts,  218-222;  and  cate- 
gories, 238,  240  f.,  242  ;  and  rela- 
tion, 244  f . ;  see  Judgment. 

Time:  301-310;  Kant's  view,  85, 
86,  236-238;  perceptual,  301-303; 
"  specious  present,"  302  f. ;  con- 
ceptual, 303-305 ;  is  time  in- 
finitely divisible?  305  f . ;  and 
reality,  306;  non-temporal  or 
trans-temporal  reality,  307-308 ; 
conclusions,  309  f. 

Transition  Period :  61  f.;  see  Phi- 
losophy. 


Trans-spatial :  see  Space. 

Trans-temporal :  see  Time. 

Truth:  orders  of,  Aquinas,  58; 
Duns  Scotus  and  William  of 
Ockham,  60;  self-evident,  35  f . ; 
probable,  40  f.,  78;  and  incom- 
plete knowledge,  147  f . ;  see 
Criteria,  Validity. 

Ultimate  Reality :  Pre-Socratic, 
16  f.;  Plato,  25;  Stoics  and  Epi- 
cureans, 40;  Substantialists,  70- 
72  ;  the  world-ground,  334  f.,  337, 
354,  362,  405. 

Unit:  of  thought,  35,  37,  107  f., 
112,  247  f . ;  def.,  315,  316;  see 
Mjkny  and  One. 

Uimy  :  see  Many  and  One. 

Universal:  and  particular,  32  f., 
51  f.,  54  f.,  57,  63  f. ;  Ego,  97  f.; 
the  true  universal,  102-104,  353  f- 1 
experience  and,  181-186,  216-218; 
see  Concept,  Hegel,  Particular. 

Universe:  intelligible,  146,  230, 
245  f. 

Validity  of  Knowledge:  historical, 
19  f.,  25,  34-36,  40  f.,  71,  73  f.,  78, 

87,  104,  113;  an  inevitable 
assumption,  147  f.,  149,  155  f., 
169  f.,  178,  206,  229,  233. 

Value:    judgments  of,   134,   212  f., 

368,  371,  379,  391,  392. 
Victorines:   209. 
Volition:    59,  119,  133  f.,  208,  209- 

214;  5ee  Human  Freedom. 
Voluntarism:  def.,  46,  208,  369. 

Will :  see  Human  Freedom,  Volition. 

World:  and  ourselves,  1-4,  6-10; 
-substance,  16-18;  two  worlds, 
201  f. ;   of  Plato,  28  ff. ;    of  Kant, 

88,  92  f. ;  Schelling's  conception, 
99;  intelligible,  145  f.,  229  ff., 
245  f . ;  a  systematic  whole,  344 ; 
see  Universe. 

Xenophanes:   17. 

Zeno:  314-316. 


nPHE    following   pages    contain    advertisements    of    a 
few  of  the   Macmillan    books    on    kindred    subjects 


The  World  We  Live  In 

By  GEORGE  STUART  FULLERTON 

Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Columbia  University 
Cloth,  8vo,  $r.J0  net 

The  author  believes  that  it  is  to  the  world  of  our  common  experi- 
ence that  men  really  wish  to  adjust  themselves,  and  that  they  have 
the  right  to  demand  that  the  philosopher  present  himself  rather  as  a 
sober  guide  than  as  one  waving  the  wand  of  the  magician. 

From  this  point  of  view,  current  forms  of  ideahsm  in  England 
and  America  are  passed  in  review,  and  the  pragmatist  is  made  to 
speak  for  his  doctrine  of  man  as  the  creator  or  transformer  of  the 
world  upon  which  he  gazes. 

There  emerges  a  realistic  philosophy  of  experience  which  the 
author  thinks  does  not  lose  its  foothold  upon  common  knowledge 
and  scientific  truth.  The  final  chapter  on  "The  World  of  Knowl- 
edge and  the  World  of  Belief"  discusses  the  right  to  believe  beyond 
the  limits  of  indubitable  scientific  evidence,  treats  beliefs  as  social 
phenomena,  and  defines  the  attitude  of  the  thoughtful  man  toward 
those  symptoms  of  belief  and  practice  which  present  themselves  in 
the  historic  religions. 

The  matter  presented  is  set  forth  in  such  a  form  that  it  should  be 
intelligible  and  interesting  even  to  those  not  in  the  habit  of  reading 
the  philosophers,  and  whose  interest  in  philosophy  is  a  personal  and 
practical  one. 

A  First  Book  in  Metaphysics 

By  WALTER   T.    MARVIN 

Collegiate  Church  Professor  of  Logic  and  Mental  Philosophy 
in  Rutgers  College 

Clothy  $1.^0  net 

This  book  is  planned  to  be  a  student's  first  book  in  philosophy, 
though  the  course  which  it  outlines  may  either  precede  or  follow  a 
course  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  It  is  simple,  concise,  and  defi- 
nite, and  as  brief  as  possible,  so  that  the  student  may  devote  by  far 
the  larger  part  of  his  study  to  the  books  and  articles  referred  to  at  the 
end  of  each  section  or  chapter  or  to  readings  selected  by  his  instructor. 

The  book  does  not  keep  to  the  order  of  the  historical  develop- 
ment of  philosophy,  which  is  confusing,  but  to  the  logical  order  of 
the  problems,  beginning  with  problems  that  are  fundamental,  and 
working  toward  the  special  philosophical  problems  of  the  several 
major  branches  of  science.  Again,  the  book  is  not  a  mere  summary 
of  rival  philosophical  theories,  but  as  an  outline  of  a  metaphysical 
system  representing  an  important  modern  philosophical  tendency, 
namely,  neo-realism  of  the  type  which  in  many  respects  is  a  return 
to  Plato  and  Aristotle. 

THE   MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publialiers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue  New  York 


A  Brief  History  of  Modern  Philosophy 

By  Dr.   HARALD  HOFFDING 

Professor  in  the  University  of  Copenhagen 

Translated  with  the  author's  permission  by  C.  F.  SANDERS 
Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Pennsylvania  College 

Clothy  I2m0y  $i.jo  net 

In  a  concise  and  interesting  manner  the  author  discusses 
the  following  subjects,*  which  constitute  the  parts  or  books 
into  which  the  volume  is  divided :  The  Philosophy  of  the 
Renaissance,  The  Great  Systems,  English  Empirical  Phi- 
losophy, Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment  in  France  and 
Germany,  Emanuel  Kant  and  Critical  Philosophy,  The  Phi- 
losophy of  Romanticism,  Positivism,  New  Theories  of  the 
Problem  of  Being  upon  a  Realistic  Basis,  New  Theories  of 
the  Problems  of  Knowledge  and  of  Theories. 

The  New  Realism 

BY   PROFESSORS 
E.  B.  Holt  (Harvard)  R.  B.  Perry  (Harvard) 

W.  T.  Marvin  (Rutgers)  W.  B.  Pitkin  (Columbia) 

W.  P.  Montague  (Columbia)  E.  G.  Spaulding  (Princeton) 

Clothy  8v0y  $2.^0  net 

This  volume  is  unique  in  the  history  of  philosophy  in  that 
it  is  strictly  a  cooperative  work,  for  the  writers  have  been 
conferring  in  regard  to  the  subject  matter  of  the  book  for 
two  years.  It  brings  philosophy  into  harmony  with  the  natu- 
ral sciences  of  to-day  by  the  use  of  exact  language,  by  care- 
ful division  of  questions  and  by  analysis.  The  authors  believe 
that  philosophy  must  now  build  on  the  sober  facts  of  mathe- 
matics, physics,  physiology,  psychology,  and  biology,  and 
must  follow  these  sciences  rather  than  to  pretend  to  lead 
them.  Hence,  the  book  meets  the  needs  of  the  student  or 
general  reader  who  wishes  to  know  what  New  Realism  is  and 
how  it  makes  good  its  claims  against  Idealism  and  Pragmatism. 


THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

Publishers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue  New  York 


The  Persistent   Problems  of  Philosophy 

BY   MARY  WHITON   CALKINS 
Professor  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology    in  Wellesley    College 

AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY  THROUGH 
A  STUDY   OF  MODERN   SYSTEMS 

Cloth,  octavo,  575  pcLges,  $2.50  net.     First  Edition,  IQ07;  Second^ 
Revised  Edition,  igo8;   Third,  Revised  Edition,  IQ12 

"To  expound  the  metaphysics  of  modern  Europe  is  no  light  task, 
but  Professor  Calkins  has  accomplished  it  for  the  most  part  in  a 
clear  and  scholarly  rnanner.  Beginners  may  read  her  'Introduc- 
tion' with  understanding;  and  even  those  who  are  weary  with  the 
confusion  of  metaphysical  tongues  will  be  interested  in  the  freshness 
of  her  comment  and  criticism.  The  chapters  on  Descartes  and 
Leibnitz  are  good  examples  of  the  way  in  which  the  history  of 
philosophy  should  be  written  and  the  criticism  of  philosophy  per- 
formed. .  .  .  The  exposition  of  Fichte  is  undertaken  in  such  sym- 
pathy with  that  philosopher,  that  it  is  almost  dramatic.  No  author 
writing  in  English  has  surpassed  Professor  Calkins  in  giving  a  clear 
and  simple  interpretation  of  Hegel,  free  from  the  uncouth  language 
which  disfigures  most  Hegelian  commentaries. 

:|s  4s  *  «  *  *  « 

"Professor  Calkins  not  only  criticises,  but  constructs,  and  sets 
forth  her  own  doctrine  with  such  ability  that  she  should  have  a  dis- 
tinguished place  among  contemporary  Hegelians|" — From  The 
Nation,  New  York. 

"The  historical  and  critical  portions  of  the  volume  are  written 
with  a  facile  pen.  Few  recent  treatises  on  philosophy  have  com- 
bined so  constant  reference  to  the  sources  with  so  readable  an  ex- 
pository style.  The  writer  exhibits  a  comprehensive  acquaintance 
with  the  history  of  modern  thinking,  at  the  same  time  that  she 
exercises  independent  historical  judgment.  .  .  .  Unstinted  com- 
mendation must  be  given  to  the  spirit  of  Miss  Calkins's  work. 
Never  has  there  been  a  fairer  attempt  to  solve  the  difficult  problem 
of  evolving  doctrine  from  historical  analysis." — Professor  A.  C. 
Armstrong,  in  The  Journal  of  Philosophy. 

"  It  is  exceptional  in  lucidity,  candor,  and  the  freshness  with  which 
it  surveys  well-worn  doctrines.  More  than  any  Introduction  to 
Philosophy  with  which  I  am  acquainted,  it  will  induce  its  reader  to 
turn  to  the  original  sources,  and  to  find  pleasure  in  seeing  Philosophy 
as  it  rises  in  the  minds  of  the  great  thinkers.  While  the  book  is 
unusually  attractive  in  style,  and  well  fitted  for  popular  use,  it  is  the 
work  of  an  original  and  critical  scholar.  The  temper  with  which 
the  history  of  philosophy  should  be  studied  finds  here  admirable 
expression." — Professor  George  H.  Palmer,  Department  of  Phi- 
losophy, Harvard  University. 


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^ 


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